Opinion
C. A. 3:22-2599-SAL-PJG
10-10-2023
Tim Landholt, Plaintiff, v. Kendall Corley; Jeanette McBride, in her official capacity as Clerk of Court for Richland County, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tim Landholt brings this civil action against Defendant Jeanette McBride, the Richland County Clerk of Court, and Defendant Kendall Corley, a former deputy clerk of court for Richland County. Landholt originally filed this action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, naming Richland County and John and Jane Roe as defendants. Corley was added as a defendant by “consent” of Richland County on July 20, 2021 (ECF No. 1-1 at 1), but Corley has no association with Richland County and Corley was not served with process until August 1, 2022. On August 8, 2022, Corley removed this action with the consent of Richland County. Landholt filed an Amended Complaint on December 22, 2022, removing Richland County as a defendant and, for the first time, naming Corley and Defendant Jeanette McBride as defendants in a pleading.
This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' cross motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 36 & 37.) The motions are fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 41, 42, 43, & 44.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes Landholt's motion should be denied and the defendants' motion granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. On March 13, 2014, a judge with the Richland County Family Court issued a bench warrant for Landholt's arrest for failure to appear at a hearing. Landholt was arrested by a Richland County sheriff's deputy on March 28, 2014 while making a child support payment at the Richland County Family Court and was immediately brought before the court for a contempt hearing. The court ordered Landholt to pay arrearages and instructed the sheriff's deputy to release him. However, Defendant Kendall Corley, a deputy clerk of court at that time, failed to recall the bench warrant that had been executed.
Five years later, on August 23, 2019, a different Richland County sheriff's deputy arrested Landholt pursuant to the 2014 bench warrant that had already been executed. Landholt was held in jail for three days before he was released-apparently once it was determined that Landholt had previously been arrested pursuant to the 2014 bench warrant.
Landholt's Amended Complaint lists three causes of action. Landholt first lists a “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” in which he asserts that “Plaintiff was served the Warrant upon which Corley negligently and grossly negligently failed to cancel” and that “Corley's acts and omissions constituted an unlawful seizing, confinement[,] and detention of Plaintiff['s] person proximately causing a violation of Plaintiff's Due Process, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth[,] and Fourteenth Amendment rights protecting against such unlawful seizure and confinement.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 21 at 3-4.) Landholt next lists “Negligence, Gross Negligence[,] and Recklessness,” asserting that “Plaintiff was served the Warrant on August 23, 2019 for a second time as a result of Defendants' negligent and grossly negligent failure to cancel the Warrant.” (Id. at 4.) Third, Landholt lists “Negligence per se,” asserting “Defendants failed in their various mandatory, ministerial[,] and non-discretionary duties as a deputy clerk of the Court pursuant to S.C. Code § 14-17-60 and S.C. Code § 14-17-220 and to [sic] include the transmission of warrants to the Richland County Sheriff's Department, cancellation and/or withdrawal of said warrants upon Court execution[,] and/or withdrawal upon learning a warrant had been incorrectly transmitted.” (Id. at 5.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Landholt's Claims
The defendants argue that Landholt fails to put forth evidence that Corley violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, the defendants argue that Landholt's allegation that Corley was negligent in failing to recall the bench warrant is insufficient to find liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants also argue that Landholt fails to identify any evidence that would show that Corley's conduct rose above mere negligence and is therefore actionable under § 1983. The court agrees.
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Initially, the court notes that it is unclear as to what constitutional violation is asserted by Landholt. The first cause of action listed in the Complaint is a “violation of” § 1983, rather than a specific constitutional provision. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 21 at 3-4.) See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (stating that § 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ”) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Even more confusing, the cause of action lists violations of four different constitutional amendments-the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth; as well as and two different clauses-Due Process and Search and Seizure. Nor is the conduct complained of-failure to cancel an executed bench warrant-obviously covered by one of the constitutional amendments or clauses listed. The defendants appear equally perplexed, but construe the claim as one for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 37-1 at 5.) As Landholt does not appear to object to that construction or clarify his claim in his briefing, the court also construes this claim as one for unlawful seizure.
The Fourth Amendment may not be the proper analytical framework in this case, as it ia undisputed that Corley was not involved in the actual “seizure” of Landholt, nor can a deputy clerk initiate legal process himself. See generally Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1346 (2022) (describing a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim as “a claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process”); but see id. at 1346 (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a physical detention should be an element of a malicious prosecution claim).
Regardless, negligent conduct will not give rise to an actionable claim under § 1983. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (“[Liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating that negligent conduct by a state official does not constitute a deprivation of the Due Process Clause, even if it causes injury); accord Miller v. Prince George's Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627-28 (4th Cir. 2007) (Fourth Amendment violations). This principle has been applied to state officials' ministerial mistakes. See Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding a prisoner could not maintain an access to courts claim against a prison official based on the official's negligent misfiling of the plaintiff's money order, stating that constitutional deprivations only become actionable when they are intentional or deliberate). Indeed, the defendants identify a nearly identical case in which the Fourth Circuit held that the state clerks' unintentional failure to recall a bench warrant that led to the plaintiff's arrest was not actionable under § 1983. See Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 579 (4th Cir. 1989). Citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332, the Fourth Circuit found that the clerks' failure to recall the warrant was “at most a lack of due care” or negligence. Mitchell, 872 F.2d at 579. Consequently, Landholt's allegations and arguments on summary judgment that Corley was merely negligent in his failure to recall the bench warrant are plainly insufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to § 1983 upon which relief can be granted.
Further, Landholt fails to point to any evidence in the record that Corley acted with intentionality or deliberativeness. See Pink, 52 F.3d at 74-75. Corley testified that he did not recall Landholt's case and he does not know Landholt. (Corley Dep., ECF No. 36-4 at 2.) Corley testified that he drafted the family court's order releasing Landholt, which he knew only because the order was in his handwriting (id), but Corley did not recall why the sheriff's department continued to hold on to the bench warrant after Landholt was released and he did not know whether he had any involvement in, or a duty to recall, the bench warrant. (Id. at 13-14.) Janet Irvine, another Richland County Family Court employee, testified that because Corley wrote the order in Landholt's case, Corley was responsible for recalling the warrant from the sheriff's department. (Irvine Dep., ECF No. 36-5 at 10.)
Therefore, at most, Landholt presents some evidence that Corley was responsible for recalling the bench warrant from the sheriff's department, but none of the evidence shows that Corley took any affirmative action to intentionally or deliberately fail to recall the warrant and deprive Landholt of his rights. For that matter, Landholt fails to put forth any evidence that Corley was actually the cause of the bench warrant not being recalled. Based on the record before the court, it is speculative that the bench warrant was not recalled because of an act or omission by Corley. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[Constitutional torts . . . require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986). Landholt has identified only the procedure that was supposed to ensure the bench warrant was recalled, without presenting any evidence as to what actually happened.Consequently, Landholt fails to put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Corley is liable for a deprivation of Landholt's rights pursuant to § 1983.
As the record does not support an inference that Corley was at fault in failing to recall the bench warrant, the court declines to address the defendants' assertion that Corley would enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for such an act. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 37-1 at 9-10.)
2. South Carolina Tort Claims Act
The defendants argue that they are immune from Landholt's negligence claims because the South Carolina Tort Claims Act does not countenance liability for loss resulting from administration actions or inactions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. The court agrees.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq., is the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity. S.C. Code Ann. § 1578-70. The Act provides that the State, its agencies, political subdivisions, and other governmental entities are “liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” subject to certain limitations and exemptions provided in the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40. “The governmental entity asserting the Act as an affirmative defense bears the burden of establishing a limitation upon liability or an exception to the waiver of immunity.” Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 563 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
In its list of exceptions to the waiver of immunity, the Act provides, “The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from: (1) legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial action or inaction; (2) administrative action or inaction of a legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial nature[.]” S.C Code Ann. § 15-78-60 (1-2); see also Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juv. Just., 566 S.E.2d 536, 540 (S.C. 2002) (stating courts look to the nature and function of the act to determine whether a state actor is entitled to immunity for judicial or quasi-judicial action). Here, the act or omission asserted by Landholt is the failure to recall a bench warrant pursuant to an order of the court. In both nature and function, such an act falls under administrative action or inaction that is judicial or quasi-judicial. See, e.g., DeSoto Cty. v. T.D., 160 So.3d 1154, 1156 (Miss. 2015) (finding a state court clerk's failure to notify a sheriff's office that a bench warrant was cancelled is an “administrative duty” that was “judicial in nature,” and thus, the clerk was immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act's exclusion for “judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a judicial nature”). Consequently, the defendants are immune from Landholt's claims based on a failure to recall the bench warrant.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that Landholt's motion for summary judgment be denied and the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).