Opinion
1:00cv27-C
October 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Dismissal of Any Remaining State Law Claims. Upon consideration of the motion, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, the Court will deny Defendants' motion.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action was filed on February 11, 2000 and arises out of an incident between Plaintiff and various law enforcement officials employed by the Sheriff's Department of Avery County, North Carolina on November 3, 1999, during which Plaintiff alleges that he was injured as a result of the excessive force used by Defendant Deputy Lee Keller during Plaintiff's detention by Sheriff's Department officials. Plaintiff also alleged in his Complaint that Defendant Sheriff Buchanan established and maintained a policy of encouraging the use of excessive force and failed to provide his officers with adequate training and supervision as to the proper use of force.
On May 30, 2001, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court, on September 21, 2001, granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently appealed this Court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to support his claims of excessive force and that Defendant Keller was not entitled to qualified immunity. See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 531-35 (4th Cir. 2003).
Following remand, on July 7, 2003, Defendants moved jointly for summary judgment, arguing, for the first time, that they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against them. Plaintiff filed his response brief on August 1, 2003, and the motion is now ripe for decision.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The standard for summary judgment is familiar. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P, 56(c). As the issue of whether a particular defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of law, its resolution on summary judgment is appropriate. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 900, 904 n. 5 (1997),
DISCUSSION
This Court recently issued a decision on the issue of whether North Carolina sheriffs are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and, with some reluctance, held that they are not entitled to such immunity. See Harmon v. Buchanan, No. 1:00cv28 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2003). The undersigned noted in that decision that my analysis of the creation of the office of sheriff and the historical role of the sheriff in North Carolina in the exercise of his duties of governance and the enforcement of state law has convinced me that the position of sheriff is more properly considered an office of the State of North Carolina, entitled to all of the privileges and immunities bestowed upon any office of the State. As such, it is my opinion that the sheriff should enjoy immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court is nevertheless bound to follow the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, and in light of the Fourth Circuit's continued adherence to its decision in Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996), holding that North Carolina sheriffs are not state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, this Court cannot hold otherwise,
In Harter, the Fourth Circuit held that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a North Carolina sheriff in his official capacity." Harter, 101 F.3d at 343. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit explained that in determining whether an agency or employee constitutes an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, a court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the state treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded; (2) whether the entity exercises a significant degree of autonomy from the state; (3) whether the entity is involved with local versus statewide concerns; and (4) how the entity is treated as a matter of state law. See id. at 337. The Harter Court made clear that the first factor whether the state treasury will pay any resulting judgment — is the most important factor, such that if the state treasury will pay the judgment, "the entity is immune from suit," and the remaining factors need not be considered. Id. at 339. On the other hand, if the state treasury will not pay the judgment, it remains the most important consideration but is not determinative and must be considered in light of the other three factors. See id.
Noting that it was undisputed that the State does not have to satisfy judgments against sheriffs in North Carolina and that this factor weighed against the extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the sheriffs, the Harter Court then considered the degree of a sheriff s autonomy from the State and found that the State of North Carolina exercises "considerable authority" over the office of sheriff in that the office is created by the North Carolina Constitution and the North Carolina General Statutes set the sheriff's term of office, qualifications, and numerous duties. See id. at 340. The court then found that the county also exercises substantial control of sheriff's. See id. In particular, the court noted that the sheriff is elected by residents of the county, the county sets and pays the salaries of the sheriff and his deputies, the county determines and pays the overall budget, and the Board of County Commissioners determines the number of salaried employees in the sheriff's office, appoints a new sheriff if the sheriff resigns or is removed, and receives a sheriff's resignation. See id. at 340-41. Ultimately, the Harter Court determined that this factor was mixed and that it did not weigh strongly in either direction. See id. at 341. With respect to whether the sheriff was involved with local or statewide concerns, the court found that while sheriff's enforce state laws and perform duties for the State's benefit, he may only perform those duties within a county and is, ultimately, responsible to the county, such that the office of sheriff is generally involved with local, rather than state, concerns. See id. at 342, Finally, in considering how the office of sheriff is treated under North Carolina state law, the Harter Court noted that state court decisions as to whether a particular entity is a state actor are not determinative, though such decisions should be considered. See id. After considering the relevant state statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions and the lack of analysis in North Carolina decisions holding sheriff's to be state actors, the Harter Court concluded that state law treats sheriff's as local, not state, officials. See id. at 342-43. A strongly divided court decided to deny the defendant sheriff's petition for rehearing en bane. See id. at 343.
Following Harter, the Supreme Court issued opinions in Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S, Ct. 990 (1997), and McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781,117 So. Ct. 1734 (1997), which emphasized the importance of relevant state law in determining whether a particular entity is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes and rejected the notion that this determination turns on the issue of financial responsibility alone. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786,117 S.Ct. at 1737; Regents, 519 U.S. at 429-31,117 S.Ct. at 904-05. In light of Regents and McMillian and yet another decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirming that North Carolina sheriff's function as "state officials" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Buchanan v. Might, 133 N.C. App. 299, 305, 515 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1999); see also Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 713-14, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1993); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 429, 429 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1993), the undersigned concluded that the Harter Court's emphasis on the effect of a judgment on the state treasury was misplaced and that, considering all factors but especially the treatment of the office of sheriff under North Carolina law, North Carolina sheriff's are more properly considered state officials, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Henderson Amusement, Inc. v. Good, 172 F. Supp.2d 751, 763 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
Following Regents and McMillian, however, and in response to arguments that these cases effectively overruled its decision in Harter, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the validity of its analysis and judgment in Harter. See Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 2001). The court cited the judgment in Harter with approval, see id. at 226, and stated explicitly: "[W]e continue to follow our jurisprudence, as stated in Harter . . ., and in doing so, we believe that we are faithfully applying the relevant Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence announced by the Supreme Court in Regents. . . ." id. at 227. The Cash Court then concluded, "[w]e therefore reject the district court's view that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Regents and McMillian overruled our decision in Harter." Id. In light of the Fourth Circuit's clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of its Harter decision — both its analysis and its judgment — this Court is bound to adhere to that decision and, therefore, concludes that North Carolina sheriff's are not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, but rather, are subject to suit in federal court.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that Defendants are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Dismissal of Any Remaining State Law Claims (#70) is DENIED.