Opinion
CASE NO. 1:12-cv-00169-MP-GRJ
01-16-2014
JOSEPH FRANK LEE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Doc. 27, Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, which recommends that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 15, be denied and that Petitioner's habeas claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Doc. 1, be evaluated on their merits. The parties were furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation and were afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Respondent filed an untimely Objection, Doc. 28, wherein it merely incorporated by reference the arguments set forth in its original Motion to Dismiss. Despite the untimeliness of Objection, I have made a de novo determination of the Objection.
In 1985, Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of armed robbery in Florida. Prior to sentencing, he absconded from the State. Exh. C, p. 18. In 2008, approximately twenty three years after his original plea, Petitioner was arrested in South Carolina and extradited back to Florida. On October 30, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment on Petitioner's charge of armed robbery and sentenced him to 12 years in prison. Id. at 328. Petitioner subsequently sought relief through an appeal of his sentence and a motion for post-conviction relief, both of which were denied. See Exhs. G, L, & O. Petitioner brought the instant federal habeas petition on July 19, 2012, alleging that his trial counsel in 1985 was constitutionally ineffective. Doc. 1.
Respondent now moves to dismiss, claiming that the instant petition is procedurally barred based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and the doctrine of laches. However, as the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation correctly points out, neither of these doctrines apply to the instant habeas petition.
Turning first to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, this doctrine "permits courts to dismiss a fugitive's appeal in cases in which an individual escapes while at the same time attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of that particular court." Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). According to the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrine applies "where the fugitive status and the court proceedings overlap, but . . . does not generally have a separate, independent application that per se bars motions or appeals later filed by a one-time fugitive." Id. at 1243; see also Xiang Feng Zhou v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 290 F.App'x 278, 280-81 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the doctrine has typically been reserved to situations in which the petitioner is a current fugitive); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that "to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine" in the appellate context, "the appellant must be a fugitive"). Instead, "in the context of habeas corpus, the traditional rules of exhaustion and procedural default . . . ultimately control." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1244.
In this case, Petitioner is a former fugitive. As such, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be applied as a per se bar to his habeas petition. Instead, under Lynn, traditional rules of exhaustion and procedural default must ultimately control the disposition of Petitioner's claims. Id.
Concerning laches, this doctrine is an equitable principle that applies where an unreasonable delay in enforcing one's rights works as an undue prejudice against an opposing party. See Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980). Rule 9(a) of the Habeas Corpus Rules, which became effective in 1977, introduced the concept into the habeas corpus context. However, this Rule was removed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which imposed a one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. AEDPA superceded Rule 9(a) and, thus, replaced the doctrine of laches with a bright-line limitations period.
Respondent argues that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Holland v. Florida, AEDPA did not eliminate the doctrine of laches from consideration in habeas petitions. Instead, even under AEDPA's limitations period, a habeas petitioner's timeliness is still determined under equitable principles. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). However, Holland stands only for the proposition that AEDPA's statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. Id. The Supreme Court did not address whether equitable principles, such as laches, could serve to shorten the statutory limitations period. Consequently, given AEDPA's bright-line rule and its replacement of Rule 9(a), laches does not apply to the instant petition.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this Order.
2. The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petition, Doc. 15, is DENIED.
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Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge