Opinion
00 Civ. 3960 (JGK)
April 2, 2002
TC OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Audrey Kirnon-Emans and Richard Blanding bring this action against their former employer, American Management Association International ("AMA"); AMA's director of human resources, Manny Avramidis; and AMA's vice president for marketing communications, Lawrence Geiger. The plaintiffs allege that defendant AMA discriminated against them on the basis of their race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They also allege that defendants AMA and Avramidis violated the employment discrimination laws of New York State and New York City, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs. Finally, the plaintiffs allege that all of the defendants defamed them. The defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims.
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). "The trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution."Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying the matter that "it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts which are material and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).
II
There is no dispute as to the following facts except where specifically noted.
Defendant AMA is a New York not-for-profit corporation. Defendants Avramidis and Geiger, who are white, have at all relevant times been employed by AMA as director of human resources and vice president of marketing communications respectively. (Affirmation of Anne L. Clark, dated June 22, 2001 ("Clark Aff."), Ex. C at 7 Ex. D at 15-16.) In September, 1999, AMA hired plaintiff Audrey Kirnon-Emans, who is African-American, as an executive assistant at a salary of $50,000 per year. (Affirmation of Audrey Kirnon-Emans, dated June 21, 2001 ("Kirnon-Emans Aff."), ¶ 2; Clark Aff., Ex. A at 53-54). The executive whom Kirnon-Emans was hired to assist was terminated in January, 2000, and Kirnon-Emans' position at AMA was eliminated. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.) In February, 2000, Kirnon-Emans accepted defendant Geiger's offer of a position as account executive in AMA's marketing communications department, reporting to Geiger. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) By accepting the position, which paid $53,200 a year, Kirnon-Emans became one of two account executives at AMA, both of whom were African-American. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 8-9; P1. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff Blanding, who is also African-American, was hired by AMA :n 1990 and, at all relevant times, held the position of production coordinator. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10.) Blanding and Kirnon-Emans, who met at AMA, became friends; they spoke frequently at work, often rode the subway together on their trips home from work, and occasionally met outside of the office. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 98-102.)
As an account executive, Kirnon-Emans had a private office with a sliding frosted-glass door. (Kirnon-Emans Aff. ¶ 8.) Claire Reisert, who was then Geiger's executive assistant, worked in a cubicle nearby. (Affirmation of Claire Reisert, dated June 22, 2001 ("Reisert Aff."), ¶¶ 2, 4.) Elsa Carrasquillo, another AMA employee, worked on the same floor as Reisert and Kirnon-Emans, but in a different department. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 56.) Majlinda Kukaj regularly cleaned offices at AMA. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 223.)
On the evening of Friday, March 17, 2000, Blanding was in Kirnon-Emans' office for one to one and a half hours, beginning at about 5:20 p.m. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 139.) At some point while the plaintiffs were in the office together, the office lights were turned off, and neither plaintiff turned them back on for the remainder of the evening. (Id. at 178-79; Clark Aff., Ex. B at 62.) When Kukaj arrived to clean the office, Kirnon-Emans told her that she did not need to enter and clean the office at that time. (Clark Aff., Ex. B at 66.)
According to Carrasquillo, between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. that evening, she saw Kirnon-Emans and Blanding engaging in sexual conduct on the floor of Kirnon-Emans' office. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 75.) The plaintiffs deny that they were engaged in any sexual activity. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 144-45 Ex. B at 71.) They claim that only their feet ever touched the floor and that they were merely talking in the darkened office. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 146 Ex. B at 71-72.) They also assert that Carrasquillo could not have seen everything that she claims to have seen through the frosted glass door.
Carrasquillo then approached Reisert and told her that Kirnon-Emans was on the floor of her office. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 86-87.) Reisert then went to investigate. (Reisert Aff. ¶ 9.) Neither Kukaj nor Carrasquillo accompanied Reisert to Kirnon-Emans' office. Id. Reisert states that she saw two figures in the darkened office and that it looked as though one person was sitting on the floor and one person was sitting on a chair leaning toward the person on the floor. Id. Reisert states that she did not see anything that looked like two people having sexual intercourse or lying on the floor. Id.
Over the weekend, Carrasquillo told family members and one co-worker that she had caught people having sex in the office on March 17. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 110-14.) Carrasquillo, bothered by the incident, did not come to the AMA offices on the following Monday, but did report to work on Tuesday, March 21. (Id. at 117-18, 120.) On Tuesday, she told several co-workers that Kirnon-Emans and Blanding had engaged in intercourse in the office on March 17. (Id. at 129-34.)
On Wednesday, March 22, Carrasquillo met with Martha Medina, a human resources specialist at AMA, to discuss a web site project. (Id. at 150-51.) In the course of the meeting, Carrasquillo asked Medina what employment consequences faced personnel caught engaging in sexual activity at work. (Id. at 153.) This led to a discussion in which Carrasquillo told Medina that she had witnessed such activity, and identified Kirnon-Emans and Blanding as the employees involved. (Id. at 154.) Medina promptly reported the matter to her supervisor, Avramidis. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at ¶¶, 78, 81.)
Later that day, Avramidis held a meeting with Medina and Carrasquillo. In response to open-ended questions by Avramidis, Carrasquillo again asserted that she had seen Kirnon-Emans and Blanding having sex in Kirnon-Emans' office. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 161-62.) Carrasquillo also said that she thought that Blanding and Kirnon-Emans should not be fired for their conduct. (Clark Aff., Ex. E at 168; Def. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. I.) Avramadis and Medina then interviewed Kukaj and her acting supervisor. Kukaj told Avramidis that she had seen a man in Kirnon-Emans' office with Kirnon-Emans, and that they were both on the floor. (Clark Aff.
The plaintiffs do not deny that Avramidis's notes support his account. They do, however, assert that Kukaj did not say what the notes indicate she said. The plaintiffs' evidence in this regard is inadmissible hearsay because it consists of Reisert's and Carrasquillo's statements about what Kukaj, an employee of an outside cleaning service, told them she had said to Avramidis. In contrast, Avramidis can report on what Kukaj told him for its effect on his state of mind, which is relevant to determine why he took the actions that he did.
Ex. G at 114, 224-25; Def. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. J.) After interviewing Kukaj, Avramadis went to Kirnon-Emans' office and, together with a colleague, determined that someone in the hallway could see figures, movement, and motions through the office's sliding glass door while the lights were off in the office. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 98-100.
On Thursday morning, March 23, 2000, Avramidis met with Priscilla Goss, AMA's vice president in charge of human resources, and Robert Duncan, AMA's general counsel, to discuss the incident. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 129-130.) Later that day, Avramidis met separately, and privately, with Kirnon-Emans and Blandinq. (Id. at 137, 158.) By the end of each plaintiff's meeting with Avramadis on Thursday, March 23, 2000, that plaintiff's AMA employment had been terminated.
The content of the March 23 meetings between Avramidis and the plaintiffs is in dispute. Kirnon-Emans and Blanding claim that Avramidis began each meeting by informing the plaintiff in question that the plaintiff had been fired. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 157-58 Ex. B at 95.) Kirnon-Emans testified that in her meeting, Avramidis went on to say that he had three witnesses who said that the plaintiffs were having sex in her office. (Clark Aff., Ex. A at 158.) The plaintiffs also testified that Avramidis described Blanding as a "big guy" several times during each meeting (Id. at 165; Clark Aff., Ex. B at 99), and Blanding says he asked Avramidis if he was implying that Blanding had raped Kirnon-Emans (Clark Aff., Ex. B at 100).
Avramidis says that he began each meeting by asking the plaintiff in question if anything unusual had happened on March 17. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 138, 158.) According to Avramidis, Kirnon-Emans responded to this question by initially denying that Blanding had been in her office at all, but eventually admitted that he had been in her office, that the door was closed and the lights were off, and that Blanding had taken off his shirt to pose for her. (Id. at 139.) Avramidis says that he only terminated Kirnon-Emans at the end of the meeting, after it was clear that at least some portion of her response was a fabrication. (Id. at 139-40.) Avramidis testified similarly that he terminated Blanding after Blanding denied spending any time at all in Kirnon-Emans' office that day. (Id. at 158, 161-62.) He admits that he may have said that Blanding was a "big guy" during his meeting with Kirnon-Emans, and says that he specifically inquired, even though she continued to deny that anything sexual had taken place, whether whatever had happened was consensual. (Id. at 141-42.) The defendants have produced accounts of the meetings in Avramadis' handwriting dated March 23, 2000 which are essentially consistent with his testimony (Def. 56.1 Stmt., Exs. K L), but the plaintiffs deny that the notes accurately reflect what transpired.
Reisert was home ill the week of March 20, 2000. (Reisert Aff. ¶ 11.) Avramidis spoke to Reisert on the telephone on March 23 after the other interviews had occurred. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 189.) The content of this conversation, and the accuracy of Avramidis's purportedly contemporaneous notes, is also disputed. Reisert states that she told Avramidis that, at Carrasquillo's urging, she looked at Kirnon-Emans' office on the evening of March 17, and saw that the lights were out and two figures were inside, one apparently on the floor and the second leaning towards the first. (Reisert Aff. ¶ 12.) Reisert also says that she told Avramadis during this phone conversation that she did not see anything that caused her to be alarmed or made her believe that something was wrong, and that she again told Avramidis on March 27, 2000 that she had seen nothing wrong or improper. (Id. ¶ 14.) Avramidis has testified that Reisert told him on the phone that she saw two people in the office, one atop the other, and that she confirmed on March 27 that his notes of that phone call were accurate. (Clark Aff., Ex. C at 189, 195.)
AMA hired a white person to replace Kirnon-Emans and a Hispanic person to replace Blanding. (Def. Mem. at 9.) AMA has a written policy prohibiting harassment in the workplace. (Def. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. G.) Apart from the plaintiffs, since April, 1998, AMA has terminated five employees in response to harassment complaints. (Def. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. O.) Two of those employees were African-American; the remainder were white. (Id.)
III
Employment discrimination claims under § 1981 are evaluated under the same burden-shifting framework as Title VII actions. Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of New York, 735 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1934). A plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)): Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997). The burden of establishing a prima facie case is de minimis. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37. To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) termination from employment or other adverse employment action; and (4) that this adverse employment decision occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001); Quaratino v. Tiffany Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). The plaintiff may satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case by showing that the plaintiff's position remained open after the plaintiff was discharged, or that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class. Zimmerman v. Associates First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001).
When a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated the elements of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the defendant's action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. After the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the action, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case drops out. Id. at 255-56 256 n. 10. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that race played a motivating role in that decision. See id. at 254-56;Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1999);Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336.
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2001);Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336; Alleyne v. Four Seasons Hotel — New York, No. 99 Civ. 3432, 2001 WL 135770, at *910 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001), aff'd, 25 F. App. 74 (2d Cir. 2002). Evidence of pretext is "one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive." Windham v. Time Warner, Inc., 275 F.3d at 188 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 157) (punctuation omitted). However, the existence of such evidence "does not mandate a denial of [a defendant's motion for] summary judgment."Lizardo, 270 F.3d at 103. Rather, "[w]hether summary judgment is appropriate . . . depends upon `the strength of the plaintiff['s] prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the [defendant's] explanation is false, and any other evidence' that supports the defendant['s] case." Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49)
On this motion, the defendant does not dispute that the plaintiffs have met their de minimis burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant instead claims that the plaintiffs were terminated legitimately in response to Carrasquillo's report regarding inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace. The plaintiffs claim that this reason is pretextLal because it is irrational and based on fabricated evidence, and that the evidence of pretext and the record as a whole could support a jury's finding that the plaintiffs' race was a motivating factor in their termination.
For the purposes of this section, which discusses the plaintiffs' § 1981 claim, "the defendant" refers to defendant AMA.
AMA has clearly met its burden of articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Kirnon-Emans and Blanding. Avramidis's sworn account of his discussions with Carrasquillo, Medina, Kukaj, and the plaintiffs; Avramidis's notes; and Carrasquillo's own testimony support the defendant's contention that Carrasquillo reported the plaintiffs engaged in behavior warranting termination and that after investigation, Avramidis believed Carrasquillo's report to be true, and he therefore terminated the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs argue that the defendant's proffered reason for terminating them was pretextual. The question with regard to pretext is not whether Carrasquillo was correct in reporting that she had seen the plaintiffs having sex. Nor is the relevant inquiry whether Avramidis was correct in reacting to Carrasquillo's report in the way he did. Rather, the plaintiffs must offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the reported inappropriate activity in the office by the plaintiffs was not the true reason for their termination.
Viewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the defendant's stated reason for the plaintiffs' termination was false. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Carrasquillo made her allegations about the plaintiffs' activities on March 22, or that Avramidis conducted an immediate investigation that included an inspection of Kirnon-Emans' office, interviews with Carrasquillo and Kukaj, and consultations with senior human relations and legal personnel at AMA. Within a day of the reported inappropriate activity, both plaintiffs were fired. Whether this decision was correct or precipitous, no reasonable jury could conclude that the reported inappropriate activity was not the true reason for the termination.
To attempt to establish pretext, the plaintiffs point to discrepancies in Carrasquillo's account of what she saw and they argue that Avramidis terminated the plaintiffs at the outset of their interviews without listening to their explanations. Avramidis denies that he terminated the plaintiffs before he listened to their explanations. The plaintiffs also allege that Avramidis's notes were not truthful, which Avramidis also denies. But even accepting all of the plaintiffs' allegations, all that they amount to are allegations of a shoddy investigation. They do not undercut the undisputed facts of an allegation of improper activity by the plaintiffs in the office, a prompt investigation, and an immediate termination. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 45 (2d Cir. 2000); Alleyne, 2001 WL 135770, at *11; Anatsui v. Food Emporium, No. 99 Civ. 1337, 2000 WL 1239068, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2000); Bloomfield v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, S.A., No. 94 Civ. 0056, 1999 WL 675966, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999).
Moreover, there is simply no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that race was a motivating factor in the plaintiffs' termination. The circumstances of the termination do not themselves suggest that race played a role in Avramidis's actions. The plaintiffs have stated that they believe that Avramidis's reference to Blanding's physical size and Avramidis's willingness to believe Carrasquillo's story indicate that the defendant's conduct was driven by racial stereotypes about the sexual behavior of African-Americans. There is, however, no allegation of any racial epithets or even racial statements made by any of the AMA supervisors or employees. There is also no evidence that AMA used any racial stereotypes. See Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 43-44 (summary judgment upheld where no evidence of stereotyping). The plaintiffs' own beliefs do not constitute evidence. See Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 456 ("the plaintiff's [feelings and perceptions] of being discriminated against [are] not evidence of discrimination" (alterations in original) (punctuation and citation omitted)); Alleyne, 2001 WL 135770 at *11. It is not sufficient for the plaintiffs to "cite to their mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to their race."Lizardo, 270 F.3d at 104; see also Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1998).
The only other possible indication of racial animus in this case is Blanding's testimony that he was unfairly given a lower performance rating than a white co-worker in 1992, and that the same white co-worker was allowed to change her hours and come in late, although Blanding and an Ecuadorian co-worker were not. (Clark Aff., Ex. B at 118-19, 123.) These allegations, even if true, relate to events remote in time and do not concern the decisionmakers responsible for the incident at issue. They do not directly suggest that either AMA or Avramidis fired the plaintiffs in March, 2000 because of a discriminatory motive. See McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1997); Alleyne, 2001 WL 135770, at *12; Anatsui, 2000 WL 1239068, at *7; Boyle v. McCann-Erickson. Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N Y 1997). Nor could they support a finding that racial discrimination was so pervasive at AMA that it must have been a motivating factor behind the plaintiffs' dismissal. Significantly, there is no other evidence that during the plaintiffs' time at AMA, any employee made any comment or statement, or took any action, that could be interpreted as racial on content or tone.See Lizardo, 270 F.3d at 104; Cobbs v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 8284, 1999 WL 244099, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1999).
Indeed, the record not only lacks any evidence of racial discrimination, but it contains undisputed facts which affirmatively suggest an absence of racial discrimination at AMA. The month before terminating her, AMA voluntarily reassigned Kirnon-Emans to a new position at a higher salary after her original position was eliminated because her prior supervisor was terminated. Kirnon-Emans' only counterpart in the organization was also African-American. Furthermore, both white and African-American employees have been disciplined and terminated for harassment.
Viewing the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could conclude that race was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiffs. Judgment should therefore be entered in favor of defendant AMA on the plaintiffs' § 1981 claim. See Lizardo, 270 F.3d at 103-04; Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2001); Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2001); Norton, 145 F.3d at 119-20; Allayne, 2001 WL 135770, at 13; Anatsui, 2000 WL 1239068, at *7-*8.
IV
The remaining claims in this case arise under the laws of New York. A district court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims in an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of state claims after grant of summary judgment on federal claims). A failure to dismiss remaining state law claims after all federal claims are eliminated before trial "`may be an abuse of the district court's discretion' especially when the state claim involves novel questions of state law." Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1054 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001); Morse v. Univ. of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1992).
A
The plaintiffs have brought claims against defendants AMA and Avramidis under the New York City Human Rights Law, New York City Administrative Code § 8-107, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. The plaintiffs' state and city discrimination claims are based on the same factual allegations as their § 1981 claim. Race discrimination claims brought under the New York City and New York State Human Rights laws are evaluated under the same framework as § 1981 and Title VII actions. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000); Farias, 259 F.2d at 98. It is within the Court's discretion to maintain jurisdiction where doing so merely involves applying the same analysis to the same facts; certainly, judicial economy, convenience and fairness are all served in this instance, and comity concerns are not implicated when the New York courts have indicated that the same analysis applies. See, e.g., Evans v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, No. 00 Civ. 5753, 2002 WL 77074, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (simultaneously granting summary judgment dismissing § 1981, state, and city claims); cf. Giordano, 274 F.3d at 754 (inappropriate to maintain jurisdiction over New York disability claim where federal and New York definitions of disability differ) Therefore, the Court maintains jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' New York City and New York State discrimination claims and, for the reasons explained above, grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to those claims.
B
The plaintiffs' state law defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims would require the Court to consider additional facts and legal issues which are uniquely matters of state law. In these circumstances, the Court declines to maintain jurisdiction over these claims. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York City Administrative Code § 8-107, and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. The plaintiffs' remaining state law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Opinion and Order and to close the case.