Opinion
Case No. 00-72606
August 8, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
1. Introduction
This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with pendent state claims. Plaintiffs Jamil Joubran (Joubran) and Ryan Anderson (Anderson), students at Kearsley High School in Flint, Michigan, are suing their teacher Damon McCord (McCord), the school's principal Karl Paulson (Paulson), and the Kearsley Community School District for violation of their federal and state constitutional rights as a consequence of negative statements made by McCord about plaintiffs' great-uncle. Plaintiffs claim: (1) denial of equal protection, (2) denial of procedural due process, (3) denial of substantive due process, (4) grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) violation of the Michigan constitution. Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in pad and the case dismissed without prejudice as to the state law claims.
Although the defendants' motion is styled as motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, for dismissal, because the Court's decision relies on papers outside of the pleadings, it treats the motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
II. Facts
The material facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, follow.
A. Damon McCord
Joubran and Anderson are cousins. During the 1999-2000 academic year, both were students in McCord's English class at Kearsley High School. During class sessions, McCord made negative statements in front of the class about their great-uncle, Tom Joubran, a high profile member of the Genessee County community. Specifically, McCord said that that Tom Joubran is a "crooked son of a bitch," that he "burns down buildings and collects insurance money," and that he puts people in housing and then "jacks the prices up." Apparently, McCord's parents and grandparents live in a mobile home park owned by Tom Joubran.
The papers are unclear as to specific dates or the number of occurrences.
McCord also publicly scolded Joubran saying that "at 18, he was the most immature kid at school," and taunted Joubran and Anderson about their great-uncle buying them nice cars.
Plaintiffs further say that McCord lowered their grades without a legitimate reason. Joubran's grades dropped from a "B" average in 1998-1999, to a "C" average in 1999-2000. Anderson, however, went from a grade of "C" while in McCord's class to a "B+" after transferring to another class the following semester. The cumulative impact of McCord's comments and illegitimate grading caused them to become very upset; Joubran was prescribed anti-anxiety medication, while Anderson removed himself from McCord's class to minimize his feelings of humiliation and outrage.
B. Karl Paulson
After plaintiffs, Eva Joubran (Anderson's mother), and Tom Joubran complained about McCord's in-class conduct, Paulson, the school principal, sent a letter to McCord on February 17, 2000 admonishing his behavior and directing him to stop making inappropriate comments about Tom Joubran. The letter contained no threat of any further disciplinary action.
Despite the admonishment, McCord continued to embarrass the plaintiffs by telling the class he could not talk about certain subjects due to the fact that he might get in trouble, or that a lawsuit was pending. McCord also continued to ridicule Tom Joubran in class.
There are no references to specific comments.
C. Kearsley Community School District
The plaintiffs and Tom Joubran informed the school district's superintendent, Jeff Morgan (Morgan), about McCord's conduct in February, 2000. Morgan contacted Paulson directing him to investigate McCord's conduct. Morgan did not take disciplinary action to address McCord's conduct, allowing Paulson's letter to serve as corrective action.III. Standard of Review A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all factual allegations and reasonable inferences. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The complaint must allege facts in sufficient detail to adequately support the corresponding legal claims. Id.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment requires the Court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
IV. Analysis
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a clearly established constitutional right. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Here, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the requisite constitutional violation.
A. Equal Protection 1. Standing
Generally, an equal protection claim requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has intentionally discriminated against him or her because they are part of a vulnerable minority class of protected individuals. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977). Recently, however, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs can bring an equal protection claim even when they are not part of a protected class, by alleging they are a "class of one" which has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Here, the plaintiffs say the defendants' conduct, coupled with the lack of similar complaints by other students, allow them to be classified as a "class of one."
It is important to note, however, that Willowbrook, and all of the cases cited in support of it, involved claims of disparate treatment by property owners under various property and zoning laws. See e.g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), Alleghen Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty. 488 U.S. 336 (1989). Plaintiffs have not cited any authority, and the Court's own research has not found, any application of the "class of one" theory outside of the property-owner context. Thus, it is unclear whether it is applicable to the circumstances at hand.
The "class of one theory," as applied to a § 1983 situation, has significant policy implications since it appears it would potentially allow anyone who has experienced insults or indignities by a public official, based on anything (including non-protected traits) to sue for a civil rights violation.
Alternatively, (and possibly in recognition that the "class of one" theory may not apply), the plaintiffs now seek to amend their complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. to claim they suffered discrimination because they are Palestinian-Christians thereby fulfilling Arlington's requirement of a traditional "protected class." A district court can consider claims outside of those raised in the pleadings only when it does not cause prejudice. Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 372 (6th Cir. 2000). Prejudice means a lack of opportunity to prepare for the issue that was not originally pleaded. Id.
Here, plaintiffs' claim of religious or ethnic discrimination appears to be simply an attempt to evade dismissal. The plaintiffs' complaint, and all of their deposition testimony, specifically states that plaintiffs believe they were discriminated against based on their relationship to their great-uncle, not for ethnic/religious purposes. In fact, a review the specific comments allegedly made by McCord currently at issue, fails to show any relation to plaintiffs' Palestinian origin or religious beliefs. Moreover, discovery has been completed and allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint at this time would unduly prejudice the defendants because they have not had the opportunity to prepare a defense to the claim. More appropriately, if plaintiffs want to claim ethnic or religious discrimination, they should file a separate suit.
Accordingly, plaintiffs will not be allowed to amend the complaint.
b. Property Interest
Even assuming that plaintiffs can proceed as a "class of one," they must still demonstrate that they were deprived of a constitutionally protected right. Here, relying on Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), plaintiffs' claim that they were denied a "interest" in pursuing their education in a hassle-free environment and a "liberty interest" in maintaining their reputation.
In Goss, Ohio public school students who had been suspended from school for 10 days without a hearing brought a class action suit against school officials, The Supreme Court held that the due process clause protects students facing suspension and requires that students be notified of the charges against them, as well as the opportunity to present their version of facts to authorities. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court recognized that the students had a liberty interest in reputation and a property interest in education.
However, the present situation is distinguishable from Goss in that here, plaintiffs were never suspended or expelled. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the suspension or expulsion from school is the basis of the holding in Goss. Furthermore, Goss discussed a property interest in "education," not a right to education "in a hassle-free environment." Moreover, the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) subsequently held that damage to one's reputation or "good name" with out more does not result in a deprivation of liberty. Thus, plaintiffs' reliance on Goss is misplaced.
c. Deprivation
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' failure to allege injury to a legally protected interest, plaintiffs have also failed to show that they received an unequal education or suffered damage to their reputation. Simply because plaintiffs heard disparaging comments about their great-uncle does not mean they were deprived of an equal education with respect to their classmates. Moreover, the plaintiffs have not shown that defendants damaged their reputation. Simply because plaintiffs' classmates know that McCord dislikes their great-uncle does not equate to damage to the plaintiffs' reputation. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Goss, 419 U.S. at 572. The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claim because there is no issue of material fact concerning the loss of a legally cognizable liberty or property interest.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Goss recognized the potential loss of property interest in education, and liberty interest in reputation, only when the student has been suspended or expelled from school. Given that there was no suspension or expulsion involved here, defendants properly assert that plaintiffs have failed to raise the loss of a liberty or property interest.
Plaintiffs, however, argue they have been subjected to "punishment" by McCord through a lowering of grades and the disparaging comments made about Tom Joubran. They allege this "punishment" occurred without an informal or formal hearing which amounts to a procedural due process violation.
Plaintiffs are incorrect; defendants did not subject the plaintiffs to any form of disciplinary action. Nonetheless, even if their conduct could be construed as punishment, such punishment would be de minimis, and plaintiffs would still not be entitled to procedural due process protection. See Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 77 1-72 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding no procedural due process violation for a three-day in-school suspension where the student was not deprived of any in-school education).
Given the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claim as well.
C. Substantive Due Process
Defendants next argue that plaintiffs' substantive due process claims must fail as well, for they have not shown a violation of a fundamental right. Substantive due process claims must allege conduct that is an "egregious abuse of governmental power." Cale v. Johnson, 861 5. 2d 943, 949 (6's Cir. 1988). The conduct must rise to the level that "shocks the conscience." Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 201 (6th Cir. 1988).
Again, relying on Goss, the plaintiffs claim that they have suffered property and liberty injury. They argue that McCord's conduct was egregious because he is an adult teacher operating in a public school who repeatedly made disparaging comments about a family member.
The plaintiffs do not claim McCord's arbitrary grade lowering is a substantive due process violation.
McCord's conduct does not amount to a substantive due process violation. First, the Court in San Antonio v. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973) held the right to pursue an education is not a fundamental right subject to substantive due process protection against arbitrary government action. If there is no fundamental right to pursue an education, then there is no fundamental right to be free from listening to disparaging comments while pursuing an education.
Second, while McCord's comments appear inappropriate and mean-spirited, they were not so inflammatory as to "shock the conscience" as a matter of law. For example, the court in Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1367-68 (6th Cir. 1993) held that banning a coach from a city ice rink and publishing to third parties false statements that he was sexually abusing minor students was not egregious conduct that shocked the conscience. Here, McCord may have made distasteful comments, but they do not shock the conscience in light of Mertik. Thus, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.
D. Municipal Liability
Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches only when the defendant municipality is responsible for the violation. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 1996). Therefore, municipalities are not subject to respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Monell v. New York Cit Dep't of Social Services 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1987). The defendants argue that municipal liability cannot attach here because plaintiffs have failed to claim a "policy or custom" on the part of Kearsley Community School District.
As previously discussed, the plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue as to a violation of a federal right. For this reason alone, the plaintiffs' claim against Kearsley Community School District cannot stand. Nevertheless, plaintiffs have also failed to show a policy or custom employed by the school district.
Both parties discuss qualified immunity. However, the issue is moot because defendants have not violated any of the plaintiffs' rights. Moreover, the plaintiffs' claim that the Michigan Constitution was violated must be dismissed because its due process provisions are coextensive with the United States Constitution. Crego v. Coleman, 463 Mich. 248, 258 (2000).
Despite plaintiffs' protestations, the school district's "inaction" to discipline McCord does not amount to a policy. The plaintiffs' own statement of facts indicates that Morgan, the school's superintendent, contacted Paulson concerning McCord's conduct. The undisputed facts also show that Paulson, the principal, acting as an agent of the school district, took corrective action by sending a disciplinary letter to McCord. In fact, the plaintiffs admitted they did not complain to Paulson about McCord anytime after the letter was sent. In sum, the plaintiffs simply view the letter as insufficient punishment that carded no real consequence or threatened action. However, their disappointment with the disciplinary action taken does not constitute a policy of "inaction" and, therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of liability on the part of the Kearsley Community School District fails on this basis as well.
E. Intentional and Grossly Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs additionally assert claims for intentional and grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, having found that plaintiffs have no federal cause of action under § 1983, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the federal law claims; plaintiffs' state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.