Opinion
13 Civ. 2226 (JSR)
12-07-2013
ANTHONY JONES, Plaintiff, v. THE ROOSEVELT ISLAND OPERATING CORPORATION; ROOSEVELT ISLAND PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT; RALPH TORRENS; FRENSHERIA MICHAEL; JEFFREY LASZCZYCH; DAN FLAHERTY; EMMANUEL ANKOMAH; GARY YEE; and RAUL HERNANDEZ, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Jones sues the Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation ("RIOC"), Roosevelt Island Public Safety Department ("RIPSD"), Detective Jeffrey Laszczych, Lieutenant Gary Yee, and several public safety officers of the RIPSD for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York law. Jones alleges that RIPSD personnel used excessive force during a false arrest, resulting in severe injuries that required a seven-day hospital stay. He also alleges false imprisonment because he was handcuffed and kept under police surveillance during his hospital stay, even though he was never arraigned. He brings claims against RIOC and RIPSD on a variety of theories, including respondeat superior and negligent hiring, and against Laszczych and Yee for failing to prevent the alleged events.
RIOC, RIPSD, Laszczych, and Yee are represented by the State Attorney General's Office, which filed a motion to dismiss all claims against these defendants on August 28, 2013. These defendants argue that the claims against RIOC and RIPSD, as well as Laszczych and Yee in their official capacities, should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity doctrine. Regarding Laszczych and Yee in their personal capacities, they ask the Court to dismiss: (1) the federal claims for failure to plead personal involvement as required under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) all claims for failure to state a cognizable cause of action; and (3) all claims because defendants are entitled to qualified immunity since plaintiff failed to allege any wrongdoing by these defendants. On October 10, 2013, following the parties' briefing, the Court heard oral argument on this motion. At oral argument, the Court granted the motion to dismiss in full. This Memorandum Order reaffirms the Court's ruling from the bench during oral argument and explains the Court's reasoning. See Transcript, Oct. 10, 2013, at 4:17-:18, 8:3-:8, 8:14-:20.
The relevant standards are the following. First, on a Federal Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of jurisdiction, a court resolves disputed jurisdictional issues, including disputes related to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must prove that subject-matter jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence, see Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000), although "the governmental entity invoking the Eleventh Amendment bears the burden of demonstrating that it qualifies as an arm of the state entitled to share in [the state's]immunity," Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2006).
Second, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While "a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must provide 'more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Retirement Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A court should "accept[] all factual allegations as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2013). However, merely offering "labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 712 F.3d at 717 (internal quotation marks omitted). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 712 F.3d at 718 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Applying these standards, the Court, as reflected in its ruling from the bench, has reached the following conclusions:
First, the Amended Complaint ("Complaint") against RIPSD must be dismissed with prejudice because the plaintiff does not object to this dismissal. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition of the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Defendants RIOC, RIPSD, Detective Laszczych and Lieutenant Yee ("Pl. MTD Opp."), Sept. 11, 2013, at 2.
Second, the Complaint against RIOC, as well as all RIPSD officers (including Yee and Laszczych) in their official capacities, must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. The Eleventh Amendment protects these defendants under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States and their agencies in federal court, unless Congress validly abrogates immunity or the State waives it. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). In addition, sovereign immunity extends to damages actions against state officials sued in their official capacities. Cf. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1985). The State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court, see, e.g., Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 does not abrogate a state's immunity, see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-77 (1974).
In this regard, the only issue is whether RIOC, RIPSD, and the officers sued in their official capacities are entitled to the protections given to New York State. A state-created entity that is not an agency qualifies for immunity only if it shows that it is more like an "arm of the State" than like a "municipal corporation or other political subdivision." Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); see also Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1996). Mancuso lays out the relevant Second Circuit test for determining if an entity sufficiently is an "arm of the state." Specifically, the court weighs six factors:
(1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded; (4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's actions; and (6) whether the entity's obligations are binding upon the state.Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293. "[I]f those factors point in different directions," then the court must ask whether allowing the entity to be sued in federal court "threaten[s] the integrity of the state" or "expose[s] the state treasury to risk." Id.
This District, in an unreported, but well-reasoned decision by Judge Buchwald, has previously held that RIOC is an "arm of the state," at least with respect to "liabilities, claims or judgments arising out of the development, management or operation of Roosevelt Island." Chafetz v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., No. 97 Civ. 0761, 2000 WL 1277337, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision used the test from Mancuso to determine if RIOC was "an arm of the State," concluding that both parts of the disjunctive test supported its entitlement to sovereign immunity. Id. at *2-5. Judge Buchwald concluded that the balance of the six factors pointed toward RIOC being an arm of the State. Id. at *3. The Court found that the entity's powers, its method for appointing governing members, and the binding nature of its obligations on the State "weigh[ed] strongly in favor of immunity." Id. at *3-4. Weighing only "slightly against" immunity were RIOC's function being traditionally one of local government and the absence of a State veto power over it. Id. at *4. Finally, the entity's funding structure did not clearly cut either way. Id. at *3-4. Thus, the balance plainly favored immunity; furthermore, if there were any doubt, the Court concluded that "[a]llowing RIOC to be sued in federal court would indeed be an affront to the dignity of the State, given the substantial degree of connectedness between the State and RIOC," and that "allowing the suit to proceed would expose the state treasury to risk, since . . . the State would be liable for any judgment entered in this action." Id. at *5.
Since Chafetz, the Second Circuit has held that the entity claiming sovereign immunity has the burden of proving that it is an arm of the State by a preponderance of evidence. See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2006). After carefully considering the parties' briefing and Judge Buchwald's decision in Chafetz, the Court concludes that the defendants have met their burden. Even if not all of the six factors point in favor of RIOC being an "arm of the state," most do, and the impact of any potential RIOC liability will be felt directly by the State treasury since RIOC is indemnified by the State from:
any and all liability, claim, loss, damage, suit or judgment . . . that such corporations or their officers, directors or employees may suffer or incur . . . as a result of . . . performance or non-performance . . . of any of its obligations or duties with respect to Roosevelt Island.N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6392(a)(1) (McKinney 2013).
Plaintiff's responses to the defendants' arguments also fall short. First, plaintiff argues that the Southern District has, in at least one recent case, allowed a suit against RIOC to proceed to conclusion, even though sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional matter that should be raised by the court sua sponte. See Stipulation of Settlement and Order of Dismissal, Archer v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6659, ECF Doc. No. 47 (Mar. 10, 2011). However, the Court need not deny dismissal just because one court did not raise the issue sua sponte. Second, plaintiff correctly notes that the most crucial factor in determining sovereign immunity is the effect on the State treasury, but then misconstrues the case law by requesting discovery as to whether the State has insurance or is indemnified from any judgment. Pl. MTD Opp., at 4. Controlling precedent makes clear that if the State is obligated to pay at all, it is irrelevant whether the State has insurance or is indemnified. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 431 (1997); Walker v. City of Waterbury, 253 F. App'x 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2007). Moreover, the one case plaintiff cites in support of its contention involved an entity that, by statute, was not entitled to State indemnification of any liabilities. See Aguilar v. N.Y. Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Finally, it should be noted that, since the Court has an independent obligation to ensure that it has jurisdiction, see, e.g., Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2001), the Court dismisses claims against all RIPSD officers in their official capacities, even though some of these defendants have not so moved.
Third, the Complaint against Detectives Yee and Laszczych in their personal capacities is dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. With respect to the plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1983, plaintiff fails to "show . . . the [defendants'] personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). In Colon v. Coughlin, the Second Circuit held that:
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).
District courts in this Circuit dispute whether Iqbal narrowed the substantive requirements for supervisory liability under Section 1983. Compare Bellamy v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (arguing that the only ways to show liability after Iqbal are the first and third methods), with Delgado v. Bezio, 09 Civ. 6899, 2011 WL 1842294, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (arguing that Iqbal was not as limiting with respect to constitutional claims that do not require discriminatory purpose or intent). Regardless of whether all or only some of the Colon methods still apply, plaintiff fails to state a claim. There is no evidence in the Complaint that Yee or Laszczych participated directly in the alleged violation. Also, the Complaint does not state whether these defendants were even informed of any violation. Instead, the Complaint simply states in a conclusory manner that the defendants did not "take steps to intervene in, prevent, or otherwise limit the misconduct . . . ." Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), July 1, 2013, ¶ 38. Moreover, while there are general allegations of a policy or custom in which unconstitutional practices occurred, plaintiff offers no concrete evidence or even a suggestion of such evidence in the Complaint. Merely stating legal conclusions is insufficient to state a cognizable claim for relief. See, e.g., Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Retirement Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013). Furthermore, the plaintiff does not plead any actual facts suggesting that defendants Yee and Laszczych were negligent; instead, there is only a legal conclusion in Claim Four. See Complaint, ¶¶ 60-61. Finally, the plaintiff fails to plead that there was any deliberate indifference on these defendants' part because plaintiff has not pleaded that the defendants were even aware of the unconstitutional acts.
With respect to the state law claims against defendants Yee and Laszczych in their personal capacities, plaintiff also fails to state a claim. As discussed during oral argument, the plaintiff alleges little that relates to these defendants. See Transcript, at 2:21-3:2. At best, paragraphs 38 and 40 of the Complaint might potentially refer to Yee and Laszczych; but these paragraphs allege simply that the defendants failed to "take steps to intervene in, prevent, or otherwise limit the misconduct engaged in by [two other] Defendants" and that the defendants generally "act[ed] with animus" and other culpable mental states in "failing to intercede on behalf of [the plaintiff]." Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 40. This alone — without any plausible particularization of these defendants' knowledge of wrongdoing, their ability to stop it, or their mental state — fails to state a claim. The remaining allegations in the Complaint either clearly do not pertain to these defendants or merely offer a generic statement of the elements of a tort without any indication of what these defendants did. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 52-56, 60-61, 66. This does not meet the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Given the several sufficient grounds for this decision, the Court need not address these defendants' alternative argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. --------
Moreover, the Court dismisses these personal-capacity claims against Laszczych and Yee with prejudice because plaintiff's counsel failed to offer — either in briefing or at oral argument — any specific information that suggests that these defendants violated the plaintiff's rights. See, e.g., Transcript, at 3:3-4:18.
Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, the Court confirms its October 11, 2013 ruling from the bench and directs the entry of judgment dismissing all claims against defendants RIOC, RIPSD, Yee, and Laszczych with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed close document number 14 in this case's docket.
SO ORDERED. Dated: New York, New York
December 7, 2013
/s/_________
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.