Opinion
Nov. 21, 1972.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Holley, Boatright & Villano, Gerald E. Boatright, Wheatridge, for plaintiff-appellee.
William M. Griffith, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
SILVERSTEIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant, husband, appeals from an order, entered after a hearing on a contempt citation, in which the trial court ruled that the husband was $900 in arrears on child support payments.
Plaintiff, wife, obtained a divorce in 1962. The decree awarded custody of the parties' three children, who were then minors, to the wife. As pertinent here, the decree, as subsequently amended, provides:
'That until each individual said child above referred to reaches the age of 21 years, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff (specified amounts) per month for each said child above named as temporary and permanent support; . . . that said payments of support terminate on the . . . 21st birthday . . . of each child.'
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'Child support for any child admitted to and attending an accredited college or university shall be reduced by one-half during the time or times such child is living away from home for purposes of attending such college or university.'
The parties' oldest child is over twenty-one and is away from home attending an accredited college. The wife contends that since this child is in college, the decree requires that the husband continue to pay her one-half of the specified monthly support for this child. The husband contends that he owes no further support payments because the child is over twenty-one. In ruling that the husband was $900 in arrears, the trial court determined that the husband was obligated to continue to pay support because the child was attending college even though the child was over twenty-one years of age. We do not agree and reverse.
The legal obligation of a parent to support a child terminates when the child reaches the age of twenty-one years, absent an agreement to the contrary. The authority of the divorce court to order support payments is so limited. The Colorado Supreme Court stated in Laws v. Laws, 164 Colo. 80, 432 P.2d 632:
'(W)e generally subscribe to the following language found in Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal.App.2d 443, 126 P.2d 357.
'The purpose of the law is to continue in effect after divorce the same legal obligation of support which the father owes to the children from their birth to their majority, where the marriage continues throughout that period. . . . It can hardly be contended that the law places upon the divorced parent any greater obligation toward his children than he has in the absence of divorce."
The decree in this case conforms to the above rule and specifically provides for the termination of support for each child as that child reaches twenty-one years. The obligation to pay one-half the specified support amount is necessarily dependent upon support being otherwise due. After the child reached twenty-one no further support payments were due.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
PIERCE and SMITH, JJ., concur.