Opinion
May 21, 1982
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Roy, J.
Present — Simons, J.P., Callahan, Denman, Boomer and Moule, JJ.
Order reversed, without costs, motions granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: The complaint alleges that plaintiff dentist administered a fatal dose of nitrous oxide to his patient while performing minor surgery. The accident was caused by the mislabeling of the oxygen and nitrous oxide connectors to plaintiff's anesthesia machine, when either the machine was repaired by defendant McKesson Co., or reinstalled by defendants Norton Starr, Inc. and Hradil. The plaintiff claims damages for his mental distress, loss of earnings and loss of reputation as a consequence of the death of the patient caused by the defendants' negligence in servicing his equipment. The defendants McKesson Company and Norton Starr, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action and the motion was denied. We reverse. A cause of action may be stated for emotional harm resulting directly from the negligence of another. (See Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, where the defendant hospital negligently sent a false message to plaintiff announcing her mother's death; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, where the infant plaintiff suffered emotional trauma as the result of defendant's failure to secure the restraining belt on a chair lift occupied by plaintiff.) On the other hand, no cause of action is stated when the emotional harm results indirectly through the reaction of the plaintiff to injury negligently caused to another. (See Lafferty v. Manhasset Med. Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, where plaintiff suffered emotional distress when she witnessed a negligently performed blood transfusion; Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, revg 71 A.D.2d 270, where drugs administered to the mother during her pregnancy caused serious birth defects to her child resulting in emotional injury to the mother and father; Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, and Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, where the plaintiffs suffered emotional distress because of birth defects to their children caused by negligent medical treatment given to the mothers; Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, where the mother sustained shock and emotional trauma when she heard the defendant's automobile strike her child; Aquilio v. Nelson, 78 A.D.2d 195, where the mother's emotional injuries were caused by the death of her newly born child as the result of the doctor's malpractice in treating the mother during pregnancy.) Here the plaintiff's emotional injuries did not result directly from the defendant's negligence, but resulted indirectly through the plaintiff's reaction to his patient's death. In Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp. ( supra), the defendant owed a duty to the mother, and by ingesting the drugs the mother participated in the events that caused severe birth defects to her child, yet she was denied recovery. "In order to recover for emotional harm, plaintiff must show, in addition to a breach of duty owed to [him], that [he] was the person directly injured by that breach." ( Aquilio v Nelson, supra, pp 198-199; see Rainnie v. Community Mem. Hosp., 87 A.D.2d 707.) As recently stated by the Court of Appeals, "There can be no doubt that the [plaintiff has] suffered and the temptation is great to offer [him] some form of relief. Ideally, there should be remedy for every wrong. This is not the function of the law, however, for `[e]very injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree'." ( Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, supra.) All concur, except Callahan and Denman, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in the following memorandum.
We vote to affirm Special Term. This case does not represent "another effort to extend existing principles of law so as to expand the liability of the negligent actor to include third parties who suffer shock as a result of direct injury to others" ( Lafferty v. Manhasset Med. Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, 279; Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809; Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401; Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109; Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609). On the contrary, plaintiff's claim for damages stems solely and directly from the breach of a duty owed to him by one or more of these defendants. Under well-established principles of tort law, plaintiff may recover. While the majority acknowledge that a cause of action may be stated for emotional harm resulting directly from the negligence of another as long as the injury was genuine, substantial and proximately caused by the defendant's conduct ( Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-384; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237), they fail to recognize how perfectly this case fits within that rule. Here, as in Johnson, the injury was inflicted directly upon the individual claiming the harm and the same individual to whom the duty was owed was the one directly injured by its breach. The fatal injury to plaintiff's patient was the indirect and unintended spinoff of a breach of a duty owed directly to plaintiff by one or more of these defendants. Logic, as well as justice, compels affirmance as all proven harmful consequences proximately caused by the tortious act should be compensable. In our view, the cases relied upon by the majority are inapposite and plaintiff should be permitted to pursue recovery on his causes of action.