Opinion
W.C. No. 4-709-400.
November 9, 2007.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ) dated July 19, 2007 that denied and dismissed his claim for benefits. We affirm.
This matter proceeded to hearing in order to determine whether the claim was compensable and, if so, whether recommended medical treatment was related to the claimant's injury and reasonably necessary to cure and relieve him from its effects. The ALJ issued a summary order denying and dismissing the claim. The claimant requested a full order pursuant to 8-43-215(1), C.R.S. 2007, which the ALJ subsequently prepared and issued.
The ALJ's corresponding Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Order) reflect the following findings. The claimant worked in sales for an auto dealership. He took his personal car into the dealership's service department and asked a mechanic to look at it. The mechanic looked at the claimant's car in the role of the claimant's friend, rather than as an employee of the auto dealership. Later that day, the mechanic parked the claimant's car in the lot reserved for customers having their vehicles repaired. The claimant was not allowed to park his vehicle in the customer's repair shop parking lot. After finishing his work the claimant punched out and walked toward his car. He slipped and fell in the repair shop parking lot. The claimant reported his slip and fall to the employer. The ALJ determined that the claimant's fall was not incidental to his employment and otherwise did not arise out of the course and scope of his employment. He, therefore, denied and dismissed the claim for medical benefits.
As noted by the ALJ, a compensable injury occurs when the claimant is performing services "arising out of and in the course of" his employment. Section 8-41-301(1), C.R.S. 2007; Price v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 919 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1996). The question of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment generally raises issues of fact for determination by the ALJ. Consequently, we must uphold the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2007; L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 849 P.2d 876, 882-883 (Colo.App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994).
The "arising out of" element is narrower than the "course" element and requires the claimant to prove that the injury had its "origin in an employee's work-related functions and is sufficiently related thereto to be considered part of the employee's service to the employer." Popovich v. Irlando, 811 P.2d 379, 383 (Colo. 1991). However, the employee's activity need not constitute a strict duty of employment or confer a specific benefit on the employer if it is incident to the conditions under which the employee usually performs the job. City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953). For example, injuries sustained on the employer's premises while eating lunch are generally compensable under that doctrine because the employee is at a place he might reasonably be, within the time limits of the employment, and engaged in an activity reasonably incident to the work. In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17, 22-23 (Colo. 1988); Industrial Commission v. Golden Cycle Corp., 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902 (1952); (Colo. 1988) Ventura v. Albertsons' Inc., 856 P.2d 35 (Colo.App. 1992). It is generally sufficient if the injury arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental to the conditions and circumstances of the particular employment. Phillips Contracting, Inc. v. Hirst, 905 P.2d 9 (Colo.App. 1995). This includes discretionary activities on the part of the employee which are devoid of any duty component, and are unrelated to any specific benefit to the employer. City of Boulder v. Streeb, supra; L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 849 P.2d 876 (Colo.App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994) (claimant sustained fatal compensable injuries while traveling between the job site and the employer's main office to pick up a paycheck). Here, the ALJ determined that the claimant's relevant activities were personal and were not incidental to the claimant's employment. Consequently he denied the claim. Order at 7, ¶¶ 9-11.
On appeal the claimant does not take issue with the ALJ's findings of fact. Nonetheless, the claimant argues that the ALJ's findings support an award of benefits if there is any benefit to the employer at the time of his accident. However, we are not persuaded that the ALJ erred in determining that the claimant's injury is not compensable according to his findings of fact. The ALJ found that the claimant had the employer's mechanic inspect his car in the mechanic's personal capacity as a friend, rather than as a co-worker. Order at 4, ¶ 3. The mechanic parked the claimant's car in the repair parking lot reserved for the exclusive use of customers. Order at 4, ¶ 4. After finishing work, the claimant slipped and fell in the repair parking lot while proceeding to his car. Order at 4, ¶¶ 5-6. Injuries do not arise out of and in the course of employment if, at the time of the injury, the employee's acts "are for the employee's sole benefit." Kater v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 746, 747 (Colo.App. 1986). Furthermore, injuries resulting from an incident occurring on the employer's premises do not necessarily arise out of the course of employment. See Ferris v. Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Union, Local 26, 867 P.2d 38, 42 (Colo.App. 1993) (nexus between employment and sexual harassment allegedly inflicted during working hours and on employer's premises presents question of fact).
The ALJ considered whether the claimant's actions at the time of his accident were incidental to his employment conditions and found no significant connection between his fall and his employment. We are not bound by legal conclusions drawn from undisputed facts. See Schrieber v. Brown Root, Inc., 888 P.2d 274 (Colo.App. 1993). However, we decline to conclude that the claimant's injuries are compensable under the circumstances. Cf. Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755,759 (10th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (recognizing admitted injury occurring in employee parking lot); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Walter, 143 Colo. 549, 354 P.2d 591 (1960) (injury sustained crossing public street en route to assigned parking space on employer's premises compensable); Seltzer v. Foley's Dep't Store, W.C. No. 4-432-260 (September 21, 2000) (slip and fall in employer-designated area of parking lot adjacent to employer's premises compensable).
As we understand the claimant's additional argument, the claimant used his car for transportation to and from work. He asserts that the employer expected him to park his car on the employer's premises and that the actions of mechanic, who was a co-worker, required him to go to the parking lot where he fell in order to get to his car. Thus, he claims that the employer received some appreciable benefit under the circumstances and refers to several cases in which injuries were found to be compensable. The ALJ did not expressly find that the parties mutually expected the claimant to park his personal car on the employer's premises, but he did find that the employer provided workers with a designated employee parking lot. Order at 4, ¶ 1. In any event, the various decisions cited in support of the claimant's position are distinguishable from the facts in this case as found by the ALJ. The cases cited by the claimant reflect findings to the effect that the injured employee's actions at the time of injury were not merely in furtherance of personal activities, but also pertained to the employment relationship.
In this case, the ALJ found that having the employer's mechanic look at the claimant's car had nothing to do with their employment. The ALJ determined that the claimant's fall was not reasonably incident or otherwise related to his work. In other words, the ALJ determined that the claimant was engaged in activities for his sole benefit at the time of the injury. Cf. Brogger v. Kezer 626 P.2d 700 (Colo.App. 1980) (claimant injured while painting residence used for employer's business awarded benefits because claimant's acts at time of injury not done solely for own benefit); Kater v. Industrial Comm'n, supra (injury not compensable where claimant's activities at time of injury for her sole benefit). We therefore conclude that the ALJ correctly applied the relevant legal standards and are not persuaded to disturb his order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated July 19, 2007 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Curt Kriksciun
PRESTON M RAHN, AURORA, CO, (Claimant).
MCDONALD AUTO GROUP, Attn: NINA JENKINS, C/O: MCDONALD AUTOMOTIVE GROUP INTEGRITY MOTORS, LTD, LITTLETON, CO, (Employer).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D FLEWELLING, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Insurer)
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN G TAUSSIG, JR., Attn: JOHN G TAUSSIG JR., ESQ., BOULDER, CO, (For Claimant).
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH STERN, LLC, Attn: MARC P HARDEN, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).