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dismissing failure-to-protect claim where there was "no evidence of any history of animosity sufficient to establish a risk of serious harm prior to Plaintiff being assaulted"
Summary of this case from Garcia v. Westchester Cnty.Opinion
09 Civ. 7226 (CM)
11-18-2011
KEMAR JAMES, Plaintiff, v. ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, CARL E. DUBOIS, SHERIFF OF ORANGE COUNTY, KENNETH T. JONES, UNDERSHERIFF OF ORANGE COUNTY, CORRECTIONS OFFICER VINCENT CZUBAK AND CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATOR DOMINICK ORSINO, Defendants.
Pro se
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS McMahon, J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Kemar James (hereinafter "Plaintiff") brings the present action against Orange County Correctional Facility and against Sheriff Carl E. Dubois (hereinafter "Dubois"), Undersheriff Kenneth T. Jones (hereinafter "Jones"), Corrections Officer Vincent Czubak, (hereinafter "Czubak") and Corrections Administrator Dominick Orsino (hereinafter "Orsino") in their individual capacities (individual defendants collectively hereinafter "individual Defendants"; all defendants collectively hereinafter "Defendants"). The essence of Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants failed to react fast enough when Plaintiff was attacked by two fellow inmates. For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff's claims will be treated as an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect. Plaintiff's claims against the Orange County Correction Facility will be treated as claims against the County of Orange and the caption is hereby amended accordingly.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
Factual History
The facts are drawn from the complaint, affidavits, exhibits, and plaintiff's answers to interrogatory questions. For purposes of this motion, the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Plaintiff's claims center on an assault he suffered in a prison law library. At the time in question, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Orange County Correctional Facility (hereinafter "OCCF"). (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff was in the OCCF law library on the morning of May 18, 2009. (Compl. at 2.) He had been allowed to visit the library despite being on confinement; his request to do so had been approved per OCCF policy. (Orsino Aff. at ¶ 5, 17; First Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff at 1.) There were approximately eleven to twelve inmates in the library at that time. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 15.) Officer Czubak was present and on duty. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 1, 13.)
Plaintiff was seated at the end of the library furthest from Czubak, when Luis Melendez and Abdul Santos, two other inmates, attacked him. (Compl. at 3.) Upon seeing the altercation, Czubak called for assistance on the radio. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 17.) He also gave three verbal commands to Melendez and Santos to stop their assault. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 18.) However, Czubak waited to physically intervene in the altercation until Officer Fairweather arrived to assist him. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 18.) Once Fairweather arrived, he and Czubak physically separated Plaintiff and his attackers, and all three prisoners were placed in temporary restraints. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 23; Defendants' Deposition Questions to Plaintiff (hereinafter "James Interrog.") at ¶ 153-55.) Several additional officers also responded to the incident. (James Interrog. at ¶ 150-152.)
Plaintiff asked for and received immediate medical care following the attack. (James Interrog. at ¶ 175-176.) He suffered injuries to his eye, facial areas and elbow which required medical attention. (James Interrog. at ¶ 164-174.) His treatment included a cat scan, painkillers and medicine for his eye. (James Interrog. at ¶ 179-184.) Plaintiff states that he must now wear glasses as a result of damage from the attack. (James Interrog. at ¶ 219-220.)
Plaintiff admits that, during the attack, he could not see or hear Czubak state anything to anyone or call for assistance because of the intensity of the ongoing assault. (James Interrog. at ¶ 120-123, 129.) Plaintiff only knows that Czubak called for assistance because back-up arrived. (James Interrog. at ¶ 119.) Fairweather was approximately 30 feet from the law library when he received Czubak's call. (Fairweather Aff. at ¶ 2.) His response time to the incident was between a few seconds and a several minutes.
Plaintiff describes Fairweather's reaction time as between 2 and 3 minutes. (James Interrog. ¶ 109.) Fairweather and Czubak described Fairweather's reaction time as between 5 and 10 seconds. (Czubak Affidavit at ¶ 22; Fairweather Affidavit ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff was familiar with Melendez for a few days prior to the incident because they were housed in the same unit. (James Interrog. at ¶ 55-56, 62-63.) Plaintiff was not familiar with Santos and had no contact with him prior to the incident. (James Interrog. at ¶ 64, 74.) Neither of these inmates was on a "no contact" list with Plaintiff prior to the attack. (Czubak Aff. at ¶ 14.)
A no contact list indicates that particular inmates should not be allowed in the same prison areas together.
Plaintiff filed a grievance with the OCCF on May 25, 2009. (Estrada Aff., Ex. G.) In it he alleges that while he was being attacked, Czubak "just stood there and watch[ed] the [i]ncident unfold." Id. Sergeant Estrada, the facility's Grievance Coordinator, denied Plaintiff's grievance after investigating the incident and finding no evidence that Czubak failed to act appropriately. (Estrada Aff., Ex. H.) Sergeant Estrada found that Czubak followed facility procedures "to the letter" by radioing in a call for assistance, issuing verbal commands for the assailants to stop, and then by physically acting to restrain Plaintiff's attackers. Id.
Plaintiff appealed this decision and it was reviewed by OCCF Chief Administrative Officer Orsino. Id. Orsino also found that Czubak took proper action during the incident. Id. Plaintiff elected to appeal Orsino's decision to the Citizen's Policy and Complaint Review Council and received a receipt that his grievance had been submitted. Id. The Citizen's Policy and Complaint Review Council reviewed and denied plaintiff's grievance at a meeting in August, 2009. (Orsino Aff., Ex. E.)
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Pro Se Office in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York on August 17, 2009.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Plaintiff's claims against Dubois, Jones, and Orsino should be dismissed because they had no personal involvement in the law library incident; (2) Czubak is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions in the law library incident were reasonable and did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights; (3) Plaintiff's claims against the County should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged nor do the facts show a Monell violation under § 1983; (4) any state based claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim pursuant to County law § 52 and GML § 50-e prior to commencing this action. Defendants also argue in their reply brief that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
III. Discussion
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants' argue that the complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. This argument is untimely.
The PLRA provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies are exhausted.42 U.S.C.1997e(a). An inmate-plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies acts as a bar against bringing an action in federal court. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); see also Flowers v. City of New York, 668 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense and thus the initial burden of proof rests with Defendants. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Id. Here, Plaintiff supplied at least a partial history of his exhaustion of the grievance process. Id.
Defendants asserted a failure-to-exhaust defense in a conclusory manner in their answer to the complaint and only elaborated on this defense with any specificity in their reply memorandum of law. This Court, in its discretion, declines to consider these additional arguments as untimely. ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Americas, Inc., 485 F.3d 85, 97, n.12 (2d Cir. 2007) (A court can decline to consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.); Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 2006) (Generally, arguments which are raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered.); Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 451 F. Supp. 2d 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Thus, Defendants' summary judgment motion will be decided on its merits.
2. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the nonmoving party must present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The party opposing summary judgment "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Id. To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Instead, sufficient evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 906 (2d Cir. 1997).
Although the same standards apply to pro se litigants, "special solicitude should be afforded pro se litigants generally, when confronted with motions for summary judgment." Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court "liberally construe[s] pleadings and briefs submitted by [the] pro se [Plaintiff], reading such submissions 'to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
3. Claims Against Individual Defendants Pursuant to § 1983
Pro se Plaintiff's complaint will be interpreted as a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Eight Amendment. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individual liability under § 1983 requires that a defendant was personally involved in the alleged violation. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Blaylock v. Borden, 547 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd, 363 F. App'x 786 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Second Circuit previously has held that the personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). However, in 2009, the Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... [section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must [prove] that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (citations omitted). There has been considerable division among the district courts of the Second Circuit as to whether Iqbal abrogates several factors of the Colon test and if so to what extent. Compare Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (finding that Iqbal abrogated three of the Colon categories) aff'd 387 Fed. App'x 55(2d Cir. 2010) (summary order), and Newton v. City of New York, 640 F.Supp.2d 426, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[P]assive failure to train claims pursuant to section 1983 have not survived the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal."), with Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declining to adopt the "narrow interpretation of Iqbal " advanced by Bellamy and Newton ), and Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307, 324 & n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (holding Colon standard is unaffected by Iqbal in deliberate indifference case, because Iqbal "involved discriminatory intent."). This Court has recently explained its position that Colon remains the standard for establishing personal involvement by supervisory officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of the Eighth Amendment. Plunkett v. City of New York, 10-CV-6778 CM, 2011 WL 4000985 at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). Still, where a plaintiff brings a claim that prison officials failed to prevent violence between prisoners, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply and the prisoner must show "more than a linkage in the prison chain of command." Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985); Prince v. Edwards, No. 99 Civ. 8650 (DC), 2000 WL 633382, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000).
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Liggins v. Griffo, 356 F. App'x 537, 539 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Hayes v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)). Failure-to-protect claims are treated as challenges to the conditions of confinement. See Lee v. Artuz, 96 CIV. 8604 (JGK), 2000 WL 231083, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2000) (citing Edney v. Karrigan, 69 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (characterizing failure-to-protect claims as challenging the conditions of confinement within the meaning of Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832)). Prison officials are responsible for preventing inmates from violently attacking one another. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; see also Blaylock, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 310. However, "not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
The Eight Amendment is applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
In order to prevail in a challenge to prison conditions, an inmate must establish both an objective and a subjective element. Id. Objectively, the prisoner must demonstrate that the conditions of his incarceration posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The prisoner must also demonstrate that subjectively, the defendants acted with a "sufficient[ly] culpable state of mind." Id. That state of mind is one of deliberate indifference, in which a prison official "has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm." Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620. In the context of a physical altercation between inmates, an officer displays deliberate indifference when he fails to act despite having adequate time to assess the presence of a serious threat against an inmate and a fair opportunity to protect the inmate with no risk to himself. Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988).
A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Dubois
Plaintiff brings suit against Dubois in his individual capacity, alleging that he failed in his responsibility to run the OCCF in an orderly fashion. Plaintiff does not contend that Dubois played any personal role in the incident in the law library at issue in this case. His position as a supervisor in the OCCF chain of command is patently insufficient to establish his personal involvement for purposes of a § 1983 action. Ayers, 780 F.2d at 210; Prince, 2000 WL 633382, at *6. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Dubois in his individual capacity are dismissed.
B. Plaintiff's Claims Against Jones and Orsino
Plaintiff also brings suit against Jones and Orsino in their individual capacities, alleging that they are liable for their role as policy makers and overseers at the OCCF. However, Plaintiff fails to establish the personal involvement of either of these individuals. As discussed above, the holding of a supervisory position is insufficient grounds for establishing personal involvement. Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). A policy making role can be a ground for personal involvement, Id; see also Wright, 21 F.3d at 501, but in such a case the plaintiff must still establish that the defendant created a policy which resulted in an unconstitutional action. Black, 76 F.3d at 74. Whatever their role as policy makers at the OCCF, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence showing how any policy promulgated by Jones or Orsino led to his injuries. Plaintiff only identifies policies in order to allege that corrections officers failed to follow them.
If anything, Plaintiff's claims tend to support the conclusion that any policies at issue were in fact constitutionally valid. After all, it seems unlikely that following an unconstitutional policy would nonetheless protect a plaintiff from a constitutional harm.
The fact that Orsino affirmed the denial of plaintiff's grievances is also insufficient to establish personal involvement in any underlying constitutional violation. Foreman v. Goord, 02 CIV. 7089 (SAS), 2004 WL 1886928 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004) (prison superintendent's affirmation of the denial of inmate-plaintiff's grievance is insufficient grounds to establish personal involvement). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Orsino and Jones in their individual capacities are dismissed.
C. Plaintiff's Claims Against Czubak
Czubak was personally involved. Nevertheless, I find that Plaintiff's claims against Czubak fail, because on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law, Czubak did not act with deliberate indifference.
First, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Czubak was aware of a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff prior to the incident in the law library. In this respect, the present case is largely analogous to Blaylock, in which the plaintiff brought suit against a corrections officer for allegedly failing to prevent another inmate from assaulting him. 547 F. Supp. 2d at 311. The officer in that case was not aware of any previous ill will between the plaintiff and his assailant, and prior to their altercation there had been at most a mild animosity between the two. Id. The court held that summary judgment was appropriate because no reasonable jury could find that the corrections officer acted with deliberate indifference when there was no evidence of any animosity. Id. at 312.
Here, as in Blaylock, there is no evidence of any history of animosity sufficient to establish a risk of serious harm prior to Plaintiff being assaulted. Plaintiff admits that he was not familiar with Santos and had no contact with him prior to the attack. Plaintiff was previously familiar with Melendez, but there is no evidence of a serious animosity between the men before Melendez attacked Plaintiff, let alone animosity known to Czubak. None of these inmates had been placed on a "no contact" list with one another prior to the incident in question. Plaintiff has not proven, or even raised a genuine issue, that Czubak was privy to any information which should have put him on notice of an existing danger. The only rational conclusion from the undisputed evidence is that Czubak did not become aware of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff until the fight started.
Such a list would have indicated that allowing the inmates in the same areas together was dangerous.
Second, the undisputed evidence shows that Czubak took measures to abate any harm to Plaintiff when he saw that an attack was underway. Again, Blaylock provides a useful analogy. The officer in that case radioed for assistance when he saw a fight was occurring and issued verbal commands while he waited for back-up. 547 F. Supp. 2d at 312. The officer, in keeping with prison policy, did not physically intervene until sufficient assistance arrived. Id. The court held that, as a matter of law, these actions established that the officer had acted to abate the harm the plaintiff faced and thus summary judgment was appropriate. Id.
Here, Czubak radioed in for assistance and when that assistance arrived the officers acted together to restrain Plaintiff's attackers. As in Blaylock, Czubak does not become liable for waiting for assistance, because intervening earlier could have placed him at significant risk. Plaintiff correctly points out that OCCF policy requires officers to intervene in physical altercations between inmates when an inmate faces serious physical injury. However, prison policy also dictates that "[i]n the event that an Officer is convinced, based on an assessment of the incident and the area, that his personal safety will be placed at risk by directly intervening, he may wait for assistance to arrive to the area." In this case, there were three inmates involved in the fight and Santos, Melendez or both could have turned their assault on Czubak. The other inmates in the room, even if seemingly compliant, could likewise have attacked Czubak if he began to physically intervene by himself. Therefore, Czubak's delay in intervening was not a failure to act. See Stubbs, 849 F.2d at 86-87 (deliberate indifference is shown when an officer fails to act when there is no risk to himself); Blaylock, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (awaiting assistance was reasonable when the officer was alone with two inmates, one of whom had a weapon); Williams v. Russo, 01-CV-6401, 2009 WL 185758 at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009) (finding that it was unsafe for two officers to enter a room with 6 inmates to break up a fight between two of them).
None of the factual discrepancies Plaintiff identifies regarding Czubak's actions on the day in question create a material dispute of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (there must be a dispute as to a material fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment). For instance, it is unclear whether Czubak issued verbal commands to the inmates before or after he placed a call out on the radio. OCCF procedure dictates that in the event of a physical inmate-on-inmate altercation, an officer is to immediately make a radio call for assistance. Even if Czubak issued verbal warnings to the inmates prior to calling for assistance on his radio, this constituted at most a de minimus deviation from established procedure and not deliberate indifference. But Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to show that even a de minimus violation occurred.
It is also unclear whether Czubak moved to physically restrain Santos before or after the arrival of Fairweather or whether Santos disengaged from his assault prior to Fairweather's arrival. In does not matter; Czubak was justified in waiting for assistance because of the number of inmates present. See Blaylock, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 312; Williams, 2009 WL 185758 at *2.
Although it is disputed how much time passed between Czubak's call for assistance and the arrival of Fairweather, Plaintiff does not dispute that Czubak either immediately called for assistance or did so shortly after issuing verbal commands for the inmates to stop fighting. Czubak did not control Fairweather's response time, and any delay in Fairweather's arrival does not stem from a failure of Czubak to act.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Czubak's actions were negligent, negligence is insufficient to establish the necessary subjective state of mind for an Eight Amendment violation. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) ("deliberate indifference requires more than negligence"); Williams, 2009 WL 185758 at *3. No reasonable jury could interpret the facts of the case to find that Czubak had the requisite culpable state of mind for an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect and Plaintiff's claims against Czubak in his individual capacity are therefore dismissed.
Having found that, on the undisputed facts, there was no constitutional violation as a matter of law, it is unnecessary to reach Czubak's alternative argument for qualified immunity. Were I to reach it, I would dismiss on that ground, since it cannot be said that no reasonable officer in Czubak's position would have done as he did and follow prison procedures to the letter.
4. Claims Against the County of Orange
In order to plead a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). There must be an underlying constitutional violation to support a Monell claim. Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). If there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal official, the municipality is not liable. Rutigliano v. City of New York, 326 F. App'x 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2009); Khan v. Ryan, 145 F.Supp.2d 280, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Having dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants, there is no violation by a municipal official on which a Monell claim can be based. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the County of Orange are dismissed.
There is a limited exception, which does not apply here. See Rutigliano v. City of New York, 326 F. App'x 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2009). --------
5. State Law Claims
Plaintiff has not plead any state law claims, but pro se complaints should be interpreted to raise the "strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). However, where all federal claims in a case have been disposed of pursuant to summary judgment, courts, "absent exceptional circumstances, should abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction." Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986); Alki Partners, L.P. v. Vatas Holding GmbH, 769 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Dismissal of state law claims is appropriate so long as the "interests of judicial economy, convenience, comity and fairness to litigants are not violated by refusing to entertain matters of state law." Karmel v. Liz Claiborne, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3608(WK), 2002 WL 1561126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002). The Court, in its discretion, declines supplemental jurisdiction over any possible state law claims because it has dismissed all federal claims and doing so is not unfair. Id.; 784 F.2d at 53; 769 F. Supp. 2d at 499. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider Defendant's arguments as to County laws § 52 and GML § 50-e.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in the favor of Defendants and close the case file. Dated:
/s/_________
U.S.D.J.