Opinion
No. 1:02-cv-365
February 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Joyce Johnson filed her complaint in the Chancery Court for McMinn County, Tennessee on October 21, 2002 [Court File No. 1, Exhibit 2]. She brought this action against Collins and Aikman Automotive Interiors, Inc., ("Collins/Aikman"). She alleges that Collias/Aikman wrongfully terminated her as part of a reduction in force ("RIF") in July 2002. Plaintiff alleges that she was selected for termination by Collins/Aikman as part of the RIF as a result of age discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101 through 4-21-903.
On November 29, 2002, Collias/Aikman removed this action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties [Court File No. 1]. Thereafter on January 9, 2004, Collins/Aikman filed a motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 7]. Plaintiff Johnson filed her response to the summary judgment motion of Collins/Aikman on February 9, 2004 [Court File No. 10].
The motion of Collins/Aikman for a summary judgment [Court File No. 7] is now ripe for review.
II. Background
Plaintiff, Joyce Johnson, was 57 years of age when her job as a project accountant/purchase order administrator with defendant, Collins/Aikman, was eliminated, effective July 1, 2002, as part of a RIF. Plaintiff had worked for Collins/Aikman and its predecessors at its Athens, Tennessee, facility since 1982. During her 20-year career with Collins/Aikman, and/or its predecessors, plaintiff had received numerous promotions and salary increases and she had always received favorable performance reviews from her superiors.
At the time of the RIF, plaintiff was the oldest employee in the accounting department at the Athens, Tennessee facility. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was Mary Jane Loftis, who was 41 years of age in July 2002. Ms. Loftis was the controller of the accounting department at Collins/Aikman's Athens, Tennessee facility; and, she was also the highest ranking person in the accounting department at the Athens facility.
Bruce Higgins was the Human Resources Manager at Collins/Aikman's Athens facility in July 2002. He was 44 years of age.
In June 2002, Ms. Loftis was informed about a RIF at Collias/Aikman's Athens, Tennessee facility. She received the information about the RIF from the plant manager, Paul Slater, and human resources manager, Bruce Higgins. The RIF was to be plant-wide; and Collins/Aikman required a reduction in the size of the salaried staff at the Athens facility by 10 percent. A decision as to which salaried employees were to be subject to the RIF was required by the end of June 2002, because the effective date of the RIF was to be July 1, 2002. In order to facilitate the RIF, Bruce Higgins copied the organizational chart of the Athens facility by department. He gave a copy of the departmental organizational chart to the respective departmental managers, including Ms. Loftis, asked them to see where the required cuts could be made in their department and to submit the names of the employees who were to be terminated as a result of the RIF to him.
At the time of her meeting with Slater and Higgins, Ms. Loftis had 12 employees under her supervision. She was ordered to reduce that number from 12 to a single-digit number.
Out of the 12 employees in Loftis department, four employees, one of whom was the plaintiff, reported directly to her. Ms. Loftis testified that in making her decision, she looked at the organizational chart for her department while assessing the activities and responsibilities she had in the accounting department. Ms. Loftis stated she looked at each function and duty.
She concluded that the project accounting duties were more routine in nature, not time bound and in her view the easiest functions in the accounting department to divide between the other employees. Based upon her conclusions about the project accounting duties, she decided to eliminate that position — the position held by plaintiff Joyce Johnson.
Besides plaintiff, three other employees were terminated from Collins/Aikman's Athens, Tennessee facility as a result of the RIF. Loftis's decision to eliminate plaintiffs position in the accounting department was discussed with and approved by the human resources manager, Bruce Higgins.
After the project accounting position was eliminated, plaintiff was not replaced. The duties of the project accounting position were divided between and performed by other individuals in the department. Both Ms. Loftis and Mr. Higgins testified that neither seniority nor age were a factor in Loftis's decision to eliminate the project accountant position occupied by plaintiff.
In a letter dated June 25, 2002, plaintiff was notified that her position was to be eliminated/she was to be terminated effective July 1, 2002. At the time of the June 25, 2002 letter, plaintiff was on a medical leave of absence. She was informed that if she wished to exercise her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), she would remain on the payroll and that her employment status would be determined at the time her leave under the FMLA expired. Plaintiff expressly refused to apply for FMLA leave.
Due to an oversight, the effective date of plaintiff's termination should have been July 12, 2002, because she was actually on medical leave through that date. Plaintiff received severance pay for the period from July 12, 2002, through November 22, 2002.
Plaintiff submitted a detailed affidavit in response to defendant's motion for a summary judgment [Court File No. 12]. The affidavit is discussed in detail, infra.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant moves for a summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of age discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") [Court File No. 7]. Defendant, Collins/Aikman, first contends that plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the THRA. Id. Defendant next contends that even assuming arguendo that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the THRA, it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-pretextual reason for terminating her employment. Id.
Plaintiff has responded to defendant's motion for a summary judgment [Court File No. 10, 11]. She contends that the pleadings of the parties establish that there are genuine issues of material fact, which can only be resolved by a trier-of-fact, which precludes a summaryjudgment in favor of the defendant. Id. A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 5 87 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To reflate such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
B. Plaintiffs claims under the THRA
Defendant seeks a summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under the THRA. [Court File No. 7].
This Court's jurisdiction in this action is based upon complete diversity of citizenship between the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
The THRA is a "comprehensive anti-discrimination law," which is "intended to further the policies embodied in the similar federal laws against employment discrimination." Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002) (citing Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp., 974 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Term. 1998)). In light of the overlap in purpose between the THRA and federal anti-discrimination laws, "Tennessee's courts regularly consult the decisions of their federal counterparts for guidance when called upon to construe and apply the Tennessee Human Rights Act." Id. (citing Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1996)).
"The stated purpose and intent of the [THRA] is to provide for execution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal civil rights laws." Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101(a)(1)). Accordingly, the analysis of claims under the THRA is the same as is used under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act. Id. See also Dennis v. White Way Cleaners, L.P., 119 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003), quoting Barnes v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000))("Because of the commonality of purpose between the [THRA] and the federal statues, `we may look to federal law for guidance in enforcing our own anti-discrimination laws.'").
The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analytical framework is applicable to claims of age discrimination. Lovas v. Huntingdon National Bank, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 712355 at **3 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992)). A plaintiff who brings a claim of age discrimination, must prove that age was a determining factor in the adverse employment action taken against her. Id. (citing Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1023 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Generally, in order to establish her prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was a member of the protected class, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for a particular position and (4) she was replaced by a younger person. Id. (citing Gotfredson v. Hess Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 365 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, where as in this case, the employee is discharged a part of a RIF, the fourth requirement of the usual prima facie age discrimination is modified because in a RIF the employee is not replaced. Id.
Thus, in a RIF situation, the fourth element of the prima facie case of age discrimination requires that a plaintiff who is discharged due to a RIF, present some "direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons." Id. (quoting Skalka v. Fernald Envtl Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnes v. GenCorp. Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)). However, this heightened proffer on the part of the plaintiff for establishing her prima facie case applies only to a "true" RIF case. Norbuta v. Loctite Corp., 1 Fed. Appx. 305, 2001 WL 45114 at **6 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2001). A "true" RIF case
occurs when business considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company. An employee is not eliminated as part of a work force reduction when he or she is replaced after his or her discharge. However, a person is not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff's duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work. A person is replaced only when another employee is hired or reassigned to perform the plaintiff's duties . . . Of course an employer could not avoid liability by changing the job title or by making minor changes to a job indicative of an attempt to avoid liability.Id. (quoting Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 n. 10).
Further, the employer's decision to retain younger persons in jobs for which the plaintiff was qualified does not satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case in a "true" RIF situation. Id. When economic conditions force an employer to reduce its staff, the most common legitimate reason for a discharge is the RIF itself. Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 1997). In such a situation, an employer's decision to discharge a qualified, older employee is not inherently suspicious because it is "readily explainable in terms of the employer's economic situation." Id. (citing Lytle v. Malady, 530 N.W.2d 135, 140, 209 Mich. App. 179 (1995)). Qualified employees are going to be discharged in the event of a RIF. Id. (quoting Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466). Moreover, the employer has no duty to the employee to transfer her to another position when the employer is in the process of a reduction of its workforce due to economic reasons. Id. (quoting Ridenour v. Lawson Co., 791 F.2d 52, 57 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Hatcher v. General Elec., 208 F.3d 231, 2000 WL 245515 at ** 4 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2000) (citing Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1464). If a defendant meets its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff is then given an opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the defendant are a pretext for discrimination. Id.
A plaintiff can establish pretext in one of three ways: (1) she can show that the defendant's articulated reasons have no basis in fact; (2) if the defendant's articulated reasons do have a basis in fact, the plaintiff can show that the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were not the actual factors which motivated the employer's adverse employment action; or (3) if the defendants' articulated reasons are factors, the plaintiff can show that they were jointly insufficient to motivate the adverse employment action. Hatcher, 2000 WL 245515 at **4 (citing Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1986)). The first category of pretextual showing consists of "evidence that the proffered bases for the adverse employment action never happened." Id. (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)). In the second category of pretextual showing, "the plaintiff admits the factual basis of the defendant's articulated reasons and admits that such conduct could warrant the adverse employment action," but the plaintiff argues the weight of the circumstantial evidence makes it "more likely than not" that the explanation of the employer is a pretext for discrimination. Hatcher, 2000 WL 245515 at ** 4 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). Finally, the third type of pretextual showing usually consists of evidence that other employees, particularly employees outside of the protected class, engaged in the same conduct as that of the plaintiff, but suffered no adverse employment action. Id. See also Lovas, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 712355 at** 4:
A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the given reason is factually false, by showing that the stated reason is insufficient to explain the adverse employment action or finally, by showing that the stated reason was not the actual reason. In cases in which the employer's explanation is challenged as not being the actual or true reason for the adverse action, the plaintiff cannot rely on evidence used to make a prima facie showing but must introduce additional evidence of discrimination. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).Id. (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, "[t]he soundness of an employer's business judgment . . . may not be questioned as a means of showing pretext." Brocklehurst, 123 F.3d at 898 (citing Dubey v. Stroh Brewery Co., 462 N.W.2d 758, 760, 185 Mich. App. 700 (1990) (citing Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1986)). An age discrimination action is not a means for permitting a jury to examine an employer's reasons for discharge and determining that the employer's judgment or policies offends the jury's sensibilities. Brocklehurst, 123 F.3d at 898 (citing Elliott v. Group Med. Surgical Sew., 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Applying the law, as set forth in detail above, to the evidence presented by the parties in their respective pleadings, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and as a matter of law plaintiff, Joyce Johnson, has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the THRA. Specifically, she is unable to establish the fourth prong of a prima facie case of age discrimination in a "true" RIF case. Moreover, even were the Court to give plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and assume arguendo that plaintiff had been able to establish a prima facie case, there is no genuine issue of material fact and as a matter law, plaintiff has failed to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason advanced by defendant, Collins/Aikman, for her termination was pretextual.
First, the evidence presented by the parties shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of whether this action involves a "true" RIF situation. In his November 19, 2003 deposition, Bruce Higgins, the human resources manager at Collins/Aikman's Athens, Tennessee facility testified about the RIF. He stated that in early June 2002, Paul Slater, the plant manager at the Athens facility informed him that "there had been a corporate mandate that we reduce the size of our salaried staff by 10 percent. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 1, p. 27]. He stated that as a result of the RIF, three regular, full-time salaried employees, including plaintiff Joyce Johnson lost their jobs. Id. at 28. Mr. Higgins testified he was given no specific directive as to how the RIF was to be accomplished, except that it had to be completed by the end of June because the effective date of the RIF was July 1, 2002. Id. at 28-29.
In her November 19, 2003 deposition, Mary Jane Loftis, plaintiff's supervisor, stated that in early June 2002, she received information from Paul Slater and Bruce Higgins that there was to be a RIF. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 2, pp. 27-28]. She was informed that the RIF required the Athens plant to "reduce its salaried work force by X number." Id. at 29. That meant that Ms. Loftis was required to reduce the 12 employees who reported to her to a single-digit number. Id. at 29. Ms. Loftis testified about the factors that led her to determine to eliminate plaintiff's position. Id. at 30-40, 55-57. Ms. Loftis testified that she was the one who made the decision to terminate Joyce Johnson, id. at 57, and that neither age, seniority, nor the personal situation of any of her employees played any role in her decision, id. at 29-30.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in support of her response to defendant's motion for a summary judgment. [Court File No. 12]. Paragraph 2 of plaintiff's affidavit sets forth her employment history and paragraph 3 states that during her service with Collins/Aikman and its predecessors, she received favorable performance evaluations. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of plaintiff's affidavit lists the ages of the individuals, including plaintiff, who were supervised by Mary Jane Loftis. Paragraphs 6 through 10 of plaintiff's affidavit describe plaintiff's job at Collins/Aikman and essentially challenge the rationale testified to by Ms. Loftis in her deposition as to why she chose plaintiff's position for elimination.
However, these paragraphs — 1 through 10 — of plaintiff's affidavit are insufficient to establish either that age played a role in the decision to eliminate her position or that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason articulated by Collins/Aikman for her termination — a RIF — was a pretext for age discrimination. In this instance, plaintiff may have been the oldest employee under Ms. Loftis supervision. However, in a RIF situation, a "decision to discharge a qualified, older employee is not inherently suspicions because `[i]n a RIF, qualified employees are going to be discharged.'" McGrath v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 48 Fed. Appx. 543, 2002 WL 31269646 at **8 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Brocklehurst, 123 F.3d at 896) (quoting Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466)). Age discrimination statutes do not create a duty on the part of an employer to retain older workers when a RIF becomes necessary nor are they "intended to protect older workers from the often harsh realities of common business decisions and corporate reorganizations." Stipkala v. American Red Cross, 215 F.3d 1327, 2000 WL 712378 at ** 4 (6th Cir. May 23, 2000) (per curiam) (citing Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 1994); Wilson v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 1991)). Lastly, although plaintiff naturally disagrees with the rationale set forth by Ms. Loftis for her decision to eliminate plaintiff's position, "[t]he soundness of an employer's business judgment . . . may not be questioned as a means of showing pretext" in an age discrimination case. Brocklehurst, 123 F.3d at 898 (citing Chappell, 803 F.2d at 266; Dubey v. Stroh Brewery Co., 462 N.W.2d 758, 760, 222 Mich. App. 700(1990)).
In her affidavit, plaintiff also complains about certain isolated incidents which she asserts shows that age was a factor in her termination. She avers that her supervisor was aware of her age. She further asserts in paragraph 13 of her affidavit that on one occasion Ms. Loftis referred to plaintiff as a "good old girl." [Court File No. 12, ¶ 13]. Plaintiff was asked about this statement in her September 16, 2003 deposition. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 3, p. 64]. Plaintiff admitted that Ms. Loftis ". . . didn't mean to say that. She meant to say that I did a good job, I was a good person." Id.
Moreover, plaintiff testified that other than the "good old girl" comment she cannot recall any other statements made by Ms. Loftis relating to age which she felt were inappropriate. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 3, p. 67]. Plaintiff also admitted she did not recall any one else in the accounting department, any other co-worker, or any other supervisor at Collins/Aikman making an age related comment which she felt was inappropriate, id. at 67-68; nor did she recall any co-worker ever telling her about overhearing an age related comment that they felt was inappropriate, id. at 68.
In her affidavit plaintiff also states that in March 2002, she heard a rumor of impending layoffs and made a statement to the effect that since she was the oldest employee in the department she would probably be the first to be laid off. According to plaintiff, Ms. Loftis said, "You know they couldn't say they let anyone go because of their age, that would be illegal." Id.
In paragraph 15, plaintiff states that in April 2002, Ms. Loftis had a meeting with two other employees in the department. Plaintiff thought she should have been included in the meeting; but was not. After the 30-minute meeting, she complains that Ms. Loftis did not tell her anything that was discussed in the meeting. [Court File No. 12, ¶ 15, p. 6].
In that same paragraph, plaintiff also discusses about another meeting where she expected certain additional duties to be assigned to her. She states that at the end of the meeting no additional duties had been assigned to her. Plaintiff was asked about this meeting during her deposition. The purpose of the meeting was to assign the duties of Matt Daughtrey to other persons in the department because he was being promoted to a position outside of the department. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 3, p. 41]. The meeting was held in Ms. Loftis's office. However, Ms. Loftis excused herself shortly after the meeting began. Once Ms. Loftis left, those present at the meeting were Matt Daughtrey, Jill Morketter, Randy Green, and Gail Hester. Plaintiff stated that during the meeting, Daughtrey's duties were parceled out and that Jill Morketter "volunteered herself to take or volunteered for Carrie Andreaus which [sic] worked under her to take." Id. at 43. Matt Daughtrey also specified which duties he thought Randy Green should take. Id.
At the conclusion of the meeting, no additional duties were assigned to plaintiff. Id. at 43. She stated that at the end of the meeting she felt she was being "snookered" Id. at 47. However, she admitted she did not volunteer for any of the duties because she did not know the details of any of the duties and she thought some of them would be assigned to her. Id. at 46.
In paragraph 14, plaintiff states:
after my husband's first two surgeries, during a month-end closing meeting which included Mary Jane Loftis, Matt Daugherty, Jill Morketter and me, there was an expression of concern over the cost of my husband's medical care (approximately $60,000.00). His subsequent bills were some $130,000.00
[Court File No. 12, ¶ 14]. Plaintiff's husband died on December 8, 2001. Id. at ¶ 11.
In paragraph 16, plaintiff complains about some "sharp" criticism she received from Ms. Loftis concerning a deduction, rebate or "give back" which Ford Motor Company took on parts Collins/Aikman had shipped to them during the period from January through March 2002. Plaintiff states that Ms. Loftis was hostile and made a baseless accusation that plaintiff had not given Ms. Loftis information about the Ford "give back." Id. at ¶ 16. According to plaintiff, based upon Ms. Loftis attitude she felt she was being singled out for termination; and this resulted in her being placed on a medical leave of absence beginning May 6, 2002. Id. at 18.
During her deposition, Ms. Loftis was asked about her discussion about the Ford "rebate" problem with plaintiff. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 2, p. 46]. Ms. Loftis stated that she was upset with plaintiff during the discussion. Id. She also acknowledged that she was aware that there was going to be a discrepancy in the Ford "rebate" calculations prior to the date of her discussion with plaintiff; however, the time of her discussion with plaintiff was the first date on which Ms. Loftis was aware that the amount of the discrepancy was $100,000.00. Id. at 46-47. Ms. Loftis stated that she was "upset with missing a hundred thousand dollars and having to tell corporate that our outlook is going to be off by a hundred thousand dollars." Id. at 46. Ms. Loftis stated that plaintiff was responsible for the "rebate" calculations and she expressed her feelings about the discrepancy to plaintiff. Id. at 48-49.
"Discriminatory remarks by those with managerial authority over [a] challenged decision or those who influenced the decision can be indicative of age discrimination." Hatcher v. General Electric, 208 F.3d 213, 2000 WL 245515 at ** 7 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2000) (citing Erecgovich v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1998)). However,'" isolated and ambiguous comments are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial to support a finding of age discrimination.'" Hatcher, 2000 WL 245515 at **7 (quoting Phelps v. Yale Security, 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Here, the only statement identified by plaintiff which even vaguely referred to plaintiff's age was Ms. Loftis isolated remark that she was a "good old girl." However, even plaintiff admitted she knew that Ms. Loftis meant she was a good person and was doing a good job when she made that remark.
Ms. Loftis comments about the discrepancy in the Ford "rebate" calculations related to the quality of her performance, not her age. Further, although plaintiff stated that some concerns were expressed about the cost of her husband's medical care, plaintiffs affidavit does not identify who expressed such concerns. Further, those statement did not refer to her age and, since plaintiff's husband died approximately 7 months prior to her termination as part of the RIF, concerns about the future costs of her husband's medical care could not have been a motivating factor in selecting her for termination in the RIF. Moreover, plaintiff's exclusion from the meeting in Ms. Loftis office is ambiguous because there is no evidence concerning the subject matter of that meeting. Finally, the fact that Matt Daughtrey's duties were assigned to other employees is also ambiguous because plaintiff admits that during the meeting where the duties were reassigned she did not volunteer for any of his duties, but other employees did.
Moreover, plaintiff's speculation about why she was excluded from a meeting in Ms. Loftis's office or that she was being "snookered" by the reassignment of Matt Daughtrey's duties to employees other than herself is not the additional evidence which she must produce to show that these actions were a pretext for age discrimination. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
Finally, in paragraphs 18 through 22 of her affidavit, plaintiff discusses an oversight on the part of Collins/Aikman's human resources manager, Bruce Higgins at the time she received his June 25, 2002 letter, which informed her she was to be terminated as a result of the RIF effective July 1, 2002.
In his letter of June 25, 2002, Mr. Higgins stated in pertinent part:
Recent business decisions have resulted in the need to eliminate your position with Collins and Aikman effective July 1, 2002.
Your personnel file indicates that you began a medical leave of absence on May 6, 2002 for an unspecified period of time, Additional documentation indicates that you were seen again by your health care provider on May 28, 2002 whereby you were placed on an additional two weeks of leave. There is not additional documentation in your file regarding your continued absence.
[Court File No. 12, deposition exhibit 7]. As plaintiff points out in paragraphs 18 and 19 of her affidavit, she had, however, provided another letter, dated June 13, 2002, which extended her leave of absence through July 12, 2002. This letter had been provided to the human resources office at the Athens facility; however, it had apparently not been placed in plaintiff's personnel file at the time Mr. Higgins wrote his letter, a fact which was later acknowledged by Mr. Higgins. [Court File No. 12, paragraphs 18, 19].
Thereafter, on August 15, 2002, Mr. Higgins sent another letter to plaintiff which states in pertinent part:
The purpose of this letter is to follow up on our discussion yesterday regarding the effective date of your termination. As I told you, based upon your decision not to apply for FMLA leave, your termination date is supposed to be July 1, 2002. Based upon our conversation, however, it is clear that you understood the proper termination date to be July 12, 2002. While I do not agree with your reading of my June 25th letter, I do not want you to feel you have been cheated out of money to which you believe you are entitled. I therefore plan to extend the length of your severance pay until November 22, 2002.
[Court File No. 12, deposition exhibit 8].
Plaintiff received 19 weeks of severance pay from Collins/Aikman [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 3, p. 137]. She would have received an additional eight weeks of severance pay had she signed a form agreeing not to file any legal claims against Collins/Aikman arising out of her termination, but she declined to sign the agreement. Id.
Mr. Higgins June 25, 2002 letter also informed plaintiff that she "still ha[d] [leave] time available under the Family and Medical Leave Act," and it enclosed the appropriate forms for plaintiff to apply for FMLA leave. [Court File No. 12, deposition exhibit 7]. The letter also stated that "[a]t the conclusion of your FMLA leave we will evaluate whether there are any available positions for you at that time. If there are no available positions at that time, your employment will be terminated as part of a reduction-in-force." Id.
During her deposition, plaintiff admitted that she signed a handwritten note essentially stating that she had been offered leave under the FMLA and was declining the offer. [Court File No. 9, Exhibit 3, p. 132]. She stated she declined FMLA leave because:
I inquired. I said, you know, what would this do for me. Well, I would still be considered an employee at that point. But what would that do for me. So I'm considered I'm on their payroll just in name only. I would not have been drawing a pay day. I would have had no benefits. No compensation. And then, you know, I would have gone through an approval process for long-term disability. It may have been approved; may not have been; . . .
I was told that for that time frame whatever amount of time that would be, that I would stillbe an employee. But at the end of that time, there again, it was uncertain as to what would happen . . .
There's no guarantee. What benefit would an FMLA at this point in time, an extension, what would it have done for me . . . I was not guaranteed a job at the end of it . . .Id. at 134-35.
Viewing the evidence discussed in detail above in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence does not amount to any direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence which tends to indicate that Collins/Aikman singled plaintiff out for termination for impermissible reasons relating to her age. See Lovas v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 312355 at ** 3 (6th Or. 2000). Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and as a matter of law plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Moreover, even were the Court to give plaintiff the extreme benefit of the doubt and assume arguendo that a prima facie case had been established, evidence that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason advance by Collins/Aikman for plaintiff's termination was pretextual is singularly lacking in this action.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for a summary judgment [Court File No. 7] will be GRANTED and the plaintiff's claims will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A separate judgment will enter.