Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Marin County Super. Ct. No. CV061589
Sepulveda, J.
Appellant Tim Kelly obtained a wage garnishment order against respondent Elizabeth Barela in order to satisfy a judgment against Barela’s husband. The trial court denied respondent’s first claim of exemption after her attorney neglected to request oral argument following an adverse tentative ruling. The trial court later granted respondent’s motion for relief from the order, ruling that it would be inequitable to deny respondent an evidentiary hearing on her claim. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside its prior order, and that the court’s subsequent order partially granting respondent’s claim of exemption is also void. We disagree and affirm.
A judgment debtor who claims that a portion of his or her earnings are necessary for the support of the debtor or his or her family may file a claim of exemption in order to terminate or modify the withholding order. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 706.051, subd. (b), 706.105.) All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 1, 2006, appellant obtained a default judgment in the amount of $35,623.70 (including attorney fees and costs) against Mark A. Lopez, individually and doing business as Mark A. Lopez & Associates. Respondent, Lopez’s wife (who later separated from Lopez), was not a party to the action. On February 7, 2007, the trial court granted appellant’s motion for the issuance of an earnings withholding order against respondent, a grocery store journeyman food clerk and the sole provider for her two school-aged children. It authorized the sheriff of any California county to issue an earnings withholding order against respondent’s earnings pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the court in the matter, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not listed as a judgment debtor.
Lopez did not appear in connection with the postjudgment matters that are the subject of this appeal, and he likewise has not made an appearance in this appeal. Appellant’s counsel commented at a hearing in the trial court that Lopez was “making himself hard to find.”
Although the court’s February 7, 2007 order, which was prepared by appellant’s counsel, did not cite authority for issuing an earnings withholding order against respondent, the court presumably relied on section 706.109, which provides: “An earnings withholding order may not be issued against the earnings of the spouse of the judgment debtor except by court order upon noticed motion.”
Respondent filed a claim of exemption, asserting that all of her wages were exempt from execution. Appellant filed a notice of hearing on respondent’s claim of exemption pursuant to section 706.105 on February 27, 2007, and noticed a hearing date of March 21, 2007. Appellant used a Judicial Council form, which provides a box next to the statement: “The judgment creditor will not appear at the hearing and submits the issue on the papers filed with the court.” The box was not checked, presumably indicating that appellant intended to appear at the hearing and did not intend for the issue to be “submit[ted] . . . on the papers filed with the court.” Appellant also served on respondent a subpoena for personal appearance and production of documents, ordering respondent to appear as a witness and produce records at the March 21 hearing.
According to respondent’s attorney (who does not represent respondent on appeal), he was retained “only days” before the scheduled hearing. Because he considered a claim of exemption to be an “unusual proceeding,” it did not occur to him that there would be a tentative ruling on the claim, or that it would be necessary for him to request a hearing pursuant to the court’s local rules. He therefore did not check to determine whether there was a tentative ruling or request a hearing. In fact, the court issued a tentative ruling adverse to respondent. Respondent’s counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing on March 21, along with respondent and her mother (who was present to testify as a witness), but was not permitted to argue the claim of exemption or present respondent as a witness as he had planned. Following the suggestion of the trial court (Judge Terrence Boren), respondent’s counsel contacted appellant’s counsel to request rescheduling the hearing; appellant’s counsel refused. A minute order dated March 21, 2007, stated that the tentative ruling was adopted. The trial court issued an order dated April 10, 2007 (prepared by appellant’s counsel), consistent with its tentative ruling and minute order, ordering that $156.64 be withheld from respondent’s weekly paychecks.
The tentative ruling stated: “The claim of exemption is denied as to $156.64 per week. Barela’s disposable income is $2,715.12 per month. Although Barela claims that her expenses include $1,500 for rent/house payment and $400 for utilities, Barela stated in her January 19, 2007 declaration that she was living with her mother. Therefore, these amounts appear excessive.” (Unnecessary capitalization removed.)
On March 27, 2007, respondent filed a second claim of exemption, submitting a financial statement that was basically identical to the one she had previously filed, except that it listed an additional $300 monthly obligation. Appellant again filed a notice of hearing on the claim of exemption, and noticed a hearing date of May 2, 2007. He argued that respondent was not entitled to file another claim of exemption under section 706.105, subdivision (a) (which provides that a judgment debtor may claim an exemption if there has been no prior hearing, or if there has been a material change in circumstances since the time of any previous hearing on the earnings withholding order), and that respondent claimed excessive expenses.
The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the second claim of exemption. The tentative ruling stated: “Barela has not shown ‘changed circumstances.’ The ‘circumstances’ upon which she relies existed at the time of the previous claim of exemption, she just neglected to include them in her original claim. This order is without prejudice to Barela’s right to seek other appropriate relief (i.e., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (b), or 1008, subd. (a)).” (Unnecessary capitalization removed.) An order consistent with the tentative ruling was filed on May 11, 2007.
On October 9, 2007, respondent filed a “motion for relief from order” pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b). The notice of motion stated that respondent sought relief “pursuant to C.C.P. §473(b) based on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect of her attorney, Timothy J. Tomlin, with regard to the Order issued on April 10, 2007, allowing garnishment of [respondent’s] wages.” Respondent argued that the hearing on the claim of exemption was analogous to a short cause trial, as opposed to a law and motion appearance, and that it was therefore not the proper subject of a tentative ruling. Appellant opposed the motion, arguing that (1) it was untimely because it was filed more than six months after the trial court’s March 21, 2007 minute order (as opposed to the court’s signed April 10, 2007 order) (§ 473, subd. (b)), and (2) respondent’s proper remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008, which she did not do.
The trial court issued a tentative ruling on November 21, 2007, which stated that the motion for relief was denied as untimely. At the hearing on the motion before the trial court (Judge Lynn O’Malley Taylor), respondent’s counsel argued that even if the motion was untimely, the court retained power to vacate its previous order on equitable grounds. Respondent’s counsel also argued, consistent with his moving papers, that the trial court did not have the ability to issue a tentative ruling on a claim of exemption, and that the court’s prior ruling therefore “was not effective.” Appellant’s counsel objected that respondent had not raised equitable grounds in her moving papers, and that he had no familiarity with the relevant cases cited by respondent’s counsel at the hearing. The trial court took the matter under submission.
The trial court granted respondent’s motion for relief in an order dated December 14, 2007. The order stated: “Plaintiff was entitled to the evidentiary hearing on April 10, 2007 [sic; presumably, a reference to the scheduled March 21, 2007 hearing]. She appeared and was not given an opportunity to be heard. While it is true that Barela failed to bring a motion for reconsideration under CCP1008 and failed to bring a timely motion under CCP 473, it would be inequitable and unjust under the circumstances not to allow Barela to have an evidentiary hearing on her claim of exemption and to continue to be bound by findings that were made without the benefit of such a hearing.” Appellant timely appealed from the order granting respondent relief.
An evidentiary hearing on the claim of exemption was scheduled for January 11, 2008. Following the hearing, the trial court granted respondent’s claim of exemption in part, and allowed garnishment of respondent’s wages in the amount of $100 per month. Appellant timely appealed from the court’s order granting exemption in part.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant respondent relief from the trial court’s March 21, 2007 minute order denying her first claim of exemption. A brief overview of the procedure underlying the court’s original order is appropriate to provide context to the orders that followed.
A. Procedure for Claims of Exemption from Wage Garnishment Orders.
With certain exceptions not applicable here, the portion of a judgment debtor’s earnings that is necessary for the support of the judgment debtor or his or her family is exempt from withholding orders. (§ 706.051, subd. (b).) A judgment debtor may claim an exemption at any time during the withholding period, so long as no prior hearing has been held or there has been a material change in circumstances since the time of the last prior hearing on an earnings withholding order. (§ 706.105, subd. (a).) A claim of exemption shall be made by filing with the levying officer an original and one copy of the official claim of exemption form and a financial statement. (§ 706.105, subd. (b).) The levying officer must promptly send notice of an exemption claim to the judgment creditor. (§ 706.105, subd. (c).)
If a judgment creditor wishes to oppose the claim of exemption, he or she must file a notice of opposition with the levying officer within 10 days after the date the notice of claim of exemption was mailed. (§ 706.105, subd. (d).) If notice is properly filed, “the judgment creditor is entitled to a hearing on the claim of exemption. If the judgment creditor desires a hearing on the claim of exemption, the judgment creditor shall file a notice of motion for an order determining the claim of exemption with the court within 10 days after the date the levying officer mailed the notice of claim of exemption. If the notice of motion is so filed, the hearing on the motion shall be held not later than 30 days from the date the notice of motion was filed . . . .” (§ 706.105, subd. (e).) The judgment creditor must serve a copy of the notice of opposition and the notice of hearing on the judgment debtor at least 16 court days before the hearing. (§§ 706.105, subd. (e), 1005, subd. (b).) If the levying officer does not receive a timely notice of opposition to the claim of exemption and a notice of the hearing, the levying officer shall either (1) notify the judgment debtor’s employer that the earnings withholding order has been terminated or (2) serve the employer with a modified earnings withholding order. (§ 706.105, subd. (f).)
Appellant repeatedly asserts that no “opposition” to his “motion” was filed. In fact, under the statutory scheme, respondent was the moving party, and it was appellant who filed an “opposition.” The statutory scheme does not contemplate the filing of any reply briefs.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a) provides that a trial court that offers a tentative ruling procedure for “civil law and motion matters” must follow one of two specified procedures. By local rule, Marin County Superior Court has adopted the procedure that requires the court to make its tentative rulings available by telephone by 3:00 p.m. the court day before the scheduled hearing, and that if the court does not direct argument, oral argument must be permitted only if a party notifies the court and all other parties by telephone or in person by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Super. Ct. Marin County, Local Rules, rule 1.6A, B.)
Respondent’s counsel maintained consistently throughout the proceedings below that because respondent had been served by appellant with a subpoena to attend and produce documents at a noticed hearing concerning his client’s claim of exemption, and that because he anticipated a procedure that was in the nature of a short cause trial, he did not believe that he was required to request oral argument, as he would have been had appellant noticed a law and motion hearing. Respondent’s subsequent challenge to the trial court’s order denying her first claim of exemption therefore amounted to a collateral due process challenge to the order, based on the fact she was deprived of her opportunity to be heard, as contemplated by the procedure governing claims of exemption (as opposed to civil law and motion practice). As she argued in her motion for relief: “All Claimant wishes is for her claim to be heard on the merits.”
The trial court, in granting respondent’s motion for relief, eventually agreed that respondent should be heard, stating: “Plaintiff was entitled to the evidentiary hearing . . . . She appeared and was not given an opportunity to be heard. . . . [I]t would be inequitable and unjust under the circumstances not to allow Barela to have an evidentiary hearing on her claim of exemption and to continue to be bound by findings that were made without the benefit of a hearing.” (Italics added.)
Appellant’s arguments on appeal all presuppose that respondent’s counsel was, in fact, required to request “oral argument.” However, the trial court necessarily found that respondent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing notwithstanding the fact that her attorney did not follow the procedure for requesting oral argument. Appellant does not explain in his opening brief why the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion, waiting for his reply brief to argue that it is common for the trial court to issue tentative rulings after reviewing “motion papers” (as opposed to claims of exemption), and that it is “quite rare for oral argument not to involve some presentation of an evidentiary nature.” Having failed to address the issue in appellant’s opening brief, appellant waived it. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 [issues not raised on appeal are waived]; Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3 [points raised for first time in reply brief need not be considered].) We assume (without deciding) that the trial court was not permitted to rule on respondent’s claim of exemption without holding the hearing contemplated by the Judicial Council forms completed by appellant when he challenged the claim, notwithstanding the fact that respondent’s counsel did not request “oral argument” on the claim of exemption.
This is consistent with statements made by the trial court at the subsequent evidentiary hearing on respondent’s claim of exemption. Appellant’s counsel asked whether “the basis for [granting respondent’s motion for relief] was that she had not been able to orally argue the matter at a March 21st, 2007 hearing.” The court responded: “Yeah. She hadn’t actually been—she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and she didn’t get it. That was the—that was the bottom line.
Appellant does not cite any authority for this proposition, which is not surprising given the fact that parties are generally required to submit evidence in advance of law and motion hearings and are not permitted to present oral testimony unless they seek permission in advance. (E.g., § 473c, subd. (b)(1) & (2) [summary judgment moving and opposition papers shall be supported by evidence submitted in advance of hearing], Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b) [party must seek permission in advance of law and motion hearing to introduce oral testimony].) By contrast here, the hearing that eventually was held on respondent’s claim of exemption involved the presentation of three witnesses (respondent, her mother, and appellant), as well as six exhibits.
Although we do not decide the issue, we note that the few published cases addressing California’s statutory scheme for seeking claims of exemption appear to contemplate an evidentiary hearing where a judgment debtor timely requests one, as opposed to only oral argument. (E.g., Westervelt v. Robertson (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6 [evidentiary hearing held on claim of exemption and motion to vacate previous default judgment]; Perfection Paint Products v. Johnson (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 739, 741 [two witnesses testified at hearing on claim of exemption].)
With this background in mind, we next consider appellant’s various attacks on the trial court’s order granting relief from its previous denial of respondent’s claim of exemption.
B. Respondent Was Not Limited to a Motion for Reconsideration.
Appellant first argues that the only way to challenge the denial of respondent’s first claim of exemption was to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008, and that because respondent did not do so within 10 days as mandated by the statute, the trial court was not authorized to grant her relief. Section 1008 generally requires that a motion for reconsideration be based “upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law . . . .” (§ 1008, subds. (a), (b); Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1098.) Section 1008 limits a party’s ability to file repetitive motions, and a court lacks jurisdiction to grant a party’s motion to reconsider where it is not based upon “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” (Le Francois at p. 1098; Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)
Section 1008 is not available to a party who files a timely and procedurally adequate opposition to a motion but loses on the merits. (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 683.) Here, respondent’s motion for relief from the order denying her claim of exemption did not ask the court to reconsider its prior order on the merits (although she certainly disagreed with the outcome of her first claim of exemption). Instead, respondent sought relief from the order based on section 473, subdivision (b), claiming that she had been deprived of her opportunity to present all evidence in support of her claim (as contemplated by section 706.105 and the Judicial Council forms she received from appellant), because of her attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Section 473, subdivision (b) may be relied on in situations where, as here, an attorney’s inadvertent failure to follow a certain procedure leads to an adverse ruling for his or her client. (Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, 864-865, 869-870 [trial court erred in declining under § 473, subd. (b) to set aside summary judgment where attorney failed to timely file opposition to motion because of calendaring error].) Under the circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that respondent was not limited to seeking relief under section 1008.
The statute provides, in relevant part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The statute further provides that the application for relief shall be made “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the . . . order . . . was taken.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) An order is “taken” for purposes of the statute when it is “entered in the minutes.” (Brownell v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 703, 707.) Believing that respondent had six months after the entry of the trial court’s signed, April 10, 2007, order to seek relief, her attorney did not seek relief until October 9, 2007. We agree with appellant and the trial court that respondent’s motion was untimely under section 473, subdivision (b), because it was filed more than six months after the trial court entered its minute order dated March 21, 2007, adopting its tentative ruling. We address below whether the trial court nonetheless had jurisdiction to set aside its prior order based on equitable grounds.
Appellant’s claims that section 1008 is the sole authority upon which a party may challenge any order of the trial court is contradicted by the language of section 473, subdivision (b), which provides that the court may relieve a party “from a[n] . . . order . . . taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Italics added.) At least one published case has stated (albeit in dicta) that a judgment debtor is not limited from seeking relief under section 473 from an order on a claim of exemption “because of an improperly set hearing.” (Westervelt v. Robertson, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 10, fn. 2.)
Gilberd v. AC Transit, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, relied on by appellant, is not to the contrary. In Gilberd, the trial court granted a number of plaintiff’s motions and dismissed defendant’s summary judgment motion. (Id. at p. 1498.) Defendant thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of all the trial court’s orders, which the trial court granted. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court did not have the power to reconsider its prior rulings because defendant’s motion did not meet the prerequisites set forth in section 1008. (Gilberd at pp. 1498-1499.) The court rejected defendant’s argument that the fact it had not intended to waive oral argument on the initial motions was a “ ‘new’ fact or circumstance sufficient to satisfy the statute.” (Id. at p. 1500.) “While not denigrating the assistance that oral argument can provide to a court, the fact that [defendant] intended to request that the court entertain oral argument with respect to the initial motions is clearly collateral to the merits of the motions. Again, [defendant] did not present any facts or authorities relating to the merits of the underlying motion that were not considered by the trial court when it issued its initial orders.” (Ibid., italics added, fn. omitted.)
Here, by contrast, the hearing sought by respondent was not “collateral to the merits of the motion” (Gilberd v. AC Transit, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500), because respondent sought to present evidence in the first instance. She sought an evidentiary hearing, not “oral argument,” as was the case in Gilberd. (Ibid.) We recognize that, “under the circumstances presented in [the Gilberd] case,” the “general relief mechanism provided in section 473” could not be used to circumvent the jurisdictional requirements for reconsideration set forth in section 1008. (Id. at p. 1501, italics added.) It was undisputed in Gilberd that the only reason defendant did not have the opportunity to present oral argument on plaintiff’s original motions was because counsel neglected to timely call the trial court to schedule a hearing, and that there was no other fact or law that counsel omitted from the original briefs. (Id. at p. 1498.) Here, by contrast, the trial court concluded that respondent was entitled to present evidence at a hearing despite the fact her counsel did not call the trial court to request oral argument. We conclude that under the unique circumstances of this case, section 1008 was not the exclusive mechanism to challenge the trial court’s order.
C. Trial Court Had Power to Set Aside Prior Order on Equitable Grounds.
Respondent’s notice of motion for relief from the trial court’s order denying her first claim of exemption stated that she was seeking relief “pursuant to C.C.P. §473(b) based on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect of her attorney.” No doubt realizing after a review of appellant’s opposition that a motion under section 473, subdivision (b) was in fact untimely (see fn. 9, ante), respondent’s counsel, citing Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, argued at the hearing on the motion that the trial court could vacate the order on equitable grounds even if statutory relief was unavailable under section 473. The trial court agreed, ruling that “it would be inequitable and unjust” to deny respondent an evidentiary hearing on her claim of exemption.
Trial courts have inherent equitable power to set aside an entry of default and a subsequent default judgment where there has been extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 737 (Aldrich); Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574.) A trial court retains this power even where a motion for relief is made more than six months past the statutory maximum set forth in section 473. (Aldrich, supra, at p. 737.)
In his opening brief, appellant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that it would be “inequitable and unjust” to deprive respondent of an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he first argues that the issue of equitable relief was not properly before the trial court, because it was not raised in respondent’s moving papers. “A basic principle of motion practice is that the moving party must specify for the court and the opposing party the grounds upon which that party seeks relief.” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 [trial court need not consider relief under mandatory provision of § 473 when party moves under only discretionary provision].) Section 1010 mandates that a notice of motion state “the grounds upon which it will be made.” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a) provides that a “notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.” “As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion. [Citations.]” (Luri, supra, at p. 1125.)
Appellant instead waits until his reply brief to argue that respondent failed to establish the elements for equitable relief, thereby depriving respondent the opportunity to respond to appellant’s arguments on appeal. Having failed to raise the issue in his opening brief, appellant waived the issue. (Campos v. Anderson, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 794, fn. 3 [points raised for first time in reply brief need not be considered].)
In Luri, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for relief from summary judgment rulings under the discretionary provisions of section 473, and plaintiff argued on appeal that the court erred by not treating the motion as though it sought relief under the mandatory provisions of section 473. (Luri v. Greenwald, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123-1124.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, concluding that specifying issues in moving papers “is no less necessary when a motion invokes section 473 than when a motion is made pursuant to any other statute.” (Id. at p. 1125.) It held that trial courts are not required to evaluate, sua sponte, alternative bases for relief other than those specified by a moving party in seeking relief under section 473. (Luri at p. 1125.)
Section 473, subdivision (b) provides for two types of relief, commonly referred to as “discretionary” and “mandatory.” (Luri v. Greenwald, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) The court has discretion to allow relief upon a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” which is what respondent sought to show here. (§ 473, subd. (b); Luri at p. 1124.) By contrast, where an attorney submits a sworn affidavit attesting to his or her fault, the court shall vacate any “ ‘ “resulting default judgment or dismissal entered.” ’ ” (§ 473, subd. (b); Luri at p. 1124.)
Although it may be true that the trial court here was not required to consider equitable grounds not raised in respondent’s moving papers, the trial court was permitted to do so. As the court observed in Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at page 736: “Although the relief granted by the trial court in the case at bench is neither authorized nor governed by section 473 we note that section 473 empowers courts to grant its relief ‘. . . upon [any] terms as may be just . . .,’ thereby authorizing the courts to exercise their equitable powers in considering applications for relief under that section.” (Italics added.) This authority was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th 975. In Rappleyea, defendants moved to set aside a clerk’s entry of default. (Id. at p. 980.) Although it is not clear the grounds upon which defendants (proceeding in propria persona) sought relief, the motion was denied “on the ground that good cause had not been shown under section 473.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s legal basis for the ruling was incorrect, because more than six months had passed since the entry of default. (Ibid.) However, it went on to hold that a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable, and that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering relief on that basis. (Id. at pp. 981, 985.)
Although appellant is correct that Rappleyea did not specifically address the notice of the basis for the relief sought, there was nothing in the opinion to indicate that defendants had, in fact, sought relief under equitable grounds.
Respondent’s position that the trial court was permitted to consider respondent’s claim of equitable relief is especially compelling here, where her counsel raised the issue at the hearing. (People v. One Parcel of Land (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 579, 582-583 [court had inherent equitable authority to set aside judgment, even though equitable grounds were raised for first time in written reply brief and at hearing on motion].) Appellant complains on appeal that he was “completely deprived” of “any ability to research and present to the court the law and evidence relevant to a request for equitable relief from an order.” However, although appellant’s counsel raised the objection of lack of notice at the hearing on the motion for relief, he did not ask to file supplemental briefing on the issue before the trial court took the matter under submission. Nor did appellant seek leave to file such briefing in the more than three weeks between the hearing and the date of the trial court’s written order granting relief. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in considering equitable grounds to set aside its prior order simply because respondent did not raise it in her moving papers.
Appellant also argues that trial courts have no authority to grant equitable relief from “orders” (as opposed to defaults or judgments). Although it is true that cases addressing the trial court’s inherent equitable powers to grant parties relief focus primarily on defaults and default judgments (e.g., Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th 975 [default]; People v. One Parcel of Land, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 579 [default judgment]), appellant’s argument ignores the practical effect of the order denying respondent’s claim of exemption. The trial court ordered that $156.64 be deducted from respondent’s weekly paychecks despite the fact she claimed that all her income was exempt, and she was not permitted to present evidence to the trial court about her economic circumstances. This amounted to a default judgment of more than $600 per month, money that respondent claimed was necessary for family expenses. In light of the fact that section 473, subdivision (b) provides relief from “orders,” and that a trial court may exercise its equitable powers in considering applications for relief under that section (Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 736), we decline to hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from the denial of her first claim of exemption because the denial was technically an “order.”
D. Trial Court’s Order Granting Respondent’s Claim of Exemption in Part.
Appellant’s only challenge to the trial court’s order granting respondent’s claim of exemption in part is that it is “void” because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside its first order denying the claim. Because we have concluded that the trial court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to set aside its prior order on equitable grounds, we reject appellant’s argument that we must set aside the court’s subsequent order granting the claim of exemption in part.
III. DISPOSITION
The December 14, 2007 order granting respondent relief from the trial court’s prior order and the February 8, 2008 order granting respondent’s claim of exemption in part are affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: Reardon, Acting P.J., Rivera, J.