Opinion
1:20CV762
11-10-2020
HARRY SHAROD JAMES-EL, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant(s).
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Harry Sharod James-El, submitted what purports to be a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff names the United States of America as the sole Defendant in the case. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is not a citizen of the United States, that he filed various lawsuits in other federal courts, that those courts charged him filing fees for those cases, that demanding he pay the fees with federal reserve notes instead of gold or silver amounted to "counterfeiting," and that this "counterfeiting" violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks an injunction, the return of the fees paid to his prison account, and damages totaling $20,000,000.
Because Plaintiff is "a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," this Court has an obligation to "review" this Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). "On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if [it] - (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
As to the first basis for dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has explained that "a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "The word 'frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim." Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). As part of this review, the Court may anticipate affirmative defenses that clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court further has identified factually frivolous complaints as ones involving "allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In making such findings, this Court may "apply common sense." Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954.
Alternatively, a plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), when the complaint does not "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. In other words, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has "not read Erickson to undermine Twombly's requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions," Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly standard in dismissing pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("A pro se complaint . . . 'must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' But even a pro se complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697, respectively)).
The final ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at common law immunize governments and/or government personnel from liability for monetary damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing sovereign immunity of states and state officials under Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law immunity doctrines, such as judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial immunity); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where "damages are theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy").
For the reasons that follow, the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because it is frivolous, because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and because it seeks monetary damages from a defendant with immunity from such relief.
Plaintiff names only the United States of America in its official capacity as a Defendant in the case. Suits against federal officials may not be brought via § 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). Plaintiff, of course, may proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by alleging that federal officers violated his constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, he cannot name the United States itself as a Defendant or raise an official capacity against a federal officer, as such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the Complaint fails on this basis alone.
Even if Plaintiff attempted to amend the Complaint to name individual federal employees as Defendants in their individual capacities, his contentions would still fail because they fail to state any claim for relief and are, in fact, frivolous. The other federal courts charged Plaintiff a filing fee because they are statutorily required to do so under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thus, the charging of the fee was not illegal or improper. Plaintiff's citizenship has no effect on that statute. Further, there is no requirement in that statute that payment be demanded or even accepted in gold or silver. Federal reserve notes are legal tender in the United States and are accepted for payment of all debts. The Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 437-37 (1884). Plaintiff's contentions otherwise are frivolous and his Complaint should be dismissed.
As a result, Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis should not be countenanced, with the exception that in forma pauperis status shall be granted for the sole purpose of entering this Order and Recommendation.
Plaintiff has submitted the Complaint for filing, however, and, as noted above, § 1915(b)(1) requires that he make an initial partial payment of the filing fee if funds are available. According to Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, there are no funds available. However, the Court will order deductions of funds from Plaintiff's prison trust account as they become available.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that in forma pauperis status be granted for the sole purpose of entering this Order and Recommendation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's trust officer shall be directed to pay to the Clerk of this Court 20% of all deposits to his account starting with the month of December of 2020, and thereafter each time that the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for being frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as well as for seeking monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
This, the 10th day of November, 2020.
/s/_________
Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge