Opinion
W.C. No. 4-430-075
April 16, 2001
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) insofar as it authorizes the respondents to reduce the claimant's temporary total disability benefits by one-half the amount of social security disability insurance (SSDI) payments received by the claimant. We affirm.
The claimant sustained a compensable back injury on January 29, 1999. The claimant was earning $73.55 per week as a part-time dishwasher, and the respondents admitted liability for temporary total disability benefits. At the time of the injury, the claimant was receiving SSDI payments of $280.90 per month. These benefits were awarded in March 1992, and paid because of a birth defect which the ALJ found was unrelated to the industrial injury.
Under the circumstances, the claimant argued the SSDI benefits should not be offset against the workers' compensation benefits. However, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994), and Culver v. Ace Electric, 971 P.2d 641 (Colo. 1999), the ALJ held the "plain language" of § 8-42-103(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2000, allows an offset for SSDI benefits "regardless of the relatedness of the disability to the industrial injury, and regardless of the order in which the benefits were granted."
On review, the claimant argues the SSDI benefits may not be offset against his workers' compensation benefits because there is no "nexus" between the disability caused by the workers' compensation injury, and the disability for which SSDI is being paid. The claimant reasons that permitting the offset would not serve the statutory objective of preventing double recovery. We disagree.
Section 8-42-103(1)(c)(I) provides that in cases where "periodic disability benefits granted by the federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance act" are payable to the claimant, the claimant's temporary total disability benefits "shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal as nearly as practical to one-half such federal periodic benefits." As the respondents argue, in Gauger v. Natkin Co., W.C. No. 4-184-977 (August 9, 1996), we held the plain language of the statute does not require that the SSDI benefits be paid for the same disability caused by the workers' compensation injury. Gauger also relied on L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, supra, for the proposition that § 8-42-103(1)(c)(I) was designed to coordinate wage loss benefits between workers' compensation benefits and SSDI, and that "requiring that benefits be payable on account of the same disability would foster the type of `double recovery' and `grab-bag' of benefits" condemned in L.E.L. Construction.
Subsequent to Gauger, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Culver v. Ace Electric, supra. In Culver, a case which upheld the constitutionality of the statute offsetting social security retirement benefits against permanent total disability benefits, the court observed that wage-loss legislation is designed to cover losses resulting from physical disability, economic unemployment, and old age. The court favorably cited Professor Larson for the proposition that the "crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable." Consequently, the Culver court concluded the General Assembly could rationally require coordination of permanent total disability benefits and social security retirement benefits because both types of benefits address a claimant's wage loss. The Culver court also held the plain language of the statute does not condition the offset on whether the claimant was receiving social security retirement benefits before the injury.
The rationale in Culver reinforces our conclusion that we reached the correct result in Gauger. Consequently, we decline to depart from Gauger in this case.
The claimant's reliance on Spanish Peaks Mental Health Center v. Huffaker, 928 P.2d 741 (Colo.App. 1996), is misplaced. That case interprets the predecessor to § 8-42-103(1)(d)(I), C.R.S. 2000, which governs the offset of periodic disability benefits payable under a pension or disability plan "financed in whole or in part by the employer." Thus, the result in Spanish Peaks was dictated by the specific language of the statute under consideration, and it does not apply to the facts of this claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated April 28, 2000, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C. R. S. 2000.
Copies of this decision were mailed April 16, 2001 to the following parties:
Charles L. Anderson, 460 Old Hodges Rd., Abbeville, S.C. 29629
Jackie Houston d/b/a North End Diner, 3005 N. Hancock Ave., Colorado Springs, CO 80907
Michael J. Steiner, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority d/b/a Pinnacol Assurance — Interagency Mail (For Respondents)
Gordon J. Heuser, Esq., 625 N. Cascade, #300, Colorado Springs, CO 80903 (For Claimant)
By: L. Epperson