Opinion
No C 03-1234 VRW
August 12, 2003
ORDER
Defendants have moved to dismiss pro se plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1)-(3) and (b)(6), and Civ LR 7. Doc # 8. Defendants argue that: "(1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as plaintiff does not have Article III standing to bring his claims; (2) plaintiff's complaint is barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution; (3) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 76 of the 77 defendants; (4) venue is improper; and (5) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id at 1. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc # 8) is GRANTED.
On March 20, 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants because of their votes in favor of HJ Res 114, a joint resolution authorizing the United States to use military force in Iraq. Compl (Doc # 1) at 1, ¶ 7. Plaintiff claims that by voting in favor of this resolution, defendants violated their oaths under Article VI of the Constitution to defend the Constitution "by approving the use of force not under US Constitution Article 1, Sec 8, item 11." Id at 1, ¶ 8. In addition, plaintiff claims that defendants' votes were "inappropriate, fraudulent, and corrupt" because they were cast "to aid the cover up of our President's failure to take command and apparent crippling of our defenses" and "in order to aid the recovery of Enron with a second invasion in order to gain access to Caspian Sea oil." Id at 2, ¶ 14-16. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants violated their "clear, present and ministerial duty to do the people's business in a manner that will preserve and enhance the public peace, health and safety, all in accordance with the US Constitution, including but not limited to, Article 1, Sec 8, item 11." See id at 2, ¶ 13.
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a criminal provision proscribing certain false or fraudulent statements. See Compl (Doc # 1) at 1 (caption stating that plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate is brought "pursuant to oaths of office, US Constitution Art 1 Sec 8, 11, and U.S.C. Title 18, Part 1, Chap 47").
On May 22, 2003, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. Doc # 8. Plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendants' motion. In response, the court ordered plaintiff to snow cause why the court should not treat defendants' motion to dismiss as unopposed and ordered plaintiff to file a return on or before July 31, 2003. See Doc # 11 at 2. The court further ordered plaintiff to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendants' motion on or before that same date. Id. The plaintiff failed to respond to the court's show cause order.
II
Consistent with the court's July 7, 2003, order, the court treats defendants' motion to dismiss as unopposed. See Doc # 11 at 3.
A
A party invoking federal jurisdiction must have standing to do so. See Valley Forge Christian v Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," (2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of," and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing his standing to sue. Id.
Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks standing because he does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement under Lujan. Regarding this element, the Ninth Circuit has held that "the injury plaintiff alleges must be unique to that plaintiff, one in which he has a `personal stake' in the outcome of a litigation seeking to remedy that harm." Schmier v US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir 2002). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that, for purposes of standing, "the injury must be more than a generalized grievance common to all members of the public." Rubin v City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1020 (9th Cir 2002). Consequently, "[a]n asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court." Nevada v Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir 1990).
Although plaintiff is clearly concerned about the defendants' votes authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, "citizens who simply assert a general interest in the operations of government do not enjoy a sufficiently concrete personal stake in the outcome to have standing to sue." Taisacan v Camacho, 660 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir 1981); see alsoMottola v Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir 1972) (holding that military reservists lack the standing to challenge the constitutionality of the President's decision to send troops into Cambodia without a congressional declaration of war); Pietsch v Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62, 67 (EDNY 1991), aff'd 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir 1991) (noting that, while the court recognized the plaintiff's "deep concern for the loss of life in any future military action," the plaintiff did not have standing to sue "merely because as a citizen of the United States, he has an `interest' in seeing the government act constitutionally.").
Here, plaintiff alleges no personal harm, either physical, economic, or other, resulting from defendants' votes in favor of HJ Res 114. Accordingly, plaintiff does not present a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact upon which he can establish standing to sue in federal court.
In addition, as plaintiff certainly is aware, the United States has already used military force in Iraq. As a result, plaintiff cannot establish the likelihood that the court could, by a favorable decision, redress any injury plaintiff may personally have suffered. See Lujan, 504 US at 561.
Because plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's claims and plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.
B
Even if plaintiff had standing to bring this action in federal court, his claims would be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. That clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." US Const art I, § 6, cl 1. The Supreme Court has held that this clause applies to private civil actions brought against members of Congress. See Eastland v United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975). In Eastland, the Supreme Court explained:
In reading the [Speech or Debate] Clause broadly we have said that legislators acting withing the sphere of legitimate legislative activity should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves. Just as a criminal prosecution infringes upon the independence which the Clause is designed to preserve, a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function. Moreover, whether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil action brought by private parties, judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting within the legitimate legislative sphere the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.
Id (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has expressly held that Speech or Debate Clause immunity covers not only speech or debate within Congress, but also "[c]ommittee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting." Gravel v United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (emphasis added); see alsoDoe v McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973) (noting that "the Speech or Debate Clause * * * includes within it's protections anything generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants' votes on HJ Res 114 fall within the scope of legitimate legislative activity and plaintiff's suit, even if jurisdictionally proper, would be barred. Because the court has determined that plaintiff lacks standing that his claims, even if cognizable, would be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, the court need not address other potential grounds for dismissal.
III
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc # 8) is GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint (Doc # 1) DISMISSED. The clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions and close the file.IT IS SO ORDERED.