Opinion
E070689
09-13-2018
J.B., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Law Office of Thomas Shinton and Thomas Shinton for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1700325) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Donna Crandall and Matthew C. Perantoni, Judges. Petition is denied. Law Office of Thomas Shinton and Thomas Shinton for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
I
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner J.B. (Mother) seeks extraordinary writ review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of the juvenile court's orders made at the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to consider a permanent plan for her 19-month-old son F.B. Mother contends there was insubstantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that she received reasonable reunification services because she was not given sufficient time to complete the additional services added at the contested six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)). She further contends her due process rights were violated when the Riverside County Department of Social Services (DPSS) lodged additional evidence one day before the contested 12-month review hearing. We reject these contentions and deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code; all rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of DPSS on April 18, 2017, after Mother and A.S. (Father) were arrested and then two-month-old F.B. was left without care. It was reported that while holding F.B., Father grabbed Mother by her hair and threatened to throw her against the wall. Mother broke free, armed herself with an eight-inch knife, and began slashing at Father while he was holding F.B. After Father pushed Mother away with his free hand, Mother left Father's home and called law enforcement. Law enforcement arrived at the home, observed that F.B. was fine, and arrested Mother for assault with a deadly weapon and Father for domestic violence.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
The social worker spoke with Mother on April 18, 2017. Mother was unemployed and lived with her mother and sister. F.B. lived with her. She had brought F.B. to Father's home so he could spend time with his father. The paternal grandparents were also at the home. While at Father's home, they got into an argument about infidelity, and Father would not allow her to leave with F.B. Mother claimed she armed herself with the knife for protection and denied walking toward Father and F.B. with the knife. She also asserted that she had called law enforcement on Father three or four times prior to the incident and that there was a domestic violence incident between her and Father while she was pregnant with F.B. Mother denied being arrested for domestic violence prior to the incident. She also denied using drugs and alcohol after completing a substance abuse program following a DUI arrest in 2015, or having any medical or mental health issues. After Mother was unable to contact the maternal grandmother to take custody of F.B., F.B. was taken into protective custody and placed with the paternal great-aunt.
On April 20, 2017, a petition was filed on behalf of F.B. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). F.B. was formally detained at the detention hearing on April 21, 2017, and Mother was provided with services and visitation pending further proceedings. Mother was ordered to drug test and attend a parenting and substance abuse program.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on June 12, 2017. The juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true as amended and declared F.B. a dependent of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate. The parents were advised that due to F.B. being under the age of three at the time of removal, their failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their case plan might result in the termination of their services six months from the date their child entered foster care under section 366.21, subdivision (e). Mother's case plan required her to participate and complete a domestic violence program, individual and co-parenting counseling, and a parenting program. The six-month review hearing was set for December 12, 2017.
On April 27, 2017, DPSS provided Mother with referrals for individual therapy, a domestic violence program, and a parenting program. Mother completed her parenting program and individual therapy on August 8, 2017. However, DPSS opined that Mother had not benefitted from those services as she was seen yelling and having angry outbursts with Father before visitations. Additionally, in July 2017, Mother engaged in a domestic violence incident in which she chased Father with her vehicle. It was reported that Mother was flashing her lights at Father while he was driving and that once Father arrived at his home, they engaged in a verbal altercation which led to Father breaking her car window. Father reported that Mother becomes angry when he does not buy her marijuana "because she has to smoke marijuana every morning before she starts her day." When questioned about her daily marijuana use, Mother did not deny that she smoked marijuana. It was also reported that Mother had provoked Father by displaying hickeys on her neck during face-to-face contact with Father and had asked Father to climb into her bedroom window at night and then have her parents call the police. F.B.'s caregiver also reported verbal altercations with Mother. Mother failed to complete an anger management program.
On October 23, 2017, the social worker referred Mother for a medication evaluation due to her daily marijuana use. DPSS also requested that she enroll in substance abuse counseling if a drug test result was positive. Mother stated that she would get assessed if it helped her case.
The six-month review hearing was held on December 12, 2017. At that time, Father's attorney set the hearing for contest, and the hearing was continued until January 11, 2018. In addition, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete a hair follicle test, to randomly drug test, and to undergo a psychological evaluation.
DPSS gave multiple referrals to Mother for a hair follicle test in December 2017, but she had not tested. DPSS also provided Mother with a referral for a psychological medication evaluation, but she did not complete the evaluation. In addition, on December 19, 2017, DPSS provided Mother with an appointment for a psychological evaluation. Mother participated in the psychological evaluation with Dr. Ryan on January 2, 2018. Dr. Ryan found Mother had below average intelligence to the "point where it would prevent her from learning." Dr. Ryan recommended treatment that was "highly behavioral" in approach as "insight types of therapy [were] not very useful" for Mother. Dr. Ryan also recommended treatment that would help Mother learn to cope more effectively with conflict. Mother also submitted to on demand drug tests (urinalysis) and tested positive for marijuana on December 22, 2017, January 5 and 19, 2018.
On January 11, 2018, the contested six-month review hearing was continued to January 29, 2018.
The parents continued to engage in physical and verbal altercations to the point where law enforcement was called. Both parents were also observed to have bruises, including black eyes. DPSS submitted another hair follicle referral for Mother on January 8, 2018, but she failed to test. DPSS believed that neither parent had benefitted from the services provided to them and recommended that reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set.
On January 29, 2018, at Mother's counsel's request to subpoena witnesses for testimony, the juvenile court granted a continuance of the contested six-month hearing. The hearing was continued to February 6, 2018.
By February 6, 2018, DPSS continued to recommend that services be terminated for both parents and a section 366.26 hearing be set. DPSS noted that both parents continued to behave impulsively and that neither had displayed appropriate coping skills, logical thinking, or anger management skills. DPSS further reported that both parents continued to make poor choices that resulted in police contact and had displayed an instability in emotional reactions toward each other.
On March 1, 2018, the juvenile court issued a no contact restraining order against Father, protecting Mother.
The contested six-month review hearing was held on March 1 and 5, 2018. Following testimony and argument, the juvenile court continued reunification services to the parents and set a 12-month review hearing for June 5, 2018. At that time, the court also ordered Mother to participate in Alternatives to Domestic Violence (ADV), a substance abuse treatment program to address her marijuana usage, and to comply with random drug testing. Mother and her counsel were present and did not object to setting the 12-month review hearing on June 12, 2018.
On March 8, 2018, Mother came into the DPSS office and DPSS gave her referrals for her court-ordered services. Mother signed her notice of services and received a copy of her referrals and her case plan. Mother was provided with referrals for individual therapy at MFI Recovery (MFI), ADV, a substance abuse program at MFI, and random drug testing. She was also informed that she needed to maintain sobriety for 60 days before she could start individual counseling. Mother did not enroll in services immediately. On March 11, 2018, she was involved in a car accident and was cited for a DUI. Her blood alcohol level was 0.15 or more. In addition, she continued to test positive for marijuana on March 8 and 9 and April 9, 2018, and she failed to drug test on March 13, 19 and April 2, 2018. She began her substance abuse treatment program on April 5, 2018, but she had not begun individual therapy or ADV. DPSS recommended that Mother's services be terminated because she had not completed her case plan objectives. Furthermore, she had falsely denied using marijuana and contact with law enforcement, even though she had continuously tested positive for marijuana and was cited for a DUI.
On June 5, 2018, Mother's retained counsel made an oral request to be relieved as counsel for Mother. The juvenile court denied the request, and the matter was set for a contested hearing. The parents were ordered to provide the social worker with updated progress as to their services within two days, and DPSS was ordered to prepare an addendum report with delivered services logs to be filed no later than June 11, 2018. Mother and her trial counsel were present and no objection was made to the juvenile court's orders.
Neither parent contacted DPSS to provide an update. DPSS filed an addendum report with delivered service logs on June 11, 2018. DPSS believed Mother and Father were still seeing each other as of April 26, 2018, in violation of the no-contact restraining order.
The contested 12-month review hearing was held on June 12, 2018. Mother and her counsel were both present. DPSS's counsel submitted on the social worker's reports. DPSS's counsel also requested the juvenile court take judicial notice of the criminal case concerning Mother's DUI arrest, and neither Mother nor her counsel objected. Mother's counsel stated, "There is also a stipulation at least between county counsel and I regarding the date of [Mother's] arrest for the alleged DUI. It was on March 11th . . . ."
Afterwards, Mother's counsel submitted three letters to the court and moved them into evidence. One letter was from Mother's individual therapist stating that she began treatment on May 24, 2018, and was seeing her once a week to address her coping issues. The second letter was from her group therapist that stated Mother began treatment on April 5, 2018, and was attending weekly sessions three times a week to address substance abuse issues. The last letter was from her substance abuse program that indicated she had been participating in an outpatient program since April 5, 2018. As of June 4, 2018, Mother had attended two individual sessions and 17 group sessions. After submitting the three letters, Mother's counsel stated, "Other than that, we just ask that that be stipulated and moved into evidence rather than calling these individuals."
Thereafter, Mother's counsel made a lengthy argument requesting the court extend Mother's services to the 18-month mark. After DPSS's counsel responded to Mother's arguments, Mother's counsel requested a continuance to provide the court evidentiary objections to the delivered service logs based on hearsay. The juvenile court denied the request, noting counsel had indicated he was "ready to proceed" and had "waived cross-examination of the social worker." The court specifically stated: "You waived cross-examination of the social worker. You had the opportunity to put her on the stand and cross-examine her on this. You said you were ready today. That assumes that you have had the opportunity . . . to review the DSL [delivered service logs] so that you were prepared to cross-examine which you have waived." Following further argument, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On June 14, 2018, Mother filed her notice of intent to file a writ petition.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable Services
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that she received reasonable reunification services because she was not given a reasonable amount of time to complete the additional services added at the contested six-month review hearing on March 5, 2018. We disagree.
The dependency statutes place parameters on the duration of reunification services. In general, services are limited to 18 months from the date the child was originally removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) Within those 18 months, the juvenile court is required to conduct periodic review hearings. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) The first hearing, referred to as the "six-month review hearing," must be conducted six months after the initial dispositional hearing, but no later than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care as determined in section 361.49, whichever occurs earlier. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Under section 361.49, "a child shall be deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing . . . or the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of his or her parent." The second hearing, referred to as the "12-month review hearing," must be conducted no later than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The third hearing, the "18-month review hearing," must occur within 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from parental custody. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
The dependency statutes also place limitations on the duration of reunification services depending on the age of the child at the initial removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Where, as here, the child is under the age of three, reunification services are presumptively limited to six months from the date of the dispositional hearing. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.).) At each subsequent review hearing, "a heightened showing is required to continue services. . . . The effect of these shifting standards is to make services during these three periods first presumed, then possible, then disfavored." (Tonya M., at p. 845.) Reunification services are reasonable if they address the problems that required removal of the child from parental custody and the supervising agency made reasonable efforts to facilitate compliance. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362 (Ronell A.).)
Our review is limited to whether the appellate record discloses substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the agency made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification recognizing that the standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances, since "[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.); accord, In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.) "Services will be found reasonable if the [d]epartment has 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . .' [Citation.]" (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973.) It is the department's obligation at the six-month review hearing to make a record that reasonable services were provided. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1478.)
"The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the department's efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." (Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362; accord, Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.) Relevant circumstances include a parent's willingness to participate in services. Reunification services are voluntary and the department cannot force an unwilling parent to participate in the case plan. (Ronell A., at p. 1365.) The department is not required to "take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions." (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) Therefore, in assessing the reasonableness of reunification services, the juvenile court evaluates not only the department's efforts to assist the parent in accessing the services, but also the parent's efforts to avail himself or herself of those services.
At the conclusion of a 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court shall continue the case for up to six months if there is a "substantial probability" a child will be returned to a parent's custody. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) A "substantial probability" of reunification requires the court to find that the parent regularly contacted and visited the child; "made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child's removal from the home"; and "demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of [the] treatment plan and to provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
"[W]ith regard to the sufficiency of reunification services, our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 (Angela S.); James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020.) In doing so, we must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) "If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed." (Ibid.) We resolve all conflicts in favor of the court's determinations. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649.)
Mother asserts that she was given "less than 3 months to complete services that are typically given for approximately a 6 month time period" between the six-month and 12-month review hearings. We disagree.
"Delays in the timing of one hearing should not affect either the timing of subsequent hearings or the length of services to be ordered." (Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 846.) Our Supreme Court explained, "There is no rational basis for concluding that a parent whose six-month review hearing is delayed to the nine- or 10- month mark should be eligible for an extension to the 15- or 16-month mark of either services or reunification consideration, while another parent whose six-month hearing is timely held must demonstrate a substantial probability of being able to reunite by the 12-month mark." (Id. at p. 847.)
Here, F.B. was removed from Mother's custody on April 18, 2017. Mother began receiving services pending further proceedings at the April 21, 2017 detention hearing. Mother's case plan eventually became effective at the dispositional hearing conducted on June 12, 2017. The juvenile court here appropriately set the 12-month review hearing for June 12, 2018. This date is 12 months from the date F.B. entered foster care. As previously noted, the date of foster care entry is the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing or the date that is 60 days after the date the child was initially removed from the physical custody of his parents. (§ 361.49.) Additionally, Mother and her counsel were present at the March 5, 2018 six-month review hearing and did not object to setting the 12-month review hearing on June 12, 2018. Accordingly, Mother waived the issue that she did not have a reasonable amount of time to complete the additional services added at the March 5, 2018 six-month hearing. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1151-1155 (Meranda P.).)
Without providing any legal authority to support her argument, Mother also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in relying on hearsay statements in DPSS's report concerning Mother's DUI arrest. We find this contention unmeritorious.
Initially, Mother has failed to meet her burden of showing error, as she has failed to provide any legal support for her assertion. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 46-47.) Furthermore, DPSS requested the juvenile court to take judicial notice of the criminal case concerning Mother's DUI arrest, and neither Mother nor her counsel objected. In addition, Mother expressly requested the juvenile court consider Mother's DUI arrest. Mother's counsel stated, "There is also a stipulation at least between county counsel and I regarding the date of [Mother's] arrest for the alleged DUI. It was on March 11th . . . ." If a parent fails to object or raise an issue in the juvenile court, the parent is prevented from presenting the issue on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338 (Lorenzo C.).) "Many dependency cases have held that a parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) Moreover, as a matter of law, DPSS's written reports are admissible at any phase of the juvenile dependency hearing process. (§ 281; In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 376-377, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1247; In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1071.) Therefore, the juvenile court properly admitted into evidence reports concerning Mother's DUI arrest.
Mother also argues that since DPSS never identified substance abuse as an issue until the six-month review hearing, she was not given sufficient time to finish her services. However, the record shows that Mother was provided with sufficient time to complete her services, but she delayed starting her services. Mother denied using any substances after completing a substance abuse program after a DUI arrest in 2015. Therefore, her original case plan consisted of domestic violence classes, counseling, and a parenting program. Mother was provided referrals on April 27, 2017, for all of these services. Once DPSS learned of Mother's marijuana dependency in October 2017, she was referred for a medication evaluation. However, she failed to complete the evaluation. DPSS also requested that she participate in a substance abuse program if she tested positive for drugs. Mother's on demand drug tests were positive for marijuana on December 22, 2017, and January 5 and 19, 2018. DPSS further requested several times that Mother complete a hair follicle test. Yet, she failed to complete that test.
Furthermore, once the juvenile court formally ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse program on March 5, 2018, DPSS provided her with substance abuse, domestic violence, counseling, and drug testing referrals on March 8, 2018. Mother did not enroll in those services immediately. Mother was involved in a car accident on March 11, 2018, and was cited for a DUI with a blood alcohol level of 0.15 or more. She continued to test positive for marijuana in March and April 2018. She finally enrolled in substance abuse treatment services on April 5, 2018, and in individual counseling in late May 2018. The juvenile court found that Mother delayed participating in services. She delayed enrolling in a drug treatment program until the tenth month of her reunification period. By June 4, 2018, she had attended two individual therapy sessions and 17 substance abuse group counseling sessions. There is no evidence in the record that Mother was close to completing her services, as Mother suggests. There is also no evidence that she participated in ADV domestic violence services or drug tested after April 9, 2018.
When considered in this context, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that Mother had received reasonable services. The reunification plan adopted for Mother contained a myriad of services designed to remedy Mother's problems. DPSS supplied appropriate referrals for service providers on a number of occasions, including follow-up referrals. Although Mother had initially complied with her case plan, Mother's behaviors had demonstrated that she required further services, including a substance abuse program and drug testing. As such, DPSS had continued to provide Mother with referrals. Moreover, as has been often remarked, if Mother felt during the reunification period that her services were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to raise the issue in the juvenile court. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
The record shows that DPSS provided Mother with numerous referrals. Mother simply failed to avail herself of the referrals and programs. As in Angela S., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 763, Mother's "real problem was not a lack of services available but a lack of initiative to consistently take advantage of the services that were offered."
Relying on Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322 (Jennifer A.), Mother also argues that a parent's substantial compliance with a case plan may be sufficient to overcome a detriment finding. The reviewing court in Jennifer A. concluded that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the detriment finding and granted the mother's petition to vacate the section 366.26 hearing. Jennifer A. does not assist Mother because Mother's circumstances are not similar to those of the mother in that case. In Jennifer A., the children, ages three years and seven years, were removed from the mother's custody because she had left them unattended while she worked. (Id. at p. 1326.) By the time of the 18-month review hearing, the mother had completed a parenting education course and completed individual counseling. She had daily, unsupervised visitation with the children. (Id. at p. 1341.) After the mother tested positive for alcohol, she was required to complete a substance abuse treatment program, including substance abuse testing. She completed 84 drug-free tests, but tested positive for marijuana on one occasion. (Id. at pp. 1342-1343.) The reviewing court noted that the mother's performance was substantially in compliance with the case plan, and that she had resolved the problem that led to the children's removal from her care. (Id. at pp. 1327, 1343.)
In contrast to the mother in Jennifer A., the record shows that Mother had not completed individual counseling, her domestic violence program, or drug tested after April 9, 2018. She also failed to complete hair follicle tests and a psychological medication evaluation. In addition, she continued to engage in domestic violence and use marijuana and alcohol. Furthermore, she and Father continued having contact despite the no-contact order. Unlike the record in Jennifer A., this record does not support the conclusion that Mother was in substantial compliance with her court-ordered case plan.
For these same reasons, Mother's reliance on David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 is also misplaced. David B. v. Superior Court involved a father who had received 18 months of reunification services, during which he did "virtually everything" the social services agency requested, "and then some." (Id. at p. 772.) The father lived with his sister and her family and, at the social worker's direction, prepared that residence for his child. (Id. at p. 793.) At the 18-month hearing, however, the agency pointed to evidence that the sister's husband had once committed an act of domestic violence against his own daughter, and faulted the father for failing to move out of his sister's residence and establish his own. After father conceded he currently had no other housing, the juvenile court concluded, among other things, that there was a risk of detriment in placing the child with her father while he remained at his sister's residence. (Id. at p. 773.) Another reason the court refused to place the child with her father was its concern that he did not have "a steady job." (Id. at pp. 774-775, 792.) The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order, noting that the parents should not be separated from their children merely because they are "poor." It concluded that the evidence showed father had actually worked "fairly steadily, albeit at several different jobs," throughout the pendency of the proceedings, despite the demands of his case plan concerning visitation, classes, testing, and meetings with social workers. The evidence also showed that the father had "substantial family support." (Id. at pp. 792-793.) The reviewing court concluded in addition that it had been error to base the finding of detriment on the unsuitability of the father's current residence, because the record showed that the agency had never informed the father it would be necessary for him to obtain another residence to gain custody of his child, and it had not provided him with any assistance to make such a change. (Id. at pp. 773-774.) Here, Mother had not completed "virtually everything" DPSS requested of her and was not compliant with her case plan. David B. v. Superior Court does not support her position.
In sum, the evidence shows that Mother's case plan was tailored to fit her circumstances and that DPSS made reasonable efforts to assist her in complying with her case plan. Hence, the services provided, while not perfect in every regard, were reasonable under the circumstances (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547), and the juvenile court's finding that reasonable reunification services were provided is supported by substantial evidence. (See Angela S., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.)
B. Due Process
Mother argues that her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court permitted DPSS to submit the delivered service logs one day before the June 12, 2018 12-month review hearing. We again disagree.
Initially, we find that Mother waived this issue on appeal by not objecting to the juvenile court's June 5, 2018 order allowing DPSS to submit the logs on June 11, 2018. If a parent fails to object or raise an issue in the juvenile court, the parent is prevented from presenting the issue on appeal. (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.) "A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as 'waiver,' applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings. [Citations.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222; accord, Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 686.)
"[A] party waives all jurisdictional objections to a proceeding, including lack of notice, by opposing or resisting the proceeding on its merits. [Citations.]" (In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200.) Even a lack of notice that would otherwise be a due process violation can be forfeited by failure to raise it below, as long there has been an opportunity to do so. (People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060; In re Cynthia C. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1491.)
The waiver rule need not be applied when it would be "fundamentally unfair." (In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 156.) However, that is hardly the case here. In the present matter, Mother and her counsel were both present at the June 5, 2018 hearing in which the order was made and voiced no objection. Although Mother claims on appeal to have objected to the admission of the "addendum logs the day before" the contested hearing, the record belies this claim. The record shows that on June 5, 2018, neither Mother nor her counsel objected to the admission of the service logs. Moreover, neither Mother nor her counsel objected to the admission of the logs at the June 12, 2018 12-month review hearing. Mother therefore waived this argument on appeal.
In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197 (P.A.) is instructive. There, the social services agency had not completed a declaration of due diligence for the father. (Id. at pp. 1200-1201.) Nevertheless, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied reunification services for the father on the ground that his whereabouts were unknown. (Id. at p. 1201.) After the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing, the father appeared. His counsel indicated that he was going to file a section 388 petition but never did. (P.A., at pp. 1202-1203, 1206, 1209.) At the section 366.26 hearing, his counsel objected to termination of parental rights, but not based on lack of notice. (P.A., at p. 1207.)
On appeal, the father argued that the juvenile court had erred by denying reunification services in the absence of a completed declaration of due diligence. (P.A., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207.) He also argued that the failure to give him notice of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing violated due process. (Id. at p. 1208.) The appellate court held: "Because defective notice and the consequences flowing from it may easily be corrected if promptly raised in the juvenile court, [the father] has forfeited the right to raise these issues on appeal. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1209-1210.)
The father also argued that "the waiver rule is not enforced when it conflicts with due process . . . ." (P.A., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210.) The appellate court responded: "Here, [the father]'s persistent avoidance of responsibility for [the child] and his failure to seek any relief in the juvenile court persuades us the forfeiture rule is appropriately applied in this case. To remand the matter now to permit [the father] to file a section 388 petition he previously declined to file would achieve no purpose other than to delay permanence for [the child], a result we cannot countenance on this record." (Ibid.) The identical reasoning applies here.
The authorities on which Mother relies are inapposite. In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255 involved the juvenile court's denial of the parent's request for a contested review hearing. Here, Mother was not denied her request for a contested review hearing. She was afforded the right to be heard at a critical stage, and she was represented at that hearing by counsel.
David B. v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 772 is also distinguishable. In David B., the juvenile court denied the parent's request to cross-examine the social worker or present any other evidence on the issue of reasonable services at the contested 18-month review hearing. (Id. at p. 776.) The Court of Appeal granted the writ petition to give the parent the opportunity to present evidence. (Id. at p. 779-780.)
Here, the juvenile court gave Mother an opportunity to both cross-examine the social worker and present evidence at the June 12, 2018 hearing. However, after DPSS's counsel submitted on the social worker's reports, Mother's counsel submitted three letters on Mother's progress in her case plan and declined the opportunity to call or cross-examine any witnesses. Mother's counsel also made a lengthy argument requesting the juvenile court extend services to the 18-month mark. Only after DPSS's counsel's argument did Mother's counsel request a continuance to provide evidentiary objections based on hearsay. Mother had the opportunity to present evidence, but chose not to do so. Mother's failure to take advantage of such opportunities results in a waiver to this issue, not a violation of due process. (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1151-1155.)
IV
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. MILLER
J.