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holding that short-term objectives were too vague where, "[t]he short-term objectives provide that the objectives will be met according to certain percentages, but the short-term objectives do not provide objective criteria against which achievement can be measured"
Summary of this case from Penn Trafford School District v. C.FOpinion
Civil No. 02-3611 (DWF/RLE), Civil No. 02-4095 (DWF/RLE)
March 2, 2004
Amy J. Goetz, Esq., and Margaret O'Sullivan Kane, Esq., St. Paul, Minnesota, of counsel for Plaintiff
Jerome B. Abrams, Esq., and Lee Ann K. Bell, Esq., Abrams Smith, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Michael J. Ford, Esq., Quinlivan Hughes, St. Cloud, MN; Peter A. Martin, Esq., Knutson, Flynn Deans, Eagan, Minnesota; Erika S. Schneller, and Martha J. Casserly, Minnesota, MN, of counsel for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The above-entitled matters came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to several motions brought by the parties to these suits. Plaintiff Christopher Larson ("Christopher") brought a Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Defendant Independent School District No. 361 ("the School District") brought a Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record and a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding claims brought against it under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The School District, Superintendent Percy Lingen, and Principal Gerald Hilfer (collectively "the School District Defendants") brought a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 13 state and federal claims alleged against them in Plaintiffs' October 1, 2002, Amended Complaint. Defendants Koochiching County Community Services ("KCCS"), Terry Murray, and Jan Derdowski (collectively "the County Defendants") also brought a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs.
As noted in the caption, there are two matters currently before the Court involving the same matters. While the Court is aware that the School District is the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 02-4095, the Court will refer to the School District as a Defendant throughout this Order in an attempt to avoid confusion and ease readability.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record is granted; the School District's Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record is granted; the School District's Motion for Summary Judgment for the IDEA claims is denied; the School District Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 13 state and federal claims is granted; and the County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
Background
Christopher Larson is the son of Virginia and Brian Larson ("the Parents"). Prior to his enrollment at Falls Elementary School, an elementary school within the legal boundaries of Defendant Independent School District No. 361 ("the District"), Christopher was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, thus entitling him to special educational services under the category of Emotional Behavior Disorders.
In August 2000, Christopher began attending Falls Elementary School where he was subject to an Individual Educational Plan ("IEP") for his special educational needs. The following year, between September 2001 and March 2002, Christopher was involved in 31 disciplinary violations. Then, in March 2002, Christopher was involved in a physical altercation with another child.
An IEP "sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvement in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Evans v. Dist. No. 17 of Douglas County, Neb., 841 F.2d 824, 827 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1988).
As a result of this incident, Christopher was suspended from school and Hilfer suggested that the Parents meet with Derdowski to discuss a possible placement of Christopher at Northwoods Children's Services ("NCS") in Duluth for an assessment. Hilfer put Derdowski, a licensed social worker employed by KCCS, who was also under contract with the School District to provide certain services, in contact with the Parents. Derdowski discussed a placement with the Parents and believed that the Parents had agreed to placing Christopher at a residential facility. The Parents disagree with Derdowski's version of events and contend that they only agreed to further discussions about a possible placement.
Plaintiffs assert that they did not consent to allowing Hilfer to release information about Christopher to Derdowski.
The next day at a meeting in Hilfer's office, Mrs. Larson expressed her opposition to the placement of Christopher at a residential facility. Derdowski thereafter commenced a Child in Need of Protection or Services ("CHIPS") proceeding, seeking a court order compelling Christopher to obtain an in-patient evaluation at NCS. The juvenile court granted the CHIPS petition and ordered that Christopher be placed at NCS. However, the Parents later voluntarily agreed to place Christopher at NCS, where he was assessed from April 3, 2002, until May 8, 2002.
Plaintiffs assert that the School District and KCCS colluded to seek the CHIPS order and that the CHIPS petition was sought without their consent or permission. The Parents assert that while they agreed to the NCS assessment, it was only because they believed that they would otherwise lose custody of Christopher; thus, the Parents contend that their consent was coerced. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that Derdowski inaccurately reported Christopher's level of aggression to the juvenile court.
Plaintiffs assert that when Christopher returned to the School District in May 2002, the School District declined to allow Christopher back into the Falls Elementary School. As a result, Christopher was schooled at home, with some educational services provided by the School District, for the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year. On April 11, 2002, the Parents requested a due process hearing regarding matters surrounding Christopher's educational placement.
On August 7, 2002, the Parents received a favorable ruling from the Independent Hearing Officer ("IHO") based upon the allegations asserted at the due process hearing. The School District appealed this decision to a Hearing Review Officer ("HRO"). The HRO affirmed the IHO's initial opinion in part and reversed it in part.
Initially, Plaintiffs filed this action and moved for emergency injunctive relief regarding issues surrounding Christopher's placement. After this Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for emergency injunctive relief by its Order dated September 18, 2002, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to include additional defendants, as listed above. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of statutory rights under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401, et seq.; (2) disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; (3) disability discrimination in violation of Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (4) disability discrimination in violation of Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.03; (5) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment — due process; (6) deprivation of procedural and substantive due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (7) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment — equal protection; (8) deprivation of equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (9) violation of the Ninth Amendment — privacy/state intrusion; (10) deprivation of right of privacy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (11) violation of Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. Ch. 13; (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (13) negligent supervision; and (14) negligent training.
Discussion
I. Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA" or "the Act"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(ii), the court reviewing an administrative decision "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the IDEA permits a reviewing court to consider additional evidence when the party seeking the introduction of the evidence provides a "solid justification for doing so." E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. by J.D., 88 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The School District seeks an order permitting the introduction of certain items of evidence to the administrative hearing record, including: (1) Christopher's application for enrollment in ISD 363; (2) Christopher's September 27, 2002, IEP prepared by ISD 363; (3) Christopher's November 20, 2002, IEP prepared by ISD 363; (4) Christopher's September 27, 2002, Evaluation Summary Report; (5) Christopher's fifth grade report card; (6) the transcript of the August 6, 2003, deposition of Charlotte Potter, Christopher's special education teacher during the 2002-2003 year; and (7) pages 1-10 and 145-152 from the August 5, 2003, deposition transcript of Christopher's mother.
The School District asserts the evidence was prepared after the administrative proceeding had occurred and therefore could not have been introduced at the due process hearing. The School District also asserts that this evidence is relevant because it establishes the value of the education and educational programming Christopher received while enrolled in ISD 361 and shows that Christopher suffered no harm to his education while enrolled in ISD 361. Plaintiffs contend the Court should not allow the School District to introduce evidence that was not available at the due process hearing, because doing so will transform the appeal of the HRO's decision into a de novo review of the evidence. Plaintiffs assert that if the Court does allow the School District to introduce additional evidence, it should also allow Plaintiffs to introduce additional evidence.
The Court granted the School District's motion to introduce additional evidence when this motion was orally presented to the Court. The Court also allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to provide a limited amount of rebuttal evidence. The Court granted these motions based on case law that allows for the introduction of evidence that came into existence subsequent to the due process hearing when a case is heard on appeal. See Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. for Com. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984).
II. The IDEA Claims
A. Standard of Review
Under the IDEA, a reviewing Court must determine, based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, whether a school district has complied with the requirements of the Act. Although the standard of review under the IDEA is less deferential than that accorded to federal administrative agencies, the court is still required to give "due weight" to agency decision-making. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 88 F.3d at 561. Under this form of review, a court may make a decision on the merits even if there exists disputed issues of material fact. See Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993).
The School District asserts that the decisions of the IHO and HRO should be given little deference by this Court. The School District notes that the IHO adopted verbatim nearly all of the Plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact. The School District asserts that a number of the findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the School District contends that the HRO's decision should be given little deference because the HRO adopted 151 of the IHO's 153 findings of fact. Plaintiffs contend that while the IHO adopted a number of its findings of fact, it excluded at least 18 other findings of fact presented by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also point out that the HRO excluded some findings of fact that had been adopted by the IHO and adopted other findings that were adverse to the interests of the Plaintiffs.
The Court finds that it need give only limited deference to the findings of fact and legal decisions of the IHO and HRO. The vast majority of the IHO's report was drawn directly from the Plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact. Likewise, the HRO's report adopted almost all of the IHO's findings of fact. The Court finds that the IHO and HRO's nearly verbatim adoption of the Plaintiffs' findings of fact cast doubt on whether the hearings were truly impartial and independent. As this Court stated in its September 18, 2002, Order, even if the hearing was truly impartial and independent, the verbatim adoption of findings of fact "must undermine public trust in the system and compromise the integrity of a process designed to protect our most valuable citizens." Larson ex rel. Larson v. Int. Falls Public Schools, Civil No. 02-3611, 2002 WL 31108199, at *5 n. 3 (D. Minn. September 18, 2002). Thus, the Court will give only limited deference to the factual and legal decisions of the IHO and HRO.
B. IDEA Claim
The Court begins its analysis of Plaintiffs' IDEA claim by considering whether Plaintiffs waived their rights to a due process hearing. The IDEA was enacted to ensure that children with disabilities receive a "free, appropriate education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Under the IDEA, parents are entitled to certain procedural safeguards to make sure that their child's educational needs are being met by the student's school district. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988). If parents are not satisfied with their child's IEP, they are entitled to request a due process hearing. See § 1415(f). However, if a student changes school districts without requesting a due process hearing, he or she cannot challenge prior educational services received in the school district. See Smith ex. rel. Townsend v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Minneapolis), 184 F.3d 764, (8th Cir. 1999); Thompson By and Through Buckhanon v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998).
Under the Minnesota statute implementing the IDEA, parents may obtain a due process hearing when "a dispute arises over the identification, evaluation, educational placement, manifestation determination, interim alternative educational placement, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to a child with a disability." Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 12. A due process hearing shall be initiated and conducted by and in the school district responsible for assuring that an appropriate program is provided. See id. The IDEA permits parties that are dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hearing to bring suit in state or federal court. See 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(2). However, before an aggrieved party can bring suit under the IDEA, he or she must satisfy the Act's exhaustion provision. See § 1415(1).
The School District asserts that the IHO and HRO abused their discretion by failing to consider or explain two of the School District's legal arguments that might have resulted in the dismissal of all, or a significant portion, of the disputed issues in the case. First, the School District argues that Plaintiffs waived their claims against the School District by unilaterally placing Christopher in a residential facility located in another school district before the due process hearing took place. The School District asserts that a student's departure from a school district, whether it is a voluntary or involuntary departure, renders moot any subsequent challenges to a student's prior education. Thus, the School District contends that Plaintiffs did not have any right to the due process hearing they requested on April 11, 2002, because Christopher had been enrolled by his Parents at NCS on April 3, 2002. Second, the School District claims that the IHO and HRO did not address the ability of the Plaintiffs to submit a third amended complaint after a scheduling conference deadline.
Plaintiffs assert that Christopher's placement at NCS did not waive the Plaintiffs' ability to file for a due process hearing because the School District was at least indirectly responsible for the placement. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the School District involved KCCS in the placement process in order to avoid the School District's obligations under the IDEA. In support of their position, Plaintiffs contend that the placement was one of the primary issues considered by the IHO and HRO, and that both the IHO and HRO found that the placement violated the IDEA. In response to the School District's assertion that the Plaintiffs should not have been able to amend their complaint a third time, Plaintiffs assert that the amendments did not result in undue delay, were not the result of bad faith, and did not create undue prejudice for the School District.
The IHO and HRO both found that the School District placed the Parents in a situation in which they "had no choice" but to agree to the voluntary placement of Christopher into NCS. Because the IHO and HRO found the School District had coerced the placement of Christopher at NCS, the IHO and HRO found the Parents' request for a due process hearing was appropriate even though Christopher was receiving educational services outside the School District at the time the hearing was requested.
Christopher was enrolled at NCS on April 3, 2002. Only eight days later, the Parents requested the due process hearing. The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not waive their right to a due process hearing by agreeing to send Christopher for a one-month assessment at NCS, because the Parents agreed only to a short-term placement of Christopher at NCS, and within one week of agreeing to the placement the Parents requested a due process hearing. The Court finds that, for purposes of the IDEA, Christopher continued to reside in the School District while he was assessed at NCS, and the School District remained responsible for supervising and providing educational services to Christopher while he was admitted to NCS. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did not waive their right to a due process hearing by placing Christopher at NCS.
The Court finds that the cases cited by the School District to support their waiver argument are distinguishable. In Smith v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764, (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit held that a school district had no duty to provide a student a due process hearing when the student's family had voluntarily moved out of the school district and the student no longer attended school within the district. Smith differs from the case at bar because in Smith the student's whole family moved out of the school district before bringing its IDEA claims. In this case, Christopher and Christopher's family continue to reside in the School District.
The School District also cites Thompson By and Through Buckhanon v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). In Thompson, the Eighth Circuit held that a student who was voluntarily removed from a school by his parents and sent to a school in another school district could not pursue an IDEA claim against the former school district after having attended school in the latter district for several months. Thompson differs from the case at bar because the parents in Thompson made a conscious decision to remove their child from one school district and send him to a second school district. Here, the Parents did not place Christopher at NCS to effectuate a change of school districts, but, rather, for the limited purpose of having Christopher assessed by NCS staff.
The Court also does not find merit in the School District's contention that the IHO and HRO abused their discretion in allowing Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs requested the opportunity to amend their complaint on two occasions and both times their requests were granted. Both requests coincided with Plaintiffs taking on new counsel, and the School District has not shown it was prejudiced by the IHO or HRO's decisions to allow for the amendments to the complaint. Having resolved the issues raised by the School District regarding the Plaintiffs' ability to bring their IDEA claims, the Court will now go on to consider those claims.
1. Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") in the Least Restrictive Environment
The United States Supreme Court has formulated a two-part test to analyze whether a FAPE was provided in cases under the IDEA. The court must determine: (1) whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA; and (2) whether the IEP developed pursuant to the IDEA was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive some educational benefit. See Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
a. Placement of the Student
The School District asserts that the IHO and HRO erred in finding that the School District initiated the CHIPS proceedings and thereby unilaterally placed Christopher at NCS. The School District claims its employees never asked anyone at KCCS to file the CHIPS petition. The only connection the School District admits to between it and the CHIPS proceedings is that Principal Hilfer put the Parents in contact with Derdowksi to discuss a possible residential evaluation. The School District also acknowledges that it provided Christopher's educational information to Derdowski, but asserts that it did so in compliance with Minnesota law. The School District contend that the Parents voluntarily and unilaterally placed Christopher into the program at NCS.
Plaintiffs assert the School District brought Derdowski into Christopher's life to effectuate the placement. The Parents maintain they were unaware that Derdowski was KCCS' employee during their initial discussions with Derdowski and that they did not consent to the release of information between the School District and KCCS. Plaintiffs assert the administrative record is clear that the School District contacted KCCS to bring about the placement. Plaintiffs also assert that the disclosure of educational information from the School District to KCCS violates Minnesota and federal law.
Both the IHO and HRO found that the School District's role in the placement of Christopher at NCS was improper. The IHO held that the School District violated Christopher's rights to an education in the least restrictive environment when it removed Christopher through a CHIPS petition "in concert with" KCCS and Derdowski. The HRO further found that the Parents were "coerced into the NCS placement through the efforts of Derdowski" while Derdowski was an employee of KCCS and under contract with the School District.
The Court disagrees with both the IHO's and HRO's assessments of the transfer of information from the School District to Derdowski and the role the School District played in Christopher's placement at NCS. First, the Court will examine Plaintiffs' claims that the transfer of information from the School District to Derdowksi violated the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act ("FERPA") and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act ("MGDPA"). Second, the Court will examine the role played by the School District in placing Christopher at NCS as it pertains to the IDEA claim.
The School District asserts that it did not violate state or federal law when it transferred information to Derdowski because FERPA governed and permitted the transfer of information. Specifically, the School District asserts that FERPA's general privacy requirements did not apply to Derdowski because Derdowski was exempted from FERPA as an "other school official." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that Derdowski was not an "other school official" as the term is defined by FERPA because the contract between the School District and KCCS stated that the educational records of students were to remain private and because the School District failed to notify the Parents of Derdowski's dual role as county official and school social worker.
The Court finds that Derdowski was an "other school official" as the term is defined by FERPA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (allowing for the release of information to "other school officials, including teachers within the educational institution or local educational agency, who have been determined by such agency or institution to have legitimate educational interests, including the educational interests of the child for whom consent would otherwise be required") Id. FERPA allows school officials to determine who qualifies for access to a student's educational records. In this case, the School District adopted a policy in 1997 that defined "other school officials" for the purposes of the release of information as "a person employed by, or under contract to, the school board to perform a special task." (Affidavit of Leeann K. Bell (hereinafter "Bell Aff."), ¶ 9, Ex. L, 10/20/97 International Falls School Board Meeting Minutes and MSBA/MASA Model Policy 515, at 114.) The Court finds that while the definition of "other school officials" as adopted by the School District is quite broad, Derdowksi would undoubtedly qualify as someone with legitimate educational interests as to the students. Thus, the School District did not violate FERPA by transferring information regarding students to Derdowski.
Plaintiffs contend that even if the School District did not violate FERPA by transferring information to Derdowksi, the School District violated the MGDPA by permitting such transfers. The School District responds that the MGDPA specifically provides that the handling of certain classifications of data may be governed by other provisions of state or federal law. The School District asserts that the educational records of students are one area that MGDPA was not meant to cover because FERPA already provides protection for those records. The Court finds that the School District did not violate the MGDPA, because Derdowski was authorized to access Christopher's education records as an individual specifically authorized to access such data. See Achman v. Chisago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, 45 F. Supp.2d 664, 669 (D. Minn. 1999) (Alsop, J.) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (expressly incorporated into the MGDPA by Minn. Stat. § 13.32, subd. 3(e))).
Plaintiffs also assert that the placement and the manner in which the placement took place constitute substantive and procedural violations of the IDEA. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the School District attempted to resolve its issues concerning Christopher by involving law enforcement and the courts rather than by following the procedures set out in the IDEA. In contrast, the School District contends that it had nothing to do with the initiation of the CHIPS proceeding and the placement of Christopher at NCS. The School District asserts that KCCS, not the School District, pursued the CHIPS petition and placement. The School District maintains the only role it played was in putting the Parents in contact with Derdowksi to discuss a possible residential evaluation.
While the Court finds that the School District attempts to minimize the role it played in the placement, the Court still finds that the actions of the School District with regard to the placement were not in violation of the IDEA. The School District began by putting the Parents in contact with Derdowksi. After discussing placement options with Derdowski, Mrs. Larson either agreed to place Christopher at a residential facility or to engage in further discussions regarding the placement of Christopher. As a result of Mrs. Larson and Derdowski's subsequent interactions, Derdowski determined that a CHIPS petition was necessary. Whether or not the IHO and HRO agreed with the bases upon which the CHIPS petition was filed, the juvenile court judge ordered the placement of Christopher at NCS through an emergency protection hearing. The judge later agreed to stay the court's order pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiffs and KCCS in which the Parents agreed to place Christopher at NCS for a period of evaluation.
The School District's conduct in putting the Parents in contact with Derdowski does not violate the IDEA. The discussions were meant only to provide the Parents with information about an option that they might be interested in pursuing. Once Mrs. Larson had apparently agreed to the placement, the School District worked with Derdowski in an attempt to facilitate the placement. However, once it became clear that no agreement could be reached with Mrs. Larson, the School District played no role in the placement, other than Hilfer's testimony at the CHIPS proceeding. The school officials' testimony at the proceeding cannot form the basis for an IDEA violation. Because the Court finds that the School District's role in Christopher's placement at NCS does not violate the IDEA, the Court also finds that the School District was not required to conduct a manifestation determination review as is discussed below.
b. Procedural Violations
The adequacy of an IEP is to be judged by whether the procedural requirements of the IDEA have been satisfied. See Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Nevertheless, an IEP "should be set aside only if `procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil's right to an appropriate education, seriously hampered the parents' opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits.'" Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D., 88 F.3d 556, 561-62 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990)).
The School District asserts that the IHO and HRO erred in finding that it had violated several procedural provisions of the IDEA. The School District asserts that even if it violated some procedural provisions of the IDEA, there is no evidence that these violations caused harm to Christopher's education or denied the Parents due process or an opportunity to participate in Christopher's education.
Plaintiffs assert the School District violated the IDEA because the School District: (1) did not provide the Parents with the statutorily-mandated written notices of IEP team meetings; (2) did not conduct a manifestation determination or an IEP team meeting prior to removing Christopher from the public school setting; (3) did not provide IEP team meetings with the statutorily-mandated IEP team members in attendance; (4) did not provide the Parents with the Notice of Procedural Rights and Safeguards; (5) did not provide the statutorily mandated behavior intervention plan; (6) did not complete and conclude the re-evaluation in a timely manner; (7) did not review and revise Christopher's lEPs annually; and (8) disclosed Christopher's personally identifiable information without obtaining parental consent.
The Court has already concluded that the School District did not need to conduct a manifestation determination review and did not violate any of Christopher's privacy rights. Thus, the Court will address only the remaining six alleged violations of the IDEA.
(1) Notice
Plaintiffs assert the School District violated the IDEA by failing to provide written notification to the Parents of the IEP meetings. The HRO found that the School District met its burden with regard to this issue, because the IDEA does not require written notice to be provided and it is undisputed that one of the Parents was present for all of the meetings. The Court agrees with the HRO's decision on this issue. The language of the IDEA does not require notices to be in writing, and the evidence confirms that at least one of the Parents was in attendance at all of the meetings.(2) Attendance of IEP Team Members
Plaintiffs assert that not all of the necessary team members were present at some IEP team meetings. The School District asserts that evidence in the administrative record was overlooked by the IHO and HRO that establishes that the necessary team members were present at all IEP meetings. The IHO and HRO found that the School District failed to meet its burden of proof. In reviewing the record, the Court finds that the IHO and HRO erred in finding that certain IEP team members were not present for meetings. The September 14, 2001, IEP states that Hilfer, Peterson, McDonald, and Mrs. Larson were all present for the team meeting. In addition, McDonald testified that Peterson attended the May 16, 2002, IEP meeting. The Court finds that evidence in the record supports the School District's assertion that all of Christopher's IEP team meetings were comprised of the proper number of team members in accordance with IDEA standards.
(3) Notice of Procedural Rights and Safeguards
Plaintiffs contend that they did not receive a copy of the Parental Rights and Procedural Safeguards brochure. The HRO agreed with the Parents and found no "documentary evidence indicating whether or not a procedural safeguards brochure was actually provided to the Parents." The School District asserts the HRO erred when it found that the School District had not produced documentary evidence that a copy of the brochure had been given to the Parents. First, the School District asserts that the IDEA does not require a School District to document when a Parental Rights and Procedural Safeguards brochure is disseminated to parents. Second, the School District asserts the record contains testimony from McDonald that the Parental Rights and Procedural Safeguards brochure was distributed as a matter of habit and numerous notices of Christopher's upcoming IEP meetings stated that such a brochure was enclosed.
While the School District has presented evidence that at certain times it appears to have distributed the Parental Rights and Procedural Safeguards brochure, the Court finds that the evidence does not show that the Parental Rights and Procedural Safeguards brochure was given to the Parents each time the notice of IEP meetings were distributed. However, the Court finds that this violation of the IDEA could have had only a limited affect on Christopher's education because the Parents were present at all of the IEP meetings and the Parents were knowledgeable enough about their rights to request a due process hearing.
(4) Behavior Intervention Plan
Plaintiffs contend that the School District failed to complete a functional behavioral assessment ("FBA") and a behavior intervention plan ("BIP") for Christopher. Plaintiffs' assertion is supported by the findings of both the IHO and HRO. The HRO specifically stated that his finding on this issue was supported by the lack of a written plan to be found in Christopher's IEP and by evidence presented by Dr. Richard Amado, who stated that the School District's efforts did not satisfy minimum professional standards in addressing Christopher's inappropriate behaviors. The School District asserts that the IDEA does not require a FBA be conducted unless a student has been removed from his or her current placement for more than 10 school days. The School District then contends that while no formal written document was ever created, Christopher's special education instructor prepared an informal BIP and integrated its findings into the IEP.
The Court finds that the School District violated the IDEA by failing to complete a FBA and a BIP. Christopher's IEPs indicated that the goal of the IEPs was to address Christopher's challenging behaviors. Nevertheless, the School District failed to address those behaviors through a FBA and BIP. The Court is mindful that not every situation will call for a formal written BIP, but in cases such as this, where a student's behaviors are the sole focus of the IEP, an FBA should have been conducted and its findings should have been used to create a BIP that would be integrated into the IEP.
(5) Timeliness of the Re-Evaluation
The IDEA requires that a student be re-evaluated if conditions warrant a re-evaluation, upon the request of a student's parent or teacher, but that the re-evaluation must occur at least once every three years. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2). Plaintiffs assert the School District failed to conclude its required triennial re-evaluation of Christopher. The School District asserts that the re-evaluation was made moot, because, before the re-evaluation could be completed, Christopher was placed at NCS and then home-schooled for the remainder of the 2001-2002 academic year.
The Court finds that the School District did not violate the IDEA by failing to complete the triennial re-evaluation. The Court agrees with the School District that in some cases intervening events can keep the re-evaluation from occurring within the 30-day deadline set out in the law, but once those intervening events have passed, the re-evaluation should occur in an expedited manner. In this case, the School District sought to complete its re-evaluation of Christopher once he returned from NCS. However, the Parents denied the School District access to Christopher and to the NCS evaluation report. Based on the lack of access the School District had to Christopher, the Court finds that the School District did not violate the IDEA by failing to complete the triennial re-evaluation.
(6) IEP Revisions
Plaintiffs assert that the School District did not revise Christopher's IEP on an annual basis and that the IEPs that were prepared did not adequately represent the levels of Christopher's performance and goals and objectives. The School District, on the other hand, asserts that it held annual IEP meetings and that the Parents were involved in each of these meetings. The School District also asserts that the IEPs set out appropriate goals and objectives and that the IEP team decided to maintain the goals and objectives outlined in prior IEPs.
The IHO found that the portion of the IEPs dedicated to describing Christopher's present levels of educational performance were inadequate because the IEPs did not provide information "related to the Student's specific skill deficits in attention, organization, behavioral compliance and social interaction." (IHO Conclusions of Law at 11.) The same goals and objectives were later repeated in the Student's fourth grade IEP. The IHO also found that the annual goal components of the IEPs were "so vague they are immeasurable." (Id.) The IHO came to this conclusion because a number of the terms set out in the goals had not been defined and the goals themselves could not be objectively evaluated. The HRO affirmed the IHO's finding as to the inadequacies of the IEPs, stating that there was "substantial evidence in the record to support the IHO's determination that the Student failed to make any progress on his challenging behaviors." (HRO Conclusions of Law at 18.)
The Court finds that the lEPs developed by the School District were inadequate as to the "present levels of performance" and "goals and objectives" sections. The "present levels of performance" sections of Christopher's lEPs contain only conclusory statements about Christopher's present level of abilities and the lEPs do not fully explain how Christopher's disability affects his involvement in the educational process. For instance, the 2001-2002IEP discusses only very generally Christopher's difficulties in interacting socially with other students.
In addition, the Court finds that the sections of Christopher's lEPs dedicated to "goals and objectives" are inadequate. Christopher's IEP for the 2000-2001 school year states only that: "[Student] will improve his behavior from non-appropriate to appropriate through teacher intervention and small group instruction by 10-01." This goal is repeated in Christopher's 2001-2002 IEP. The wording of the goal and the short-term objectives that follow is very vague and could define a broad range of conduct. The short-term objectives provide that the objectives will be met according to certain percentages, but the short-term objectives do not provide objective criteria against which achievement can be measured. Based on an evaluation of Christopher's lEPs and the criteria against which Christopher's achievements are to be measured, the Court affirms the findings of the IHO and HRO and finds that the "present levels of performance" and "goals and objectives" sections of Christopher's lEPs were inadequate.
2. Educational Benefit
The Court must also consider whether the IEP developed pursuant to the IDEA was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive some educational benefit. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. The Supreme Court has held that a "free appropriate education" has been provided when a State provides a child with "personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Id. at 203-04. The instruction and services must meet the state's educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the state's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP. See id. The objective of the criteria set out in federal law is "the achievement of effective results-demonstrable improvement in the educational and personal skills identified as special needs-as a consequence of implementing the proposed IEP." Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. for Com. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 788 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). In addition, states must provide special education in the "least restrictive alternative." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(d).
Plaintiffs assert that no special education services were made available to Christopher prior to his placement at NCS. As a result of this alleged deficiency of available services, Plaintiffs claim Christopher was less able to control his challenging behaviors and was subjected to more disciplinary measures by the School District. The School District asserts that the record contains numerous instances of Christopher making progress towards the goals and objectives set out in his IEP. Specifically, the School District points to Christopher's average to above-average grades and the improvements noted by Christopher's former treating psychologist while he attended the school. The School District asserts the HRO erred when evaluating the IEP's educational benefits to Christopher by considering only Christopher's achievements in behavior as opposed to his academic efforts.
In support of its argument that the academic progress of Christopher should have been considered by the IHO and HRO, the School District directs this Court to the holding of the Eighth Circuit in CJN v. Minneapolis Public Schs., 323 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003). In CJN, the child at issue was an 11-year-old third grade student who exhibited challenging behaviors while continuing to progress academically. See id. at 364. School personnel developed a system to deal with CJN's inappropriate behavior, but CJN continued to misbehave in the classroom. See id. at 635. Ultimately, CJN's mother enrolled him in a private school and attempted to recover the costs of tuition from the school district that had previously provided CJN with services. See id. at 636.
The Eighth Circuit held that the mother was not entitled to recover CJN's tuition expenses. See id. 642-43. As part of its analysis of CJN's lEPs, the Eighth Circuit held that the academic progress of CJN should be considered when evaluating the adequacy of CJN's lEPs even though CJN's disability did not affect his academic performance. See id. at 638. The Eighth Circuit stated that if CJN's behavior problems, if unattended, could curtail his ability to learn, the fact that he is learning is significant evidence that the behavioral problems have been attended to. See id.
Here, the IHO found that the School District had "produced no credible documentation that the Student made progress toward his IEP goal and objectives while in the District." (IHO Conclusions of Law at 19.) The IHO premised this determination on its finding that Christopher's frustration and inappropriate behavior had increased in intensity over time. The IHO also found that the School District's staff failed to implement behavioral interventions that would teach Christopher skills that he could use in dealing with his inappropriate behaviors. The HRO came to the same conclusion as the IHO regarding Christopher's receipt of educational benefits. The HRO relied primarily on Christopher's disciplinary record for the 2001-2002 school year that documents numerous instances of Christopher's aggressive behavior toward other students.
The Court finds that Christopher's IEPs were not reasonably calculated to enable him to receive a meaningful educational benefit. The Court agrees with the School District that Christopher has progressed and continues to progress at an average rate in his academics. However, the Court finds that the case before it and CJN differ from one another in that the School District in CJN had conducted an FBA and an occupational therapy evaluation. Here, the School District did not conduct a proper FBA or prepare an appropriate BIF. Even considering Christopher's academic performance, Christopher's behavior during the 2001-2002 school year-the primary issue to be addressed by the IEP-should have indicated to the School District that changes needed to be made in the types of services Christopher received and the way the School District provided those services. Christopher clearly had difficulty in interacting with other students at a social level in unstructured settings. Christopher's disciplinary record for the 2001-2002 school year, showing over 22 disciplinary actions over a seven-month period, is evidence of the IEP's failure to have any effect on Christopher's behavior. While the Court acknowledges the challenges the School District faced in dealing with Christopher's particular behavioral difficulties, the record shows far less effort was made by the School District to address Christopher's behaviors than was required under the law. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Christopher's IEPs were not reasonably calculated to enable him to receive a meaningful educational benefit.
3. Relief Granted
The district court has broad discretionary authority to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). The Eighth Circuit has specifically held that appropriate relief under the IDEA includes compensatory education services. See Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 284, v. A.C., by and through her Parent, C.C., 258 F.3d 769. 779-80 (8th Cir. 2001) (Hansen, J.) (concurring) (citing Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000)). The rationale for granting compensatory damages is that an award of such damages merely requires the educational services provider to pay for services that should have been paid for in the past. See Miener By and Through Miener v. State of Mo., 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting School Committee of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1985)).
The School District asks that the Court deny Plaintiffs the IFB assessment awarded by the HRO as moot, based on the fact that a similar assessment has been performed in ISD 363. The School District also asks that the Court deny Plaintiffs the 225 minutes of direct EBD services per week awarded by the HRO because the IEP never called for that amount of direct services, the School District provided a FAPE, and the School District never flagrantly failed to comply with the requirements of the IDEA. If the Court is unwilling to deny the Plaintiffs compensatory damages, the School District asks that such damages be mitigated because the Parents played a role in determining the sufficiency of the IEPs.
Plaintiffs' counsel asserted at the hearings on these motions that a private IFB had yet to be performed with regard to Christopher in ISD 363. Plaintiffs also assert that a showing of bad faith on the part of the School District is not necessary to maintain the award of compensatory damages. Plaintiffs point out that compensatory damages are appropriate in this case because of the substantive and procedural violations of the IDEA by the School District.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to have the School District pay for a private IFB to be performed, as nothing in the record before the Court indicates that such an assessment has been conducted by ISD 363. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to 225 minutes of direct special education services as ordered by the HRO. As previously stated, the Court finds that the School District did not provide Christopher with a free appropriate education as is set out in the IDEA. Based on the violations of the IDEA, the Court finds that an award of compensatory damages is appropriate and defers to the judgment of the HRO regarding the level of minutes awarded. See Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 871 (D.N.H. 1992) (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71) (finding that "a compensatory education award requires neither a finding of bad faith nor a finding of a denial of special education"); see also Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 91-1660, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11831, at *9-10 (D.D.C. 1992).
III. School District and County Defendants — Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to state court judgments. Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 111 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)). Specifically, federal courts are precluded from adjudicating claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgments. Id. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16). A federal claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment when "the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it." Id. at 493 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)).
The School District seeks a grant of summary judgment on the 13 non-IDEA claims brought by Plaintiffs against the School District, the International Falls Board of Education, Superintendent Percy Lingren, and Principal Gerald Hilfer (collectively "the School District Defendants"). Likewise, KCCS, Terry Murray, and Jan Derdowski (collectively "the County Defendants) seek summary judgment on the same claims. The School District and County Defendants (collectively "the Defendants") argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from considering Christopher's placement at NCS. Plaintiffs assert that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not applicable because the juvenile court judge never entered a final judgment in the matter and the court in which the CHIPS proceeding was heard could not have adjudicated all of Plaintiffs' claims.
The Court finds that it is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Here, the Court is not being asked to review a district court's order, but is instead merely being asked to adjudicate the merits of claims that have not yet been adjudicated or addressed by a state court. The CHIPS proceeding did not address issues related to a number of Plaintiffs' claims and the actions of all of the Defendants. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot close the courthouse doors to these claims. The Court also notes that no final judgment was ever issued in the CHIPS proceeding. Because issues central to some of Plaintiffs' claims were never adjudicated and no final judgment was ever entered by the state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. The ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the MHRA
`Title II of the ADA `prohibits qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.'" Birmingham v. Omaha School Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 1999)). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall . . . be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)). The enforcement, remedies and rights are the same under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. (citing Hoekstra By and Through Hoekstra v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283, 103 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1996)). In addition, there is no distinction in the analysis of a claim under the ADA and the MHRA in the context of educational services for disabled children. See Roberts By and Through Rodenberg-Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 846 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit has clearly held that when alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are based upon educational services for disabled children, "the plaintiff must prove that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment." Id. (citing Hoekstra, 103 F.3d at 627).
Here, Plaintiffs assert that the "conduct of [all of] the Defendants was outrageous, was done in a deliberate, callous, malicious, fraudulent and oppressive manner to injure Plaintiffs, was with an improper motive, and was done in conscious disregard of Christopher's rights." Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 82. However, Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts that lead to an inference of bad faith or gross misjudgment on the part of the School District or County Defendants. The only School District Defendant who is alleged to have been directly involved in this matter is Hilfer, who facilitated the discussions between Derdowski and the Parents regarding the possibility of placing Christopher at NCS and testified at the CHIPS hearing. Derdowski was the only County Defendant that had any direct involvement in Christopher's placement at NCS. Derdowski discussed a placement at NCS with Mrs. Larson and later a CHIPS proceeding was filed by KCCS at her behest. This Court has already determined that the placement of Christopher at NCS was handled in an appropriate manner by all of the Defendants. Aside from this matter, there are no other factual allegations of bad faith or gross misconduct. Thus, the School District Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' ADA, Section 504, and MHRA claims.
C. Section 1983 and Constitutional Claims
Plaintiffs assert several constitutional claims under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Under the guise of due process, equal protection, and right to privacy, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants unnecessarily institutionalized Christopher and deprived him of equal access to public education. Specifically, the Parents assert that they have been deprived of their "liberty to establish of [sic] home and to bring up their child resulting in consequent unnecessary erosion of parental rights. . . ." Amended Complaint at ¶ 61; see also ¶¶ 68, 75, 82, 88, 89, 97.
To the extent that Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims relate to an alleged deprivation of equal access to a public education, these claims are merely an attempt by Plaintiffs to recast their IDEA claims under the guise of Section 1983. As such, these portions of the claims cannot provide a basis for a Section 1983 action. See Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996); Reinholdson v. State of Minnesota, 2002 WL 31026580 at *7. However, Plaintiffs' claims with regard to the placement of Christopher clearly contemplate more than just IDEA violations.
To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a municipality's formal policy or informal custom caused an actual deprivation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation). A municipal policy is a "deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters." Mettler, 165 F.3d at 1204. A plaintiff must satisfy three requirements to demonstrate a municipal custom exists. Id. First, a plaintiff must prove the "existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees." Id. Second, a plaintiff must show a "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct." Third, a plaintiff must show that the custom was the basis of the constitutional violation See id. (quoting Ware v. Jackson County, Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiffs contend that the School District and County Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations by disclosing private information about individuals to one another and by using the CHIPS petition as a means to effectuate educational placements of children. Plaintiffs assert that in the period of 2000 to 2002, 17 children residing in the School District were placed at NCS. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To KCCS Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment at 29.) However, Plaintiffs admit that they do not know the mechanism through which these children were placed and that, as such, "Plaintiffs are unable to sustain a showing that there was a pattern and practice within KCCS to place children into unnecessarily restrictive settings." (Id.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that a policy or custom has been established that forms the basis of a constitutional violation. As the Court has previously discussed, the Court finds the privacy rights of the students were protected and that the transfer of information from the School District and school officials to Derdowski did not violate applicable law. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with evidence that establishes that KCCS and the School District are effectuating placements at residential treatment facilities in an effort to avoid IDEA obligations. However, the Court is aware that discovery regarding this issue is ongoing. Therefore, the Court will dismiss these claims without prejudice so that Plaintiffs can re-file their claims at some later point should Plaintiffs discover evidence sufficient to support such a claim.
Both Hilfer and Derdowski, in their individual capacities, claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, an official performing discretionary functions is generally immune from liability unless a reasonable person in his or her position would have known that his or her actions violated clearly established law. Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 593 (2002) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). In order to determine whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must consider whether the facts alleged, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that the official violated a federal statutory right. Bradley v. Arkansas Dept. of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2002). "If no . . . right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. However, if the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that a violation of a federal right occurred, then the Court must inquire into whether the right was clearly established. Id. In order to show that a law is "clearly established," the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable official would understand that what she is doing violates the law governing her conduct. Sparr, 306 F.3d at 593.
The Court finds that Hilfer and Derdowski are entitled to qualified immunity. Here, the basis asserted for Hilfer's liability is that he did not follow the procedural requirements mandated by the IDEA regarding the placement of Christopher at NCS. There are no other factual allegations of Hilfer's involvement except that he testified at the CHIPS proceeding. The basis asserted for Derdowksi's liability is that she did not use reasonable efforts to prevent removal of Christopher from his parents' home, and that she was dishonest in her dealings with the court during the CHIPS proceeding. The Court has already determined that the placement of Christopher at NCS was carried out in a lawful manner. The Court also finds nothing in the record that supports a finding that Derdowski deliberately lied at the CHIPS proceeding or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. The court that was involved in the CHIPS proceeding heard testimony from all of the parties involved and independently determined that a placement at NCS was in the best interests of Christopher. Based on the facts before the Court, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Hilfer and Derdowksi violated clearly established law. Thus, Hilfer and Derdowski are entitled to qualified immunity as to all federal claims asserted against them, and Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of Hilfer and Derdowski's qualified immunity are granted.
D. Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
In the Court's discussion of the IDEA claims, the Court held that the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act had been complied with by all parties. Further, claims brought pursuant to the MGDPA cannot be brought against individuals. See Walker v. Scott County, 5 18 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994). Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment for all Defendants on the MGDPA claims brought by Plaintiffs. E. State Tort Claims
Plaintiffs have also asserted claims for negligent training, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants. Minnesota law does not recognize a claim for negligent training. See Mandy v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 940 F. Supp. 1463, 1473 (D. Minn. 1996) (citing M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Minn.Ct.App. 1995)). The theory of negligent supervision is defined as "an employer's duty to control his or her employee's physical conduct while on the employer's premises or while using the employer's chattels, even when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment, in order to prevent intentional or negligent employment of personal injury." Mandy v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 940 F. Supp.2d 1463, 1471 (D. Minn. 1996) (quoting Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn. 1992)). Minnesota courts have held that claims for negligent supervision arise only when a threat of physical injury or actual physical injury occurs. See Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F. Supp. 1067, 1083 (D. Minn. 1994) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they suffered any physical injury or threat of physical injury. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.
The final state tort law claim alleged by Plaintiffs is intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that there are four elements to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) the conduct complained of was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe." Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn. 1999) (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983)).
Defendants sued in their individual capacities assert that they are entitled to official immunity. Under Minnesota law, public officials are automatically entitled to official immunity from state law claims when their duties require the exercise of discretion, so long as the officials are not guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990); Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1998). Thus, to determine whether official immunity is available in any given context requires a determination of whether the alleged acts were discretionary or ministerial and whether the alleged acts were malicious or willful. See Davis v. County of Hennepin, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997).
Malice, in the official immunity context, means intentionally committing an act that the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited. This is an objective inquiry that examines the legal reasonableness of an official's actions. See State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994). To overcome a defense based on official immunity, a plaintiff cannot rely on "bare allegations of malice"; rather, plaintiff must present specific facts evidencing bad faith. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
The Court finds that Murray, Derdowski, and Hilfer are entitled to official immunity for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought against them by Plaintiffs. The acts of these officials were discretionary, and Plaintiffs have failed to present facts sufficient to support a showing of malice. Because the Court finds that there is no basis for imposing liability on Murray, Derdowski, and Hilfer, there is no basis for imposing vicarious liability on the remaining School District and County Defendants. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798-99 (1986) (no award of damages against a municipality based on the actions of one of its officers where there has been no showing of constitutional harm by the officer); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 42 (2001) (a municipality cannot be held liable for inadequate training or supervision when the officers did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights); Dokman v. County of Hennepin, 637 N.W.2d 286, 297 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) ("Vicarious official immunity protects a governmental entity from liability based on the acts of an employee who is entitled to official immunity.").
Conclusion
There is always a place for zealous and passionate advocacy on behalf of children. Zealous and passionate advocacy often levels the playing field for parents and children in these difficult situations and thus, well serves the best interests of children and parents. Here, the art of advocacy certainly prevailed when the hearing officer adopted, almost verbatim, the proposed findings of Plaintiffs. Zealous and passionate advocacy, however, requires something more than the "shotgun" or "kitchen sink" style pleadings that can be found throughout Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Such complaints distract the Court's attention from the genuine issues in the case, thus adversely affecting the interests of children and parents. Under no circumstances would a form complaint, rather than one tailored to the facts of a particular case, serve the best interests of a child or his or her family. Moreover, the language found in such a complaint only serves to polarize the parties, making it more difficult for them to communicate with one another and to reach a common ground. In such cases as the one before the Court, the best interests of the child and the child's special education needs should always be the top priority of all parties concerned. Zealous and passionate advocacy from either or both sides of the aisle is not nearly as well-suited to the resolution of these cases as is the art of compromise.
Each party should accept responsibility for the errors in judgment that they have made, even if such errors did not result in actionable behavior. To the extent that the parties would like to bring this matter to a close and resolve it in the interests of justice, the Court is willing to offer the services of Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson to assist in post-dismissal negotiations. If the Court may be of assistance in this matter, the parties should contact Lowell Lindquist, Calendar Clerk for Judge Donovan W. Frank at 651-848-1296, or Vicki Miller, Calendar Clerk for Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson at 218-529-3520.
Thus, for the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs Virginia and Brian Larson and Christopher Larsons' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 72 in Civil No. 02-3611) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 18 in Civil No. 02-4095) are GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs Virginia and Brian Larson and Christopher Larsons' oral Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record is GRANTED.
3. Defendant Independent School District No. 361's Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 15 in Civil No. 02-4095) is GRANTED.
4. Defendant Independent School District No. 361's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11 in Civil No. 02-4095) for claims brought against it pursuant to the IDEA is DENIED.
5. Defendants Independent School District No. 361, Superintendent Percy Lingen, and Principal Gerald Hilfer's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76 in Civil No. 02-3611) as to the 13 state and federal claims alleged against them in Plaintiffs' October 1, 2002, Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
6. Defendants Koochiching County Community Services, Terry Murray, and Jan Derdowski's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 67 in Civil No. 02-3611) as to all claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.