Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:97-CV-205-J.
April 5, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services "Motion to Dismiss," filed February 5, 2002, Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, and Motion for Entry of Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff and Supporting Brief," filed February 25, 2002, and Defendant's "Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Dismiss," filed March 13, 2002. Based on the following, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Background
The above-captioned cause of action was originally filed by Plaintiff Susan Ivy on February 22, 1997, against Defendant Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, an agency of the State of Texas. In her Original Complaint, plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from the defendant for alleged violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. Plaintiff alleged that she was a qualified individual with a disability as defined by § 12112(a) of Title land the sole reason for her discharge was her hearing impairment. In her Original Complaint, and her First Amended Complaint, the live pleading in this case, plaintiff plead no pendent state law causes of action.
Following discovery and an unsuccessful mediation, the parties submitted their Agreed Joint Pretrial Order, which the Court approved on August 4, 1998. In the Pretrial Order, the parties stipulated that Plaintiff's federal ADA claim was the sole cause of action in this case.
On August 19, 1998, the parties proceeded to a trial before the Court that concluded in the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Plaintiff's ADA claim. Defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which vacated the judgment and remanded to this Court to determine whether Plaintiff was substantially impaired with her hearing loss when considering the use of her hearing aid, under the then just decided Supreme Court opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).
On March 24, 2000, before reconsideration in light of Sutton, this Court entered an order abating Plaintiff's remanded ADA claim, pending a ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). The question to be answered by the Supreme Court in Garrett was whether an individual may sue a State, or an agency of that State, for money damages in federal court under the ADA. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363, 121 S.Ct. at 961.
On February 21, 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Garrett, holding that because the ADA was not a valid abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, suits brought by state employees in federal court for money damages under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 361-375, 121 S.Ct. 955, 961-68 (2001).
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State." In Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the Supreme Court extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett, the parties in this case filed their respective motions for relief. This Court will discuss each motion in light of Garrett. Ultimately, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Discussion
Defendant's February 5, 2002, motion to dismiss broadly states that plaintiffs pending ADA claims are jurisdictionally barred as a matter of law by Garrett. However, a reading of Garrett reveals that the issue is not as cut and dried as defendant claims. Plaintiff sought not only monetary damages for the defendant's alleged ADA violations, but also injunctive relief. The Court's holding in Garrett focuses solely on the issue of suits for money damages. To the extent plaintiff seeks money damages in this suit, defendant is correct that Garrett holds that suits by state employees in federal court for money damages under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 361-375, 121 S.Ct. 955, 961-68 (2001).
The Supreme Court's holding in Garrett can not be read to extend to suits for injunctive relief In fact, although in dictum, the Court stated:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. See n. 5, supra.Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9. It is on this language that plaintiff relies to defeat defendant's motion to dismiss. In fact, plaintiff relies on this language in asking this Court not only to deny defendant's motion to dismiss but to allow her to amend her complaint to add a pendent state law claim under Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.000 et. seq. and to then enter judgment for her by applying the jury's findings under the ADA to the provisions of the Texas Labor Code.
The stated purpose of Chapter 21.001 of the Texas Labor Code is to "provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its subsequent amendments ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.)." See Tex.Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001(3) (Vernon 1996).
The Court will not accommodate plaintiff in her request to amend her complaint to add, now five years after filing suit, a pendent state law claim under the Texas Labor Code. The provisions of Chapter 21 of the Labor Code were enacted in 1993, well before plaintiff filed suit in February 1997. Plaintiff amended her complaint once in July 1997, but failed to add a claim under the Texas Labor Code. She shall not be allowed to add that claim now.
Because the Supreme Court has stripped plaintiff of her ADA claim for monetary damages and because this Court has refused to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint to add claims under the Texas Labor Code, plaintiff is subject to dismissal unless the Supreme Court's dicta in Garrett supports her claim for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The language relied on by Plaintiff states, "Those standards (ones made applicable to the States under Title I of the ADA) can be enforced by . . . private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young (citation omitted). See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9.
Plaintiffs reliance on the above language mandates a reading of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in federal court when the State is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or injunctive relief, created an exception that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of federal claims. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
At the outset, this Court notes that the holding in Ex parte Young has been restricted to its facts and the Supreme Court has declined, on numerous occasions, to extend its holding. In Elderman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), Ex parte Young was restricted to its facts by the Supreme Court. In Elderman, the Court recognized the holding of Ex parte Young but refused to extend its holding to allow for retroactive relief against a State official in federal court. Id.
In Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, the Supreme Court recognized that Ex parte Young was necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the "supreme authority of the United States," but held it inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06, 104 S.Ct. 900, 910-11 (1984) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160).
A reading of Elderman and Pennhurst reveal that the force of Ex parte Young is restricted to cases where injunctive relief is sought against a state official to cure a continuing violation of federal law. The Fifth Circuit has recognized the restriction of Ex parte Young on two occasions. In Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit held that the doctrine of Ex parte Young was unavailable to the plaintiff who named only a state agency as a defendant. Prior to Reickenbacker, the Fifth Circuit in Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998), held that to meet the Ex parte Young exception, a plaintiffs suit alleging r violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect. See also Saltz v. Tennessee Dept. of Employment Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff's claim in the instant case does not meet this criteria, and thus, Ex parte Young does not save plaintiff from dismissal.
First, plaintiff has not plead a cause of action against a state official. Plaintiffs only claim is against the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, an agency of the State of Texas. Second, plaintiff has not plead facts to support a finding of an ongoing violation of the ADA. Plaintiff was employed by defendant for a period of roughly five weeks in late 1996 and she made no allegations of an ongoing violation of the ADA by defendant. Plaintiffs allegations against the defendant stemmed from her alleged wrongful termination by defendant in late 1996. Thus, while plaintiff has sought injunctive relief for an alleged violation of the ADA, she has not made allegations of a continuing violation committed by a state official. As a result, the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Young, as recognized in Garrett, does not save Plaintiff from dismissal.
Conclusion
Because the Supreme Court's holding in Garrett has stripped plaintiff of her ADA claim for monetary damages, because this Court has refused to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint to add claims under the Texas Labor Code, and because the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Young is inapplicable to plaintiff, the defendant's motion to dismiss must be GRANTED and plaintiffs sole cause of action for monetary and injunctive relief against the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services must be dismissed.
It is SO ORDERED.