Opinion
Case No. 5D21-1692
07-30-2021
Thomas Leslie JORDAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida and Department of Corrections, Respondents.
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, Orlando, and Robert Thompson Adams, IV, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida. No Appearance for Respondent, Department of Corrections.
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, Orlando, and Robert Thompson Adams, IV, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida.
No Appearance for Respondent, Department of Corrections.
SASSO, J. Thomas Leslie Jordan petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his ongoing pretrial detention without bail is unlawful. For the following reasons, we deny the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jordan was arrested on April 14, 2021, for allegedly trafficking in methamphetamine. For that arrest, bond was stayed at $50,000 in Orange County Circuit Court case number 2021-CF-4311.
On May 14, 2021, Jordan moved for release on his own recognizance pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.134. That rule requires release after thirty-three days if the State has not filed a charging information or indictment. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.134. In response, the State admitted that it was awaiting a lab report, and that it would not file a charging document by day thirty-three. The trial court granted Jordan's motion.
On May 21, 2021, Jordan was arrested again, for felony grand theft in Orange County Circuit Court case number 2021-CF-5964. That new case is not part of this Court's review.
At the first appearance in the new case, a different judge set bond at $150, but revoked bond entirely in case 2021-CF-4311. The judge entered a separate order in case 2021-CF-4311, revoking pretrial release and ordering Jordan detained without bond pending trial. In support, the court relied on section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2021), which permits a court to "revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release."
On May 28, 2021, Jordan again moved for release on recognizance in case 2021-CF-4311. He noted that he had been held for more than thirty days in this case and that the State still had not filed a charging document. The trial court denied the motion in an unelaborated order on June 9, 2021.
On June 16, 2021, Jordan moved for release again, noting that the State had still not filed any charges in case 2021-CF-4311. On June 28, 2021, the court again denied this last motion.
DISCUSSION
In support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Jordan presents an argument about the interplay between Rule 3.134 and section 903.0471, Florida Statutes. Specifically, Jordan recognizes that section 903.0471 permits a trial court to revoke pretrial release if the court finds probable cause to believe the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. However, Jordan argues that Rule 3.134 precludes application of section 903.0471 in his case. Rule 3.134 requires the State to file formal charges against a defendant in custody within thirty days from the date the defendant is arrested or the date of service of a capias upon him. If a defendant remains without formal charge on the thirtieth day, the rule requires the court to:
We reject Jordan's argument that the first appearance judge in case 2021-CF-5964 was not authorized to revoke the bond in case 2021-CF-4311. See Rodriguez v. State , 269 So. 3d 639, 640 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
(1) Order that the defendants automatically be released on their own recognizance on the 33rd day unless the state files formal charges by that date; or
(2) If good cause is shown by the state, order that the defendants automatically be released on their own recognizance on the 40th day unless the state files formal charges by that date.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.134. The rule goes on to provide that "[i]n no event shall any defendants remain in custody beyond 40 days unless they have been formally charged with a crime." Id.
Jordan argues that the forty-day deadline prescribed by Rule 3.134 has no exceptions, and thus applies regardless of whether he committed a new law violation while on recognizance release. In essence, Jordan argues that section 903.0471 has no application to his case.
We reject Jordan's argument. In explaining why, it is helpful to highlight how the substantive protections outlined in section 903.0471 relate to the procedural protections outlined in Rule 3.134.
Section 903.0471 is part of a comprehensive legislative scheme relating to pretrial detention and release. Included within that overall scheme is section 903.047(1)(a) which provides that as a condition of pretrial release, whether by "surety bail bond or recognizance bond ," a defendant must refrain from criminal activity of any kind. § 903.047(1), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added). Section 903.0471 gives teeth to section 903.047 ’s proscription against engaging in criminal activity. See § 903.047(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021) ; Parker v. State , 843 So. 2d 871, 878 (Fla. 2003).
Procedural rules, by contrast, do not create new substantive rights but instead are adopted by the Florida Supreme Court to prescribe the means and method of applying and enforcing duties and rights as created by the legislature. See Benyard v. Wainwright , 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975). With that context in mind, Rule 3.134 can be read as consistent with the substantive rights delineated in section 903.0471.
While Rule 3.134 compels a defendant's release in the absence of a charging document, the rule specifies that release is on his own recognizance. However, nothing in Rule 3.134 suggests that the recognizance release contemplated by the rule is unconditional, or without exception. Indeed, such an interpretation would be contrary to the term "recognizance" itself. "Recognizance" is not unconditional—it carries with it a promise as opposed to a surety. See King v. State , 401 So. 2d 931, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) ; see also Recognizance , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A bond or obligation, made in court, by which a person promises to perform some act or observe some condition, such as to appear when called, to pay a debt, or to keep the peace ....").
What's more, the language of Rule 3.134 does not address the effect of a defendant's violation of his pretrial release at all. Thus, when reading section 903.047, section 903.0471, and Rule 3.134 together, the recognizance release contemplated by Rule 3.134 is still "pretrial release" as contemplated by the statutes, and that release is still subject to the basic condition that a defendant refrain from committing new crimes.
Furthermore, if there was a conflict between Rule 3.134 and section 903.0471, the statute, rather than the rule, would govern. See, e.g. , State v. J.A.R. , 318 So.3d 1256 (Fla. 2021) ("[E]ven assuming this rule would apply here, the rule cannot conflict with the substantive law ....").
In sum, the trial court was correct to rely on section 903.0471 when determining the consequences of Jordan violating his release. Accordingly, we deny his petition.
This interpretation does not lead to an absurd result. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) and (p) run from the date of "arrest," and this Court's interpretation of Rule 3.134 is therefore consistent with the overall structure of the rules of procedure.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED.
COHEN and TRAVER, JJ., concur.