Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County,Super. Ct. No. JJD060998 Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.
Catherine Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Raymond L. Brosterhous III and Judy Kaida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Dawson, J.
INTRODUCTION
On July 25, 2006, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, James G., resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), count one) and possessed a billy club (§ 12020, subd. (a), count two). On September 26, 2006, count one was amended to allege that James provided false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9). After a contested jurisdictional hearing on November 29, 2006, the court found the allegations of the petition true.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
At the January 22, 2007, dispositional hearing, the court adjudged James a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On appeal, James contends section 12020, subdivision (a) does not prevent him from carrying a baseball bat for self-defense and that there was insufficient evidence he violated the statute.
FACTS
At 5:56 p.m. on May 26, 2006, Visalia Police Officer Candido Alvarez was driving a marked patrol car on Main Street. James and Chris G., both 14 years old at that time, were riding bicycles. James was carrying a black and red baseball bat that he was trying to conceal with his arm and hand. The 29-inch bat was made of aluminum.
Alvarez stopped and contacted the two minors. When Alvarez asked James why he had a baseball bat, James replied he had been playing baseball or softball. When Alvarez asked James where he had his gloves, cleats, and baseball or softball, James admitted he had not been playing a ball game. James said he had taken the bat from a friend at a nearby park.
James identified himself as Chris G. (same last name) and gave a birth date that was one day off. Alvarez telephoned James’s grandmother who stated that her grandson’s name was James. The officer confirmed James’s identity and address by calling James’s father. Alvarez arrested James for possession of a billy club and for giving false information.
Alvarez testified that a baseball bat can be used as a weapon. After being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving them, James told Alvarez that he was carrying the baseball bat for protection in case he ran into any southern gang members. James said he gave false information about his name because he thought he had an outstanding arrest warrant and did not want to get into trouble. James told Alvarez that he “hung out” with northern gang members.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
DISCUSSION
James contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court’s finding that he possessed a billy club because he possessed the bat for only defensive purposes. He further argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of section 12020, subdivision (a). We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from a juvenile proceeding, our court reviews the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if there is substantial evidence -- evidence that is credible and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense. (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 859.) We are in no position to weigh conflicts or disputes in the evidence. We consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference which can be drawn from that evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's decision. We resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court’s decision. We view the entire record to find any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the decision of the trier of fact. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373.)
Section 12020 states, in pertinent part: “(a) Any person in this state who does any of the following is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison: [¶] (1) Manufactures or … possesses any … instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, sap, or sandbag.”
In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 (Grubb), the California Supreme Court recognized that this statute was worded broadly to include both “the classic instruments of violence” (id. at p. 620) that were “specially created or manufactured for criminal purposes” and ordinarily harmless objects. (Id. at p. 621.) In order to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the court interpreted section 12020 as prohibiting the possession of objects falling into the latter category only when “the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless purpose. [Citation.]” (Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 620-621, fn. omitted.) The burden rests on the defendant, however, to show that possession of the weapon was for an innocent purpose. (Id. at p. 621.)
In People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399 (Fannin), the Court of Appeal of the First Appellate District considered whether a bicycle lock on a chain was a “slungshot” within the scope of section 12020, subdivision (a). The court recognized that a bicycle lock and chain were not a weapon in themselves, but could be “an instrument with ordinary innocent uses ....” (People v. Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) As a result, Fannin held that
“Intent to use a weapon is not an element of the crime of weapon possession. ‘Proof of possession alone is sufficient.’ [Citation.] However, if the object is not a weapon per se, but an instrument with ordinary uses, the prosecution must prove that the object was possessed as a weapon. The only way to meet that burden is by evidence ‘indicat[ing] that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose.’ (Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 620-621, italics added.)” (Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)
The Fannin court explained that the evidence presented may be circumstantial and could be rebutted by the defendant with evidence of innocent usage. (Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1404-1406.) In Fannin, the prosecution’s burden of showing that the chain and padlock was a weapon proscribed by section 12020 was met by the defendant’s statement that he was carrying the chain and padlock for self-defense. (Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405-1406.) In Grubb, the burden was met by the defendant’s possession of a 20-inch broken bat with a taped handle and the defendant’s statements that he carried the modified bat for protection and had used it on two prior occasions to strike someone. (Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 617, 621.)
In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401 (Robert L.) involved a defendant who, when asked by an officer why he had a concealed ice pick in his possession, replied, “‘You know why I carry it. It is for protection.’” (Id. at p. 405, italics added.) In affirming the defendant’s conviction for violating section 12022, subdivision (a) the court stated, “Nothing further was necessary to show the instrument though ‘conceived for peaceful purposes, … was wrapped in the indicia and circumstance of probable assault.’ [Citations.]” (Robert L., supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 405, citing Grubb.)
Recently, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed these legal principles in People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 624-626 (King). The defendant in King was convicted of possessing a short barreled rifle. (Id. at p. 620.) In King, the court found that a violation of section 12020, subdivision (a) requires a culpable mental state. (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 624-625.) King reaffirmed the holding in Grubb that a defendant may be able to prove an innocent use of a weapon, but the burden is on the defendant to show possession was for an innocent purpose. (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 424.) King noted that some objects with lawful uses, such as a baseball bat, could nevertheless be prohibited depending on the defendant’s mental state and the intended use of the object. (Id. at pp. 625-627.)
The baseball bat James was carrying was not a weapon per se but an instrument with ordinary uses. Thus, the prosecution had to prove that James possessed it as a weapon. James initially told the officer that he possessed the bat to play baseball or softball, but later admitted that he did not have any other gear to play ball and that he obtained the bat from a friend for self-defense. This was substantial evidence of James’s culpable mental state. (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 624-625.)
James quickly recanted his original statement that he had used the bat to play a ball game. James did not have a glove, cleats, or a baseball or softball. James did not attempt an affirmative defense at the hearing that he possessed the bat for a lawful purpose.
Like the defendants in Fannin and Robert L., James admitted that he carried the bat for protection, or, self-defense. Under the above authorities this was sufficient to sustain the prosecutor’s burden of showing that James possessed the bat for use as a billy club in violation of section 12020, subdivision (a). Additionally, we note that the evidence that James admitted he was concerned about an attack from rival gang members bolsters this conclusion. Accordingly, we reject James’s legal challenges to the statute and to the sufficiency of the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.