Opinion
No. H12-CP02-008295-A
April 7, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On November 9, 2004, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112, et seq., to terminate the parental rights of Gloria R. and Henry M. to their child, Trinity R. Respondent mother and father contest termination of their parental rights. Trial of this matter took place before this court on January 4 and 5, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
The statutory ground alleged against both respondents was that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petition also alleged as to father only (1) abandonment, in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); and (2) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).)
On January 11, 2002, an order of temporary custody ("OTC") was issued by the court (Turner, J.) as to Trinity and her two half-siblings, Kaare E. and Darnell R. At the same time, DCF filed petitions alleging that the children were neglected. On October 9, 2002, the court (Burke, J.) adjudicated all three children neglected and found that they were permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well being. Darnell and Kaare were committed to the care and custody of DCF on that date. Father of Trinity, Henry M., contested commitment of the child and a hearing was scheduled. Father failed to appear for the hearing which took place on March 17, 2003. After the hearing, the court (Dannehy, J.) ordered tat Trinity be committed to the care and custody of DCF.
On September 25, 2003, the court (Wollenberg, J.) made a finding that further efforts to reunify with father were no longer appropriate. On September 8, 2004, the court Wollenberg, J.) made a finding that further efforts to reunify with father and mother were no longer appropriate. On November 9, 2004, the termination of parental rights ("TPR") petition was filed.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However,"[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the social study and addendum, a psychological evaluation, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social worker Ehibor-Cole and DCF social worker supervisor Argenta, Nancy Randall, Psy. D., Officers Babkiewicz and Kenney of the Bloomfield Police Department, Edward Mayer, AIC (Community Partners in Action), William Young of the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Centers, Inc. ("ADRC") and Yvette Thibodeau, of Klingberg Family Services. Respondent father, Henry M., called Ivis Ayala and Mary Vance, two employees of Klingberg Family Services, Lorenzo Jones (Community Organizer), Renee Smith, and Chuck Cummings (city Manager, City of Hartford) and also testified on his own behalf. The child's attorney participated fully, but introduced no exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
On January 7, 2002, mother reported to the Hartford Police Department that her apartment had been burglarized. When the police responded, they discovered that the conditions of the home were deplorable and not consistent with damage from a burglary. Mother was in a physically abusive relationship at the time and there were suspicions of substance abuse which were later substantiated through a hair test. That day mother was arrested and charged with risk of injury and assault in the third degree after she struck the police officer during questioning about the condition of the home. Mother was held on a $15,000 bond and there were no other caretakers who could care for the children. In addition to one-year-old Trinity, half-siblings Kaare and Darnell, who were then nine and eleven, were also removed from the home. A 96-hour hold was invoked and an Order of Temporary Custody issued and was later sustained.
A. Respondent Mother — Gloria R.
Respondent mother, Gloria R., was born in Georgia on July 25, 1966. When she was approximately twelve years of age, her parents separated and Gloria moved from Washington D.C. to Hartford with her mother and siblings. Mother graduated from high school in Hartford in 1984. She has resided in Hartford for many years and remains close to her mother and siblings. Mother has a prior history with DCF dating back to 1994. Previous referrals and a removal of the children in 1996 were based on deplorable and filthy conditions in the home, the children being left crying and unsupervised, and with a lack of appropriate food in the home, the presence of men in the apartment at all hours, and cocaine use in the apartment around the children by mother and male associates. In August 1996, Darnell and Kaare were removed from mother's care under an OTC and in October 1996, they were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF. (Teller, J.) After three years, the commitments of Darnell and Kaare were revoked (Swienton, J.) and the children were returned to mother. The case was closed in January 2000. Trinity was born November 27, 2000 and in January 2002, an OTC was once again granted, (Turner, J.), as to all three children.
Mother has never been married and all three children have different fathers. At the time of trial, mother was over nine months pregnant. Mother has never lived with any of the children's fathers. The children were each the product of short-term relationships that did not last even until the children were born.
Mother represented and father agreed that Henry M. is not the father of this child.
Mother has a ten-year history of substance abuse with her drug of choice being primarily cocaine. She also has a lengthy history of alcohol abuse. She has had multiple relapses despite enrollment and participation in numerous inpatient and outpatient treatment services. Although Kaare was reunified with her for a second time from December 2003 to March 2004, she was returned to DCF care again after mother relapsed due to the added stress of having a child living with her.
B. Respondent father — Henry M.
Respondent father, Henry M., was born in Hartford, CT on May 28, 1963 and is the oldest male of his parent's nineteen children. He reported that he completed high school in the Hartford Public Schools and that he attended two years of college but left after two years to open his own automotive mechanics business and worked for his father prior to being incarcerated in 1994 for possession of a handgun. Father reported that he is currently not working and is receiving social security disability benefits. He testified that he lived with his parents for a number of years, but at the time of trial, he was living with his fiancée.
Father's relationship with mother lasted only three months. He was incarcerated when Trinity was born and remained incarcerated for the first year and a half of her life. He has five children as a result of relationships with four different women. None of his children live with him. Father's son Kyron was committed to DCF in April 1996 at the age of five, and in 2002, guardianship was transferred to paternal grandparents. (Keller, J.). Father resided at his mother's house while Kyron was in her care. Father testified that in 2004 he asked DCF to come get his son, who was then in eighth grade, because his son was smoking marijuana and was involved with gangs and guns. An OTC was granted in April 2004 and in October 2004, the child was committed to DCF (Bentivegna, J.). In August 2005, commitment was revoked and guardianship reverted to the child's mother (Santos, J.).
Father has a criminal history dating back to 1991 including convictions for assault, carrying a dangerous weapon, threatening and breach of peace. With regard to an arrest in 1994 for drug and gun charges, father told the court-appointed evaluator in this case that he was running a drug factory, but that the authorities could not prove it and did not know the magnitude of the conduct. He told the evaluator that the police got arrested before him and he was not convicted. In 2000, he was convicted of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and served two years.
Father has a history of substance abuse dating back to the age of fifteen when he first tried marijuana. He stated that he was introduced to cocaine by the manufacturers of coca-cola and that the government introduced him to narcotics. He told the evaluator that he "dibbled and dabbled" with drugs, but that he was not an addict.
Father was arrested on February 23, 2004. During the arrest, when asked about a crack-pipe which he had dropped from his hand, he stated to Police Officer Babkiewicz of the Bloomfield Police Department, "I have a drug problem, you know what it's used for." In connection with this arrest, father was referred to the Alternative Incarceration Center ("AIC"), Community Partners in Action ("CPA") program. At intake on March 1, 2004, father was aggressive and angry and stated that he intentionally had himself arrested so that the could be placed in the program in order to evaluate it. Edward Mayer, the acting program manager, testified that father stated that he would report when he wanted to, would give urine samples when he wanted to and that he did not use drugs. Father stated that he determined who got the funding, and told the manager to shut up, stating that the manager could be out of a job. Mayer testified that father's manner was threatening and that Mayer feared for his own safety. Ex. T. As a result of father's conduct the intake process was never completed. Father tested positive for cocaine and opiates March 1, 2004. Ex. V.
Father did not send cards, gifts or letters to Trinity until after the TPR petition was filed. He did not provide financial support. In December 2004, after the TPR petition had been filed, DCF contacted father in an effort to obtain information. He told DCF that he wished to be reunited with Trinity. He stated that he had "stepped back" from involvement with the child with the expectation that mother was going to be reunified with Trinity and her siblings. Once the TPR petition had been filed, he became interested in reunifying with her.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court as to mother on January 18, 2002 (and amended on May 13, 2002) and as to father on March 17, 2003. The specific steps required that parents do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; participate in parenting and individual counseling (and as to mother, family counseling) to address treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF (as to father); submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with recommended service providers; cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing, obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF (as to mother); sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric or educational providers (as to father); immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household; and visit with the children as often as DCF permits. Mother was also required to learn to understand the importance of consistent visits and arrange for an immediate and complete physical, as to the issue of depression, and follow all of the doctor's recommendations.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, father has complied with some, but not all of the specific steps. Father has kept some appointments with DCF, but has missed others and has had periods where he has not been in contact with DCF. Father did not attend administrative case reviews between January 2002 and December 2004. He missed numerous court hearings from February 2003 through September 2004. Father was initially referred for parenting education to the Family Center in Rockville, CT and to Klingberg Family Services in 2003, but did not comply with those services. He was referred to Kidsafe for parenting. Lynn Webber of Kidsafe issued letters in May 2003 and September 2005 stating that the class they offered would simply be a review of what father had learned while incarcerated and recommended a parent aide. Ex. J, K.
With regard to substance abuse, father was referred to Alcohol Drug Recovery Centers, Inc. ("ADRC") for substance abuse evaluation and testing and tested positive for cocaine in June 2003. He also tested positive for cocaine and opiates in March 2004. Ex. V. On March 1, 2004, father stated to the AIC-CPA program that he intentionally placed himself in the program to investigate how it operated and that he tested positive for cocaine intentionally. Ex. T. Based on father's "inappropriate, aggressive and volatile behaviors," the program recommended that father's pre-trial status be revoked. Id. The program also asked to be relieved of supervision on father's case stating: "We feel strongly that this client jeopardizes the safety of both the staff and clients at the Hartford AIC." Id.
Father attended the intensive outpatient program ("IOP") at ADRC beginning in April 2004. He did not attend for a few months, but resumed IOP treatment in July 2004 at which time his counselor found him to be at high risk of relapse. Ex. 14. He participated in the relapse prevention program consistently through December 7, 2004 and tested negative for drug use during that time. Ex. Y. However, beginning in January 2005 and continuing through May 2005, he failed to show for numerous appointments. Ex. 18.
Father signed releases at DCF's request when he made himself available to DCF. Although the specific steps of 2003 required no further criminal acts, father was convicted in 2004 for possession of drug paraphernalia. With regard to housing, he has maintained housing either with his parents or with his fiancé. When he resided with his mother, he often cancelled DCF home visits. Throughout the case he received social security disability and has been unemployed, but has volunteered with various community organizations.
With regard to visitation, father has not visited with Trinity regularly. He did not see her for the first year and a half of her life as he was incarcerated. From September through December 2003 mother was having unsupervised visits and started having overnight visits in anticipation of reunification. Father stated that during that time he saw Trinity during unsupervised visits at his mother's house. Mother stated that she did not see father at this time, that she had not seen him since September 2003 and that they were not speaking. Father visited with Trinity on March 26, 2004 and then did not visit with Trinity again until January 31, 2005. He did not contact DCF during this time to inquire about the well being of Trinity. After January 2005 father began supervised visitation with Trinity once a month at the DCF office and called her on a regular basis. In April 2005, Trinity expressed confusion stating sometimes she wished to live with her foster mother, sometimes her mother and sometimes her father. In June 2005, a court-appointed attorney for father disclosed that father had threatened her over a misunderstanding about a meeting that was to take place at the courthouse. As a result, father was prohibited from entering the DCF office and visitation was moved to Klingberg Family Services. During the time period of July through December 2005, Trinity seemed to be excited about her monthly visits with father, enjoyed them and stated that she wished to see him more.
The attorney stated in a voluntary sworn statement to the police that father was upset with her, and stated that she was disrespecting him. He raised his voice and stated "You wait until I see you today and your [sic] up in my face, you will see what I do." He also stated "I know what you look like and you don't know what I look like, you wait and see what I will do." Ex. 25. The attorney stated that she was in fear for her life as a result Id. No charges were filed against father. According to Officer Kenney of the Bloomfield Police Department, the warrant was "turned back" either by the prosecutor or the court.
With regard to mother's compliance with the specific steps, she has failed to keep many appointments with DCF. While she has kept some appointments, between February 2002 and July 2004, mother either was not available or refused to allow DCF workers into her home on fifteen occasions and was uncooperative and even threatening on occasion. Mother also missed a number of court hearings. Mother was referred to the Hartford Parent Aide Program in 2002. She was also referred to Interval House for domestic violence counseling; the program reported that mother did not attend consistently. She also failed to attend services at Catholic Family Services consistently.
During the fall of 2003, mother and DCF were working toward a reunification of mother and all three children. In September 2003, mother was referred to the Klingberg Family Centers for intensive reunification services. During the reunification process, there were unsupervised overnight visits between mother and the children from which the children returned tired. Mother's home became increasingly cluttered. Mother stated that she understood the importance of setting house rules, establishing routines and maintaining appropriate standards of cleanliness. However, she stated she would work on this on her own. Kaare was returned to mother's care on Christmas Eve, 2003 after a plan was developed to stagger the return of the children since mother had disclosed that she was feeling overwhelmed at the prospect of having all three children returned at once. Mother was terminated from the reunification program one week later on December 31, 2003 due to the fact that she had missed several appointments and had not consistently complied with the program expectations. There was difficulty in communication and a lack of progress on goals. When the reunification program was terminated part way through the process, mother was referred for a parent aide and for family counseling. Mother stated that her work schedule would make it difficult for her to participate in these services and she never followed through. Although the plan was to have all three children returned by January 9, 2004, Darnell and Trinity were not reunified and mother began to show signs of relapse. After Kaare was returned, the social worker attempted to visit several times to see how it was going. The worker brought the two other children to the home after New Year's for a visit, but no one was there. Mother subsequently missed five visits and stopped participating in services. By the end of January, due to concerns that mother had relapsed, DCF requested a hair test which mother refused. DCF then ceased the weekend visitation with Trinity and Darnell. In March 2004, DCF received results of mother's drug testing which were positive for cocaine and Kaare was removed from the home for the third time.
With regard to substance abuse treatment, mother received in-patient services at Stonington Institute on three occasions. She first entered Stonington in February 2001 when Trinity was three months old. Mother described her daily crack cocaine use at that time at $150 per day and disclosed that she was drinking two forty-ounce beers daily. At the time of her discharge in 2001, mother had not completed any of the treatment goals and left the program against clinical recommendations. She left "in relapse mode" and left treatment "to use heroin." Ex. 4. She entered Stonington again in April 2003 while all three children were in DCF care. At admission, she reported using two eightballs of crack cocaine almost every day (twenty-six of the last twenty-eight days) and drinking three forty-ounce beers every day (twenty-eight of the last twenty-eight days). At her discharge in May 2003, she was described as clean and sober and had made positive progress in treatment. Ex. 5. Mother relapsed again after Kaare's removal, and in April 2004, mother entered Stonington a third time. She stated that she had relapsed around Christmas, just after Kaare was reunified with her, and reported using $20 to $30 worth of cocaine daily. She stated that her involvement with DCF was a major trigger to relapse. At the time of discharge on May 27, 2004, mother was considered clean and sober with a fair prognosis due to "her continuation in treatment, her history of relapse and the nature of her addiction." Ex. 7. In May 2004, mother rescinded releases she had signed which would have permitted DCF to monitor her progress since leaving Stonington.
Mother's employment throughout has been sporadic. She has worked at times, but has not maintained long term employment and has not provided proof of employment to DCF. In September 2004, the social worker made an unannounced home visit to mother's house and found two bedrooms completely cluttered from floor to ceiling. These were to be the children's bedrooms and were not suitable for the children.
Mother has continued visiting with all three children on a regular basis.
D. The Child — Trinity R.
Trinity R. was born November 27, 2000. At the time of her birth, father was incarcerated having been convicted of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. Mother and father had previously had a short-tern relationship and were no longer involved by the time of Trinity's birth. Trinity has been in DCF care since January 2002 when she was removed from mother's care due to deplorable conditions in the home. While in foster care placements, Trinity has met all of her developmental milestones and has no history of hospitalizations or operations. Her medical records do not reveal any major concerns regarding behavior or development, although Trinity has asthma and is prescribed Albuterol and a nebulizer. Trinity is strongly bonded with her siblings, particularly her half-sister Kaare with whom she was placed in foster care from May 2004 to October 2005 when Kaare joined Darnell in the home of the maternal grandmother. Maternal grandmother subsequently had problems managing these two older children and a Family With Service Needs petition was filed as to Kaare who had difficult behaviors including truancy. Maternal grandmother did not express a willingness to adopt Trinity and, in view of Trinity's young age, DCF chose to pursue a plan of adoption for her. At the time of trial, however, Trinity was not in a preadoptive home.
E. Psychological Evaluations
Trinity, her siblings, mother and father were evaluated by Nancy Randall, Psy.D., in May 2005. Randall testified as an expert in the area of psychology. With regard to mother, Randall found that she suffers from a history of depression and difficulty with stress and that she has a lengthy history of substance abuse and a pattern of relapsing due to stressors including caring for children and DCF involvement. Randall stated that mother had a "high likelihood" of relapse and that the birth of the new child, which was imminent at the time of trial, would be an added stressor and would increase mother's risk for relapse. Randall stated that substance abuse adversely effects safe parenting by shifting a parent's focus to their own need for the substance and detracts from a focus on the child's needs and the ability to place the child first. Randall described mother as having poor coping and problem solving skills and easily overwhelmed by childcare as she was when her older daughter Kaare was briefly returned to her care. Randall also stated that mother had difficulty in forming relationships as demonstrated by the lack of any emotional connection to any of the fathers of her children. Randall's report stated:
This mother has had ongoing problems handling any increase in stress levels. When she had Kaare placed with her before, she was unable to maintain this placement and so the reunification process was stopped. She minimizes her own difficulties and blames others for these disruptions. It does not appear likely that she would be able to have the children return to her at this point. Ex. 1 at 21.
Randall testified that mother's history of depression together with her substance abuse and pattern of relapsing placed her at high risk for relapse and that she had not achieved such degree of rehabilitation so that she could assume a responsible position in the life of Trinity.
With regard to father, Randall found that he had not demonstrated sufficient understanding of Trinity's needs and that he too was unable to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation in a timely manner which would warrant reunification with the child. Randall stated that father declined the clinical testing requested of him including the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory III and the Rorschach tests claiming that he had taken the tests previously and that it had been used against him. Father's position was that the court had ordered only an evaluation and not the clinical testing. With regard to substance abuse, father told Randall that he had no current problem but she was unable to verify that statement. Father stated that he first used drugs at age fifteen and he admitted using cocaine in May 2004. Father told Randall that he was exposed to cocaine by the government through coca-cola. Randall concluded that father had a significant substance abuse problem and a high risk of relapse because of his inability to acknowledge the problem and seek appropriate and necessary treatment. In her report Randall stated:
[Father's] judgments often reflect a poor quality of thought. He tends to provide vague, tangential information, refusing to get pinned down to specifics which might be able to be refuted. He rationalizes his actions and he shows a poor understanding of the needs of his daughter. Mr. [M.] does not take responsibility for the part that his own actions have played in the difficulties in his life. He blames other people, including the children's mother for the fact that he does not have his daughter in his care at this time . . . His unwillingness to trust professionals or to be cooperative with them however would make it difficult for him to be able to get her any help that she might need, and it is questionable whether he would follow through with expectations even if his daughter was placed in his care. Ex. 1. at 18.
Randall also found that father had specific parenting deficits in that he had significant anger and preferred to blame DCF or the children's mother for the situation. Father did not understand the child's emotions. Dr. Randall found that father's statements that he had backed off from seeing Trinity because he wanted to give mother a chance to reunify and that he preferred to have contact without DCF's knowledge reflected poor judgment. She found that father also showed poor judgment in connection with his criminal conduct and that he minimized such conduct. Father proudly stated to Randall that he had been running a drug factory and that the police had underestimated the magnitude of his criminal conduct. She testified that father's explanation was simply that he is not involved in criminal activity any longer, so it was not a problem. According to Randall, father's statements demonstrated a lack of insight into his own activities and their impact on a child. Moreover, father's arrest for possession of a crack pipe in February 2004 was evidence of his continued involvement with both criminal activity and substance abuse. Father's actions demonstrated that he was not able to put Trinity's needs above his own. Randall also expressed concerns about father's judgment in connection with his relationship with his fiancé. He told Randall that he had only known her a short time but that he planned to marry her. In view of father's relationships with a number of different women with whom he had children, this was of concern. Randall stated that based on all of the above factors, father failed to achieve rehabilitation such that he could assume a responsible position in the life of Trinity.
Randall testified with regard to Trinity that she requires permanency and that she needs to be placed into a permanent home where she knows she will grow up. Randall stated that permanency could be achieved for Trinity by allowing her to be adopted by a family able to raise her in view of the fact that her parents cannot accomplish that. Without permanency, Randall believed that Trinity would experience problems with attachments and difficulty forming close relationships and that her ability to trust and her sense of security would be adversely affected. Dr. Randall testified that children without permanency often have behavioral and emotional difficulties. She stated that she believed termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Randall testified that visiting a child once a month and displaying affection towards a child does not demonstrate that a parent can discharge the obligations of parenthood over time even if the visits are appropriate and go well. Similarly, the fact that Mother did well in the structured setting of a supervised visitation which both mother and child enjoyed did not demonstrate that mother was able to parent Trinity.
According to Dr. Randall, in the interactional visit between father and child, father did not show attention to Trinity's needs. As described in Randall's report, father asked four-year-old Trinity why she had missed a visit and she did not respond. "He stated `they' said that she did not want to come to the visit and he asked her why she did not want to come. She ignored him and he continued to ask this question over and over at least a dozen times. She never did respond to him." Ex. 1 at 19. Father also asked Trinity where the earrings were which he had previously given her and told the child that she needed to find out or he would not bring her anything. He said that she wanted to play too much and that she should be working on her writing more. He criticized the way she held her pen. Randall described father's relationship with Trinity as a visiting relationship and noted that Trinity had seen father four times that year on monthly visits. She stated that a visiting relationship is different from a parent-child relationship. She testified that it is critical for Trinity to have permanency and that termination of parental rights provided permanency to a greater degree than transfer of guardianship which left the child in legal and psychological limbo since the parents could seek to have guardianship restored at any time. Randall noted that Trinity, who had been placed in care just after she turned one, had already been in DCF care far longer than recommended. She concluded that it would be detrimental to Trinity to allow additional time for parents to rehabilitate.
Randall testified that Trinity had a bond with mother and that Trinity would feel a loss if she did not see mother again, but that it was more important for her to have permanency. Randall acknowledged that Trinity had relationships with both parents, but that Trinity was in need of a permanent home to allow her to "develop optimally."
F. Testimony of Respondent Father
Respondent father testified on his own behalf. He stated that he was disabled by law but that he volunteered in the community and was the founder of the "True Foundation." Regarding his drug use, he testified that he began smoking marijuana when he was fifteen, but that he was not an addict and categorized himself as an abuser. He stated that he believes he has a father-daughter relationship with Trinity. He stated that although he has the room for her at his house, he would prefer that she grow up with her brother and sister (Darnell and Kaare) and that he is not in a position to have all three children living with him. He believes that all three children should be placed with their maternal grandmother. Father conceded that his record was "not the best," but stated that he has changed.
Father called witnesses from Klingberg Family Services who testified that they observed visits between father and Trinity and that the visits went well. Mary Vance from Klingberg testified after observing six visits between father and Trinity that there were no issues with regard to father's parenting skills and that he was "one of the best" and that Trinity wished to see father more. He also called witnesses who testified that he was an active member of the community who conducted research for community programs and on legislative issues and was dedicated to helping in the community.
II. ADJUDICATION
The ground alleged in the petition as to both respondent mother and father is that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petition also alleges as to father only (1) abandonment, in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); and (2) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)). The petitioner is required to prove these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).
On September 25, 2003, the court made a finding that further efforts to reunify with father were no longer appropriate (Wollenberg, J.). On September 8, 2004, the court made a finding that further efforts to reunify with father and mother were no longer appropriate (Wollenberg, J.). Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001). Nevertheless, the court finds that DCF has made substantial efforts to reunify with mother and father in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help respondent mother and father address their presenting issues. Referrals were made for parenting education and parent aide services as well as substance abuse evaluation and treatment. Visitation and transportation services were provided throughout the case. Indeed, with regard to mother, intensive reunification services were put in place, which were terminated after mother relapsed following reunification with one child. Father has not played an active role in the life of the child during the time she has been in DCF care and although he began visiting more consistently recently, he did not regularly visit until 2005. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify in this case.
B. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent mother and father's parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Trinity was found to be neglected on September 12, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the child. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John C., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that neither parent has achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. Dr. Randall was unequivocal in her opinion that neither parent was able to be reunified with Trinity and that they were both unlikely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time. Ex. 1 at 22. As to respondent mother in May 2005, Dr. Randall concluded:
[Mother] has attempted in the past to reunify with the children and has not been able to handle the stresses of doing so. These children have been in DCF foster care for an extended period of time. Trinity is still quite young and is in need of a permanent home. In view of the mother's history of being unable to maintain the past reunification, and a lack of significant changes, it appears that the mother is unlikely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time to reunify with Trinity. Id.
Randall testified that mother's history of depression together with her substance abuse and pattern of relapsing placed her at high risk for relapse and that she had not achieved such degree of rehabilitation so that she could assume a responsible position in the life of Trinity.
As to respondent father in May 2005, Dr. Randall concluded:
[Father] continues to demonstrate a lack of understanding of Trinity's needs. He has not been cooperative with requests made of him. It is not known whether there is any ongoing substance abuse at this time, and he has been resistant to attempts to document his rehabilitation efforts. He does not appear to be able to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time to reunify with Trinity. Id.
Randall concluded that father had a significant substance abuse problem and a high risk of relapse due to father's denial that any problem exists and that any treatment is necessary.
Although specific steps were issued to assist respondent mother and father in achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that both parents failed to fulfill them in a number of significant measures. With regard to mother, during the time period of 2002-2004, she failed to keep many appointments with DCF, she refused to allow DCF workers into her home and was uncooperative, and even threatening on occasion. She missed court hearings and did not attend or participate consistently in services designed to help her rehabilitate. With regard to substance abuse, she continued to struggle with her addiction. After her third discharge from Stonington, she revoked releases which would have allowed DCF to monitor her progress.
With regard to father, he did not attend administrative case reviews between January 2002 and December 2004. He missed numerous court hearings from February 2003 through September 2004. Father continued his involvement with criminal conduct when he was arrested in February 2004 for possession of a crack pipe and he tested positive for cocaine in June 2003 and again in March 2004. Also in March 2004 in connection with his arrest, he was referred to the AIC-CPA program. There he engaged in "inappropriate, aggressive and volatile behavior" which "jeopardize[d] the safety of both the staff and clients at the Hartford AIC." This conduct reflected his extremely poor judgment, instability and an inability to put Trinity's needs above his own. Moreover, father failed to visit with Trinity during most of the time between the date of the OTC in January 2002 until the TPR petition was filed. As Randall concluded:
[Father] rationalizes his actions and he shows a poor understanding of the needs of his daughter. Mr. [M.] does not take responsibility for the part that his own actions have played in the difficulties in his life. He blames other people, including the children's mother for the fact that he does not have his daughter in his care at this time . . . His unwillingness to trust professionals or to be cooperative with them however would make it difficult for him to be able to get her any help that she might need. Ex. 1 at 18.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of November 9, 2004, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the child. Mother continued to struggle with mental health and substance abuse issues and did not benefit from intensive services which were put in place to assist her. Siblings Darnell and Kaare were originally removed from mother's care in 1996 when Darnell was six years old and Kaare four. The reasons for removal included mother's substance abuse, the conditions in the home, and mother's inability to care for the children. These children returned to mother's care three years later in 1999. In 2002, Darnell and Kaare were removed for a second time, along with Trinity. After being provided intensive reunification services, mother was unable to successfully reunify with even one of her children, Kaare. Mother relapsed almost immediately after Kaare was returned to her in December 2003, and Kaare had to be removed from her care. As Dr. Randall noted, any reunification with mother would require continued DCF involvement which mother has identified as a trigger for her relapse. Moreover, it appears that mother has really never adequately cared for Trinity on a day-to-day basis. Shortly after Trinity's birth, mother was admitted to Stonington reporting significant daily crack cocaine and alcohol use. She left the program against clinical recommendation in relapse mode in order to use heroin. Trinity was removed from her care approximately nine months later. Mother therefore had Trinity in her care for only a short period of time during which she was actively abusing substances.
As of the adjudication date, father essentially had no relationship with Trinity and did not even seek visitation with her until after the termination petition was filed. As of the adjudication date, father did not demonstrate either the ability or the desire to provide day-to-day care for the child. Indeed, father's inability to care for a child was evident in April 2004 when an OTC was issued as to father's son Kyron. Kyron was committed to the care and custody of DCF in October 2004, shortly before the TPR petition was filed in this case. Thus, father was clearly unable to meet his son's needs at that time. Trinity's needs are arguably even greater than Kyron's considering her young age and the need for constant supervision and guidance. Thus, as of the adjudication date, neither parent was in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was little positive change in mother's circumstances after the adjudicatory date and she continued to maintain a visiting relationship with Trinity. Significantly, mother was pregnant and due to give birth imminently at the time of trial, a factor which, according to Dr. Randall, would greatly increase mother's stress level and increase her risk of relapse.
Father's conduct after the adjudicatory date does show improvement with regard to his relationship with Trinity. Whereas he previously exhibited neither the ability nor the desire to care for Trinity, after the petition was filed, he did express a desire to care for her. He regularly visited with Trinity once a month starting in 2005 and according to the Klingberg employees, he did very well in monthly visitation sessions. However, as Dr. Randall testified, visiting a child once a month and displaying affection towards a child does not demonstrate that a parent can discharge the obligations of parenthood overtime. Further, father continued to display poor judgment such as his conduct with regard to his attorney. Even though the conduct did not result in criminal charges, it nevertheless reflects poor judgment. Moreover, beginning in January 2005 and continuing through May 2005, he failed to show for numerous ADRC appointments. Ex. 18.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Dr. Randall testified that neither parent could provide day-to-day care for the child and would be unable to do so within a reasonable time. Trinity has been in DCF care for over three years. Randall testified that it would be detrimental to Trinity to allow additional time for parents to rehabilitate and that Trinity had already been in DCF care far longer than ideal having been placed in care just after she turned one. Here, for a child who was placed in foster care at the age of one and who has only visiting relationships with her parents, the time needed for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable. And rehabilitation itself remains contingent on numerous factors, including continued counseling and substance abuse treatment for both parents. Further, father's denial of the need for continued substance abuse treatment renders the likelihood of his actually receiving and benefitting from additional treatment remote. Moreover, respondents have had several years to accomplish such rehabilitation while the child remained in DCF care.
Father and mother may be able to manage their own lives to a certain degree. Father has been successfully involved in numerous community activities. Mother has regularly visited with Trinity and her siblings. However, at trial, the birth of another child was imminent which would increase mother's stress and raise the likelihood of another relapse. Father stated that he had the room for Trinity where he lives with his fiance, but that he preferred that she live with her siblings. The court finds that neither father nor mother is in position to provide day-to-day care for the child or to assume a useful role in her life and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the child.
The court is mindful that parents are not required to be "able to assume full responsibility for a child, without the use of available support programs." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986). The fact that mother and father require continued counseling and treatment is not the basis of the court's determination that they have not sufficiently achieved rehabilitation. See In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 564, 718 A.2d 997 (1998) (trial court's finding that respondent had failed to achieve rehabilitation was properly based on her inability to meet court-approved expectations, and not on her mental retardation); In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 672-74, 723 A.2d 356 (1999) (trial court properly found a failure to rehabilitate); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. at 606 (trial court terminated parental rights not because of mental condition, but because of an inability to function as a parent).
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. at 292; In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondents have improved their abilities to manage their own lives, but rather whether they have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. At five, Trinity requires constant guidance and supervision. Trinity desperately needs to have a permanent family. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Dr. Randall noted, father has a poor understanding of his own substance abuse problems, as well as Trinity's needs, and mother's substance abuse adversely effects safe parenting by shifting a parent's focus to their own need for the substance and detracts from a focus on the child's needs and the ability to place the child first. Randall also described mother as having poor coping and problem-solving skills and easily overwhelmed by childcare. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, CT Page 6671 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care this child needs within a reasonable time.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the child and lack the ability to assure a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in his case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
C. Abandonment: C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
Petitioner has alleged as to respondent father that he has abandoned Trinity.
"Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14, 438 A.2d 801 (1981)." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993); In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 394, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112. Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App., 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
Respondent father failed to maintain regular visitation with Trinity from the time of her birth in 2000 until 2005. Father did not indicate or demonstrate that he wished to have a relationship with Trinity until after the TPR petition was filed. He stated that he "stepped back" because he believed mother would reunify with the children, including Trinity. As of the adjudication date of November 9, 2004, even crediting father's testimony that he saw Trinity at his mother's house in 2003 without DCF's knowledge, father's efforts to maintain contact with Trinity, cannot be viewed as anything other than sporadic. Such efforts, as set forth above, are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. at 53. Certainly father has shown "some interest" in his child and her welfare, and his interest has been much stronger recently. As of the adjudication date, however, the degree of interest shown by father was not reasonable under the circumstances. As set forth above, indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. at 129. Knowing Trinity was in DCF care and that mother continued to struggle with substance abuse and crack addiction, to the extent that she required three inpatient programs since the time of Trinity's birth, father's decision to "step back" was not reasonable. He visited with Trinity in March 2004 and then did not visit her again, or even inquire of DCF as to her well-being, until after the TPR petition had been filed. By March 2004, reunification with mother had unquestionably failed and father knew or should have known that mother was not going to reunify with Trinity. He nevertheless did not even have contact with her again until January 2005.
The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, out rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. at 36. Father failed to take advantage of the visitation when it was offered. The court recognizes that father still wishes to have a visiting relationship with his child. A desire for occasional visiting contact, however, is not a "reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare." The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent father.
D. No Ongoing Parent-child Relationship — § 17A-112(j)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. at 22. In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to father (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, as of the adjudication date of November 9, 2004, there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between the child Trinity and respondent father. Father has never provided day-to-day care for the child and had no regular contact with her from birth until she was over four years old. Monthly visits with Trinity did not begin until January 31, 2005. Dr. Randall testified that as of the date of her evaluation, May 2005, Trinity and father had a visiting relationship and not a parent-child relationship. She noted that Trinity's primary relationships at the time of the evaluation were with her foster parents and siblings. Ex. 1 at 22. Father was incarcerated when she was born and remained there until she was approximately one and a half and already in DCF care. He then "stepped back" according to his own testimony because he believed mother would reunify with the children. However, it was not until long after the reunification plan for all three children broke down due to mother's relapse, that father requested more visitation and a greater role in Trinity's life. By this time, Trinity had already been in care for almost three years and a TPR petition had been filed. As of the adjudication date, Trinity would not seek comfort from him or go to him to have her needs met. Thus, as of November 9, 2004, there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between Trinity and father.
As a result of his own conduct, including his incarceration and his decision to "step back," father rendered himself unavailable to serve as a parent for Trinity. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. at 241. Respondent father has never met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of this child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 525.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondent father further time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship with the child would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. Although father was regularly visiting after the adjudication date, and, on occasion, Trinity looked to him for comfort during visits, that still did not constitute a parent child relationship. Trinity is five years old and has been in DCF care since she was one. According to Dr. Randall, Trinity requires permanency and needs to be placed into a permanent home where she knows she will grow up. In view of the child's needs, it would be detrimental to her to allow additional time in which respondent father could attempt to establish a parent-child relationship.
Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondent father by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including January 5, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered many services to address substance abuse, mental health and parenting issues. Respondent mother and father participated in visitation.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondents. As set forth above, there was compliance by respondent father and mother as to some steps, but failure to comply with others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
CT Page 6676
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does have a bond with her biological mother whom she has seen on a regular basis since she was placed in DCF care in January 2002. Trinity also has a relationship with father with whom she has only visited regularly since January 2005. The child has a strong emotional bond with her half-siblings.
(5) As to the age of the child, the court finds that Trinity R., born November 27, 2000, is five years old. The court further finds that this child requires stability of placement and continuity of care.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parents' circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent mother and father have maintained contact with the child and DCF and attended visitation. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. DCF took many steps to facilitate reunification. Further, while the respondents' financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the child.
With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Gloria R. and Henry M. to the child Trinity is in the best interest of the child. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Trinity. She has been in DCF care since she was one year old. Neither parent is in a position to assume day-to-day care for the child at this time.
While respondent mother and father express love for the child, neither has been able to assume a responsible parental role. Neither parent has achieved rehabilitation or made sufficient improvements in their ability to care for the child, and neither is in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child. Throughout the child's long stay in foster care, parents have not modified their behavior to make it appropriate for the child to be reunified with them. Although father and mother love the child and would like to continue to visit with her, and to have a relationship with her, they have not put themselves in a position to be able to care for her. Mother has experienced numerous failures in treatment and, after being reunified with Trinity's half-sister Kaare, relapsed such that Kaare had to be removed from her care for a third time. Similarly, father's son Kyron was committed to DCF in October 2004.
The court considers that father has made significant improvements in his relationship with Trinity recently. He has had successful regular visitation with her since January 31, 2005 which Trinity has generally enjoyed. The reports from Klingberg and the testimony of the visitation supervisors recently have been favorable regarding father and his recent interactions with Trinity. DCF, however, argues that father's interest in Trinity is "too little, too late." The court considers father's actions throughout the case in the context of the very lengthy time Trinity has been in care when her father was not part of her life. Indeed, even crediting his testimony that he "stepped back" to allow mother to reunify with all three children, this conduct reflects very poor judgment during a time when his daughter was in DCF care. His actions in stepping back resulted in the child remaining in DCF care for over four years. Certainly it was clear when mother failed to reunify after intensive family reunification services had been put in place and mother relapsed in January 2004, that there was little likelihood that mother would rehabilitate such that Trinity could be placed with her. Even then, father was not involved in Trinity's life in any significant way on a regular basis and did not make meaningful efforts to do so until well after the TPR petition was filed. After a visit with Trinity in March 2004, he then did not see her again until January 2005. Even as of the time of trial, father's relationship with Trinity could only be described as a visiting relationship and not one in which he provided for her on a day-to-day basis. A visiting relationship is far different than caring for a child full-time.
Significantly, the court considers that father is not parenting any of his children from other relationships. Although he did live with his mother at a time when she had guardianship of his son Kyron for a short time, that guardianship ended when, according to father, he asked DCF to take custody of the child who was involved with gangs and guns. The court also considers that father is not seeking to have Trinity placed with him at this time, but would prefer that she be placed with her siblings (for whom he stated he was not in a position to provide care). Similarly, mother is not parenting her other children, Kaare or Darnell.
Counsel for mother, father and the child, all point to Trinity's expressed desire to be with her siblings. Mother and father have argued that the matter should be resolved within the biological family. Although counsel appeared to suggest transfer of guardianship to grandmother, no motion for transfer of guardianship was filed. The suggestion that Trinity be placed with Kaare ignores Trinity's need for permanency. In discussing the issue of arriving at different permanency resolutions for the siblings, Dr. Randall stated, "It would be preferable to choose the legal status that is appropriate for each child individually, rather than choose a lesser plan for one of the children based on this issue alone." Ex. 1 at 23. Additionally, the evidence established that grandmother was having difficulty with the older children and that she had not committed to adopting Trinity. Moreover, termination of parental rights will not preclude Trinity from continuing to have a relationship with her siblings.
Trinity undoubtedly has some attachment to her birth parents. However, the existence of a bond between parent and child does not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 105-07; In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 536, 857 A.2d 963 (2004). Despite the existence of a bond with parents, termination can nevertheless be in a child's best interest. This is particularly true where the child is in desperate need of permanency as noted by Dr. Randall. Here, where Trinity has been in DCF care since she was one year old, while mother underwent in-patient drug treatment for her severe cocaine addiction and failed at reunification efforts and while father "stepped back," termination is in the child's best interest.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development well-being, stability and continuity of her environment; her length of stay in foster care; the nature of her relationship with biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents; and her genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the child's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the testimony that Trinity is not currently in a preadoptive home. Trinity is entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as her parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The attorney for the child stated that she believed termination of parental rights was not in the child's best interest, and that Trinity wanted to be with her siblings. She also stated that Trinity had an overwhelming desire to be part of a family. However, "there is no prerequisite that adoption will ensue before a termination of parental rights is granted." In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. at 535. And, as set forth above, termination of parental rights will not preclude Trinity from continuing to have a relationship with her siblings.
After considering the child's sense of time, her need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the child's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Gloria R. and Henry M. are hereby terminated as to the child Trinity R. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan. In view of the child's stated desire to be with her siblings, as represented by counsel for the child, the court directs DCF to consider whether Trinity could be placed with maternal grandmother and whether at this time maternal grandmother would be an adoptive or placement resource for her. Although the evidence established that maternal grandmother was not committed to adopting Trinity at that time, her position may have changed. DCF is also directed to consider other relatives, including maternal uncle Jerry R., who may be willing to adopt. The permanency plans for Kaare and Darnell are long-term foster care with maternal grandmother. Certainly permanency planning for Trinity should continue to include a relationship with her siblings. A permanency plan shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.