Opinion
I.D. No. 0510005738.
Submitted: June 30, 2006.
Decided: September 26, 2006.
Upon Appeal From a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas. Affirmed.
Sheryl Rush-Milstead, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Defendant-Below, Appellant.
Daniel M. Stevenson, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Appellee.
ORDER
Defendant, Calvin Layne ("Mr. Layne"), appealed to this Court from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas ("Court-below"), in which he was found guilty of violating 11 Del. C. § 1325 (Cruel Neglect of an Animal). Mr. Layne argues that the Court-below erred in denying him the opportunity to proceed with his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Layne argues that he should have been granted relief from Court of Common Pleas Criminal Rule 12(b)(3), which provides that all suppression motions shall be made at pretrial or are considered waived, due to good cause shown. Mr. Layne claims to meet the good cause requirement, because the police report provided to him in discovery lacked a sufficient factual basis upon which to file a Motion to Suppress, thus creating exceptional circumstances. The State asserts that the Court-below correctly denied Mr. Layne the opportunity to proceed with his Motion to Suppress, because the police report would put a reasonable person on notice of a potential search and seizure issue, thereby, defeating Mr. Layne's good cause argument.
The State further asserts a plain view argument that does not need to be addressed.
The Salient facts are as follows: Dover Police Officer Jennifer King ("Officer King") arrived at Mr. Layne's home, on September 10, 2005, in response to an anonymous call regarding a neglected dog. Officer King knocked on the front door, and she walked around to the back of the house when no one answered. The Officer observed the dog in the back yard through a whole in the wooden fence surrounding the residence. Officer King went inside the fence and made observations concerning the dog that lead to the Cruel Neglect of an Animal charge and eventual verdict against Mr. Layne. The narrative section of the Police report in question, which was delivered to Mr. Layne in discovery states:
. . . Upon arrival writer knocked for several minutes on the front door of the residence, negative response. Writer walked around to the side of the house and observed that there was a wooden fence surrounding the back yard of the residence. Writer further observed that there was a plank of wood that had been broken off from the fence. Through the hole in the fence Writer could observe a white and brown colored pit bull. Writer then opened the door to the fence to get a better look at the dog. Writer observed that the dog was on a leash approximately 3-5 feet in length and was tied up to a stake in the ground. Writer observed that the dog did not have any shelter from any weather. Writer also observed that the dog did not have any food or water available to him . . .
Mr. Layne argues that the police report provided an inadequate factual basis to give him notice as to any issues ripe for a Motion to Suppress. Mr. Layne claims that he did not have notice of any suppression issues until Officer King testified before the Court-below.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's appeal from the decision of the Court-below is denied.
Standard of Review
This Court functions in the same manner as the Supreme Court, in its position as an intermediate appellate court, when considering an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas. This Court is limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support factual findings. This Court reviews the case on the record and shall not be tried de novo. The Court may review any error of law de novo. An appeal from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, sitting without a jury, is upon both the law and the facts. In such an appeal, the Superior Court has the authority to review the entire record and to make its own findings of facts in a proper case. However, this Court must defer to the trial court's findings of facts if there exists sufficient evidence on the record to support them.Discussion
The Court of Common Pleas requires that all suppression motions must be made prior to trial. Failure to raise such a motion prior to trial constitutes a waiver thereof, but the Court may grant relief from the waiver for cause shown.It is within discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to suppress. Unless the reviewing court determines that the trial court has abused its discretion, the ruling will not be disturbed. Absent exceptional circumstances, a trial Judge's refusal to hear an untimely motion to suppress on its merits is properly within the trial court's broad discretion of its rules of procedure. Exceptional circumstances include a defendant's ignorance of his legal rights or failure to provide notice to a defendant that suppression was at issue before trial began.
DiSabatino v. State of Delaware, 808 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Del.Super. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
In DiSabatino, this Court affirmed the trial court's determination that Defendant DiSabatino had ample facts to file a timely suppression motion concerning her Miranda issue. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the concerns should have been raised before trial. Among other indicators, the Defendant had access to the accident report, alcohol influence report and Intoxilyzer 5000 results, which all included the statements DiSabatino sought to exclude at trial. DiSabatino failed to prove exceptional circumstances, because she had timely notice of a suppression issue. Therefore, no good cause existed to defeat the Defendant's waiver of her Motion to Suppress.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Id. (The Court also pointed out that Defendant was represented by experienced, competent legal counsel. Thus, the Defendant was presumed to have knowledge of her legal rights).
In Bloomingdale, the Defendant made a Motion to Suppress after a verdict was reached against him. The Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendant relief from his prior waiver and allowed the Defendant to bring his Motion to Suppress. The Court of Common Pleas opined that the police report was conclusory and was insufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that a suppression issue may be warranted under the facts. The police report, concerning why police initially stopped the vehicle, stated in relevant part: "General broadcast of Defendant and his vehicle put out on radio by passerby." The Court of Common Pleas reasoned that the Defendant had no notice of a suppression issue based on the police report.
Bloomingdale v. State of Delaware, 2002 WL 31477995 (Del.Super.) at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
On appeal, this Court observed, in dicta, that the police report in Bloomingdale raised the specter of a suppression question (giving the Defendant notice). Even though this Court questioned the Court-below's conclusion concerning notice to the Defendant, the Court went on to assume, without deciding, that the trial court's original willingness under Court Of Common Pleas Criminal Rule 12(f) to hear Defendant's post-trial Motion to Suppress was not an abuse of discretion and continued on with analysis of the case. In affirming the Superior Court decision, the Supreme Court decided that the Court of Common Pleas did not abuse its discretion in hearing the untimely Motion to Suppress, but the trial Court should have afforded the State the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, given the failure to make a timely objection. The Supreme Court also articulated that the circumstances of the Bloomingdale case may be unique, so it would be prudent to not view the case as precedential on the waiver issue. The Supreme Court further stated that they did not wish to condone a practice of post-trial motions to suppress, and noted that there may be circumstances when such a delay may well constitute a waiver. Deference was given to the trial court's ability to use discretion in deciding whether to hear an untimely Motion to Suppress, but the Supreme Court wanted to limit Bloomingdale to the facts of the case due to a policy of not wanting to condone a practice of post-trial (untimely) Motions to Suppress.
Bloomingdale was on appeal following a prior appeal and remand.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Bloomingdale v. State of Delaware, 842 A.2d 1212, 1216 (Del.Supr. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Mr. Layne fails to show exceptional circumstances in the case sub judice. Therefore, the Court-below's refusal to hear the Defendant's untimely Motion to Suppress is properly within the Court's broad discretion concerning its rules of procedure. Mr. Layne had adequate notice that suppression was at issue based on the police report and should have made a timely pre-trial Motion to Suppress. The relevant section of the police report states: "Through the hole in the fence Writer could observe a white and brown colored pit bull. Writer then opened the door to the fence to get a better look at the dog. . . ." A reasonable person should have been put on notice that a suppression issue was involved, because the report raised significant questions concerning whether Officer King's observations occurred after the Officer "opened the door to the fence." The report reads as though Officer King observed the dog's conditions after she opened the fence door "to get a better look at the dog."
Mr. Layne analogizes his situation to the situation in Bloomingdale. In Bloomingdale, the Court of Common Pleas allowed the Defendant to present an untimely Motion to Suppress, because the police report in issue gave the Defendant no notice of a suppression issue prior to trial. This Court exhibited deference for the trial court's ability to use discretion in deciding whether to hear an untimely Motion to Suppress, even though the Court questioned the trial court's finding that the Defendant lacked notice. In Mr. Layne's case, this Court agrees with the determination of the Court-below that the Defendant's untimely Motion to Suppress should not have been heard. The police report provided adequate notice to Mr. Layne that a suppression issue existed. Consequently, the Defendant fails to prove that there are exceptional circumstances that would allow him to meet the good cause exception for his prior waiver. Therefore, the Court-below did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing to hear Mr. Layne's untimely Motion to Suppress.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.