Summary
holding that the designation of some non-parties as third-party beneficiaries acts as an exclusion to all other non-parties
Summary of this case from Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Rodriguez & Quiroga Architects CharteredOpinion
No. 88-0024.
May 24, 1989.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, John D. Wessel, J.
Berman, Paley, Goldstein Berman, New York, New York, and Alan C. Brandt, Jr., of Chappell Brandt, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant/cross appellee-Robert F. Wilson Inc.
Robert E. Pershes and Diane M. Perry of Pershes Schwartz, P.A., Plantation, for appellee/cross appellant-Kessel Constr. Corp.
Lewis Vegosen Rosenbach Fitzgerald, P.A., and Larry Klein of Klein, Beranek Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee/cross appellant-Sharsand Associates, Inc.
We agree with the appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to determine whether appellee Sharsand was a third party beneficiary under the Wilson trade agreement contract. Contract construction is a matter of law to be determined by the court. City of Orlando v. H.L. Coble Construction Co., 282 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 288 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1973). Since the contract clearly limits third party liability status to "contractors," a defined term under the contract which Sharsand, as a subcontractor, does not meet, the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that Sharsand was not a third party beneficiary to the contract. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the final judgment awarding Sharsand $90,250.00, plus interest. In all other respects we affirm the final judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
DOWNEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.