Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Juvenile Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court. Marguerite Downing, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK61671)
Andre F. F. Toscano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
P.M. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that her daughter, F.M., is a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). We affirm the court’s finding.
All section references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code, unless otherwise designated.
FACTS
P.M. is the mother of three children, J.R. (born November 2002), C.R. (born April 2004) and F.M. (born September 2006). All three children have been placed in protective custody. While P.M. appeals only the court’s jurisdiction over F.M., the proceedings relating to J.R. and C.R.’s dependency status are relevant to this case.
I. J.R. and C.R.
On November 25, 2005, P.M. left J.R. and C.R. with Sylvia P., her mother. The children were dirty and their grimy clothes smelled of cigarette smoke. They were also not appropriately dressed and hungry. Although they had “coughs and colds,” they were left without any medication. When she did not return for the children and could not be located, the Department of Family and Child Services (“DCFS”) filed a juvenile dependency petition under subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300 alleging P.M. “is a current abuser of illicit drugs” and “left the children with the maternal grandmother, Sylvia [P.], without making a plan for the children’s ongoing care and supervision and the basic necessities of life not limited to, food, clothing, shelter and medical care.”
At the detention hearing on December 5, 2005, P.M. appeared and agreed to her children’s placement with Sylvia but requested visitation rights. The juvenile court placed them in their grandmother’s home. According to Sylvia, P.M. visited the children twice in December, once for about 10 minutes and again on Christmas day for about 11/2 hours. At the disposition hearing on February 23, 2006, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to justify removal of the children from P.M.’s custody. However, the court found there was insufficient evidence to sustain the drug allegations. Nevertheless, the court ordered P.M. to undergo drug rehabilitation with random testing and ordered DCFS to provide monitored visits and reunification services. Thereafter, DCFS attempted to contact P.M. with little success. Between February and September of 2006, DCFS only met with P.M. four times and was not able to provide referrals for drug counseling and parenting classes until July. P.M. did not participate in the random drug testing program in July, August, or September 2006.
II. F.M.
F.M. was born in September 2006, and P.M. agreed to place her with Sylvia while she enrolled in a drug counseling program and parenting classes. By June 2007, P.M. was living with relatives but indicated she would move in with Sylvia if she was granted custody of the children. She visited the children almost every day at Sylvia’s home. She enrolled in, but had not completed drug counseling. She had tested negative on all her drug tests but missed seven of them. She claims she missed two tests due to job obligations. As of June 20, 2007, P.M. was unemployed.
Because she failed to meet her case plan objectives, a dependency petition was filed for F.M. on June 13, 2007, alleging “[P.M.] has a history of substance abuse which renders the child’s mother incapable of providing regular care for the child. Further, the mother failed to comply with prior DCFS voluntary services and prior DCFS intervention has failed to resolve the family problems in that the mother failed to regularly participate in substance abuse counseling and failed to regularly participate in random drug testing. The mother’s history of illicit drug use endangers the child’s physical and emotional health and safety and creates a detrimental home environment, placing the child at risk of physical and emotional harm and damage.”
Sylvia stated she thought P.M. should be given more time to complete her programs but she was ready to adopt the children if necessary. During an interview on July 11, 2007, P.M. admitted she started to use cocaine in 2006, which prevented her from providing adequate care for her children, but that she was no longer using. P.M. also admitted she did not have a permanent place to live. Because she was unable to afford an increase in rent, Sylvia moved in with her mother (the children’s great grandmother) while she waited for affordable housing to become available. For these reasons, DCFS recommended that family reunification services be terminated for J.R. and C.R. and that F.M. be declared a dependent of the court.
At F.M.’s jurisdictional hearing on September 13, 2007, the juvenile court considered DCFS reports from June, July and September of 2007 detailing the above facts and heard testimony from the children’s social worker. The court sustained the allegation against P.M. and ordered F.M. to remain at Sylvia’s home. P.M. was to be provided continued reunification services for all three children. In the November 29, 2007 dispositional order, the court placed the children in P.M.’s care under the supervision of DCFS on the condition they remain in Sylvia’s home and not be removed without court notification. P.M. timely appealed from the September 13, 2007 and November 29, 2007 orders.
DISCUSSION
P.M. contends the jurisdictional findings of the juvenile court as to F.M. are not supported by substantial evidence. “To sustain a jurisdictional finding, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the minors come within at least one of the subdivisions of section 300.” (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112.) “In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)
P.M. argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision because there was no substantial risk of serious harm to F.M., who did not test positive for drugs when she was born. P.M. argues the drug allegation was unsupported because she never tested positive for drugs and she completed her drug treatment program as required. Further, she maintained consistent and appropriate visits with the children. We disagree and find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.
The court sustained the section 300 petition based on evidence P.M. had admitted to drug use in 2006 and had failed to provide for her other two children as a result. She had also missed seven drug tests, only two of which she claims were missed due to job obligations. In addition, she had only completed one drug counseling program in the 18 months since the court’s first order and no parenting classes. Further, it was unlikely P.M. could provide a stable home for the children at the time of the jurisdictional hearing because she was unemployed and “living from house to house with her friends.” It was unclear whether she would have been able to live with Sylvia and the children at the children’s great-grandmother’s house. This is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction over F.M.
In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814 (Rocco M.), does not assist P.M. as she claims. In Rocco M., the court found the trial court properly determined the mother’s conduct placed Rocco at risk in that she had: left drugs in a place where he could find them; been absent for extended periods of time which gave him the opportunity to take the drugs; neglected him in such a way as to create emotional and psychological conditions underlying substance abuse; and exposed him to her own drug use. Similarly P.M.’s unexcused missed drug tests here indicated she was still using drugs. In addition, her admitted neglect of John and Chrissy in leaving them with Sylvia without any further plan for their care was, by her own admission, due to her cocaine use. Thus, as in Rocco M., F.M. was at risk of neglect “in a way which might be reasonably expected to create the kind of emotional and psychological conditions in which substance abuse typically thrives; . . .” (Id. at p. 825.)
P.M.’s reference to events occurring after the jurisdictional and dispositional rulings—that she got a job, did not miss any other drug tests and that F.M. was returned to her custody—are irrelevant to our evaluation of the juvenile court’s determination of “whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject[ed] the minor to the defined risk of harm.” (Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional order declaring F.M. a dependent of the court is affirmed.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.