Opinion
No. 92,827.
Opinion filed November 18, 1999.
Original Proceeding — Mandamus.
Douglas M. Jackson, Jr., pro se, Starke, Florida, for Petitioner.
Louis A. Vargas, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.
Douglas M. Jackson, Sr., petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
FACTS
Jackson is a prisoner currently serving a life sentence for multiple murders committed in 1981. On April 20, 1998, Jackson filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the Florida Department of Corrections ("the Department") seeking an order from this Court requiring that the Department pay him money for the duties and tasks he performs while incarcerated. On April 23, 1998, this Court granted Jackson's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, upon further review, it came to this Court's attention that Jackson had not complied with the requirements of section 57.085(7), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides in full:
A prisoner who has twice in the preceding 3 years been adjudicated indigent under this section, certified indigent under § 57.081, or authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by a federal court may not be adjudicated indigent to pursue a new suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal without first obtaining leave of court. In a request for leave of court, the prisoner must provide a complete listing of each suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal brought by the prisoner or intervened in by the prisoner in any court or other adjudicatory forum in the preceding 5 years. The prisoner must attach to a request for leave of court a copy of each complaint, petition, or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit and a record of disposition of the proceeding.
Accordingly, on September 18, 1998, this Court vacated its earlier order granting in forma pauperis status to Jackson. This Court instructed Jackson that the denial was without prejudice to his filing another motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, conforming to the requirements of section 57.085(7).
Jackson has filed a new motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In that motion, Jackson indicates that he has been adjudicated indigent at least twice in the last three years, but has not provided copies of any of the documents required in section 57.085(7). In the space provided for listing the prior cases, Jackson has inserted the following notation: "Note unable to List All/Each Action, provide copy, etc. as File being Closed/Ended Destroyed. But the Courts litigated before were: 11th Cir. Ct. Appeal; U.S. Dist. Cts; Fla. Supreme Ct.; U.S. Supreme Ct; 1st DCA; Fla. DOC; 2nd DCA, 4th DCA, 2nd Cir, 8th Cir., 17th Cir.; to the best of my memory. This is the best info I can provide."
ANALYSIS
Jackson's answer is inadequate and does not justify his failure to comply with the statute and this Court's order. Jackson has, until recently, been able to avoid the requirements of section 57.085, and thus has not come to terms with the reality that maintaining an "active" pro se litigation practice is both time-consuming, and costly.
We note, however, that there may be situations in which the Department has had to limit an inmate's storage space. The statute does not address the potential problem that an inmate may not be able to provide copies of the required pleadings because he has had to dispose of them. Further, if an inmate does allege that he has been forced to dispose of his prior pleadings, the courts are placed in the difficult situation of either simply believing the inmate, which could lead to the creation of a rather large loophole in the statute, or attempting to confirm the inmate's assertion. This could lead to a complicated, drawn-out proceeding in which the Department might have to verify that the pleading had indeed been disposed of. An inquiry would then be required to determine whether the prison had actually required the destruction of the pleadings or whether the inmate had unnecessarily disposed of the pleadings. While this particular petitioner has not alleged that he was forced to dispose of his pleadings, we alert the Legislature to these potential procedural problems associated with this statute.
This Court has not been specifically advised of Jackson's pleadings in other courts. However, based on an examination of this Court's records, from 1992 when this Court reversed Jackson's death sentence, see Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1992) (No. 79,970), to just prior to filing the instant petition, he has filed or taken part in thirteen petitions in this Court. See Coleman [and Jackson] v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 717 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1998) (No. 92,828); Jackson v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 718 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1998) (No. 92,793);Jackson v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1998) (No. 92,121); Coleman v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 717 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1998) (No. 92,116); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 717 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1998) (No. 92,114);Jackson v. Davis, 705 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1997) (No. 91,796);Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 707 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 1997) (No. 91,381); Vega [and Jackson] v. Singletary, 704 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1997) (No. 90,021);Jackson v. McAndrew, 687 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 1997) (No. 89,675); Jackson v. Schapiro, 680 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1996) (No. 88,860); Jackson v. Singletary, 675 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1996) (No. 87,961); Jackson v. Singletary, 670 So.2d 938 (Fla. 1996) (No. 87,372); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 617 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,061). Seven of those petitions were for writ of mandamus filed against the Department of Corrections or employees of the prison.
As a general rule, Jackson's petitions against the Department concern the manner in which it conducts prison affairs and how it disciplines its inmates. In each of the petitions listed above, Jackson was granted in forma pauperis status and thus was not required to pay the filing fee. Jackson paid no filing fee in his two petitions for review filed in this Court, and he paid no filing fee for the four habeas petitions filed here since there is no filing fee for such petitions.
Since the filing of the instant petition against the Department on April 20, 1998, Jackson has filed eleven additional petitions against the Department which are either still pending, were transferred, or were dismissed.See Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 93,227 (Fla. petition filed May 6, 1998) (pending); Jackson v. Singletary, No. 94,196 (Fla. petition filed Oct. 26, 1998) (pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,195 (Fla. petition filed Oct. 26, 1998) (pending);Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,234 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 3, 1998) (pending); Jackson v. Department of Corrections, No. 94,271 (Fla. petition filed Nov. 9, 1998) (pending); Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,700 (Fla. petition filed June 1, 1999) (pending); Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,891 (Fla. Jul. 19, 1999) (transferred);Jackson v. Moore, No. 95,931 (Fla. Jul. 19, 1999) (transferred);Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore, No. 95,992 (Fla. Jul. 23, 1999) (transferred); Jackson v. Moore, No. 96,321 (Fla. petition filed Aug. 19, 1999) (pending); Stridison [and Jackson] v. Moore, No. 96,382 (Fla. Aug. 31, 1999) (dismissed). In all likelihood, Jackson will have filed more petitions in this Court before this decision is published.
This Court is not at liberty to ignore the statutes enacted by the Legislature.
While formulating procedures for granting in forma pauperis status is the exclusive province of the Supreme Court pursuant to rulemaking authority vested in it by the Florida Constitution, the existence of a right for indigents to proceed without payment of costs is a substantive one and is properly provided for by the Legislature.See Amos v. Department of Health Rehabilitative Servs. 416 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 421 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1982).
See art. V, § 2, Fla. Const.
We note, however, that even if a statute may be considered substantive, this Court retains its judicial prerogative to find that the application of the statute may be unconstitutional under some circumstances. Nevertheless, since Petitioner Jackson has failed to raise this issue, we decline to address it at this time.
The right to proceed as an indigent is a statutory right created by section 57.081. See Kleinschmidt v. Estate of Kleinschmidt, 392 So.2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (asserting that the purpose of rule 9.430 was "not to expand the substantive right of an indigent . . . but merely to provide a vehicle for enforcement of the right" created under section 57.081). Further, prior to 1980, it had been held that section 57.081 only applied to trial courts, not appellate courts.See Lee v. City of Winter Haven, 386 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Hillman v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 375 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In chapter 80-348, Laws of Florida, however, the Legislature created a statutory right for an indigent person to gain access to Florida's appellate courts as well. See, e.g. Kleinschmidt, 392 So.2d at 67. That substantive right was codified in what is now section 57.081(1), Florida Statutes (1997). However, due to the costly administrative problems caused by repeated frivolous inmate filings, the Legislature recently created a separate statute for inmate proceedings and removed a prisoner's absolute right to repeatedly proceed without payment of the filing fee and provided for only a limited right to proceed, under certain circumstances, without paying the fee in advance. See § 57.085, Fla. Stat. (1997). Further, even if a court determines that an inmate may proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, that inmate must contribute toward the costs of his or her lawsuit and ultimately pay for the lawsuit in full, if he or she subsequently becomes able to do so. See § 57.085(5), Fla. Stat. (1997).
The statute also provides for circumstances under which a court may determine that an inmate is only partially indigent. In such circumstances, the court may require the inmate to pay a reduced payment at the time of filing, and then make periodic payments toward the full payment of the filing fee.See § 57.085(4), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Although the photocopy requirements of section 57.085(7) present litigious prisoners with some procedural hurdles in seeking indigency status, the practical effect of the statute is merely that the more litigious a prisoner becomes, the more time-consuming and costly it will be for that prisoner to continue along the same path. If a prisoner has filed four or five prior lawsuits, it will require some effort on the prisoner's part to file another lawsuit (because he or she will have to obtain photocopies of the documents in those cases). Since Jackson has filed a large number of lawsuits in many courts, it is particularly cumbersome for him to continue at the same exhaustive pace.
In enacting section 57.085, the Legislature made express findings regarding the financial and administrative burdens that frivolous indigent prisoner lawsuits place on the state judicial system. See ch. 96-106, preamble, at 92-93, Laws of Fla. Subsection (7) of the statute attempts to ameliorate this problem by providing courts with a mechanism to review a prisoner's recent litigation history and determine whether to allow the prisoner the opportunity to again seek a waiver of prepayment of filing fees where that prisoner has already proceeded twice as an indigent in any court within the last three years. By reviewing the prisoner's prior filings, the court may be able to determine whether the prisoner has raised the same claims before or has repeatedly filed pleadings showing no possible entitlement to relief. Such filings are specifically listed as types of frivolous actions which are not permitted under the statute. See § 57.085(9), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 57.085 and the preamble of the act creating the statute also discuss the improper filing of malicious suits or suits intended only to harass public officers and employees.See § 57.085(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). An examination of the prisoner's prior pleadings could help a court determine whether the prisoner has previously filed those types of improper actions as well.
Section 57.085, Florida Statutes (1997), was created pursuant to chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida. At the beginning of the act, the legislature provided a preamble in which it set forth the basis or reasons for the act. The preamble provided, in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants, and
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in Florida's jails and prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous lawsuits at public expense against public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates, and
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are dismissible by the courts only after considerable expenditure of precious taxpayer and judicial resources. . . .
Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla.
Thus, underlying section 57.085 is the concept that judicial labor should be spent analyzing meritorious matters and issues which have not already been reviewed by another court. This purpose is accomplished by allowing the courts to review the prisoner's prior pleadings. If the prisoner does not provide those pleadings, that purpose is frustrated.
Conserving judicial labor is further accomplished by increasing such litigants' commitment of time and resources since it is the prisoner's responsibility to keep appropriate records as to how many cases he or she has filed, the case numbers, the dispositions of those cases, and copies of the requisite documents from those cases. This being the case, strict enforcement of the statute may cause prisoners to consider more carefully whether to file a claim in court and to refrain from filing excessive, successive, or frivolous lawsuits.
This Court has recognized that "[t]he resources of our court system are finite and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine disputes." Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998). The United States Supreme Court itself has restrained indigent petitioners who have abused the system in order to allocate the resources of the Court "in a way that promotes the interests of justice," In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989), and in a decision addressing adequate prison law libraries, it held that the constitutional right of access to courts does not "guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines."Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (emphasis added). Jackson's lawsuits against the Department of Corrections have become so numerous that one could describe him similarly. We agree with the Supreme Court's assertion that "paupers filingpro se petitions are not subject to the financial considerations . . . that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions" and that "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources." 489 U.S. at 184. Therefore, we find that we must restrain Jackson's ability to monopolize this Court's resources.
While this Court could completely deny Jackson indigency status altogether as the Supreme Court has done in some cases, that option is not necessary at this time. However, in order to give effect to section 57.085, this Court must require that Jackson strictly comply with the disclosure provisions of subsection (7). Since Jackson has not done so after having been given more than one chance to do so, this petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new petition along with the appropriate filing fee or a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis that includes a list of all legal actions he has filed in the last five years and copies of the documents commencing and disposing of those actions.
See § 57.085(7), Fla. Stat. (1997). Furthermore, if Jackson wishes to proceed as an indigent in any cases now pending in this Court or in any new petitions, cases or other legal actions covered by the section 57.085, he must either submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in strict compliance with section 57.085(7) or submit the requisite filing fee. Should Jackson file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which does not comply with this order in connection with any future pleadings or petitions, the motion shall immediately be denied and Jackson will be required to pay the requisite filing fee or have his case dismissed.
Section 57.085 does not, however, cover petitions for writ of habeas corpus because in this State, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost."See art. I, § 13, Fla. Const. Accordingly, a petitioner seeking habeas relief would not need to seek leave to proceed without payment of any filing fee.
Section 57.085 does not prevent a prisoner from challenging his conviction or sentence by means of a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 or 3.850. Section 57.085 does not cover postconviction motions because they are collateral criminal proceedings, which are specifically excluded from the statute. See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (1997) ("This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding."); see also Ferenc v. State, 697 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (finding that a 3.850 motion is a collateral criminal proceeding).
ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS
Having resolved this particular petitioner's case, we must point out what we perceive to be the extremely burdensome administrative requirements the statute has imposed on this Court and, most probably, the Department. From our experience with the statute over the last few years, it appears to us that any judicial labor saved by potentially reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits is nearly outweighed by the tremendous administrative burdens created by the statute.
First, as discussed above, the more litigious inmates must provide photocopies of their prior pleadings. These inmates, however, often have insufficient funds to pay for these copies. Nevertheless, the Department is still required to make photocopies of the relevant pleadings for these inmates.See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-602.405(4) (previously 33-3.0051(4)). Further, it is not uncommon for an inmate's prior pleadings to consist of several hundred pages and, at times, thousands of pages. Clearly, this requirement must be a tremendous burden on the Department and, ultimately, on the taxpayer.
Further, since only a small portion of the average balance of an inmate's trust account may be deducted monthly to pay for the cost of the copies and the lawsuit, this statute imposes a huge burden both on the court clerk's offices and, most probably, the Department's accounting office. At such small amounts, the paperwork could continue for years. This Court has already had to hire additional staff to handle the administrative burden caused by this statute.
While it seems logical that requiring inmates to take a financial stake in their lawsuits would likely reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits filed in the long run, a single one-time reduced filing fee for partially indigent inmates would probably have the same preventive effect without the costly administrative processing currently required under the statute.
Furthermore, once a litigious inmate has actually complied with the statute by sending in his or her thousands of pages of prior pleadings, this Court's clerk must place it with the court file and, due to its tremendous size and weight, literally wheel the file up to each justice's office, where the stacks of pleadings must be reviewed. Ultimately, once the case is completed, the storage of these large files also poses problems. Therefore, we strenuously urge the Legislature to further review this statute in an attempt to remedy what has truly become an administrative nightmare for Florida's court system.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.