Opinion
7:21-cv-03423-JD-JDA
01-18-2023
Jamar L. Lenton, Sr., Plaintiff, v. James Bogan, Travis Copeland, Aaron Wrennall, Jonathan Payne, Matthew Turner, Unknown Deputies with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, C. Baldwin, Defendants.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants. [Doc. 38.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff has filed this action pro se, asserting claims arising out of his encounter with law enforcement in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on the night of October 31, 2019, and into the early morning hours of November 1, 2019. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on November 9, 2021. [Doc. 12.] Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on August 22, 2022. [Doc. 38.] On August 23, 2022, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 39.] Plaintiff filed a response on October 17, 2022, and Defendants filed a reply on October 24, 2022. [Docs. 46; 47.] The motion is now ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as is appropriate on consideration of Defendants' summary judgment motion, the undersigned gleans the following facts.
On October 31, 2019, Defendant Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office (“SCSO”) Deputy Aaron Wrennall responded to an address in Spartanburg County. [Doc. 38-3 at 2.] There, Deputy Wrennall was advised by Plaintiff's daughter that her child-Plaintiff's grandchild-was at another residence with Plaintiff. [Id.] Plaintiff's daughter indicated she had been at a Halloween party but had received a call from Plaintiff telling her to come home and get her child, who would not stop crying. [Id.] Plaintiff's daughter asked Deputy Wrennall to accompany her to Plaintiff's house because “[Plaintiff] had been drinking during the night and she kn[ew] how [Plaintiff could get] when he drinks and wanted [Deputy Wrennall] to come with her to retrieve her child.” [Id.]
Plaintiff's daughter's name has been redacted from the incident report provided to the Court. [See Doc. 38-3.]
Deputy Wrennall then went with Plaintiff's daughter to Plaintiff's home. [Id. at 4.] According to Deputy Wrennall's report, he knocked on Plaintiff's door, announced who he was, and asked him to open the door. [Id.] When Plaintiff opened the door, he began yelling at his daughter and telling her to leave. [Id.] Deputy Wrennall noted that he smelled alcohol on Plaintiff. [Id.] Deputy Wrennall told Plaintiff that his daughter had a right to take her child with her. [Id.] Plaintiff told his daughter she could not take the child because the child was safer at home. [Id.] Deputy Wrennall tried to separate Plaintiff and his daughter to keep them from yelling at each other. [Id.]
A body worn camera (“BWC”) recording, which appears to be that of Deputy Wrennall, shows Plaintiff standing at the side door of his house, speaking with and gesturing toward the deputy and two women behind the deputy. [BWC 0:00-0:30 .] There is only video, no sound, for the first 29 seconds of the recording. [Id.] The sound begins at 0:29, when Plaintiff can be heard yelling “[inaudible] can do and not do at my house when you come pounding on my f***ing door. F*** being drunk. F*** being drunk.” [BWC 0:29-0:42.] Next on the recording, a woman, who Plaintiff later identified as his wife, looked out of the door and said, “Chill the f*** out.” [BWC 0:44-0:46, 1:03-1:05.] Plaintiff's daughter began yelling back at the woman, threatening that she would get “beat later on tonight” as Deputy Wrennall attempted to move the women behind him away from the house and closer to the street. [BWC 0:47-1:00.] Deputy Wrennall forcefully told the women to go down to the car. [BWC 0:58-1:00.]
Defendants indicate the BWC recording is from the BWC of Defendant SCSO Deputy James Bogan; however, Deputy Bogan's incident report indicates he did not arrive at the scene until Plaintiff came to the front porch of his home [Doc. 38-3 at 3], and the BWC starts with Plaintiff speaking to a deputy from the side door of his house. According to the incident report, Deputy Wrennall was the only deputy there during that time. Additionally, Deputy Bogan's report does not indicate his BWC was on during his involvement in this incident though it notes “[o]ther officers had their BWC on during the event.” [Id.] Thus, it appears the BWC footage submitted to the Court is from Deputy Wrennall.
Docket Entry Number 38-2 contains one DVD, which contains a single video file, labeled Exhibit 1. The Court cites the recording in the format [BWC x:xx-x:xx].
As Deputy Wrennall turned back to Plaintiff, Plaintiff told him that he wanted the women arrested for threatening his wife. [BWC 1:00-1:07.] Deputy Wrennall responded, “She has no intent.” [BWC 1:07-1:08.] Plaintiff and Deputy Wrennall then argued about whether Plaintiff's daughter could be arrested for her statement. [BWC 1:07-1:25.] After Deputy Wrennall stated Plaintiff's daughter had “freedom of speech,” Plaintiff yelled, “Get the f*** off my property,” repeatedly. [BWC 1:23-1:31.] Deputy Wrennall told him to calm down. [BWC 1:30.] Plaintiff yelled, “F*** you and that s***,” and slammed the door. [BWC 1:31-1:33.]
Deputy Wrennall can be heard on his radio asking other units to come quickly. [BWC 1:36-1:39.] He then turned back to Plaintiff's daughter and the other female, and Plaintiff's daughter told him, “seriously, he's about to get really crazy and I want my child out of this house.” [BWC 1:39-1:43.] Deputy Wrennall asked if Plaintiff had weapons, and the women indicated he did, but they were unsure if he had bullets. [BWC 1:44-1:48.]
Around that time, Plaintiff opened the front door of his house and began yelling at them to “get the f*** off [his] property right now.” [BWC 1:54-2:15.] Deputy Wrennall again instructed the women to go to the car at the street as Plaintiff continued yelling. [BWC 2:01-2:15.] Plaintiff told Deputy Wrennall to get off of his property repeatedly. [BWC 2:10-2:21.] Plaintiff's daughter yelled back multiple times that she wanted her son, and Deputy Wrennall told her to go to the car and be quiet because “she was not helping anything.” [BWC 2:21-2:32.] Plaintiff continued to yell at the deputy to get off of his property. [BWC 2:34-2:55.] Deputy Wrennall told Plaintiff his daughter “ha[d] every right to be here.” [BWC 2:54-2:56.] Plaintiff then yelled, “and I've got every right to defend my property, too. Don't f*** up. Get off my property now. I'm telling you. Get off my property.” [BWC 2:56-3:04.]
Plaintiff continued to yell to Deputy Wrennall and the women to get off his property, and Deputy Wrennall responded that Plaintiff's daughter had to get her child. [BWC 3:05-4:18.] Plaintiff went inside his home and closed the door. [BWC 4:20-4:22.]
Another deputy arrived, and Deputy Wrennall explained the situation to him as they walked toward Plaintiff's home-”He's got her child. He's not letting me get in. He's threatening me.... He's kicked her out. She lives here.” [BWC 4:35-4:46.] Deputy Wrennall also told the other deputy that Plaintiff had been drinking, but he did not know of any weapons. [BWC 4:48-4:52.] At that time, Plaintiff reemerged from the front door holding a young child, wearing only a diaper, by his underarms. [BWC 4:52-4:53.] Plaintiff's arms were outstretched as he held the baby out in front of him and yelled, “Here's the f***ing baby, just woke up, naked as f***. Take him. Take him.” [BWC 4:53-4:58.] The other deputy repeatedly told Plaintiff to put the baby down, to which Plaintiff responded, “No, he want him. Take him.” [BWC 4:56-4:59.] Plaintiff's daughter can then be heard screaming, “Are you serious?” [BWC 5:01-5:02.] She rushed forward and grabbed the baby. [BWC 5:03-5:07.] After she did that, multiple deputies ran up onto the porch, where they appeared to push Plaintiff toward his front door and grab him, and, as they surrounded him, he can be heard saying, “What the f*** are y'all doing? What the f*** is this?” [BWC 5:07-5:15.] The BWC recording cuts out after the group of deputies pull Plaintiff away from his front door and down into the yard. [BWC 5:15-5:19.]
Deputy Wrennall's report states that the other deputy was Defendant SCSO Deputy Jonathan Payne. [Doc. 38-3 at 5.]
Deputy Wrennall's report largely follows what can be seen in the BWC recording. [Doc. 38-3 at 4-5.] He further noted that “the weather at the time was 45 degrees with the ‘real feel' of 34 degrees.” [Id. at 5.] He indicated that “Deputy Bogan and Payne told [Plaintiff] to put the child down and that he was going to be arrested but that Plaintiff did not comply.” [Id.] Deputy Wrennall described the arrest as follows:
Once [Plaintiff's daughter] grabbed her child, Deputy Bogan and Payne went to place [Plaintiff] under arrest for child neglect. While doing so, [Plaintiff] stepped back to avoid being placed in custody and Deputy Payne, Bogan and [Plaintiff] fell onto the outer storm front door made of glass and damaged it during [Plaintiff] being put in custody.
While Deputy Payne and Bogan tried to put [Plaintiff] in custody I tried also to grab a hold of [Plaintiff] by his left arm, to help other deputies with handcuffing [Plaintiff]. [W]hile doing so other [deputies] and I went backward and [Plaintiff] ended up on his back. Once Deputy Bogan and Payne and other officers and I tried putting [Plaintiff] in custody[, Plaintiff] was given commands to roll over onto his stomach. Once [Plaintiff] was given the command to roll over on his stomach I then stepped away to allow Deputy Payne and Bogan to place handcuffs onto [Plaintiff]. Once [Plaintiff] rolled over cuffs were placed onto [Plaintiff].[Id.]
Deputy Bogan's report indicates he arrived at the scene when Plaintiff was on the front porch holding the child in front of him. [Id. at 3.] According to Deputy Bogan, he told Plaintiff, “‘[P]ut the child down, you[‘re] about to get arrested[.]'” [Id.] Deputy Bogan's report describes the arrest as follows:
[W]hen the child was cleared from [Plaintiff's] hands[,] I approached [Plaintiff] and grabbed his right arm and attempted
to place it behind his back. [Plaintiff] turned to his left and pulled away and started back towards the front door. Other deputies attempted to assist with placing [Plaintiff] under arrest. [Plaintiff] pulled away and continued to try and get back into the house. The storm door glass popped out of the frame and fell into the house. During the shuffle I was bumped into the concrete ledge of the porch and knocked into the front yard. I landed beside a bicycle in the front yard. I got up and observed the suspect on the ground behind a vehicle. [Plaintiff] would not follow commands and put his hands behind his back. I grabbed [Plaintiff's] right wrist and utilized a wrist lock to put [Plaintiff's] arm behind his back and assist with getting him in handcuffs. During this time he was told “put your hands behind your back, stop resisting[.]”[Id.]
Reports by Defendant SCSO Deputy Travis Copeland and Deputy Payne are similar in stating that just after those deputies arrived, Plaintiff walked out to the front porch holding his grandson with his arms outstretched. [Id. at 3-4.] They assisted in the arrest, and their statements describe their actions in detaining Plaintiff. [Id.] For example, Deputy Copeland stated that he “grabbed [Plaintiff] by his right arm and placed him on the ground to gain control to effect an arrest.” [Id. at 3.] According to Deputy Copeland, Plaintiff refused to comply with the deputies' commands, but “[a]fter a few short moments of struggle, officers were able to get [Plaintiff] into handcuffs and place him inside of a police vehicle.” [Id.] Deputy Payne described the following:
I observed [Plaintiff] to be screaming at Deputies to take the child while waving the child around in the air as if he were going to throw the child. I began giving [Plaintiff] verbal commands. I observed a female run up to [Plaintiff] and grab the child. I immediately r[a]n onto the porch and grabbed [Plaintiff's] left arm while Dep. Bogan grabbed [his] right arm. I observed [Plaintiff] begin to resist by turning his body and attempting to go back inside the residence. I heard the front door to the residence beg[i]n to crack from all our weights while attempting to take [Plaintiff] into custody. [Plaintiff] began to
swing his arms around attempting to get away. Dep. Copeland came onto the porch and attempted to assist in taking [Plaintiff] into custody at which time all the involved parties fell off the porch. I fell off the front of the porch and landed on the ground face first. I got up and observed Deputies struggling with [Plaintiff] in the front yard. I ran over and placed my knee on [Plaintiff's] right shoulder attempting to pin him to the ground so other Deputies could gain control of [Plaintiff]. I was then able to gain control of [Plaintiff's] left wrist at which time I applied a handcuff to his wrist. Deputies then were able to turn [Plaintiff] onto his stomach at which time I applied [Plaintiff's] right wrist. I then stood [Plaintiff] up and assisted him to my patrol vehicle.[Id. at 4.]
Deputy T. Baldwin's and Defendant SCSO Deputy Matthew Turner's reports indicate they arrived after deputies were already trying to detain Plaintiff. Deputy Baldwin stated,
As I ran up to the porch [Plaintiff] and Deputies f[e]ll off of the porch and into the front yard. I then placed my right knee on [Plaintiff's] back and grabbed his right wrist. [Plaintiff] then managed to rotate onto his back and I replaced my knee on his stomach, still maintaining control of his right wrist. We then managed to get [Plaintiff] onto his stomach and I pulled his right arm behind his back so he could be placed in handcuffs.[Id. at 2.] Deputy Turner reported that “[o]nce [Plaintiff] was on the ground, [Deputy Turner] sat on his legs so that the other deputies could successfully put [Plaintiff] in handcuffs.” [Id.]
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with unlawful neglect of a child or helpless person. [Doc. 38-3 at 5.] An arrest warrant was issued by a magistrate judge. [Doc. 38-3.] On May 25, 2021, the charge was nolle prossed. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019A4210204603) (last visited Jan. 11, 2022); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action. Count I alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him without an arrest warrant and without probable cause. [Doc. 12 ¶¶ 1-15.] Count II alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to excessive force. [Id. ¶¶ 16-22.] As his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages, including punitive damages, as well as court costs. [Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 15, 22.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
“In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first concerns whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a federal right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second “asks whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.” Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. For purposes of this analysis, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
District court judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers-i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation-the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court “need not formally resolve” the constitutional question of “whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause” to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it “need only determine whether [the defendant]-a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment-acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity”).
DISCUSSION
Dismissal of Defendant C. Baldwin
Initially, Defendants assert that Defendant C. Baldwin is misidentified and incorrectly named in the Amended Complaint and should be dismissed from this action because he was not present at the time of the arrest and has no knowledge of the facts that led to this lawsuit. [Doc. 38-1 at 1, 6.] Defendants have provided an affidavit by Deputy Christopher Baldwin to that effect. [Doc. 38-4.] In response, Plaintiff states, “Deputy Baldwin was not involved in the arrest due to the statement that he wrote that says he had his knee on the plaintiff's [b]ack and grabbed him by his right wrist.” [Doc. 46 at 2.] It appears Plaintiff is referencing the incident report where Deputy T. Baldwin stated, “I then placed my right knee on [Plaintiff's] back and grabbed his right wrist.” [Doc. 38-3 at 2.] However, that evidence regarding T. Baldwin does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant C. Baldwin was involved in the incident. Because the only evidence before the Court demonstrates that Defendant C. Baldwin was not involved in the arrest at issue in this case, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted as to Defendant C. Baldwin and he be dismissed from this action. See Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (“To establish personal liability under § 1983, . . . the plaintiff must affirmatively show[ ] that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiff's claims.
Defendants also assert that this action should be dismissed for insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), (4), and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 38-1 at 6-7.] According to Defendants, they were only made aware of [this action] when the suit papers were found in the night-shift Lieutenant's mailbox at the SCSO during the evening of December 28, 2021. No individual was present at the time to accept service, no individual has been identified by Plaintiff as having accepted service, and no affidavit of service has been filed with the Court or provided to Defense counsel as proof of service. [Doc. 38-1 at 6.] Although Defendants “raised this defense generally in their [A]nswer” filed eight months before their motion for summary judgment was filed, they “have otherwise failed to develop this claim in a timely fashion.” Brown v. Boatwright, No. 4:18-cv-2138-JFA, 2020 WL 1429348, at *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2020) (finding that the defendants' argument that the case should be dismissed for insufficient service of process had been waived where they did not request dismissal on that basis until doing so in a summary judgment motion filed three months after their answer (citing cases)). Accordingly, the undersigned declines to recommend that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of service of process.
False Arrest Claim
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's false arrest claim because Plaintiff's arrest was lawfully supported by probable cause. [Doc. 38-1 at 7-10.] Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiff's actions were “sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe that Plaintiff was engaged in unlawful conduct toward the child in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-70(A)(1) by ‘[placing] the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physical or mental health, or safety[,'] thereby establishing probable cause for his arrest under South Carolina law.” [Id. at 10.] The Court agrees.
Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution or false arrest are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Curtis v. Devlin, No. 1:04-cv-409, 2005 WL 940571, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005) (explaining that § 1983 actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment).
To prove a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested without probable cause. Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. And a “§ 1983 claim for damages due to false imprisonment is akin to a malicious prosecution claim.” McCormick v. Wright, No. 2:10-cv-00033-RBH, 2010 WL 565303, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2010); see also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) (“What is conventionally referred to as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.”). “To [prove] such a claim, a plaintiff must [show] that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
“Whether probable cause [to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed] exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004); see also Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[P]robable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.'”) (alterations in original) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The analysis “turns on two factors in combination: the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). “To prove an absence of probable cause, [a plaintiff] must allege a set of facts which made it unjustifiable for a reasonable officer to conclude that [ ]he was violating the [law].” Brown, 278 F.3d at 368.
The relevant inquiry in the Fourth Circuit regarding the facts known to the officer includes facts reported to the officer. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1974) (“We do not think the fourth amendment should now be interpreted to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside an officer's presence.”); United States v. Rivera, No. 7:15-cv-101, 2018 WL 6625080, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2018) (noting that “[m]ore recently, the Fourth Circuit declined to address the presence issue further, but recognized that several other circuits have held that the Fourth Amendment contains no ‘in the presence' requirement for misdemeanors,” that “district courts in this Circuit have routinely adopted the Street holding,” and that “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to address the issue”).
In South Carolina, the statute outlining the crime of unlawful conduct toward a child states,
It is unlawful for a person who has charge or custody or a child, or who is the parent or guardian of a child, or who is responsible for the welfare of a child . . . to . . . place the child
at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physical or mental health, or safety ....S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-70(A). The evidence presented to this Court, including deputy incident reports and a BWC recording, demonstrates that during a domestic dispute that had become increasingly intense, Plaintiff brought his young grandchild outside late at night when the temperature was 45 degrees, clothed in only a diaper, and held the child out by his underarms while waving the child around. The deputies witnessed that conduct and, thus, had probable cause to believe Plaintiff had “place[d] the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physical or mental health, or safety” in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-70(A).
Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendants had a reasonable belief that he was violating the law. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to Count I.
Assuming arguendo that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for his actions, Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity on Count I, as Defendants argue they would be [Doc. 38-1 at 11-14], because it was not clearly established on the day of the incident that the arrest was unjustified based on the facts known to the officers, Smith, 781 F.3d at 100.
Excessive Force Claim
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim because they used reasonable force in arresting and detaining Plaintiff. [Doc. 38-1 at 10-11.] Specifically, Defendants contend,
[T]he Deputies involved were faced with an individual who posed a serious threat not only to the officers, but to a minor child who was in his care and custody at the time. Deputies
used minimal and proportional force available to them in restraining Plaintiff while he actively resisted arrest, shouted, and cursed, all while intoxicated.
The Deputies did not employ any type of firearm or other weapon in attempting to restrain Plaintiff, but instead used the most reasonable means available in engaging tactical maneuvers that allowed them to gain control of his person and restrain him and ensure the safety of everyone around him.[Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted).] In the alternative, Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. [Id. at 11-14.]
Claims of excessive use of force during an arrest or other seizure are governed by the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “Objective reasonableness” requires “balanci[ng] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the government's interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[R]easonableness is determined based on the information possessed by the officer at the moment that force is employed.” Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, “force justified at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated.” Id. at 481.
The Graham Court set forth several factors to consider when determining whether an officer's use of force is reasonable, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 96. The Supreme Court explained this reasonableness inquiry by noting that there must be an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.
Turning to the first Graham factor, although the crime of unlawful conduct toward a child generally is serious, what the deputies witnessed Plaintiff do with his grandchild was relatively minor compared to other felony crimes-in particular, although the BWC recording showed Plaintiff's grandchild appeared to be stunned, the child was not crying or in any apparent pain when Plaintiff brought him outside and held him out in front of the deputies. Plaintiff's daughter can be seen rushing forward to grab the baby after Plaintiff brought him outside. [BWC 5:03-5:07.] Thus, at the time Defendants arrested Plaintiff, he had already turned over his grandchild. Cf. Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding “[t]hough driving while intoxicated is a serious offense, it does not present a risk of danger to the arresting officer that is presented when an officer confronts a suspect engaged in an offense like robbery or assault” and further noting that where a suspect “exited the vehicle voluntarily, he no longer posed a threat of driving while intoxicated”). Based on the facts surrounding his arrest, the undersigned finds this Graham factor weighs slightly in Plaintiff's favor.
The Court next considers whether Plaintiff was a threat to either the deputies or others. As previously noted, moments before Defendants converged on Plaintiff, he handed his grandchild over to his daughter. As such, he no longer posed a threat to the child. Further, Plaintiff's hands were empty at that time, and as stated by Deputy Wrennall, shortly before Plaintiff's arrest, there were no indications Plaintiff was armed. A factfinder could conclude that although Plaintiff had been vocally belligerent and was potentially intoxicated, he did not pose a threat to Defendants or others at the time Defendants moved in to arrest Plaintiff. See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 530 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A] drunken plaintiff's screaming and use of foul language in a confined area . . . constitutes a mere nuisance and not an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others under Graham.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tuggles v. United States, 1:18CV97, 2020 WL 3036601, at *5 (M.D. N.C. June 6, 2020) (finding the second Graham factor weighed in favor of a plaintiff where “there [was] no evidence that the VA officers felt threatened by Plaintiff, believed him to be armed, or believed him to be a danger to himself or others at the time he was brought to the ground”). Accordingly, this second Graham factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor.
The facts relevant to the final Graham factor-whether Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight-are conflicting. For example, the incident reports indicate that deputies advised Plaintiff he was going to be arrested while he was still holding the child, and most of the deputies' statements indicate Plaintiff was resisting arrest in some form. [See Doc. 38-3 at 3 (stating that Deputy Bogan “advised [Plaintiff] ‘put the child down, you[‘re] about to get arrested,'” after which he “approached [Plaintiff] and grabbed his right arm and attempted to place it behind his back [but Plaintiff] turned to his left and pulled away and started back towards the door”), 3 (stating Plaintiff “the[n] rolled onto his back, refusing to roll over so that officers could detain him with handcuffs after multiple verbal commands to do so”), 4 (stating that Deputy Payne “observed [Plaintiff] begin to resist by turning his body and attempting to go back inside the residence”), 5 (stating that “Deputy Bogan and Payne told [Plaintiff] to put the child down and that he was going to be arrested” and that “[Plaintiff] stepped back to avoid being placed in custody”).] However, the BWC recording did not capture any warnings to Plaintiff that he was going to be arrested, and his statements when the deputies rushed him demonstrated confusion on his part as to what was happening. [BWC 5:07-5:15 (“What the f*** are y'all doing? What the f*** is this?”)] Further, the BWC recording does not clearly show what, if any, actions of resistance or evasiveness Plaintiff took at the time multiple deputies ran up onto the porch to arrest Plaintiff and then the recording cuts out. [Id.]
Case law in this Circuit establishes that merely instinctively moving away from an officer is not resisting or evading arrest. See Smith, 781 F.3d at 102-03 (finding the third Graham factor favored a plaintiff where “[an officer] grabbed [the plaintiff] without warning or explanation, [and her] reaction . . . was to instinctively attempt to pull herself from his grasp”); Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding the Graham factors were unfavorable to an officer where the amount of resistance by the plaintiff was in dispute but the plaintiff “maintain[ed] that he resisted only to the extent of instinctively trying to protect himself from the defendant's onslaught”). Thus, in light of the questions of fact regarding Plaintiff's attempts to evade or resist arrest, and considering that the undersigned must view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff at the summary judgment stage, the undersigned finds the third Graham factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor, as well.
Regarding qualified immunity, Defendants argue as follows:
When presented with a grave public interest of responding to an emergency call and a similarly grave need to investigate allegations of child endangerment, the Defendants minimally interfered with the Plaintiff's constitutional[] rights as necessitated by the circumstances presented to them.
Defendants used the minimum amount of force that they plausibly could have when attempting to restrain an unruly, belligerent, violent, and intoxicated individual who posed a threat to himself, the Defendants, the minor child, and all other parties nearby at the time of this altercation.[Doc. 38-1 at 14.] As set forth above, however, the forecasted evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is that Plaintiff, who was empty-handed and unarmed, was not a threat to the deputies or others and was not trying to get away or resist when Defendants surrounded and, ultimately, took him to the ground. Because Defendants' qualified immunity argument depends upon facts that are in genuine dispute, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. See Doricchi v. Cnty. of Greenville, No. 6:17-cv-01636-TMC-KFM, 2019 WL 4307463, at *6 (D.S.C. May 15, 2019) (“The case law is clear: when the resolution of the qualified immunity question as well as the case itself depends upon a determination of what actually happened, the court must deny summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3162402 (D.S.C. July 15, 2019).
In sum, for the aforementioned reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be denied as to Count II.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion [Doc. 38] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court recommends that the motion be GRANTED as to Defendant C. Baldwin; GRANTED as to the false arrest claim at Count I; and DENIED as to the excessive force claim at Count II. It is further recommended that the “Unknown Deputies with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department” be dismissed from this action without prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.