Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK55299. Irwin H. Garfinkel, Judge.
Gilbert D. Sigala for Defendant and Appellant William G., Sr.
Ana P., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant Ana P.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
BOREN, P.J.
Appellants Ana P. (mother) and William G., Sr. (father), challenge the order denying father’s petition requesting custody of their five-year-old son (William) or reinstating reunification services, and the order terminating parental rights to free William for adoption by his maternal uncle.
We find that the myriad of contentions regarding detention, jurisdiction, disposition, reunification services, and out-of-home placement either were previously determined by this court in prior appeals and are governed by law of the case, or are waived for failure to have raised them in a timely fashion. Nor is there any merit to father’s contention that due process required a jury trial to determine if mother and father were unfit parents.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
This juvenile dependency matter was the subject of two prior appellate opinions. (See In re William G., Jr. (Nov. 28, 2006, B180479) [nonpub. opn.] [rejecting challenges to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and the order removing William from parental custody and placing him with his maternal uncle]; Ana P. v. Superior Court (Jul. 20, 2006, B190032) [nonpub. opn.] [denying petition seeking review of order terminating reunification services and setting matter for permanency planning hearing].) Because the parties are familiar with the underlying facts so fulsomely set forth in the prior appeals, a summary of the facts prior to the section 366.26 hearing is sufficient in the present appeal.
We have taken judicial notice of those prior appeals.
Proceedings prior to the section 366.26 hearing.
In May of 2004, Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition on behalf of then two-year-old William, the subject of the present appeal. Thereafter, the juvenile court removed custody from the parents, and William was placed in the home of his maternal uncle where he has thrived.
The juvenile court placed William in his uncle’s care because of ongoing domestic violence between William’s mother and father. The violence included father’s placing a plastic bag over mother’s head and handcuffing her in the presence of William’s older sister. In our prior opinion in 2005, we found that contrary to father’s contentions, the sustained dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300) stated a proper basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the court’s jurisdictional finding was supported by substantial evidence, and the disposition order removing William from father’s custody and placing him with his uncle was supported by substantial evidence.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Meanwhile, DCFS provided mother and father with more than 18 months of reunification services. However, they did not fully comply with the requirements of the reunification plan. Father never progressed beyond monitored visits, and he expressed hostility and aggressiveness toward DCFS social workers and visitation monitors. After mother and father received the maximum period of reunification services, the court terminated services and found DCFS had provided reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but that it would be detrimental to William to return him to parental custody.
In 2006, mother and father filed in this court a petition for extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 38.1 (now, rule 8.452).) Contrary to the contentions of mother and father, we found that they had been provided reasonable reunification services, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that there was a substantial risk of detriment should the children be returned to their custody.
Our prior opinion noted that the juvenile court found that mother had failed to participate in court-ordered programs. Although father had substantially complied with the drug testing aspect of the case plan, neither he nor mother addressed in a timely fashion the most important aspect of the plan, which was domestic violence. He belatedly participated in an anger management program, which did not focus on domestic violence; rather, the program was geared toward helping parents with children who had anger problems. By the date of the section 366.22 hearing, father had enrolled in a domestic violence class, but had completed only nine of 52 required sessions. As of the date of the 18-month hearing, mother and father continued to deny that any domestic violence ever took place, despite overwhelming evidence of extreme violence.
We further observed in our prior opinion that father’s threatening, belligerent behavior toward the maternal uncle and the DCFS staff showed he was not in control of his impulses and still had difficulty managing his anger. Mother continued to live with father, and she refused to address the issue of domestic violence until very late in the proceedings. We concluded, in pertinent part, that ample evidence demonstrated neither William nor his sister would be safe in their care, that the failure of the parents to sufficiently comply with her requirements of their case plan posed a substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned to their care, and that the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing were supported by substantial evidence.
Ensuing events.
Shortly before the filing of our prior opinion denying the petition for extraordinary writ review, DCFS informed the juvenile court that the private, neutral monitor assigned to monitor visits between father and child had resigned because of father’s aggression, intimidation, and verbal attacks. The juvenile court temporarily suspended father’s visits until a new monitor was approved. William’s attorney requested a temporary restraining order, which the court denied. The court also denied father’s requests for a hearing and for the removal of the social worker.
On July 21, 2006, DCFS submitted its report for the section 366.26 hearing. It reported that mother and father maintained twice monthly visits with William. The visits were monitored by the paternal grandmother. William (as well as his sister) was well cared for by the maternal uncle, with whom he had lived for over two years. The uncle wanted to adopt William (and his sister) and was committed to maintaining contact with the parents as long as appropriate.
Mother and father had yet to comply with the court-ordered case plan. They failed to complete a drug treatment program. Mother had a history of missed drug tests, and father had failed to participate in drug treatment at all, and did not adequately participate in a domestic violence program. DCFS recommended termination of parental rights to free both children for adoption by their uncle.
Father’s section 388 petition.
The same day DCFS submitted its report, father filed a section 388 petition, requesting custody of William or, alternatively, reinstatement of reunification services. In support of the petition, father claimed he had completed his drug testing requirements, had participated in individual counseling and domestic violence counseling, and had positively interacted with William during visits. Father submitted documentation from treatment providers to support his claims. The court set the matter for a section 388 hearing and a contested section 366.26 hearing in several months.
In the interim, in September of 2006, the juvenile court held a review hearing. DFCS reported the children were thriving in their placement with their uncle. Father visited with William every Sunday for four hours, but there were some problems. Father constantly violated visitation rules by bringing gifts for William and on one occasion told William to stop kissing him. When William became difficult, father became angry with the visitation monitor and sought to hand his child over to someone else. Father also became angry when accommodations had to be made on occasion because William was ill or tired.
DCFS filed a report in response to the section 388 petition. The report indicated that although father asserted he had participated in 35 sessions of domestic violence counseling at the Tarzana Treatment Center (Tarzana), father actually missed six sessions and had poor attendance. It also appeared that father had altered documents from the treatment provider to indicate that he had not missed that many sessions. The DCFS social worker called the treatment provider, who was not surprised by doctored documents because father had been upset about the progress report indicating his missed sessions. Father was also upset when the treatment provider refused to provide him with a certificate of completion, even though he had not actually completed the 52-week program.
The final report from Tarzana noted 13 absences and dismissal from the program in August of 2006, citing poor attendance and recommending continued participation. Moreover, father was guarded and defensive regarding feedback from the program provider and from peers, and he was disrespectful to staff members.
DCFS also reported similar alterations made to the report provided by father from Care Counseling Center, another domestic violence program. Specifically, the original report faxed directly to the DCFS social worker (and signed by Penny Winkler) indicated completion of 12 sessions, but the copy provided by father indicated he had purportedly completed 20 sessions. Also, the copy of the report provided by father indicated that his attendance at that program when combined with attendance at another program would constitute completion of a 52-week program; the original faxed version did not make that representation.
Regarding individual counseling, father attended only two sessions with Winkler, and contrary to his representations did not attend individual counseling sessions with Stephen Baum. Father’s letter, written by Rene Almenar from Tarzana, regarding father’s positive attendance and progress in individual counseling was also fraudulent. Almenar was a volunteer, not an employee, at Tarzana and was not authorized to write letters using the treatment center’s letterhead. Nor was he licensed or authorized to provide therapeutic services. When confronted, Almenar denied writing the letter that father presented.
DCFS reported on father’s visits, which had been monitored by two different, neutral monitors. One of the monitors terminated her contract because of father’s intimidation. With both monitors, father continually acted aggressively and violated visitation rules by discussing case issues in front of the William. Father again sought to remove the social worker from the case.
The hearing on father’s section 388 petition.
From mid-October through November 2, 2006, the juvenile court held section 388 and section 366.26 proceedings. It first received evidence regarding the section 388 petition, including the following items: the DCFS report dated October 12, 2006, with various documents presented by father in support of his petition; a case activity log (revealing an April 2006 phone call between a DCFS worker and mother’s therapist, wherein the therapist expressed concern about continuing domestic violence); an e-mail exchange between the social worker and the visitation monitor; and documents submitted by the William’s attorney revealing conflicting information regarding father’s participation in a domestic violence program.
Father testified and asserted that since the court had terminated reunification services in March of 2006, he had not engaged in any domestic violence incidents and had not been arrested for any illegal activity. He claimed he had completed 40 out of 52 domestic violence classes at Tarzana and 20 classes through another program. He denied doctoring any documents and was shocked by the report from Tarzana indicating he had 13 absences. Father admitted that he had been upset with social workers, but asserted he never got physical with anyone.
According to father, the letter from Robert Torres at Tarzana regarding father’s progress was untrue. He called Torres a liar. Likewise, Grace Flores at Tarzana was inaccurate in reporting father’s attendance. Father stated that Rene Almenar at Tarzana was his instructor in resolving domestic violence issues, and that he personally received a letter from Almenar. Regarding drug testing, father stated he never tested dirty, and if he missed a test, he would test the following day.
Father further testified that he visited William every weekend for four hours, and that William responded positively to him. Father asserted that the visitation monitor misconstrued what had happened when she reported that he had asked William to stop kissing him, and that the current monitor was difficult to deal with and placed too many restrictions on him. The current monitor, for example, terminated a visit after the father bought William a gift, and father claimed he was never told that gifts were prohibited during visits.
Father was willing to care for William full time, and William called him “daddy” and wanted to return home with him. Father believed that the reports submitted by the visitation monitor had been altered. Father also initially stood by his claim of attending 20 sessions of individual counseling with a particular counselor, but then stated he had only six or seven sessions with that counselor and other sessions with different counselors.
Contrary to what was implied in the DCFS report, father denied that mother left him in September of 2006 because of a domestic incident, and the two still lived together. Father continued to deny the extent of the domestic incident that initially brought the matter to the juvenile court’s attention. And, he claimed he did not know that the allegation of domestic violence involving a plastic bag had been found true by the juvenile court, but he took responsibility for one argument with mother several years earlier.
Janae Reyes, a DCFS social worker, also testified at the hearing. She confirmed that father had submitted a number of clean drug tests, and stated that she was not aware of any police involvement with father since the termination of reunification services in March of 2006. Regarding discrepancies in the documents submitted by father, Reyes explained that she investigated the matter by talking to treatment providers, including Rene Almenar at Tarzana, who disputed that he was not authorized or qualified to write a letter on father’s behalf and asserted that Torres had given him stationery with Tarzana letterhead.
Reyes confirmed that father had threatened her and complained to her supervisor about her, but she believed she was doing her job in a professional and unbiased manner and that father was just frustrated. Reyes explained that the visitation rule against gift giving was standard, and she denied doctoring any documents or telling treatment providers to terminate father from their programs. During the prior several months, she returned some of father’s phone calls, but did not return calls which recited statutes or otherwise ranted without leaving a question to which she could respond. Generally, after reunification services are terminated, social workers are not required to have contact with parents, and the focus shifts to the child.
Reyes also confirmed that both visitation monitors expressed feeling unsafe with father. Father also was confrontational with William’s caretaker (the child’s maternal uncle) while William was present. Father had been discharged from Tarzana due to excessive absences and disputes with the staff, and he was not currently attending a program. He had attended two sessions of individual counseling (with Penny Winkler).
Reyes explained that the monitors were not DCFS employees, but were independent and paid through DCFS funding. They were provided with no information about the case other than a court minute order, and Reyes did not discuss the facts of this case with the monitors or tell them it was a domestic violence matter.
Recently, the maternal uncle had advised Reyes that he was worried about mother because she had called him and told him that something had happened to her and she left father and went to live with her mother. Additionally, one of mother’s treatment providers (Stephen Baum) indicated domestic violence was still an ongoing issue.
Stephen Baum, a licensed psychiatric social worker at a clinic where mother was a client, testified that he had not been in touch with social worker Reyes for approximately six months. He did not recall telling Reyes about ongoing domestic violence in the home, nor did he recall whether he discussed the issue of domestic violence with her at all.
Mother also testified at the hearing. She stated she lived with father and that the two remained a couple. Mother asserted she lived with father consistently from March 2006 to the present, that there were no incidents of domestic violence, and that she did not tell her brother about any violent incidents. She routinely moved back and forth between father’s home and her mother’s home, and she described a close relationship with her brother, who cared for William.
Almenar testified that he worked at the Tarzana facility for three months as a facilitator on the resolution of domestic violence issues. He facilitated approximately 12 sessions with father, but he was not a licensed counselor. Although he was supposed to act under the supervision of a licensed therapist, he did not. Almenar’s only education in the field consisted of certificates in alcohol abuse counseling; he had an extensive criminal record.
Regarding the letter he supplied to father, Almenar felt he was authorized to do so and was given the letterhead by Torres. Almenar worked with father until July of 2006, and he wrote the letter based upon his observations. He admitted typing the letter on father’s computer at his home, and that he was not aware of the underlying allegations of domestic violence sustained in the case. Almenar did not send copies of the letter to anyone at Tarzana, but left a copy in Flores’s mailbox because she kept the files.
After hearing argument from counsel, including from William’s attorney, who opposed granting the section 388 petition, the juvenile court denied the petition. The court found that there were no changed circumstances to warrant granting father’s requests, and that William’s interest would not be best served by granting the petition.
The section 366.26 hearing.
For the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court received in evidence several DCFS reports, and notes from a visitation monitor. The court also heard testimony from social worker Janae Reyes, visitation monitor Ariane Fleiderman, and social worker Maryanne Duffy, as well as from mother and father.
Reyes considered four-year-old William adoptable and noted that he was living with his uncle, who wanted to adopt him and had an approved adoptive home study. Reyes explained that William had a close relationship with his uncle, who provided for his needs. Although William’s visits with his father went well at times, the uncle provided for the child’s primary care and the child looks to the uncle for comfort. Reyes opined that the child would not suffer detriment if parental rights were terminated.
According to Reyes, mother’s interaction with William was positive during her monitored visitation, which was permitted a minimum of once a week for four hours. However, mother never requested more visits and did not take full advantage of the visits she was already permitted. Also, neither mother nor father participated in any of William’s medical appointments, school functions, or any services to address his special needs.
Fleiderman, the visitation monitor who worked as an independent contractor through the Supervised Visitation Network, testified that father became upset because he was not permitted to purchase the child gifts, even though father had just recently been notified about the rule against gift giving. When Fleiderman cut the visit short, father uttered some expletives and proclaimed that if it had to be that way, he would rather not have any more visits with William. Mother then attempted to calm him down, as she often did during visits. Mother and father also discussed case issues during the visits, despite admonitions not to do so. Of the 21 visits Fleiderman monitored, father cancelled two, mother cancelled none, and Fleiderman had to terminate one or two. The visits were generally positive for William, but he did not seem disappointed when they ended.
Maryanne Duffy, the DCFS social worker who prepared the section 366.26 report, recommended that parental rights be terminated. Her conclusion was based primarily on information received from social worker Reyes, and she also had conversations with father and reviewed the visitation monitor’s log notes. In making her recommendation, she considered William and his sister as a sibling group. Duffy had concerns about the possible separation of the siblings, but felt those concerns could be alleviated through visits.
Father testified that he was opposed to William’s adoption, and that the child loved him, looked forward to his nightly telephone calls, and called him “daddy.” He stated that he did not participate in any of the child’s activities, appointments, or schooling because he was never invited to do so. Father took issue with the social worker’s failure to liberalize visits and claimed the social worker never had a case plan.
The juvenile court permitted father to launch into an approximately ten minute long narrative, but then interjected and advised father that he was repeating himself and had to move on. Father complained about being rushed and about the denial of due process because he needed “a fair hearing to be heard, and I’m not being heard.” The court then stated: “He’s about ready to explode again [with] his temper and rather than have anybody injured in this courtroom--I have a responsibility to everybody in the courtroom to protect them--rather than have anybody injured, I will grant you a recess.” After father would not relent and continued complaining about not being heard, three bailiffs forcefully escorted him outside the courtroom.
The matter was continued, and father resumed his testimony on the next court date. Father testified that William and his sister had lived together for the past two years and had a close relationship. Father was concerned about the sibling relationship if William was adopted by his uncle while his sister was returned home to her own father. He thought it was in William’s best interests to have ongoing contact with his sister.
Thereafter, mother and father opted not to appear in court. Father fired his attorney, prompting the attorney to request relief from representation, which the court denied. The court heard argument from counsel for mother and father, as well as argument from William’s counsel, who recommended termination of parental rights. The court acknowledged that father was a difficult person, which was not a reason to terminate parental rights. The court further noted that father’s explosive temper was evident throughout the case, including during the court proceedings, and that mother’s behavior while on the stand showed that she remained terrified of father. The court concluded that based on the parents’ conduct and lack of progress, visitation with the William could not have been liberalized, that mother offered no evidence showing that William would suffer detriment by severing parental ties, and that father had submitted perjured testimony and false documents in an effort to sway the court, which undermined father’s credibility while on the stand.
Both mother and father filed motions in propria persona asserting various constitutional and jurisdictional violations. The court, however, did not rule on either motion, and characterized them as “incoherent rambling.”
The court terminated parental rights, and this appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. The bulk of appellants’ contentions in the present appeal were either previously determined by this court and governed by the doctrine of law of the case, or were not raised in a timely fashion and thus are waived.
A. The doctrine of law of the case.
Pursuant to the well established doctrine of law of the case, “when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court ‘states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . ., and this although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.’” (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893.) The doctrine applies to decisions of intermediate appellate courts as well as courts of last resort. (People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841.) Moreover, as in the present case, the doctrine applies to a prior writ proceeding, not resulting in a summary denial, but rather where the review of the matter “necessarily includes a consideration of and ruling upon the merits of the petition.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1260.)
The doctrine of law of the case promotes finality by preventing relitigation of issues previously decided. (George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291.) The doctrine does not apply to points of law that might have been determined, but were not decided in the prior appeal. (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 302.) However, the doctrine does extend to questions that were implicitly determined because they were essential to the prior decision. (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 73.)
The doctrine is one of procedure rather than jurisdiction, and can be disregarded in exceptional circumstances. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 435.) “The principal ground for making an exception to the doctrine of law of the case is an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law.” (Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202, 212.) The doctrine can also be disregarded to avoid an unjust decision. (People v. Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 846.) For the “unjust decision” exception to apply, however, “there must at least be demonstrated a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice.” (Ibid.) The doctrine of law of the case is generally followed “not because the court is without power to reconsider a former determination, but because the orderly processes of judicial procedure require an end to litigation.” (Gore v. Bingaman (1942) 20 Cal.2d 118, 122-123.)
In our first opinion, this court affirmed father’s appeal in which we reviewed the juvenile court’s findings as to jurisdiction, disposition orders, and the reunification plan. (In re William G., Jr., supra, B180479 [rejecting challenges to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and the order removing William from parental custody and placing him with his maternal uncle].) In our second opinion, we found that DCFS had provided reasonable services, and that the juvenile court made a sound decision when it retained William in out-of-home care and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. (Ana P. v. Superior Court, supra, B190032, [denying petition seeking review of order terminating reunification services and setting matter for permanency planning hearing].)
Thus, the prior two appeals addressed the above noted issues from jurisdiction onward, until the initial section 366.26 hearing in July of 2006, and mother and father are now precluded by the doctrine of law of the case from raising issues we previously considered. Accordingly, we decline to revisit the litany of arguments on appeal dealing with the constitutionality of the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the matter, the reasonableness of reunifications services, the removal of William from the custody of the parents and the refusal to return him to their care at review hearings, and the general manner in which the proceedings were conducted. (Compare In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1486, fn. 4 [issue in direct appeal was not addressed in prior writ proceeding].)
In his reply brief, father urges for the first time that jurisdictional errors may be raised on appeal when done in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See, e.g., In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077.) However, a new contention may not be belatedly raised in a reply brief, unless good reason is shown for the failure to present the claim earlier. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26; Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.) No good cause is alleged, and, in fact, there is no supporting legal analysis for the cursory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711-1716 [discussing the objective standard of reasonableness for counsel’s conduct and the requirement of showing prejudice].)
B. Waiver of other issues.
All other arguments by mother and father pertaining to issues prior to the initial section 366.26 hearing--issues that are not precluded by law of the case--are waived by failure to raise the issues in a timely fashion. Specifically, allegations that the parents did not receive proper notices, writ advisements, or timely DCFS reports are all matters that should have been raised long ago. (See Karl S. v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1401-1404 [orders made at hearing referring the matter for a section 366.26 hearing are challenged by way of extraordinary writ; time for filing notice of intent to file writ petition is mandatory]; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [“An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed”].)
Moreover, father complains that he was not given the requisite writ advisement, which warns parents that challenges to orders made at the hearing referring the matter for a section 366.26 hearing must be made by extraordinary writ. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).) However, mother and father filed writ petitions challenging those orders which, as previously noted, we reviewed. Thus, any failure to provide parents with writ advisements was utterly harmless.
II. Other contentions.
Equally without merit are father’s somewhat opaque constitutional challenges to the dependency proceedings, and his contention that he should have been afforded a jury trial at least during the section 366.22 hearing.
Pursuant to California’s dependency statutory scheme, at a section 366.26 hearing, to terminate parental rights the court need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the child will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250.) The procedures provided in section 366.26 for termination of parental rights comply with the requirements of due process because of “the precise and demanding substantive and procedural requirements [DCFS] must have satisfied before it can propose termination.” (Id. at p. 256.) Although the rights of a father and mother to the care and companionship of their child are indeed compelling, the child’s right to a stable and loving family is equally compelling. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 609.)
Here, the trial court determined by clear and convincing evidence that William was likely to be adopted, and it had previously terminated reunification services. Although the court also noted that father had not achieved unmonitored visitation, that fact was not employed as the determinative standard for terminating parental rights, and there was no statutory or due process violation.
Equally unavailing is father’s contention that there should have been a jury trial to determine whether he was an unfit parent, and that parents should have at least the option of a jury trial at the section 366.22 hearing. However, a dependency matter is not akin to a criminal proceeding, where the focus is on the rights of the accused defendant. Rather, in a dependency matter the juvenile court must balance the rights of the parents against the rights of the children, who “are not simply chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge from the interests of the parent.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419.) Neither the Constitution nor the California Supreme Court mandates that parents in dependency matters be afforded all the same protections guaranteed to criminal defendants, such as the right to a jury trial. (See People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080-1081 [noting juvenile delinquency proceedings are treated as something other than “criminal” trials for purposes of determining the offender’s right to a jury trial].)
Accordingly, father’s contention that he had right to a jury trial--which he did not request of the juvenile court--is without merit.
Finally, we note that although DCFS has ably briefed the issues of (1) the juvenile court’s sound exercise of its discretion in denying father’s section 388 petition and (2) the substantial evidence supporting the court’s decision to terminate parental rights, those contentions were not raised in the appeals by mother and father. It is thus, of course, unnecessary to address those unraised contentions.
DISPOSITION
The orders under review affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.
Moreover, a third appellate matter (In re Lauren P., B196505), involving William’s 11-year-old sister (from a different father) had been filed but was abandoned on April 6, 2007.