Opinion
99 Civ. 3787 (RWS).
January 3, 2001.
GEORGE ZELMA, ESQ., New York, NY, Attorney for Plaintiff.
LANDMAN CORSI BALLAINE FORD, Metropolitan Transportation Authority and PO Robby Anderson, New York, NY, By: MELANIE K. SUHRADA, ESQ. Of Counsel, Attorney for Defendants.
SMITH MAZURE DIRECTOR WILKINS YOUNG YAGERMAN TARALLO, New York, NY, By: ROBERT P. SIEGEL, ESQ. Of Counsel, Attorney for Defendant Chris Rocket,
PHILIP J. DINHOFER, ESQ., New York, NY, Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff.
HOGUET NEWMAN REGAL, New York, NY, By: MELISSA L. WEISS, ESQ. Of Counsel, Attorney for Third-Party Defendants.
OPINION
Third-party defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the "MTA"), the MTA Police Department ("MTAPD"), and Metro-North Commuter Railroad ("Metro-North") have moved to stay all proceedings pending the resolution of Greene v. Long Island Railroad Co., 99 F. Supp.2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal granted, Greene v. MTA, No. 00-9292 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2000), which the parties agree will address the threshold legal issue in the case against them, namely whether the MTA is covered by the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. ("FELA"). Plaintiff Preston Kirk ("Kirk") opposes the motion, and in the alternative, moves to sever his claim from the third-party action. Defendant and third-party plaintiff Chris Rocket ("Rocket") supports a stay and opposes the motion to sever on the grounds of judicial economy.
In Smith v. MTA, 98 Civ. 2528, an unrelated action pending before this Court, defendant Rocket is listed as "Chris Rockett." Due to this unexplained discrepancy, this defendant will be referred to here as "Rocket," as he is named in this complaint.
For the reasons stated below, the motion to sever will be denied and dispositive motions regarding the FELA claims will be stayed pending the resolution of Greene.
The Parties
Kirk is a resident of New Jersey and at all times relevant to this action was a supervisor and employee of the Metro-North Commuter Railroad ("Metro-North").
The MTA, MTAPD, and Metro-North (collectively the "MTA defendants") are public benefit corporations duly organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of New York. Metro-North and the MTAPD are wholly owned subsidiary corporations of the MTA.
Rocket was at all times relevant to this action an employee of the MTA, MTAPD, and Metro-North.
Defendant Police Officer "Robby" Anderson ("Anderson") was at all times relevant to this action an employee of the MTAPD.
Background
This case arises out of Rocket and Anderson's arrest of Kirk at Grand Central Station on July 6, 1998, during which Kirk alleges that he was physically injured, handcuffed, and imprisoned without cause. The amended complaint alleges assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, malicious prosecution, and federal civil rights violations.
Rocket's third-party complaint alleges, pursuant to FELA, that the injuries he sustained on July 6, 1998 were the result of negligence by Metro-North and the MTA. Among other affirmative defenses, Metro-North and the MTA asserted that FELA is not applicable to this action.
By letter-motion of October 20, 2000, the MTA defendants moved to stay the proceedings pending the resolution of Greene, which was accepted for appeal by the Second Circuit on September 7, 2000. Greene will resolve whether FELA, the basis for Rocket's claims, applies to the MTA defendants. Kirk opposed the motion to stay by letter of October 23, 2000, and avers that he is prepared for trial. In the alternative, he moves to sever the third-party action from his action. By letter of October 23, 2000, Rocket opposed the motion to sever and joined the motion to stay the proceedings. The motion was deemed fully submitted after oral argument on November 1, 2000.
Discussion
The appellant's brief in Greene is due on January 12, 2001, and oral argument will not be heard before the week of March 26, 2001, with a decision to be issued at some time thereafter, possibly during the summer of 2001. Staying the entire proceedings in this action pending that decision might prejudice the plaintiff, who is prepared for trial, because the delay serves no purpose relevant to his action. However, because the FELA issue that the Second Circuit will be addressing in Greene is relevant to Rocket's third-party action, it may be premature to proceed with that claim at this time, and therefore severance should be considered. See Lancaster v. Monroe Cty, Alabama, 116 F.3d 1419, 1420 (11th Cir. 1997) (severing claim and staying decision until outcome of pending dispositive en banc decision).
I. Legal Standard for Severing Claims
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the severance of "any claims," and Rule 42 provides that a trial court may order a separate trial of any claim "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy," Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a).
The distinction between these two rules is that "[s]eparate trials usually will result in one judgment, but severed claims become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered thereon, independently." 9 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d S 2387. Trial courts have the broad discretion to employ either of these rules, which are considered under the same standard. See New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 128, 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988).
In exercising their discretion to sever claims or order separate trials, courts must consider "(1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims." Morris v. Northrup Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp.2d 556, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385, 1400 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Both the original action and the third-party action arise out of Rocket's arrest of Kirk at Grand Central Station on July 6, 1998. The fact that both claims arise from the same factual occurrence weighs against severance. See Cashman v. Montefiore Medical Center, 191 B.R. 558, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (judicial economy did not weigh in favor of severance of third-party products liability claim from medical malpractice action stemming from silicone implants). Moreover, courts generally abstain from severing claims where separate trials risk inconsistent jury verdicts. See B.D. v. DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. 117, 126 (S.D.N Y 2000). Here, trying Kirk's claim separately from Rocket's creates the possibility that Kirk's jury could find Rocket solely responsible for the arrest and the injuries it caused, but that the subsequent jury could instead find that the MTA defendants' negligence or faulty training was responsible for Rocket's injuries.
Common issues of fact regarding the incident and MTA policy will be relevant at both trials, and each action will involve at least some of the same witnesses. The possibility of duplicate presentation of evidence at each trial weighs against severance. See DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. at 126.
However, the law to be applied in each action differs. Significantly, as noted above, FELA is relevant only to Rocket's third-party claim against MTA defendants. If the Greene Court decides that FELA does not apply to the MTA defendants, then the third-party action must be dismissed, yet the outcome of Greene has no bearing on whether Kirk's case may be sustained. Severance would be an effective way to promote the resolution of these disputes while conserving judicial resources.
The next factor is whether severance or lack of severance will prejudice either party. Kirk argues that he is ready for trial and that the resolution of his claims would be needlessly delayed unless the third-party action were severed. Rocket is concerned about incurring duplicative expenses if the actions were severed. Any prejudice to Rocket's claim in having the jury hear Kirk's version of events is balanced by the fact that jury will also be aware of Rocket's claim that the MTA defendants' training policy was responsible for the injuries in question. Moreover, the MTA defendants' counterclaim will hardly be prejudiced by the jury's knowledge of Kirk's claims against Rocket. One final factor to consider, as the Honorable Colleen McMahon once noted, is that "the Court would be prejudiced by having to endure this trial twice." DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. at 128.
Given the overlap in facts, evidence, and witnesses between these two actions, in addition to the lack of prejudice to the parties, the motion to sever is denied.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the motion to sever is denied, and all dispositive motions regarding the FELA-related claims shall be stayed pending the Second Circuit's decision in Greene.
It is so ordered.