Summary
holding that the subjective intent of a titleholder in placing her name on a title certificate was legally immaterial and insufficient as a matter of law to rebut title ownership and stating that the titleholder “intentionally caused her name to be placed on the title certificate, it did not happen by accident or without her knowledge and consent, nor did she hold her formal ownership interest in the vehicle as a mere security device or because she had made a good faith but ineffectual attempt or effort to transfer her title interest.”
Summary of this case from Christensen v. BowenOpinion
No. 83-496.
April 12, 1984.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Orange County, Lon S. Cornelius, J.
Ronald L. Harrop of Gurney Handley, P.A., Orlando, for appellants Gary Evan Johnson, Willie D. Johnson, and Mary S. Johnson.
Duncan B. Dowling, III, of Rogers Dowling, P.A., Orlando, for appellant Government Employees Ins. Co.
Joseph H. Williams of Troutman, Parrish, Williams Blankenship, P.A., Winter Park, for appellee.
Mary S. Johnson's name, together with that of her husband, Willie D. Johnson, Jr., was on the title certificate of the motor vehicle operated by their son, Gary Evan Johnson, at the time of the accident that resulted in a wrongful death. Mrs. Johnson intentionally caused her name to be placed on the title certificate, it did not happen by accident or without her knowledge and consent, nor did she hold her formal ownership interest in the vehicle as a mere security device or because she had made a good faith but ineffectual attempt or effort to transfer her title interest. Her subjective intent or reason or motive in causing her name to be placed on the title certificate was legally immaterial and, accordingly, her testimony was insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the legal presumption arising from the motor vehicle title certificate itself and insufficient to avoid the legal consequences of that fact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict and ruling as a matter of law on the issue of Mrs. Johnson's vicarious liability for the damages caused by the operation of the vehicle by her son.
The collateral source statute (§ 627.7372(1), Fla. Stat. (1983)), plainly states that it relates to ". . . any action for . . . wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle. . ." and this is such a case. Furthermore, it would be incongruous to apply that statute to bar recovery from the tortfeasor for benefits for which a living claimant paid premiums or other compensation but to allow recovery from the same tortfeasor for the same benefits on the claim of an estate for a wrongful death caused by a motor vehicle. Whether or not the statute is good public policy in either event is for the legislature and not the judiciary to decide. Accordingly, we hold (1) the collateral source statute applies to wrongful death actions under section 768.21, Florida Statutes (1983); and (2) the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion in limine prohibiting the defendants from mentioning or proving benefits received from collateral sources and in not applying the statute in this case. We reverse the judgment insofar as it gives judgment for the total damages found by the jury verdict in favor of the estate and direct, on remand, that the trial court deduct from such damages all benefits received from collateral sources as provided in the statute.
To facilitate the establishment of statewide uniformity we hereby certify the following question to be of great public importance:
DOES THE COLLATERAL SOURCE STATUTE (§ 627.7372(1), FLA. STAT. (1983)) APPLY TO AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 768.21, FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), AND ARISING OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP, OPERATION, USE OR MAINTENANCE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE?
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.
I agree the collateral source rule should be equally and fairly applied to actions for wrongful death and actions for non-fatal injuries. In my opinion the appellee has put a strained interpretation upon the words "or that were paid by or on behalf of the decedent" in Section 768.21(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). I do not read that statute to include payments made from "collateral sources" as meant in Section 627.7372(1), Florida Statutes (1979):
In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources paid to the claimant, and the court shall instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral sources.
My disagreement with the majority is in the disposition of the matter. I would reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a remittitur or a new trial. Thus, I would give the plaintiff an opportunity to present the matter in its entirety, with all proper evidence and instructions, to a jury fully advised; or to give back the proper amount by way of remittitur.