Opinion
No. 2:13-cv-01175 JAM-EFB
01-10-2014
DANIEL CARLOS CHIRAMBERRO LARRATEGUI, Petitioner, v. VALERIA EGUIGUREN LABORDE, Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
RETURN OF CHILD WITH
UNDERTAKINGS
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Daniel Carlos Chiramberro Larrategui's ("Petitioner") Petition for Return of Child (Doc. #9). Respondent Valeria Eguiguren Laborde ("Respondent") opposed Petitioner's motion (Doc. #19) and Petitioner replied (Doc. #21). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Petition for Return of Child with undertakings.
Beginning on December 2, 2013, and through December 5, 2013, the Court held a bench trial and heard testimony from Petitioner; Respondent; Ramon Valezquez; Ricardo Arrendondo, Deputy Consul General at the Consulate General of the Argentine Republic in Los Angeles; C. Joanne Crawford, Ph.D ("Dr. Crawford"); Maria-Pilar Bernal-Estevez, M.D.("Dr. Bernal"); Arghya Chakraverty; Susana Deol; and Alicia Groba. Numerous exhibits, including affidavits from percipient witnesses, were also submitted by the parties for the Court's consideration. Following the bench trial, the parties submitted post-trial supplemental briefing on December 16, 2013 (Doc. ##50-54). For the reasons set forth below and upon review of the petition, testimony, exhibits, briefing, and all arguments made, the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner and Respondent were both born in Argentina.
2. They met and began dating in 1996 and began cohabitating in 1997.
3. S.C. was born in Argentina in December 1999.
4. Petitioner is the father of S.C.
5. Respondent is the mother of S.C.
6. In or about 2002, Petitioner and Respondent separated when S.C. was two years old.
7. When the parties separated, S.C. resided primarily with Respondent, but Petitioner frequently spent time with S.C.
8. When S.C. was about two to three years old, she was diagnosed with Developmental Dysphasia.
9. In Argentina, through the Hospital Aleman, S.C. was under the care of numerous physicians and mental health professionals, including Dr. Hernan Amartino ("Dr. Amartino").
10. In Argentina, S.C. was attending Colegio Bilingue Armonia.
11. Armonia is a school that integrates students with Special Education Needs
12. In 2006, Respondent began discussing with Petitioner the possibility of S.C. relocating to the United States in the spring of 2007.
13. In 2007, Respondent moved to the United States from Argentina. She is currently married and has a son of approximately three and a half years old.
14. When Respondent left to the United States, Petitioner cared for S.C.
15. Child custody proceedings occurred in Argentina beginning in 2007.
16. In 2010, an Argentina court granted Petitioner full custody of S.C.
17. Beginning in 2009, S.C. began experiencing emotional outbursts.
18. In November 2012, through an Argentina court order, Respondent was allowed to bring S.C. to the United States from December 13, 2012, until January 29, 2013.
Both parties have submitted substantial evidence regarding the Argentina court system and earlier custody proceedings. The evidence deals directly with custody and visitation issues, which Respondent has not fully litigated in Argentina, and therefore, have little bearing on the issues before this Court. Accordingly, the Court makes no further findings of facts or conclusions of law regarding the Argentina Court system or the custody proceedings.
19. S.C. did not return to Argentina by January 29, 2013.
20. S.C. is currently enrolled at Monte Vista Middle School, a public school in San Joaquin County.
21. Argyua Chakraverty ("Mr. Chakraverty") is S.C.'s English Language Development ("ELD") teacher at Monte Vista Middle School.
22. Suzanna Deol ("Ms. Deol") is the school counselor at Monte Vista Middle School.
23. In the United States, S.C. was evaluated by Dr. Crawford in 2012 and then again in 2013.
24. Dr. Crawford determined that S.C. "runs the risk of psychotic breakdown, and if not supported adequately is in danger of developing a Borderline Personality Disorder."
25. A medical group, including Dr. Bernal, from Kaiser Permanente Spectrum Disorder Center evaluated S.C. on April 24, 2013.
26. The Kaiser Permanente medical group diagnosed S.C. with Borderline Intellectual Functioning and a mood disorder. 27. S.C. is currently attending weekly therapy sessions.
II. OPINION
A.Legal Standard
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Convention") was adopted in 1980 with the goal of securing "the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States." Convention, Preamble, 19 I.L.M. 1501, 1501; 1980 WL 115586 (1980). Both the United States and Argentina are signatories to the Convention. Id. The United States implemented the Convention through the enactment of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.
Under the Convention and ICARA, a court must order the return of a "wrongfully" abducted child to the parent from whom she was taken. Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a "wrongful" removal or retention. See § 11603(e)(1). The respondent then bears the burden of establishing the applicability of any of the affirmative defenses set out by the Convention to prevent the child's repatriation. § 11603(e)(2). The affirmative defense at issue here would defeat or delay the return of a child wrongfully removed or retained if "there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." Convention, art. 13(b) ("grave risk exception"), 19 I.L.M. 1501, 1502. The grave risk exception must be established by clear and convincing evidence. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
B. Discussion
Petitioner seeks the return of his daughter, S.C., to Argentina. Respondent does not dispute that S.C. is a habitual resident of Argentina and is being wrongfully retained in the United States, but she argues that S.C. should not be returned because of the Convention's exception for cases in which the child would face a grave risk of psychological harm if returned to the non-abducting parent. Respondent's Post Trial Brief, Doc. #50, at 4. Respondent had also raised the affirmative defense under Article 20 of the Convention for protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the affirmative defense under Article 13 for a mature child's objection in her brief in opposition to the Petition (Doc. #19). However, she did not argue their application at trial or in her post-trial brief and consequently, the Court finds that these affirmative defenses have been abandoned. Therefore, the sole issue before the Court is whether by clear and convincing evidence, there is a grave risk that S.C.'s return to Argentina would expose her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation.
1. Grave Risk Exception
Respondent argues that S.C. is in grave risk of physical and psychological harm because S.C. has serious medical and mental health needs and the resources in place in Argentina, including Petitioner's understanding of S.C.'s needs, are gravely inadequate to provide the necessary care to S.C. Petitioner argues that Respondent has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that S.C. is in grave risk if she returns to Argentina.
The grave risk exception should be "narrowly drawn." Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 508-09 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009)). "[T]he exception for grave harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest. Rather, the question is whether the child would suffer serious abuse, that is a great deal more than minimal." Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Ninth Circuit has further held that a parent may establish a grave risk to defeat or delay the return of a child "by showing that it would disrupt an ongoing course of medical treatment and severely impact the child's health. But the parent would have to provide clear and convincing evidence both (1) of the child's serious medical needs and (2) of the home country's inability to provide the necessary care." Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d at 511 (numbering added). In Cuellar, the father, argued, in part, that Panama lacked the medical services that the child needed to treat "ataxia," which is a lack of coordination that may be symptomative of a number of underlying neurological conditions. Id. The court held that there was no clear and convincing evidence of a medical condition. Id. Even if the record did support a conclusion that the child exhibited ataxia, there was no evidence that the child was undergoing a regular course of treatment in the United States or that treatment was not available in Panama. Id. Although the father testified that Panama lacked the medical services that the child needed, there was no evidence about the Panamanian health system or that the father had any specialized knowledge about it. Id. Therefore, the court held that there was no basis to conclude that returning the child to Panama would pose a grave risk of harm. Id.
a. Child's Serious Medical Needs
Here, Petitioner provided the Court with medical evaluations of S.C. by Dr. Crawford. Dr. Crawford evaluated S.C. and diagnosed her with dysthymic disorder, mixed receptive expressive language disorder, learning disorder NOS, disorder of Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence NOS. Psychological Report, February 24, 2012, Ex. 63, at 5. In her follow up report, Dr. Crawford recommended S.C. undergo neuropsychological assessment and she also determined that S.C. "runs the risk of psychotic breakdown, and if not supported adequately is in danger developing a Borderline Personality Disorder." Psychological Report, January 29, 2013, Ex. 64, at 5-6. Petitioner argues that Dr. Crawford's reports and testimony should be given little weight because only Respondent hired Dr. Crawford and therefore, her testimony and reports are not neutral. However, nothing in her testimony or reports reflects any strong bias to affect her credibility.
Respondent also provided the Court with a Multidisciplinary Evaluation Summary, conducted by the Kaiser Permanente Spectrum Disorder Center and overseen by Dr. Bernal. Multidisciplinary Evaluation Summary, Ex. 62. Based on this evaluation, S.C. was diagnosed with Borderline Intellectual Functioning. In addition, Dr. Bernal testified that Borderline Intellectual Functioning may manifest many different symptoms, including dysphasia—a language delay. S.C. was also diagnosed with a mood disorder. Id. at 12. In support of the mood disorder diagnosis, Petitioner and Petitioner's mother, Alicia Gobra, also testified that S.C. suffers emotional outbursts. The evaluation summary adds that S.C.'s "difficulties put her at risk for developing more stress, depression, and anxiety, as she gets older. [S.C.] is likely to have difficulties negotiating the multiple and complex demands of the higher school grades. She should be carefully monitored for increases in mood disorder symptoms resulting from the increased demands expected of her." Id. Respondent asserts that the Court should disregard the report and Dr. Bernal's testimony because the evaluation was not neutral and the evaluating team, including Dr. Bernal, did not have accurate information. Although during trial Dr. Bernal testified that knowing more about S.C. would have been valuable, she did not state or suggest that it would have changed the diagnosis.
Based on these evaluations, S.C. is currently undergoing a regular course of treatment in the United States, including weekly therapy sessions. Respondent is also following the general behavioral guidelines recommended in the Multidisciplinary Evaluation Summary for S.C., which has helped control S.C.'s emotional outbursts according to Respondent's testimony. Multidisciplinary Evaluation Summary, Ex. 62, at 14-19.
Therefore, unlike the district court's finding in Cuellar (i.e., that the child suffered of "ataxia," which was based on testimony and written statements made by an unidentified physician, a professor, and a registered nurse), here, there is substantial and credible evidence to show that S.C. has Borderline Intellectual Functioning and a mood disorder that may develop into a more serious condition, including a Borderline Personality Disorder. Furthermore, there is evidence that there is an ongoing course of medical treatment. Accordingly, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that S.C. has serious medical needs.
b. Home Country's Inability to Provide the Necessary Care
i. Medical Care
Respondent argues that in Argentina, S.C. does not have a support system that can actively work with her every day as recommended by Dr. Bernal. Petitioner testified and provided affidavits about the medical care S.C. was receiving in Argentina before arriving to the United States. However, the only recognized diagnosis in Argentina was of dysphasia, which as mentioned above is merely a symptom of S.C.'s condition. See e.g. Dr. Roger's Note (Diagnosis), Ex. 20 (translation), at 1; Medical Record, Ex. 67 (translation), at 1-4.
Nevertheless, although she was only diagnosed with dysphasia, she was under constant medical care in Argentina. See Medical Treatment Records, Ex. 9-11. In addition, both Dr. Bernal and Dr. Crawford testified they knew little about the Argentinian health system and neither felt comfortable making broad statements about the services S.C. could receive in Argentina. Further, Dr. Crawford in the January 29, 2013, Psychological Report stated that "[t]he Argentinean assessments though through [sic] in many ways, did not assess these areas of psychological functioning, and this is definitely needed." Psychological Report, January 29, 2013, Ex. 64, at 5. Therefore, even though the assessments did not asses specific areas of psychological functioning, she recognized that the assessments were thorough. Moreover, during trial, neither doctor fundamentally disagreed with the Argentinian assessments.
In her post-trial brief, Respondent argues that "there is no more health insurance in Argentina for S.C. which calls into question whether she will even be provided any treatment at all," but there is no evidence that S.C. will lack insurance in Argentina. Respondent's Post-Trial Brief at 25 n.2. During the trial, Respondent testified that she did not know who would be S.C.'s health care providers if she were to return to Argentina. In addition, there is no evidence that Respondent is knowledgeable about the limits of the Argentinian health system and any testimony about S.C.'s possible treatments in Argentina would be speculation. Finally, after receiving the microarray genetic study conducted here in the United States, Dr. Amartino, stated, "This result, obtained through state of the art technology (not available in Argentina up to this date) confirms previous diagnostic assumptions and changes nothing in the therapeutic expectations, being multimodal rehabilitation and integrated education the right treatments that the girl must continue getting permanently as she was until the end of 2012." Letter by Dr. Amartino, Ex. 17 (translation), at 1. Thus, even though Dr. Amartino admitted that the technology used to diagnose S.C. is currently unavailable in Argentina, he believes that continued therapy is necessary.
Therefore, while the Argentinian assessments of S.C. were incomplete, there is insufficient evidence that S.C. cannot receive the medical care she requires in Argentina. At best, the evidence demonstrates that S.C.'s medical care in the United States may be better than that provided to her in Argentina. Regardless, the comparison of whether one country's medical opportunities are better than another's does not constitute a grave risk of harm as contemplated by the drafters of the Hague Convention nor is it within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 11603. In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 156 (E.D. N.Y. 2001); Public Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10,510 (March 26, 1986). Accordingly, Respondent has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that S.C.'s home country is unable to provide the necessary care and, therefore, no grave risk of harm if S.C. is returned to Argentina is present in this case.
ii. Education
Respondent also argues that Argentina cannot meet S.C.'s educational needs. She testified that S.C. was struggling while attending Armonia in Argentina and was denied participation in English classes. See Respondent's Post-Trial Brief at 7-8. In addition, Mr. Chakraverty and Ms. Deol testified that while studying here in the United States, S.C. has made progress in learning English and controlling her emotional outbursts. However, Armonia is a school that integrates students with Special Education Needs and S.C. had an integrated teacher while she attended Armonia. December 2012 School Statement, Ex. 25 (translation); Gutierrez Statement, Ex. 28 (translation). Although Respondent disputes whether S.C. had a private teacher, she concedes that S.C. was integrated at Armonia and had an integrated teacher. Respondent's Post-Trial Brief at 7.
While S.C. may be making progress, the evidence falls short of meeting the burden of proof in this case. Adequate education is available in Argentina and in no way creates a grave risk of harm. Accordingly, the Court finds that Argentina is capable of meeting S.C.'s educational needs.
2. Intolerable Situation
Respondent urges the Court to consider the meaning of "intolerable situation" under Article 13(b) as a separate exception. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner's inability to address his daughter's needs on a daily basis creates an intolerable situation.
Respondent relies on the law review article by Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Switzerland's Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 335 (2008). Mr. Weiner believes that "intolerable situation" and "grave risk of harm" are separate exceptions and "something may create an 'intolerable situation' for the child, yet not cause the child a 'grave risk of physical or psychological harm.'" Id. at 348. He believes that courts in the United States should adopt the Swiss formulation of "intolerable situation," which exists when the following criteria are met: "a. placement with the parent who filed the application is manifestly not in the child's best interests; b. the abducting parent is not, given all of the circumstances, in a position to take care of the child in the State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the abduction or if this cannot reasonably be required from this parent; and c. placement in foster care is manifestly not in the child's best interests." Id. at 343.
Even if the Court were to accept Respondent's contention that "intolerable situation" is a separate exception, she has failed to establish the exception here by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner's testimony demonstrated that he was unaware of S.C.'s needs while she was in Argentina as evidenced by his inability to give concrete examples of how he has personally addressed S.C.'s medical and psychological needs. When pressed by the Court, Petitioner only gave an example about him fulfilling her desire to take voice lessons. In addition, Dr. Crawford in her report, found that Petitioner cares for S.C. "but does not have much sense as to what a child['s] basic physical and psychological needs are." Psychological Report, January 29, 2013, Ex. 64, at 6. There is also evidence to suggest that Petitioner has ignored S.C.'s hygiene, such as S.C. having lice, and evidence suggesting that Petitioner was sleeping in the same bed as S.C. until she was 12 and Petitioner still bathed her at that age. See Declaration of Cecilia Eguiguren Laborde, Ex. 52, at 4; Psychological Report, February 24, 2012, Ex. 63, at 1-2.
However, this evidence at most creates an uncertainty of whether Petitioner will be able to provide the necessary care if S.C. were returned to Argentina now that he knows she has been diagnosed with Borderline Intellectual Functioning and a mood disorder. In addition, the evidence of S.C.'s hygiene and her relationship with her father are troubling but there is no evidence of abuse or a serious health risk. See Cuellar, 596 F.3d at 509-10 (holding that there was no grave risk despite evidence that the child suffered a head injury, was sometimes cared for by a sick relative, had frequent ear infections, and had unexplained burns behind her earlobes); Stirzaker v. Beltran, 2010 WL 1418388, at *8 (D. Idaho 2010) (holding that there was no grave risk despite evidence that the child was having difficulty in school and behavioral problems because of the father's abuse in the form of inappropriate touching and nudity in the home because it was not the court's role to determine the appropriateness of one's behaviors or to resolve the parties' custody dispute). Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to meet the high standard of clear and convincing evidence required to show that returning S.C. to Argentina is manifestly not in the child's best interest. Given that Respondent has failed to meet Mr. Weiner's first criteria, the Court need not address the remaining two. Accordingly, Respondent has failed to show that S.C. would otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation.
3. Undertakings
Courts have the authority to impose conditions, known as undertakings, to ensure that a potential harm does not manifest when a child returns to his or her country of habitual residence. Krefter v. Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 137 (D. Mass. 2 009); see also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 0)("A potential grave risk of harm can, at times, be mitigated sufficiently by the acceptance of undertakings and sufficient guarantees of performance of those undertakings.") Several courts have recognized that "even when a grave risk of harm is not present, that undertakings should be used 'to ensure that a potential harm does not manifest when a child returns to his or her country of habitual residence.'" Rial v. Rijo, 1:10-CV-01578-RJH, 2010 WL 1643995, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010)(citing Krefter, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (D. Mass. 2009)); Kufner v. Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d 491, 515 n. 34 (D.R.I. 2007) ("[W]here the potential for harm is real, even if it does not meet the Article 13(b) definitions, this Court believes it has an obligation to attempt to ensure that it does not manifest") aff'd, 519 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2008); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995) (if "an unqualified return order would be detrimental," "the court should investigate the adequacy of undertakings . . . to ensure that [the child] does not suffer short term harm")).
Here, both parties have argued that undertakings are either unnecessary or do not eliminate the potential harm and, as mentioned above, there is no grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). However, there is a potential for harm if S.C. is returned to Argentina and the Court has an obligation to attempt to ensure that it does not manifest. First, based on Dr. Crawford's report, which emphasized S.C.'s need for her mother, Respondent should have a continued role in S.C.'s life and therefore, Respondent should be allowed consistent access to and visitation with S.C. Second, it is clear that S.C. is in need of immediate and continuing counseling and therapy for her Borderline Intellectual Functioning and mood disorder. Accordingly, the Court imposes narrowly focused undertakings outlined below to ensure that S.C. receives the necessary medical treatments and ensures that Respondent is allowed access to and visitation with S.C. See Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (adopting similar undertakings to ensure that the children received medical care and the respondent was allowed to visit the children).
4. Attorney's Fees
Petitioner requests attorney's fees under Article 26 of the Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b) . However, Petitioner has neither stated the amount sought nor included an affidavit itemizing all costs requested and detailing the services rendered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i); L.R. 293. Accordingly, Petitioner shall file a separate motion for attorney's fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND UNDERTAKINGS
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes as follows:
1. S.C.'s country of habitual residence is Argentina.
2. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that S.C. was wrongfully retained in the United States by Respondent within the meaning of the Convention and ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603.
3. Respondent failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that returning S.C. to Argentina would expose her to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm under Article 13(b) of the Convention and ICARA, § 11603(e)(2)(A).
4. Respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that returning S.C. to Argentina would otherwise place her in an intolerable situation under Article 13(b) of the Convention and ICARA, § 11603(e)(2)(A).
5. The Court finds that Petitioner does not have the same level of understanding and appreciation for S.C.'s emotional and psychological needs as Respondent. Petitioner has, at times, also isolated S.C. from Respondent without good cause (i.e., because of his own animosity toward Respondent S.C. has not been allowed visits with her mother). These shortcomings may place S.C. at risk but do not, in and of themselves, create a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation such that the Petition should be denied. However, because the Court holds that there is a potential for harm, undertakings are necessary.
Given these conclusions, the Petition is granted. This Order is subject to the following undertakings:
1. Petitioner shall provide written proof to this Court that he has, in place, a plan under which S.C. will obtain the necessary medical treatment in Argentina for her Borderline Intellectual Functioning and mood disorder. This written plan should include a description of the type and duration of medical services that will be provided to S.C. as well as a list of S.C.'s proposed health care providers and therapists in Argentina. Petitioner's submission to this Court should also include a specific description as to how Petitioner plans to pay for S.C.'s health care needs.
2. Petitioner shall submit a declaration under penalty of perjury that states that he will make a good faith effort to reach an agreement with Respondent within thirty (30) days of this Order that will be presented to the appropriate court in Argentina for approval as a court ordered visitation regime.
3. Petitioner shall submit an amended "Order Directing the Return of S.C. to Argentina" for the Court's approval. Petitioner is to include in this proposed order a specific date, time, and location--other than the San Joaquin County District Attorney's Office--as to when S.C. is to be delivered to him. The Court will not execute this Order until it is satisfied that Petitioner has complied with Undertakings 1 and 2. The Court will also not allow S.C. to be delivered to anyone other than Petitioner or, with the permission of Petitioner, S.C.'s grandmother, Alicia Groba, for return to Argentina.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Petition for Return of Child. The Court recognizes that the law compels this result. If, however, this were a best interest of the child case, this Order would not be in the best interest of S.C. Petitioner obtained the victory he wanted, but this is a Pyrrhic victory. As S.C. grows older, parental challenges will arise and she will be better off if Petitioner and Respondent are not at odds with one another. S.C. is a child with significant needs and developmental challenges that can only be met with the involvement and support of both of her parents. Any attempt by either parent to raise S.C. alone is doomed to failure and could result in serious and permanent damage to her. Accordingly, the Court strongly urges the parties here to act only in the best interests of their daughter and quickly resolve the custody and visitation issues before the court in Argentina.
Any motion for attorney's fees by Petitioner shall be filed within twenty (20) days of this Order. Respondent shall have ten (10) days from date of service to file her brief in response, asserting why the requested award is "clearly inappropriate." See 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3). Petitioner may file a reply brief within ten (10) days of Respondent's brief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE