Summary
finding Younger abstention improper where plaintiff's federal claims were based on alleged conspiracy between Department of Children and Family Services and plaintiff's wife
Summary of this case from Matrai v. HiramotoOpinion
No. C 01-1075 MJJ.
August 31, 2004
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit stemming from a child custody dispute. This is a factually complex case in which Plaintiffs — a father and his three children — are suing the Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services ("Department") and its employees (collectively, "County Defendants"), and their former family physician, Dr. Linda Wilcox. In 1997, Thomas Lahey and his wife began a highly acrimonious divorce and custody battle amidst allegations on both sides of child abuse and domestic violence. Eventually, Mr. Lahey lost custody of two of his three children. He now sues in federal court, alleging a conspiracy among the Defendants to deprive him of his civil and constitutional rights. Defendant Wilcox and the County Defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment. Because Defendants have not demonstrated that either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or Younger abstention doctrine preclude an examination of this case in federal district court, as they assert, the overall motion for summary judgment is denied. However, because Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden on each of the various federal causes of action, summary judgment on each federal count is granted. The remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1) and 1367 (c)(3).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Divorce and Custody Battle
Zohreh and Tom Lahey met as undergraduates at Notre Dame College in Belmont, California, in 1980 and married in January 1983. They remained together for fourteen years, producing three children during their marriage. Mary Doe was born in 1985, Jane Doe in 1987, and John Doe in 1995. According to Mrs. Lahey, an Iranian immigrant, the marriage was tolerable for the first year but deteriorated when she became pregnant in 1984. Smernes report, Wilcox Exh. F at 13. She complained that her husband could not control his anger and often became violent against both her and their kids. Id. She reported that "anything would make him angry. Table manners, anything. He would go off like that. He would hit the kids and I would try to prevent it." Id. She alleges that at various times he slapped her across the face, punched her in the chest, and chased her with a fork. At one point, he allegedly threw her down to the ground, causing her to have a miscarriage. Mrs. Lahey on occasion had pictures taken of her injuries — by her daughter and others — to document them. Mr. Lahey also allegedly abused her emotionally and mentally, saying that she "didn't have a brain" and that she was "mentally crazy." Id. He would also purportedly withhold letters from her mother in Iran and ask one of his children to translate them for him into English. Mrs. Lahey places much of the blame on Mr. Lahey's extended family, which she calls "irrational, controlling, abusive, inhumane and arrogant." Id. at 12. She alleges that her in-laws constantly degraded her, often for her Iranian heritage. Id. During their marriage and afterwards, Mrs. Lahey frequently called police or Child Protective Services ("CPS") and made allegations against her husband Pl.'s Exh. 65.
Mr. Lahey described his ex-wife as a "nice, polite, soft-spoken person" when they first met and began dating in 1980. Smernes report, Wilcox Exh. F at 6. However, he claims that her mental state deteriorated during their marriage. Id. Although he remembered the woman he married as "adept socially," Mr. Lahey later reported that after one of their children was born, "things were very bad. She got extreme, like a light switch, would go off for days. I made extreme efforts not to confront her." Id. He also said that he began distancing himself from his own family because his wife disliked him so much. Id. He denied that he had ever abused his wife, arguing that her documented injuries over the years were either self-inflicted or caused by someone else. Id. Mr. Lahey said he occasionally had to defend himself from his wife's "rages" and that he and his extended family all feared for the safety of their children. Id. He admitted to using corporal punishment with his children on two occasions, including one incident when he hit his eldest daughter with a coat hanger because he did not feel that spanking with a hand was sufficient punishment. Id. Although he admitted this, he denied leaving any marks on the child, despite evidence of bruises in the shape of a coat hangar. Id. at 11. He blamed his wife for causing those bruises. Id. He also admitted to police in June 1997 that he may have once pushed his eldest daughter into a doorjamb, and she sustained a bruise on her hip. Id. at 7. Mr. Lahey told police that if it occurred, it was likely because his daughter "was a little slow at tasks assigned." Id. He reported that he never used corporal punishment on his two younger children. He did, however, charge his wife with physically abusing their children, including pulling on their ears, and with having various mental illnesses. Id. at 17.
The marriage finally came to an end in September 1997 when police arrested Mr. Lahey for spousal abuse. Id. at 6. A violent argument erupted when Mr. Lahey came home from work and allegedly found that his wife had left their son alone in the house. Id. Police later took photos of Mrs. Lahey that showed that the "left side of her face [was] slightly swollen." Id. According to Mrs. Lahey, "I filed for separation because [her eldest daughter] said that I needed to do something. [She] was right. That was my wake-up call." Id. at 13. Mr. Lahey denied the charge that he beat his wife, saying that the injuries were self-inflicted. He offered to take a lie-detector test and claimed that his wife had doctored earlier photographs that showed her injuries. Id. at 6. When Mr. Lahey returned from police custody, he moved out of the house, leaving his children with his wife.
Although the divorce became final in June 1998, a bitterly contested custody battle continued for years, with each side accusing the other of mental illness, domestic violence, neglect, and child endangerment. Mr. Lahey charged that his ex-wife physically abused their children, punched their younger daughter in the nose and caused it to bleed, caused the children undue stress by dragging them into the custody battle, left their young son home alone on numerous occasions, and for years made false accusations against him to the police and to CPS. Mrs. Lahey, for her part, charged that her ex-husband physically and sexually abused their children, failed to provide for proper nutrition and health care, and used psychological tactics to turn the children against their mother.
CPS, the Department, the police, and the courts have had difficulty substantiating these allegations, and over the years custody of the children has been transferred back and forth between the parents. Although Mr. Lahey left his children with his wife when the marriage disintegrated in September 1997, the court awarded him temporary custody of the children two months later after a Family Court Services report indicated that Mrs. Lahey could be a danger to the children. Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 2. In September 1998, after an independent evaluation ordered by the court, custody reverted back to the mother. Smernes report, Wilcox Exh. F at 3. The report concluded that both daughters were at risk for suicide and that even their relationships with their therapists were "contaminated by the parents' conflict." Scannell report, Pl.'s Exh. 2 at 12. The report recommended that Mrs. Lahey have custody even though it documented her psychological problems, inability to cope, impulsive behavior, poor judgment, and emotional vulnerability. Id. Giving the mother custody would put them "at risk for physical abuse and poor judgment which could put them in harmful situations." Id. The alternative might be even worse. The report examined Mr. Lahey's aggression toward his children, inability to take blame or responsibility for his actions, and unhealthy dependency on others combined with a tendency to become angry at those on whom he depended, including his eldest daughter. Id. at 13. Faced with these unappealing alternatives, the report recommended — and the judge ordered — that Mrs. Lahey be given custody of the children in the family home, provided that they have a court-appointed supervisor live with them and help Mrs. Lahey "solve problems and defuse anger, prior to any physical altercations." Id. at 14. The court ordered that Mr. Lahey have bi-monthly visits, but that the supervisor handle the transfer of the children to avoid contact between the parents. Id. at 14.
On February 22, 1999, the court transferred custody back to Mr. Lahey after his ex-wife took their children out of school without permission and went to a Battered Women's Alternative shelter. Compl. at ¶ 29. Three days after the father got custody, however, CPS took the children into protective custody after 11-year-old Jane Doe alleged that her father sexually abused her beginning when she was six. Pl.'s Exh. 62. She told her therapist, who alerted CPS and the police, that Mr. Lahey would open the shower door and stare at her when she was showering, that he would on other occasions drop his own towel in front of her, and that he would play a "tickle game" with her that would involve him rubbing her genitalia. Id. Although the court later dismissed these allegations, the children were removed from Mr. Lahey's custody and placed with their babysitter and various others for the next six months. In July 1999, in order to regain custody of his children, Mr. Lahey stipulated to the court that he had engaged in domestic violence against his wife and that his children had witnessed such violence. Compl. at ¶ 33.
In September 1999, CPS recommended that Mr. Lahey be given permanent custody of the eldest daughter, Mary Doe, and that Mrs. Lahey receive custody of Jane and John Doe. Pl.'s Exh. 41 at 1: 21-23. The Department found that "Mrs. Lahey's parenting skills are very good as is her ability to deal with all three children simultaneously and provide appropriate care." Id. at 2: 10-12. CPS's first choice would be to keep the children together with their mother, but Mary wanted to live with her father. "Mrs. Lahey needs specific help with parenting skills with adolescents in this culture to help her deal with [Mary], who is the child whose behavior has been most obviously affected by the long history of parental conflict and by Mr. Lahey's continuing to draw [her] into this conflict. The Department has concerns about [Mary's] placement with her father given their history, the history of this case and some of the behaviors the social worker observed between the two during the three-hour observation." Id. at 2: 12-19. The court agreed with the recommendation and on September 13, 1999, awarded permanent custody of Mary to Mr. Lahey and of Jane and John to Mrs. Lahey. Pl.'s Exh. 42; Compl. at ¶ 35. On July 20, 2000, the Juvenile Court officially ended the dependency of the Doe children on the court. Compl. at ¶ 36.
The awarding of custody, however, did not settle the acrimony between the parties. During the ongoing dispute, various other allegations surfaced. Mary Doe accused her father of placing a pillow over John Doe's head to quiet him. Pl.'s Exh. 73 at 60: 21-23. Mr. Lahey accused his exwife of giving their son a black eye on one occasion and a broken arm on another, incidents for which she blamed Mr. Lahey. Id. at 63:19-21. Mr. Lahey also told CPS that he was afraid his ex-wife was so mentally ill that she would "put all of the children in a car and drive off a cliff." Wilcox Exh. E. He also accused his wife of having Munchausen's by Proxy Syndrome (MBPS), a disorder in which parents make constant false reports about their children's health in order to gain attention. Allegations also emerged about failure to care for the children, giving them lice, allowing them to walk around with splinters in their feet, violating court orders not to discuss the custody case with their children, and numerous other charges. Case workers with CPS reported that Mr. Lahey was verbally abusive with them, threatening to "break your back" and "break the back of the Department over this case." Id. at 70: 16-21. Mr. Lahey also allegedly threatened various doctors who had treated the children, including Defendant Wilcox, saying he would cause them to lose their licenses. According to a lawyer appointed for one of the children, "I've never seen such a contentious divorce action, and I think the effect it's had on all three children is abominable." Pl.'s Exh. 73 at 136: 18-20. In April 2000, Mary Doe told a CPS employee, "You know what I think? Both of my parents are crazy. . . . [T]here's just a war going on between them." Wilcox Exh. E.
Living with her father, Mary became very alienated from her mother, and John, living with his mother, began refusing to go see his father. He would kick and scream before going to see him, then wet his pants, have gastrointestinal problems, and have trouble sleeping for days afterwards. Wilcox Exh. E. In a status review report, CPS concluded that "[t]he children are still caught between the parent's [sic] conflict." Pl.'s Exh. 48 at 9:22-3. The report further noted:
This is a very complicated and difficult family situation in which both parents are at extreme odds with one another. Both parents would like to have all three children living with them. They both express concerns that the other is influencing the children against them. . . . It is difficult, however, to discern the truth in this highly conflictual case. History indicates that father physically and emotionally abused mother and children. Mother's therapist states that mother shows every indication of having been abused.Id. at 4:15-21.
2. Federal Suit
On March 15, 2001, Mr. Lahey, acting for himself and as guardian ad litem for his three children, filed the instant case in federal court against the Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services, six of its employees who had worked on his case, unknown employees and unknown policy makers of the Department, and Linda Wilcox, his children's former pediatrician. The 71-page complaint alleges various violations of the U.S. Constitution, the California Constitution, and state and federal law forming an "incomprehensible conspiracy perpetrated by defendants to defraud the court, plaintiffs, and taxpayers." Compl. at ¶ 31. Mr. Lahey alleges that the Department subjected him to continuing threats and intimidation and forced him to enter into a false stipulation before the court admitting domestic violence. He alleges that its employees perjured themselves before the court, conspired to deprive him of his children, maliciously trumped up charges of sexual abuse against him, hid exculpatory information from police, and ignored information about the unfitness of Mrs. Lahey to have custody of the children. In so doing, the Department and its employees allegedly violated California and federal law regulating the foster care system. Furthermore, Plaintiffs charge that the Department had an unwritten policy that instructed its employees to violate the law, ignore court orders, and deprive male parents in particular of their constitutional rights. Compl. at ¶ 32.
Specifically, Plaintiffs point to a number of instances of what they see as error on the part of the Department. First, they allege that the Department broke California law by removing the children from Mr. Lahey's house on February 25, 1999, after it received the allegation of sexual abuse against the father. Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants perjured themselves by indicating on a form submitted to the court that all three children were then living with their mother, when in fact they were living with their father. Compl. at ¶ 31. Third, Plaintiffs allege that the Department had an unwritten policy to discriminate against male parents by accepting at face value without investigation anything the mother said. Id. at ¶ 32. Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that the Department "repeatedly orally threatened and intimidated" Mr. Lahey by telling him he would never regain custody of his children unless he stipulated to the court that he had engaged in domestic violence against his wife in front of his children. Id. at ¶ 33. Fifth, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "intentionally and maliciously" forced Jane Doe to undergo additional therapy in order to "obtain testimony by fraud, duress, and undue influence for the purpose of further alienating" Jane Doe from her father. Id. at ¶ 39. Sixth, Defendants conspired to file false charges in 2000 against Mr. Lahey regarding sexual abuse of Jane Doe, even though such allegations had been initially reported the year before, investigated, and found by the court to be without merit. Id. at ¶¶ 40-60. Seventh, Plaintiffs charge that Defendants "failed to require the children's mother to undergo a psychiatric evaluation" despite evidence of paranoid ideation. Id. at ¶¶ 62-65. They also failed to pursue allegations that Mrs. Lahey suffered from Munchausen's by Proxy Syndrome and that she abused her children. Id. at ¶¶ 71-76. Eighth, Defendants conspired to reduce Mr. Lahey's visitation with his son despite some evidence that John Doe "likes his father a lot." Id. at ¶ 69.
The sexual abuse charges re-emerged in 2000 because Jane Doe began seeing a new therapist, who alerted CPS when Jane began providing details of the abuse.
From these charges, Plaintiffs filed eleven different causes of action:
1) Violation of, and conspiracy to violate, Plaintiffs' civil rights. Id. at ¶ 90. Plaintiffs allege that the Department and its employees violated his right to due process, privacy and family association by failing to implement standards concerning a) the duty to avoid perjury and suppression of evidence, b) the seizure and removal of children from their parents, c) continued separation from custodial parents, and d) placing children in foster care. Id. at ¶ 93. This failure violated Plaintiffs' rights under the 4th and 14th Amendment to the Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the California Constitution Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 24. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to force the Department to implement training to address these issues.
2) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq, which provides requirements for state foster care programs. Id. at ¶¶ 106-116. Plaintiffs make the same claims and requests the same injunctive relief as in the first claim.
3) Declaratory Relief. Id. at ¶ 117-121. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that Defendants need to follow the laws under 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. and California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 et seq, which implements the state foster care program.
4) Violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 et seq. Id. at ¶¶ 122-132. Plaintiffs make the same claims and requests the same injunctive relief as in the first claim.
5) Violation of U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs claim violations of substantive due process, procedural due process "and the right to be free from unreasonable, arbitrary and undue intrusions on their privacy, person and home." Id. at ¶ 134.
6) Violation of California Constitution. Plaintiffs claim violations of state constitutional guarantees of privacy, family association, and freedom from "unreasonable, arbitrary and undue intrusions on their privacy, person and home." Id. at ¶ 144.
7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id. at ¶¶ 153-163.
8) Failure to Discharge Statutory Duty under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6, which provides liability against state entities that fail to carry out mandatory duties. Id. at ¶¶ 164-172. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not comply with federal and state laws by failing to a) complete state-mandated forms, b) provide the children with notice and adversarial hearings, c) investigate allegations, d) prepare truthful reports, and e) disclose all facts to the parties. In addition, Defendants allegedly a) fabricated evidence, b) coerced and harassed Plaintiffs, c) denied Plaintiffs the right to their chosen counsel, d) denied Plaintiffs their right to meet with counsel, and e) submitted false and fabricated evidence to the court.
9) Conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Id. at ¶¶ 173-182. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants conspired, through the enterprise of the Department, to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights "for the purpose of perpetuating funding from state and federal resources." Id. at ¶ 174.
10) Failure to Maintain Records pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Id. at ¶¶ 183-192. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants "intentionally and maliciously prepared false and misleading reports" and that as a result, "Mr. Lahey "has been deprived of court-ordered custody of his children . . . and his rights as a father and the love and affection flowing therefrom." Id. at ¶¶ 184-185.
11) Refusal to Amend Records pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to correct their records "to reflect true and correct facts." Id. at ¶ 194.
In claims ten and eleven in their complaint, Plaintiffs cited 5 U.S.C. § 522a, but they presumably mean 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs ask for: 1) a judicial declaration adopting Plaintiffs' interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. and California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 et seq; 2) a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction requiring that the State of California intervene and operate the Department in compliance with state and federal laws; 3) compensatory damages of $25,000,000 for each of the Plaintiffs; 4) punitive damages of $10,000,000 against each of the Defendants; 5) attorney's fees and other appropriate relief.
Both Defendant Wilcox and the Defendants associated with the Department filed for summary judgment on a range of theories. They claim a lack of jurisdiction under both the Rooker-Feldman and Younger Abstention doctrines, as well as a danger that this Court's decision would be merely advisory, since the custody battle has been resolved. They challenge whether Mr. Lahey is an appropriate guardian ad litem for the children, claim that he cannot show the essential elements of IIED or RICO, and argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by a statute of limitations. They also contend that the tenth and eleventh claims under the Privacy Act are moot, since that Act applies only to the federal government. The Department also claims absolute immunity for its actions, and Defendant Wilcox claims that she cannot be charged with violating Plaintiffs' civil rights because she is not a state actor but a private physician.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving party's allegations. Id.; see also Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor is it sufficient for the opposing party simply to raise issues as to the credibility of the moving party's evidence. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983). If the nonmoving party fails to show that there is a genuine issue for trial, "the moving party is `entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
JURISDICTION
1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine examines whether a federal district court has the jurisdiction to review the final decisions of state courts. District courts generally lack the authority to review state judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, since only the United States Supreme Court has such jurisdiction. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 US 413, 415 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Plaintiffs cannot appeal state court cases directly to U.S. district courts, nor can they bring federal claims that would ask district courts to pass judgment on state court findings. "If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding . . . then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483. This doctrine even bars challenges to state court decisions on the basis of deprivation of federal constitutional rights, since this would nevertheless undermine state court decisions. See id. at 484-86. To allow such suits would be a waste of judicial resources and would unnecessarily increase friction between federal and state courts. Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986).
"[T]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (concurring opinion of Marshall, J.). Although Justice Marshall's language did not control in the Pennzoil case, the Ninth Circuit found this logic persuasive in Doe Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001), holding that "[w]here the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably intertwined."
However, the Ninth Circuit in 2003 clarified — and in so doing significantly limited the reach of — the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Noel v. Hall, the court explained that Rooker-Feldman applies in only a select number of cases. 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has only applied the doctrine in the two cases for which it is named. Id. at 1155. In those cases, plaintiffs directly challenged unfavorable state court rulings that they claimed to be erroneous, and the Supreme Court barred those challenges in U.S. district court. In Feldman, the Court barred not only a direct challenge to a lower court ruling but also any claims that were "inextricably intertwined" with that ruling. 460 U.S. at 483. In Noel, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only in cases involving forbidden de facto appeals from state court rulings. 341 F.3d at 1164. The "inextricably intertwined" test can be invoked only once a court finds such a forbidden de facto appeal. Id. at 1158. "If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction." Id. at 1164.
Plaintiffs in this case claim that the Department, its employees, and Dr. Wilcox perpetrated a grand conspiracy to deprive Mr. Lahey of his children through perjury, fabrication of evidence, fraud, and various violations of state and federal law. Although Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to reverse the California Family Court's various decisions and award him custody of his children, their claims nevertheless require a Rooker-Feldman analysis, because central to their claims is the allegation that the state court reached its decisions only because of the illegal actions taken by Defendants. Assuming that all Plaintiffs' allegations are true, the California Family Court reached its custody decision despite the fact that the Department presented all evidence in a light favorable to Mrs. Lahey, trumped up charges of sexual abuse against Mr. Lahey, illegally seized his children from his possession, forced him to falsely admit to domestic violence against his wife and in front of his children, and perjured itself before the court to ensure a decision favorable to Mrs. Lahey. A favorable decision in federal court for Plaintiffs would, at minimum, cast the wisdom of the Family Court's custody decisions into question.
However, Rooker-Feldman applies only when the plaintiff seeks both to assert a legal wrong stemming from state court proceedings and to overturn the state court decision in an impermissible de facto appeal. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. In this case, Plaintiffs attempt the former but not the latter. They attempt to demonstrate a series of legal wrongs perpetrated by Defendants that led to several unfavorable custody decisions, but Plaintiffs do not seek in this suit to overturn the custody arrangements. Although Defendant Wilcox asserts that "[w]hat plaintiff Mr. Lahey is essentially doing through this lawsuit is a collateral attack in federal court to overcome an adverse custody decision in state court," Plaintiffs seek in this case to attack the circumstances that led to the unfavorable decision rather than to appeal the state court decision itself. Def. Wilcox's Motion at 9:13-14. Even though a favorable decision in federal court would undermine the credibility of the state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as recently explained by the Ninth Circuit in Noel, does not bar jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.
Both Defendant Wilcox and County Defendants expend substantial effort in their briefs discussing an Eastern District of New York case whose facts are very similar to those in the instant case. In Storck v. Suffolk County Dep't of Social Services, the plaintiff brought similar conspiracy and fraud charges against county workers after a child custody suit. 62 F. Supp.2d 927 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The court dismissed the federal case because a decision favorable to the plaintiff would "completely undermine the family court order" on custody arrangements, since the issues in the federal suit were "inextricably intertwined" with those in family court. Id. at 937. It did so even though the plaintiff did not seek to overturn the family court decision, since a decision for the plaintiff would "lead to the inescapable conclusion that the family court ruling was `wrong.'" Id. That would also clearly be true in this case, but such a result would be incompatible with the Ninth Circuit's explication of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Noel. As a result, this Court cannot follow the persuasive authority of Storck.
2. Younger Abstention Doctrine
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court decided that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the County of Los Angeles from prosecuting the plaintiff. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court held that federal courts should not intervene in ongoing state proceedings both because of reasons of comity between state and federal governments and because under the "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence," courts of equity should not intervene when plaintiffs still retain an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 43-44. "[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." Id. at 45.
The Younger abstention doctrine can be invoked if state proceedings are "(1) ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims." San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). In H.C. v. Koppel, the Ninth Circuit invoked the doctrine to bar a suit asking a federal district court to intervene in an ongoing custody battle by enjoining custody decisions unfavorable to the plaintiff. 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000). To allow the suit to proceed in that case would have been to allow "wholesale federal intervention into an ongoing state domestic dispute. . . . This is not the proper business of the federal judiciary." Id. at 613-14. " Younger abstention is a circumscribed exception to mandatory federal jurisdiction; it is not intended to cut a broad swath through the fabric of federal jurisdiction, relegating parties to state court whenever state court litigation could resolve a federal question." Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff seeks money damages under section 1983, "Ninth Circuit precedent sends the clear signal that the application of Younger abstention . . . is disfavored." Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Green v. City of Tuscon, 255 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that this Court should abstain from intervening in the ongoing state court process. Defendants point to the fact that although Plaintiffs filed their suit in March 2001, the custody case has been ongoing through at least June 2003, when a state court denied a motion to modify custody or visitation arrangements. See Wilcox Exh. B. The Plaintiffs, however, assert that "there exists no on-going controversy [in state court], nor do plaintiffs seek [that] any prior orders be vacated." Opp. Brief at 22: 18-20. Although the record is not entirely clear on the nature of the ongoing state proceedings, they appear to be continuing attempts by both parents to alter the terms of the custody arrangements. These proceedings do not appear to implicate the federal and state law questions arising in this lawsuit.
The last hearing apparently occurred on June 2, 2003 and involved the denial of a request by Mrs. Lahey to modify custody arrangements. See Wilcox Exh. B. The issues involved in the actions may have some overlap with the issues involved here, such as the listing for "F/L Special Set Hearing On: OSC/Domestic Violence by Thomas Lahey" that occurred on January 22, 2003. None of the parties in their briefings addressed the nature of the ongoing disputes in Family Court. Defendants merely assert that they are ongoing, while Plaintiffs assert they are not.
Defendants also attempt to dismiss the suit because any decision by this Court would be merely advisory, because the claims are ongoing in state court. However, for the same reasons that the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply, the danger of an advisory opinion does not present itself here.
Even assuming, however, that the Family and Juvenile Court proceedings are ongoing, those proceedings must "provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims." San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1103. That is not the case here. Although the Younger abstention doctrine assumes that state courts are competent to handle issues of federal law and constitutionality, the same is not true of Family and Juvenile Courts, which are of limited jurisdiction and are not equipped to rule on claims arising from constitutional due process considerations. Juvenile Court oversees cases relating to "the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support" of wards of the court. Cal. Wel. Inst. Code §§ 245, 362. In cases of divorce or legal separation, Family Court "has jurisdiction to inquire into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate" concerning issues of a) the status of the marriage, b) the custody of minors, c) child support, d) the support of either party, e) settlement of property rights, and f) awarding of attorney's fees and costs. Cal. Fam. Code § 2010. Neither court's jurisdiction reaches into constitutional due process issues and state tort law claims.
In a comparable case in the District of Columbia Circuit, a class of foster children sued the District's Department of Human Services, charging it with violating their due process rights. LaShawn A. by Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The District argued that Younger abstention should apply, since the children could have raised their claims in ongoing Superior Court, Family Division proceedings rather than in federal court. Id. at 1322. The district court held, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Family Division was not an appropriate forum for such constitutional claims. Id. at 1323. Because the Family Division dealt solely with issues surrounding child neglect and termination of parental rights, the court held that "[n]one of these proceedings is an appropriate forum for this multi-faceted class-action challenge to the District of Columbia's administration of its entire foster-care system. . . . [T]hese proceedings are not suitable arenas in which to grapple with broad issues external to the parent-child relationship." Id. As a result, the third prong of Younger — which requires an appropriate forum for adjudicating claims on the state level — was not satisfied by Family Court proceedings. Id.
In a case within this district, Judge Patel held that Younger abstention did apply when a class of foster children sued Contra Costa County for a number of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Laurie Q. v. Contra Costa County, 304 F. Supp.2d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The children claimed that the County violated Title IV of the Social Security Act by failing to prepare adequate case plans for the children, failed to periodically review them, and failed to ensure that certain foster children with disabilities received sufficient funding. Id. at 1190-91. The court distinguished its case from LaShawn A., holding that the claims at issue "reach to the very heart of the Juvenile Court's responsibility and core competency, viz., determining the best program of services and placement for each individual child." Id. at 1207 n. 16. Therefore, Juvenile Court was an appropriate forum for adjudication of these claims, and Younger abstention applied. Id. at 1207.
The Juvenile Court in California is charged with, among other things, determining the "extent of the agency's compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts to return the child to a safe home and to complete any steps necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child." Cal. Wel. Inst. Code § 366. As a result, the claims asserted in the federal lawsuit fell within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Laurie Q., 304 F. Supp.2d at 1207 n. 16.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs' charges do not "reach to the very heart" of the core competencies of either Juvenile or Family Court. Both courts are of limited jurisdiction, dealing with wards of the court and the dissolution of marriages. Neither is designed nor equipped to hear cases of constitutional dimension. Therefore, neither Juvenile Court nor Family Court is an appropriate forum for adjudication of these rights, and Younger abstention does not apply.
LEGAL CLAIMS
1. Statute of Limitations
In federal claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the statute of limitations for tort actions that applies in the state in which they sit. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 276 (1985). If different statutes of limitations apply for tort actions within the state, then "courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). The pertinent statute here is contained in California Civil Procedure Code § 340(3), which calls for a one-year statute of limitations. Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also adopts the states' requirements regarding equitable tolling when a plaintiff decides to first pursue a remedy in another appropriate forum. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980). "The doctrine of equitable tolling focuses on the effect of the prior claim in warning the defendants in the subsequent claim of the need to prepare a defense." Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). California courts have adopted a three-pronged approach to determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate. Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1085 (Cal.Ct.App. 1983). The statute of limitations tolls if three core elements are present: 1) timely notice to the defendants in filing the first claim; 2) lack of prejudice to the defendants in gathering evidence for the second claim; and 3) good faith and reasonable conduct in filing the second claim. Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924 (Cal.Ct.App. 1983). The first element merely requires that the first claim be timely filed. Id. The second element "essentially translates to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second. . . . The critical question is whether notice of the first claim affords the defendant an opportunity to identify the sources of evidence which might be needed to defend against the second claim." Id. at 925. The causes of action need not be absolutely identical. For example, in Elkins v. Derby, the Supreme Court of California allowed for equitable tolling in two cases involving workers' compensation and a later tort claim against the employer. 12 Cal. 3d 410, 417-18 (1974). The court found sufficient similarity between the cases even though the latter claim required an additional showing of fault by the employer that was not needed in the earlier workers' compensation case. Id.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1(which is not applicable here) extended the limitations period to two years for claims accruing after January 1, 2003.
In the instant case, County Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' civil rights actions relating to the removal of Mr. Lahey's children from his custody, including the first, third, and fifth causes of action, are barred by the statute of limitations. County officials removed Mr. Lahey's children from his custody on February 25, 1999 after sexual abuse allegations, and the children remained in foster care for almost six months. Smernes report, Wilcox Exh. F at 6. On September 13, 1999, Mr. Lahey regained custody only of Mary Doe pursuant to a Juvenile Court decision. Compl. at ¶ 35. On July 20, 2000, the court ratified its earlier decision and officially ended the dependency of the Doe children on the court. Id. at ¶ 36. Mr. Lahey filed his claims in federal court on March 15, 2001. In Plaintiffs' first cause of action, they allege that Defendants violated their civil rights by failing to implement adequate standards surrounding the removal of the children in February 1999. The third cause of action requests declaratory relief and asks the Court to instruct the Department what the correct standards are regarding placing children into foster care. The fifth cause of action alleges constitutional violations surrounding the removal of the children. Because these appear to be section 1983 claims, the statute of limitations of one-year applies, subject to equitable tolling.
The third cause of action asks for declaratory relief from violations of both state and federal statutory and constitutional law. To the extent that the claim deals with federal law, the analysis in this section applies. To the extent that the third claim deals with state law, the analysis in Section 4, infra, applies.
If Plaintiffs claim injury based on the removal of the children from Mr. Lahey's house and their placement in foster homes, then the injury likely was perfected on February 25, 1999, the day they were removed. Or alternately, the claim became perfected on September 13, 1999, when Mr. Lahey officially lost custody of his children as a result of a Family Maintenance Plan approved by the Juvenile Court. At that point, the children ended their period of foster care and were returned separately to their parents. Even assuming the latter date, Plaintiffs violated the statute of limitations by filing their suit more than 18 months after the court determined the final custody arrangement.
Plaintiffs did not attempt to invoke in their Opposition the "continuing violation theory," i.e., that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the violations of their rights were ongoing. See Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, Plaintiffs argued only for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. At oral argument, Plaintiffs for the first time raised the continuing violation theory. When asked, Plaintiffs' counsel admitted that he had "no justifiable excuse" for not raising the issue in the Opposition, and Defendants' counsel said he was not prepared to argue the issue, since he assumed that Plaintiffs had conceded the point.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows courts to grant a continuance to parties opposing a motion for summary judgment so they can present further affidavits or other evidence supporting their opposition. Compliance with Rule 56(f) requires more than a perfunctory assertion that the party cannot respond because it needs to conduct discovery. Rather, the Rule requires affidavits setting forth with particularity: (1) why the party opposing summary judgment cannot respond; (2) the particular facts that the party reasonably expects to obtain in further discovery; and (3) how the information reasonably expected from its proposed discovery requests could be expected to create a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat the summary judgment motion. In re Silicon Graphics Litigation, 183 F.3d 970, 989 (9th Cir. 1999); Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs have manifestly failed to satisfy these requirements. Accordingly, the Rule 56(f) request is denied.
The statute can be tolled if Plaintiffs' filed their claims in an alternate forum for adjudication. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 486. Plaintiffs claim that the filing of a federal lawsuit before July 20, 2000, would "have been duplicative and tended to injure the parties involved, as well as be inefficient, awkward and laborious. Plaintiffs acted in good faith in pursuing their legal remedies through the appropriate forum, Juvenile court, at the time." Compl. at 24-25. There is no question that the state court action was timely filed, so the first prong of the equitable tolling test is met. The second element requires that the federal claim be "identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second." Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 925.
On this element, Plaintiffs plead themselves into a legal paradox. For the purposes of Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention, Plaintiffs claim that they did not pursue these claims in state court. If they had, then this Court would have to find that it lacked jurisdiction because these claims would have already been adjudicated at the state level and could not be appealed de facto to district court. Plaintiffs argued that those were different claims related to custody issues. Here, however, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because they did pursue their claims in state court, and only once those claims were settled could they pursue them in federal court. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways here; the claims either were the same as those pursued in juvenile court or they were not.
As explained in the Rooker-Feldman analysis supra, the claims presented in state and federal court were substantially different. Before juvenile and family courts, Mr. Lahey fought to retain custody of his three children. Here in federal court, Plaintiffs do not seek the return of custody but present a series of tort claims against various Defendants involved in the earlier custody battle. For equitable tolling to apply, the claims involved must be substantially the same, even if an element of the claims differs, as in Elkins. 12 Cal. 3d at 417-418. In this case, however, Plaintiffs bring substantially different claims, even if they arise from the same underlying custody dispute. Deprivation of civil and constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not at all resemble a determination of which parent deserves permanent custody. Furthermore, Defendants in this case were not defendants in the previous juvenile and family court decisions and had no notice from the earlier proceedings that they should prepare to defend themselves in federal court.
As a result, equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case, and the one-year statute of limitations will be enforced. This precludes claims one, three, and five, all of which deal with the deprivation of civil rights related to the removal of the children from Mr. Lahey's house.
The individual social workers named as Defendants also claim that the first, third, and fifth causes of action should be dismissed because that they have absolute immunity for their actions and because there is no derivative liability for them because they did not remove the children from Mr. Lahey's house. Since Plaintiffs' claims violate the statute of limitations, discussion of Defendants' alternate grounds for dismissal is moot.
2. Uncontested Claims
Plaintiffs' second claim alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq., which requires that states have foster care plans approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in order to qualify for federal funds. Plaintiffs' ninth claim alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Plaintiffs' tenth and eleventh claims under 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. request relief from Defendants' alleged "failure to maintain records" and their alleged "refusal to amend records," respectively.
As noted supra, Plaintiffs specifically refer to 5 U.S.C. § 522a for these claims. See Compl. at 65:15, 67:22. However, they presumably mean 5 U.S.C. § 552a. See County Def.'s Mot. at 22:21-26.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on these claims, and Plaintiffs failed to respond in their Opposition. At oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded these claims. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment for Defendants with respect to the second, ninth, tenth and eleventh claims.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
In order to maintain a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; 2) severe or extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff; and 3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979). For conduct to be considered outrageous, it "must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982). "There are relatively few successful prosecutions of this tort because, by its very definition, the law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant." Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1489 (1986).
Defendant Wilcox contests the argument that Mr. Lahey's emotional distress was caused by the acts of Defendants; instead, she asserts that the loss of his children was a result of a court order caused the distress. Def. Wilcox Mot. at 18: 28. With regard to the children, she asserts that their distress "is related to their position as pawns in the custody battle that has ensued during the majority of their infant years." Id. at 19: 1-3. She also asserts that her behavior was never directed at Plaintiffs "but rather was directed at getting the County personnel the information requested and answering their questions" concerning the custody issues. Id. at 19: 3-5. Because her behavior was directed toward the County and not toward the Plaintiffs, Defendant Wilcox asserts that her acts cannot rise to the level necessary to support an IIED claim. This, however, is not the correct standard for IIED. A tortfeasor's behavior does not have to be directly aimed at a particular victim. It merely has to be behavior that intends to inflict severe emotional distress or behavior undertaken with reckless disregard toward that possibility. Cervantez, 24 Cal.3d at 593.
In a letter to Mrs. Lahey updating her children's medical status, Dr. Wilcox wrote, "I am sorry that you have to rely on me to let you know what is going on with your children. I hate to see [the children] be the ball in the ball game." Pl.'s Exh. 1.
A greater question arises as to whether Defendant Wilcox's acts constitute outrageous behavior. In her motion, she asserts that she merely treated the children at various times as their family physician and provided information requested by the Department. Although Plaintiffs allege a large number of conspiratorial acts against Defendant Wilcox in their complaint, in their Opposition they state only that "prescribing Paxil when not authorized and specifically when contraindications clearly state do not prescribe to minors is outrageous conduct." Opp. Brief at 36: 6-7. Plaintiffs provide no evidence to support their claim that Dr. Wilcox inappropriately prescribed the medicine, or that she intentionally did it in order to cause severe emotional distress or acted recklessly toward that possibility. They merely repeat the allegations previously made in the complaint and cite to no evidence to support the claim. The County Defendants make an identical motion for summary judgment on the claim of IIED. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs are similarly circumspect, stating only that these Defendants "repeated conduct intending to dispossess plaintiffs of their familial relationship [which] is outrageous behavior so as to warrant intentional infliction of emotional distress." Opp. Brief at 36: 8-9.
Plaintiffs contend that Wilcox knew that the Department was engaging in a conspiracy with Mrs. Lahey to deprive Mr. Lahey of his custodial rights. Compl. at ¶ 85. They allege that Wilcox furthered the conspiracy by falsely diagnosing John Doe with stress in order to prevent visits with his father, dropping a recommendation that John Doe stop attending therapy sessions without medical justification, fabricating a history of molestation of Jane Doe by Mr. Lahey, unjustifiably attempting to persuade various therapists and a judge that John Doe's visits with his father should be supervised, failing to find evidence that Mrs. Lahey suffered from Munchausen's by Proxy Syndrome, failing to report suspicions that Mrs. Lahey was abusing the children, prescribing the anti-depressant Paxil for Mary Doe, failing to disclose that Jane Doe denied to Wilcox that her father had sexually abused her, and fabricating an abuse report concerning Jane Doe by reporting that she saw bruises on Jane. Compl. at ¶ 85.
In opposing Defendants' motions, Plaintiffs have failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" but instead rely on the repetition of general allegations in the Complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Having failed at this basic task, the Court is not required to "mine the full record for triable issues of fact." Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991). "In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment motion should be granted." Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec., 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' seventh claim.
4. Remaining State Law Claims
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) allows a district court to decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim where "the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law." The Ninth Circuit has clarified the broad discretion given district courts by this provision. Executive Software North America, Inc. v. Page, 24 F.3d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994). It has explained that "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction. . . . [T]he doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values." Id.
While the Ninth Circuit referred to federal claims dropping out of a case "in its early stages," the district court's discretion to dismiss supplemental claims is still broad. The Supreme Court has observed that district courts are not required to dismiss state law claims in the absence of original jurisdiction, but that "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
In their remaining claims, Plaintiffs in this case ask the Court to construe California constitutional provisions relating to privacy intrusions and due process violations, as well as statutory provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions Code and Government Code, all in the context of parental rights and familial association. The remaining claims would require statutory and state constitutional analysis that include complex issues of California law that are more properly addressed by the California courts. In the interests of comity and judicial economy, these are state issues that are properly adjudicated at the state level. Since no federal claims remain before this Court, and since the remaining state law claims can be better adjudicated at the state level, the remaining state law claims (the fourth, sixth and eighth) are dismissed without prejudice.
This is not true of Plaintiffs' claim for IIED, which the Court addressed above. IIED, although a creature of state tort law, presents no novel or complex issues that are better left to the state courts.
Defendants present a number of defenses to the state law claims, including the statutory immunity of the social workers and a statute of limitations under the California Tort Claims Act. Since these claims are now dismissed, this Court does not reach the merits of these defenses. Nor does it reach the merits of Defendants' claim that Mr. Lahey is not a proper guardian ad litem for the children because Mary Doe had reached the age of majority and because Mr. Lahey has a conflict of interest with Jane and John Doe.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the federal law claims against the various Defendants are dismissed. Although the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines do not apply to this particular case, each federal count is vulnerable to summary judgment. The first, third, and fifth claims are dismissed for violating the statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second, ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of action are dismissed because Plaintiffs concede them. The seventh cause of action is dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. Having dismissed all federal claims before the Court, the remaining state law claims — the fourth, sixth, and eighth — are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1) and 1367(c)(3). The Clerk shall close the file.IT IS SO ORDERED.0 Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
(X) Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
Pursuant to the order dated September 2, 2004, The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and all remaining claims are dismissed.