Opinion
16-cv-8639 (PKC)
05-18-2018
INA JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. TIME WARNER CABLE ADMINISTRATION LLC, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ina Jackson filed suit against defendant TWC Administration LLC ("TWC"), alleging that TWC, in terminating her employment, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex, and age. (Amended Complaint ("AC") ¶¶ 26, 51-54). TWC has moved pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P, for summary judgment dismissing the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 28). For the following reasons, TWC's motion will be granted. BACKGROUND
For thirteen years, Jackson worked for TWC, which provides cable television and phone and internet services. (Dkt. 38 ¶¶ 1-2, 45). Over the years, she accumulated a fairly extension disciplinary record. She received a verbal warning and two written warnings for excessive tardiness, four written notices, a verbal warning, and a written warning for exceeding her earned sick leave, and five written warnings and two counselings for acting in an unprofessional and inappropriate manner. (Id. ¶¶ 11-23; see also Dkt. 30-4; Dkt. 30-5; Dkt. 30-6; Dkt. 30-7; Dkt. 30-8; Dkt. 30-9; Dkt. 30-10; Dkt. 30-11; Dkt. 30-12). She was warned on multiple occasions that similar unprofessional and inappropriate occurrences in the future could result in her termination. (Dkt. 38 ¶¶ 15, 18, 20; Dkt. 30-6; Dkt. 30-7; Dkt. 30-8; Dkt. 30-9; Dkt. 30-10 Dkt. 30-11; Dkt. 30-12).
Immediately preceding her termination, Jackson and another TWC employee, Dustin Roberts, became involved in a dispute while working in TWC's dispatch department, an open workspace in which TWC employees, among other things, field calls from customers. (Dkt. 38 ¶¶ 7-9, 24). LaWanna Baker, TWC's human resources manager, investigated the dispute. (Id. ¶ 34). During the course of her investigation, Baker received five written statements from witnesses to the dispute, interviewed both Jackson and Roberts, spoke with a third employee, Ava Collesso, and reviewed security footage of the dispute. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 40, 42).
The witness statements were consistent with each other and described the dispute as follows. The dispute began when Jackson yelled Collesso's name "loudly [and] repeatedly" to get Collesso's attention so that Jackson could ask her when she was planning to go to lunch. (Dkt. 31-2; accord Dkt. 31-3). Roberts, who was speaking with Collesso at the time, told Jackson that she was being rude. (Dkt. 31-3; accord Dkt. 31-2). Jackson left her desk and approached Roberts, who was seated at his desk, and stood over him. (Dkt. 31-2; accord Dkt. 31-3). Roberts then stood up, and Jackson and Roberts commenced yelling at each other, both using "foul language." (Dkt. 31-5; accord Dkt. 31-2; Dkt. 31-3; Dkt. 31-4; Dkt. 31-6). Three supervisors intervened. (Dkt. 31-5; accord Dkt. 31-2; Dkt. 31-3; Dkt. 31-4; Dkt. 31-6). Jackson refused repeated requests from the supervisors to return to her desk. (Dkt. 31-3; accord Dkt. 31-2; Dkt. 31-4; Dkt. 31-5; Dkt. 31-6). Jackson and Roberts calmed down after a few minutes. (Dkt. 31-5). Roberts's account of the dispute echoed the witnesses' written statements, but Jackson claimed that everyone "over reacted [sic]" and that "she didn't scream at all." (Dkt. 31-8; Dkt. 38 ¶¶ 43-44).
TWC terminated Jackson's employment shortly thereafter. (Dkt. 30-14). In the written notice of termination, TWC observed that, in addition to the dispute with Roberts, Jackson had previously been warned in writing on three occasions for, respectively, using "profanity[,] menacing[,] and threatening behavior with a coworker," "taking another employee's phone charger until [the employee] returned the cigarettes [Jackson] claimed he stole," and "rais[ing] [her] voice in an unprofessional manor [sic] to [her] forewoman . . . and then[-]senior manager . . . while they were going over [her] schedule." (Id.) TWC stated that "[b]ecause of these repeated violations of [TWC's] major work rules and disregard for [TWC's] professional work environment," it had decided to terminate Jackson. (Id.) TWC did not to terminate Roberts and instead suspended him, asserting that it elected to do so "[b]ecause he was not the aggressor." (Dkt. 31 ¶ 18).
Jackson filed suit, asserting claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec Law §§ 296-301, and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. (AC ¶¶ 51-56). She alleges that she was terminated based on her race, sex, and age, pointing to the fact the she, a black female, was terminated while Roberts, a younger Hispanic male, was not. (AC ¶¶ 29-33). Discovery has closed, and TWC has moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. 22; Dkt. 28). LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion for a claim at trial, the movant may establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact by "demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim." Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 924 (2d Cir. 1988)). On a motion for summary judgment, courts must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and . . . resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2009)). DISCUSSION
I. Section 1981 Claim (First Cause of Action)
Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens," a right which includes "the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." It does not, however, extend its protections to discrimination on the basis of gender or age. Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court will therefore assess only whether Jackson has raised a genuine dispute of material fact to warrant a trial on her race discrimination claim.
Section 1981 claims are governed by "the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green," 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that "(1) he [or she] belonged to a protected class; (2) he [or she] was qualified for the position he [or she] held; (3) he [or she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent." Id. (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008)). The Second Circuit has "often emphasized" that the plaintiff's burden at this stage is "minimal." McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001).
If the plaintiff makes this showing, then a presumption of discrimination arises, and the employer must bear "the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case—i.e., the burden of 'producing evidence' that the adverse employment actions were taken 'for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.'" Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993)). If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must "point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination." James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff cannot do so, then the defendant is "entitled to summary judgment." Id. In other words, "[i]f the defendant has stated a neutral reason for the adverse action," summary judgment is appropriate unless "the plaintiff's admissible evidence . . . show[s] circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)).
TWC asserts that, even if Jackson has made out a prima facie case, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her termination and no rational finder of fact could conclude that TWC's decision to terminate Jackson was based on racial animus. The Court agrees that TWC has met its burden of producing evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Jackson's employment—namely, Jackson's instigation of a dispute with Roberts when she had been warned repeatedly that similar behavior would result in her termination. The Court also concludes that, in response to TWC's motion, Jackson has failed to come forward with evidence, which, if believed, would enable a reasonable fact finder to find in her favor.
Jackson contends that TWC's non-discriminatory justification is "not true." (Dkt. 36 at 9). To support this contention, she faults Baker, the TWC employee conducting the investigation, for not acquiring witness statements from two black TWC employees—one of whom spoke with Baker, who is also a black female—who witnessed the dispute between Jackson and Roberts. She also attempts to discredit some of the evidence presented by TWC, arguing, for example, that Baker's declaration should be "discount[ed]" because Baker "developed a dislike for [Jackson]" because Jackson had previously filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") against Baker for unfair labor practices, that a note Baker declares she wrote documenting a conversation with Collesso "is suspect" and should receive "no probative value," and that the Court should "summarily reject" evidence of Jackson's prior disciplinary record because Jackson "refuse[d] to sign all of [the warnings] except [one]" because she "disagree[d] with the contents" of the warnings. (Dkt. 36 at 1, 10, 12; Dkt. 37 ¶¶ 17, 21). Finally, she states that TWC is now attempting to justify its termination of Jackson for the additional reason that Jackson had received numerous warnings for tardiness and attendance issues, purportedly contradicting its earlier position that Jackson's termination was the result of her unprofessional behavior on multiple occasions.
None of these arguments touch upon the relevant issue: whether Jackson's termination was motivated in whole or in part by racial animus. Rather, Jackson is predominantly "attacking the reliability of the evidence supporting [TWC's] conclusions." McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). "In a discrimination case, however, [courts] are decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff. [Courts] are interested in what "motivated the employer . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). For this reason, it is irrelevant, at least for the purpose of proving racial discrimination, whether a dislike for Jackson, caused by Jackson's filing of an NLRB charge against Baker, impacted Baker's investigation or whether Jackson actually committed the conduct underlying her prior written warnings. There is no evidence that the NLRB charge against Baker, who is also a black female, had anything to do with race-based unfair labor practices. The argument that Baker skewed the results of her investigation out of non-racial animus arising from the NLRB matter militates against an inference of racial discrimination. And, to the extent that offering additional, nondiscriminatory reasons for Jackson's termination could be relevant, TWC has not wavered from its original justification. (See, e.g., Dkt. 29 at 14-15, 18-19; Dkt. 40 at 10).
With respect to the relevant issue—motive—Jackson has taken a scattershot approach, claiming at various points in this litigation that TWC terminated her because of her race, because of her sex, because of her age, because she filed a complaint with the NLRB, because she was a union member, because she filed grievances, because TWC was downsizing as the result of a merger, because she earned a high salary, and because a supervisor disliked her. (AC ¶ 54; Dkt. 30-2 at 3-8, 15). The only evidence that Jackson has presented in an attempt to show that her termination was motivated by racial animus is that Roberts, who is Hispanic, was suspended instead of terminated. No rational jury could find beyond a preponderance of the evidence, based on this fact in conjunction with all surrounding evidence, that TWC terminated Jackson because of her race.
For a plaintiff to show racial animus by comparing the plaintiff's treatment to that of an individual outside the plaintiff's protected class, the comparator must be similarly situated to the plaintiff "in all material respects." McGuinness, 263 F.3d at 53 (emphasis removed) (quoting Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997)). Material similarity "must be judged based on (1) whether the plaintiff and those [s]he maintains were similarly situated were subject to the same workplace standards and (2) whether the conduct for which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable seriousness." Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2000).
Although Jackson and Roberts both yelled at each other at work and Roberts, according to Jackson, had been suspended previously "for using profanity at a foreman," (Dkt. 37 ¶ 7), Baker's investigation into the dispute between Jackson and Roberts revealed that Jackson initiated the dispute, left her desk, approached Roberts, and stood over him until he also stood up, at which point they both began yelling. Jackson's role in starting and then escalating the dispute materially differentiates her from Roberts and suffices to justify disparities in punishment. Further, Roberts had been disciplined for a dispute with a coworker only once in the past, while Jackson had three prior written warnings stemming from disputes with coworkers. Without sufficient similarity between Jackson and Roberts, the different punishments, standing alone, do not "permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152 (quoting Stern, 131 F.3d at 312). Because Jackson has pointed to no other admissible evidence that could support her claim for racial discrimination, TWC's motion for summary judgment dismissing the section 1981 claim will be granted.
II. NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims (Second and Third Causes of Action)
In the Amended Complaint, Jackson asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over the section 1981 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides for supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in certain situations. (AC ¶¶ 1, 3). Section 1367, however, also authorizes courts to "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" over state law claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003)).
As noted, the Court will enter summary judgment on the section 1981 claim over which it has original jurisdiction. The Court will therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims over which it has only supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "when all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation, the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice" (emphasis in original)). CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, TWC's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. 28). Jackson's First Cause of Action is dismissed with prejudice. (AC ¶¶ 51-52). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Jackson's Second and Third Causes of Action, (AC ¶¶ 53-56), and, accordingly, dismisses both claims without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
P. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge Dated: New York, New York
May 18, 2018