Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1779, SECTION "R" (4).
January 17, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants SmithKline Beecham, Wyeth (formerly known as American Home Products), Sigma-Aldrich, Merck and Aventis Pasteur (the "Vaccine Manufacturers"), which move the Court to reconsider its denial of their previous motion to stay. Defendant Eli Lilly also seeks a stay, invoking the protection recently bestowed upon it by the Homeland Security Act. The relevant provision of the Act was expressly made retroactive and it defines Eli Lilly, for purposes of this lawsuit, as a "vaccine manufacturer" under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (the "Vaccine Act"). 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2002). For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion to stay.
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005 as amended by S. Amdt. 4901, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 1714-1717 (Nov. 19, 2002); H.R. 5710, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 1714-1717 (Nov. 13, 2002).
Section 1714 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 redefines the term "manufacturer" to include a corporation that manufactures any component or ingredient of a vaccine. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-33(3).
I. Background
Plaintiffs Jacqueline Case and Mark Redding bring this action to recover damages for loss of consortium and lost wages as a result of the injuries allegedly caused by defendants to their child, Case Redding. Case Redding took childhood vaccines containing thimerosal, a chemical compound containing mercury that is used as a preservative in vaccines, which allegedly caused him to develop an autism-like disorder. Preservatives like thimerosal enable manufacturers to cut costs by distributing vaccines in multi-dose packages.
In an Order and Reasons entered on November 5, 2002, this Court determined that the Vaccine Act does not require plaintiffs' to assert claims for loss of consortium and their own lost wages in the court established by the Vaccine Act (the "Vaccine Court") before bringing them in a lawsuit in federal district court. The Court denied defendants' request to stay this lawsuit, primarily because Case Redding did not have a petition pending in the Vaccine Court. It has since come to the attention of the Court that Case Redding has, in fact, filed a petition in the Vaccine Court. In light of this development, defendants re-urge their request that the lawsuit be stayed.
II. Discussion
A. The Vaccine Act
The Vaccine Act is a federal statute that provides a no-fault compensation system for injuries caused by the administration of childhood vaccines. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa. The Act enables individuals who sustain vaccine-related injuries to bring their claims before special masters appointed by the United States Court of Federal Claims. Petitioners need only prove causation — and not negligence — to obtain a recovery that is paid out from the federal purse. Petitioners may reject the recovery that is offered in the Vaccine Court and then file a civil lawsuit against the vaccine manufacturer. The purpose of the Act was to encourage vaccine development by sparing vaccine manufacturers certain litigation expenses, as well as the insurance premiums that are associated with such costs. See Schafer v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1994).
Specifically, the Act provides that before an individual who sustains vaccine-related injuries (or the legal representatives of such an individual) files a civil lawsuit against a vaccine manufacturer for damages greater than $1,000, he or she must first file a petition in the Vaccine Court for the alleged injury. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (a)(2)(A); see Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269, 115 S.Ct. 1477, 1478 (1995). If a plaintiff fails to file a petition under the Act before the plaintiff sues in state or federal court, the court is required to dismiss the action. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (a)(2)(B). The Vaccine Act provides that "no person may bring a civil action . . . for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury . . . unless a petition has been filed in accordance with [the Vaccine Act] ." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11a (2)(A). This bar, however, applies only to individuals who have sustained vaccine-related injuries or the legal representatives of such individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11a(9) and 11b (1)(A).
Courts have long held that the Vaccine Act does not bar civil suits brought by parents, on their own behalf, for damages arising from the vaccine-related injuries of their children. Schafer, 20 F.3d at 6 (noting that the Vaccine Court "has held that a parent can both obtain a loss of consortium `award' from a state court . . . and also obtain compensation for her vaccinated (and injured) child from the Vaccine Court"); Owens v. American Home Products, 203 F. Supp. 748, 756 (S.D.Tex. 2002); see also Cook v. Children's Medical Group, 756 So.2d 734, 741 (Miss. 1999); McDonald v. Lederle Laboratories, 775 A.2d 528, 535 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 2001). As this Court noted in its Order and Reasons of November 5, 2002, Congress could have swept loss of consortium claims and lost wages claims within the purview of the Act, but it did not do so.
B. The Court's Inherent Power to Stay
The Court begins, as it must, by recognizing its "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction that it is given. Black Sea Investment, Ltd. v. United Heritage Corporation, 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000). As Judge Rubin succinctly stated, "[f]ederal courts exist to decide controversy." Itel Corporation v. M/S Victoria U, 710 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1983). A court nevertheless possesses the inherent power to control the disposition of the cases on its docket "with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. North American Co. Same, 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166 (1936). Use of the Court's inherent power to stay must not be abused. Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 198, 303 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1985). Absent statutory authorization, the moving party bears a heavy burden to show why a stay should be granted. Id. Further, the Court "should tailor its stay so as not to prejudice other litigants unduly." Id. A stay may be granted to avoid hardship or inequity, but courts should "prevent the ossification of rights which attends inordinate delay." Itel, 710 F.2d at 203 (internal citations omitted).
A number of factors persuade the Court that a stay would economize the time of the Court, the counsel and the litigants. An essential portion of plaintiffs' case is now currently pending before an adjudicative tribunal investigating the causal link between thimerosal and injuries like those sustained by Case Redding. In order to recover for loss of consortium, plaintiffs must establish that defendants caused and are liable for the injuries allegedly sustained by Case Redding. Keener v. Mid-Continent Casualty, 817 So.2d 347, 363 (La.Ct.App. 2002); Junot v. Morgan, 818 So.2d 152, 158 n. 5 (La.Ct.App. 2002); Gilbert v. Laborde, 632 So.2d 1162, 1169 (La.Ct.App. 1994). The issue of whether thimerosal caused Redding's injuries is now before the Vaccine Court, which is handling, in addition to Redding's petition, hundreds of similar claims. ( See Autism General Order #1, United States Court of Federal Claims, Office of Special Masters, July 3, 2002, Attached to Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 2.) The Chief Special Master has set forth a two-step procedure whereby, first, the general issue of whether thimerosal causes autism and similar disorders will be resolved, and, second, if it does, whether this conclusion can be applied to each of the individual cases, including Case Redding's. ( Id. at 3.) Undoubtedly, a number of experts, independent or otherwise, will be retained. Requiring the parties to conduct a parallel inquiry, on a different timetable, to determine plaintiffs' right to recover for loss of consortium is duplicative, expensive, and wasteful.
Finally, the Court notes that a stay of limited duration does not cause undue prejudice to plaintiffs. A stay reduces litigation expenses for plaintiffs as well. Further, plaintiffs' interest in the Vaccine Court's proceedings is not attenuated, as their child's petition is pending there.
In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that stay is in the interest of justice. The Court is not aware of any other court that has denied a stay of parental claims for loss of consortium when their child has a claim pending in the Vaccine Court. To the contrary, on facts nearly identical to those involved in this lawsuit, other courts have ordered stays. See Russak v. Aventis Pasteur, No. A-02-CA-480-SS, at 8 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002); Owens v. American Home Products Corporation, No. G-02-185, at 1 (S.D.Tex. July 12, 2002). In Owens, Judge Kent stayed a lawsuit involving parental claims arising out of thimerosal-related injuries for a limited time pending developments in the Vaccine Court. Given that a stay must not give rise to a lengthy delay, the Court agrees that a stay of limited duration is appropriate. See Saybolt, 761 F.2d at 203 n. 6 (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 257, 57 S.Ct. at 167). The Court grants defendants' motion to stay and hereby stays this lawsuit until August 1, 2003.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion to stay. This lawsuit is hereby STAYED until August 1, 2003.