Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7729.
March 30, 2005
ORDER
This is an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff claims that he was terminated in retaliation for his exercise of rights provided by the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Pending is defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion shall be denied.
Background
Plaintiff was a quality inspector before he went on FMLA leave. On his return, he was told to report to a line assembly job, which was a lower position. The defendant claims that the plaintiff had asked not to return to his former job. Plaintiff says that's not so, and that he made his desire to return to his original position clear.
In addition to instructing the plaintiff to work on the assembly line, the defendant asked, and, after plaintiff refused its request, instructed the plaintiff to sign a personnel action form relating to the line assignment. Plaintiff told the defendant's Human Relations Director that he was being stupid, and that he should read the FMLA guidelines.
Defendant contends that plaintiff would not have waived his claim that his transfer to the line violated the FMLA if he had signed the form. For purposes of this ruling, that does not overcome the effect of the evidence that the defendant told the plaintiff that he would be fired if he did not sign the form. If such is the case, the defendant may, however, present evidence to the jury that it told the plaintiff that signing the form did not affect his ability to exercise and/or assert his FMLA rights.
When plaintiff continued to refuse to sign the form, defendant told him that he would be terminated if he did not sign the form. Plaintiff stated that he would work in the new position, but he would not sign the form.
At this point, the parties agree, plaintiff lost his temper. In addition, he suggested to the defendant that it call the police. Defendant did so, and after officers arrived, they escorted the plaintiff from the defendant's premises.
Defendant states that it terminated the plaintiff due to insubordination (calling the HR Director "stupid" and refusing to sign the personnel action form) and out of concern about the potential consequences of permitting an enraged employee working on an assembly line producing brake parts.
Discussion
In response to this articulated statement of reasons, plaintiff argues: 1) he could not properly be terminated for his refusal to sign a form that was related to a non-consensual FMLA-violative transfer from his original position; and 2) the defendant's assertion that it terminated plaintiff on the basis of safety-related concerns relative to his working on the assembly line is an afterthought, as that reason for its actions was not expressed to the plaintiff at the time he left the plant.
I conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to defendant's motivation when it terminated the plaintiff. If its decision was based on plaintiff's refusal to sign a personnel action form that was being presented to him as result of an FMLA-violative transfer (as plaintiff contends), then defendant's motivation is improper. If, however, defendant's decision was based on plaintiff's concerns with allowing plaintiff to return to the line, then defendant's motivation was proper.
This is, in my view, a "mixed motives" case. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). As such, once the plaintiff "shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision . . . [the defendant has] the burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive." Id. at 249.
Here, a jury could find that the defendant terminated the plaintiff because of his refusal to sign the personnel action form, though such refusal was based on plaintiff's exercise of his FMLA right to return to his original position. If so, the burden then is on the defendant to persuade the jury that, in addition to such motivation, it fired the plaintiff when it did because of its concerns with allowing him to return to the line. Whether that was the defendant's motivating reason is for the jury to decide.
No decision is being made with regard to the issue of defendant's offer to plaintiff to return to work at his original position and at the same rate of pay, but without back pay or the extent to which such offer capped the extent to which plaintiff can recover backpay.
In light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED THAT defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of retaliation for exercise of FMLA rights, be and the same hereby is overruled.
So ordered.