Summary
dismissing civil rights action against federal and District of Columbia law enforcement officers who allegedly "violated the law by obtaining wiretaps without probable cause, forging documents, making false sworn statements, deceiving the Judge, and suborning perjury, among other things"
Summary of this case from Jones v. YantaOpinion
Civil Action No. 07-1172 (RJL).
May 27, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff is a prisoner recently convicted and sentenced to life in prison for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. While awaiting trial, plaintiff filed this action for civil rights violations seeking $10 million in damages. He alleges that the investigation and prosecution that led to his arrest and conviction was tainted by the unlawful conduct of federal and District of Columbia law enforcement officers who violated the law by obtaining wiretaps without probable cause, forging documents, making false sworn statements, deceiving the Judge, and suborning perjury, among other things. The Court, upon sua sponte review, will dismiss the plaintiff's pro se complaint under the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and applied to Bivens actions in Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors and police investigators involved in his criminal prosecution had engaged in unlawful conduct that led to his arrest and conviction. 512 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court concluded that "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." Id. at 486. Accordingly, "in order to recover damages from allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Id. at 486-87. Accordingly, "the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. at 487.
Here, the wrongs that plaintiff alleges, if proved, would render his conviction invalid. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Therefore, under the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, this civil rights action for damages must be dismissed.
Plaintiff has recently noticed a direct appeal from his criminal conviction.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.