Opinion
No. 84,021.
Opinion filed April 29, 1999.
Original Proceeding — Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
Honorable Melanie G. May, Circuit Judge, and Honorable Robert O. Collins, Administrative Judge, Juvenile Division, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Honorable F. Dennis Alvarez, Chief Judge, and David A. Rowland, Court Counsel, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida; Honorable Susan F. Schaeffer, Chief Judge, Honorable Peter Ramsberger, Juvenile Administrative Judge, and Debra Roberts, Court Counsel, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, Florida; Honorable William T. Swigert, Chief Judge, and David Trammell, Deputy Court Administrator, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Ocala, Florida; and Honorable Paul B. Kanarek, Chief Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Vero Beach, Florida, for Petitioners/Judicial Circuits Participating in the Pilot Project.
Howard C. Coker, President, The Florida Bar, Jacksonville, Florida; Edith G. Osman, President-elect, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Public Defender Association; and Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondents.
Trial judges in several circuits have petitioned this Court to amend the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure to permit juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio video device. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. We adopt the proposed amendment on an interim basis as explained below.
The facts are set out fully in our initial opinion in this case. See Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a) , 667 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1996). Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.010 provides that no child may be placed in detention without a hearing where probable cause and the need for detention are determined:
RULE 8.010 DETENTION HEARING
(a) When Required. No detention order provided for in rule 8.013 shall be entered without a hearing at which all parties shall have an opportunity to be heard on the necessity for the child's being held in detention. . . .
. . . .
(f) Issues. At this hearing the court shall determine the following:
(1) The existence of probable cause to believe the child has committed a delinquent act. This issue shall be determined in a nonadversary proceeding. The court shall apply the standard of proof necessary for an arrest warrant and its finding may be based upon a sworn complaint, affidavit, deposition under oath, or, if necessary, upon testimony under oath properly recorded.
(2) The need for detention according to the criteria provided by law. In making this determination in addition to the sworn testimony of available witnesses all relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the specific issue, including oral and written reports, may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though it would not be competent at an adjudicatory hearing.
"[C]riteria provided by law" in subsection (2) include those requirements set forth in section 39.402, Florida Statutes.
Section 39.402, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), provides in part:
39.402 Use of detention. —
(1) All determinations and court orders regarding the use of secure, nonsecure, or home detention shall be based primarily upon findings that the child:
(a) Presents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing;
(b) Presents a substantial risk of inflicting bodily harm on others as evidenced by recent behavior;
(c) Presents a history of committing a property offense prior to adjudication, disposition, or placement;
(d) Has committed contempt of court by:
1. Intentionally disrupting the administration of the court;
2. Intentionally disobeying a court order; or
3. Engaging in a punishable act or speech in the court's presence which shows disrespect for the authority and dignity of the court; or
(e) Requests protection from imminent bodily harm.
(2)(a) All determinations and court orders regarding placement of a child into detention care shall comply with all requirements and criteria provided in this part and shall be based on a risk assessment of the child. . . .
(b)1. The risk assessment instrument . . . shall take into consideration, but need not be limited to, prior history of failure to appear, prior offenses, offenses committed pending adjudication, any unlawful possession of a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle or possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and community control status at the time the child is taken into custody. The risk assessment instrument shall also take into consideration appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances. . . . The risk assessment instrument shall also include any information concerning the child's history of abuse and neglect.
Judges in the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Judicial Circuits petitioned this Court to amend Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a) to allow juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio-video device:
RULE 8.100 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR HEARINGS
Unless otherwise provided, the following provisions apply to all hearings:
(a) Presence of the Child. The child shall be present unless the court finds that the child's mental or physical condition is such that a court appearance is not in the child's best interests, except that the child's presence may be either in person or by electronic audiovisual device in the discretion of the Court for detention hearings.
This Court in our original opinion discussed the views of both the proponents and opponents of the proposed amendment:
The judges make the following points: Similar procedures are used for adults at first appearance and arraignment; this practice will eliminate the need for transporting juveniles from the detention center to the courthouse, which will end fights during transport and give juveniles more time to attend classes and counseling sessions at the center; this practice will eliminate the parading of juveniles through the courthouse in handcuffed groups and will do away with outbursts and fights in the courtroom.
Opponents of the amendment include individual public defenders, the Juvenile Court Rules Committee of the Florida Bar, and the Juvenile Justice Committee of the Florida Public Defenders Association, who make the following points: Unlike first appearances, detention hearings are evidentiary and adversarial in nature, often requiring witness confrontation, challenging of evidence, and review of records and documents; the practice will put the public defender and state attorney on unequal footing by giving the state attorney the advantage of his or her physical presence in the courtroom with the judge while placing the public defender far away at the detention center with the juvenile; and this practice will deprive juveniles of the opportunity to have meaningful contact with parents, guardians, and counsellors.
The proposed amendment has been unanimously endorsed by the Juvenile Section of the Florida Conference of Circuit Judges and approved by the public defender of the thirteenth judicial circuit. Further, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar has voted to disagree with the Juvenile Court Rules Committee's opposition to the amendment.
Amendment, 667 So.2d at 196. We authorized the above circuits, as well as the Sixth Judicial Circuit, to conduct a one-year pilot program to evaluate the proposed rule change:
Based on the foregoing, we decline at this time to adopt the proposed rule change but authorize the chief judge in each of the above circuits to institute a one-year pilot program that will allow juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio video device. At the conclusion of one year, the chief judge in each of the above circuits that chooses to implement such a pilot program will submit to this Court a report evaluating the program.
Id. at 197.
The petitioning circuits have now completed the one-year program and have submitted their reports to the Court. The evaluations are overwhelmingly favorable. Nevertheless, several non-participating public defenders and the Florida Public Defenders Association continue to oppose the program, citing many of the same concerns they expressed initially — i.e., primarily the concern that the program is averse to the interest of juveniles because it "dehumanizes" juvenile proceedings. See Amendment, 667 So.2d at 196. While we agree that the program depersonalizes the proceedings to a degree, we find that this result is no more "dehumanizing" than the fights, long waits, and shackles that plague the current system in some circuits, as pointed out below.
The Ninth Circuit withdrew from the program.
This Court recognized in our initial opinion in this case that there is a place in Florida's courtrooms for technological innovation in juvenile proceedings:
While every Florida citizen is entitled to due process of law in any legal proceeding where his or her personal freedom is directly in issue, this right is not vitiated by technological changes in court procedure. Attendance of adults via audiovisual device at first appearance and arraignment "has [proven] successful . . . [and] has met with the substantial approval of the arrested persons concerned." Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules — Criminal Procedure, 462 So.2d 386, 386 (Fla. 1984). See generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.130, 3.160.
While detention hearings differ from adult proceedings in several respects, we note that it is the juvenile judges themselves who have initiated the present proposal. These judges are intimately familiar with the way detention hearings function and have no vested interest in the proposal, except to make the juvenile justice system work more effectively.
Amendment to Fla. Rule of Juvenile Procedure, 667 So.2d at 196-97. We continue to endorse technological improvements in courtroom procedure.
As noted above, the response to the pilot programs has been overwhelmingly favorable. The participating judges, juvenile justice officials, and state attorneys, and most of the participating public defenders, wholeheartedly endorse the program. In fact, no participating chief judge has rejected the program or reported any major problem. Circuit Judge Melanie May in oral argument before this Court opined that the program promotes the interest of juveniles. She noted that the incidence of injury to juveniles resulting from fights and disruptions (e.g., during transport, in the holding cells, and in the courtroom) was drastically reduced under the pilot program. Chief Judge Dennis Alvarez echoed this finding in his report and further pointed out that the amount of "down time" for juveniles (e.g., missed classes, counseling sessions, group therapy sessions, and medical appointments) was diminished, and the spectacle of juveniles being paraded through the courthouse in handcuffs and shackles was eliminated.
Chief Judge Alvarez explained in detail the benefits of the program:
Since the inception of the pilot project, approximately 2,900 children have attended a detention hearing via video court, and the benefits to the children have been numerous. First and foremost, they no longer have to be transported in crowded vans through rush hour traffic and then spend several hours sitting in the holding cells at the courthouse. The juveniles are no longer humiliated by being paraded through the courthouse in handcuffs and shackles. If the judge orders them to be released, they can be released in a more timely fashion since they are already at the detention center.
The juveniles also spend less time away from their classes, groups, and appointments. If they have any physical and mental health crises, there are professionals available immediately. The detention center staff can provide the public defender with the most accurate and up-to-date information on the child's educational, mental, and physical needs in order to better assess the child's case. In short, the current procedures are far less traumatic to the child than the procedures used prior to this pilot project.
The judges conducting video juvenile detention hearings consistently felt the program was beneficial to the children and expressed hopes that it will be continued. The judges all agreed that the children's rights and their attorney-client privilege have been well preserved. The judges stated that they thought the children took the detention hearings seriously, although one judge lamented that he thought that his admonishments may be more effective in person.
The only shortcoming of the pilot project is the burden placed on the public defender in allocating attorneys. Video detention hearings require the public defender's office to have two attorneys handle the detention hearings. One attorney is at the JDC to represent the children in secure detention and one attorney is in Courtroom 29 to confer with the parents and to represent any children who are in non-secure detention and appear at their detention hearings. The biggest hardship is on the public defender at JDC, who has to rush back to the downtown courthouse (a twenty minute drive) for adjudicatory hearings immediately following the detention hearings. The public defender at the JDC is sometimes late to court. However, the judges have been able to handle other cases until the JDC attorney arrives. It is anticipated that these internal scheduling conflicts can be worked out in order to ensure this project's continued success.
Attached to this report are letters from Larry Lumpee, Juvenile Justice Manager, Department of Juvenile Justice; R. L. Pete Edwards, DCMC Supervisor, Department of Juvenile Justice; Richard Ake, Clerk of Court; Harry Lee Coe, III, State Attorney; and Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, all supporting continued use of video juvenile detention hearings. Therefore, on behalf of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, I respectfully request this Court to authorize the continued use of electronic audiovisual devices for juvenile detention hearings by amending Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a).
This evaluation of the pilot program in the thirteenth circuit is representative of the evaluations in the other participating circuits.
Our purpose in implementing the pilot program in the present case was simple — to collect practical information and first-hand observations concerning the routine workings of the proposed system. When this Court is operating in its supervisory administrative capacity, we at times must rely on Florida's court officers to serve as our eyes and ears. The candid observations of each participant in the pilot program — i.e., each judge, juvenile official, state attorney, and public defender — are indispensable to this Court in assessing the merits of the proposed program. The Court will not lightly discount the reports of these individuals who worked diligently to implement the program and who were intricately involved in its day-to-day operation. In counterpoint, we note that none of the opponents of the amendment who appeared before this Court professed a first-hand familiarity with the program, i.e., they did not assert that they have participated in any way — not even as observers — in the pilot program.
In light of the highly favorable reports, we adopt on an interim basis the above amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), which shall become effective upon the filing of this opinion. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.130. The Clerk shall publish the amended rule as soon as practicable, and we will receive commentary from interested persons for a period of ninety days from the date this opinion is filed. At the expiration of the ninety-day period, we will determine whether any further action is necessary. We direct the Juvenile Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar to study this matter further and make recommendations concerning a permanent rule.
We fully recognize that the petitioning circuits are acting out of a genuine concern for the welfare of juveniles, but we cannot ignore the pleas of those who assert that Florida's children at times are short-changed in the allocation of judicial resources. Accordingly, we use this opportunity to express our concern that each judicial circuit in the state ensure that its juvenile division is treated second to none in the allocation of judicial resources. Florida's oft-repeated pledge that "our children come first" cannot ring hollow in — of all places — our halls of justice. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders and others serving in the juvenile system cannot hope to make a difference in the life of a single troubled child if they must contend with staggering caseloads made worse by the maldistribution of judicial resources. Technology may offer one innovative way to help courts cope, but it is no substitute for an allocation of resources that meets the needs of society's most precious resource — its children.
The most recent caseload statistics gathered by the Office of the State Courts Administrator are cause for concern. Those statistics project that on average in 1998 each juvenile judge in Florida will manage a staggering caseload of 3,273 cases, compared to 1,270 cases per judge in the criminal division and 1,357 cases per judge in the civil division. See Office of State Courts Administrator, Certification of Need for Additional Judges 1999 60 (1999).
See In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S97, S99 (Fla. Feb. 18, 1999) ("We also recognize the obligation of the Judicial Branch to join with the Executive and Legislative Branches to give priority to our State's most precious resource-our children.")
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., WELLS, J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
I dissent. In my view, while there is certainly a place for the implementation of technology in juvenile proceedings and we must never fear innovation, we cannot elevate the process above substance and we must be ever vigilant to protect and safeguard our youth. The implementation of technology simply because of availability causes a misdirection of our objectives. I do not question the motives and good intentions of those proposing and supporting this modification; however, the majority view concedes that the program approved today depersonalizes the juvenile process, a substituted problem with which I cannot agree. If the goal, as suggested by the majority, is to remedy dehumanizing conditions, this procedure which substitutes a T.V. chamber with glass faces and sound system voices for human contact is an Orwellian prophecy fulfilled, merely substituting one evil for another in the name of technological advancement. If fights, disruptions, and the spectacle of parades in handcuffs and shackles are the ills to be corrected, then we should correct and change these disgraceful problems rather than avoiding correction by attempting to implement robotic justice. The same youth initially forced through the T.V. chamber process for the detention hearing will still face the uncorrected ills because they will return in person for future hearings. This "electronic audiovisual device" we have today approved is without name, description, capacity, or standards of quality. In my view, our youth and our future deserve far more.
We have learned and we have professed that our jurisprudence recognizes juvenile proceedings to be unique and different.See State v. T.M.B., 716 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1998). Juvenile proceedings are neither wholly criminal nor entirely civil in nature, with the well-being of the minor in the forefront of all deliberative measures. See, e.g., P.W.G. v. State, 702 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1997). We have noted that the State must exercise parental-type intervention and supervision in the lives of troubled youth, and I would choose that the judicial system exercise that responsibility in person and not through mirrors and glass. The detention hearing is a critical stage in the juvenile process which requires an honest judicial assessment of an individual and family in close temporal proximity to an alleged deviant event. At a time such as this, a great deal of information is exchanged by not only the spoken word, but also by personal contact and observations inherent in the personal interaction generated by a personal appearance, qualities missing when an event is perceived only through the limitations of the lens of a camera or television monitor. Most assuredly, the impact of the detention hearing has far reaching tentacles for all concerned, the individual youth, the family, and the public in general. The decision with regard to detention should be made in person, not by long distance.
Secondly, not only are standards and criteria for the equipment to be utilized missing, the provision we approve today is also deceptively silent on its face as to the practical operation of the procedures followed. The amendment states facially that utilization of the electronic device will be applied "in the discretion of the Court." This suggests and implies that each and every case with its individual circumstances and characteristics will be separately evaluated for the exercise of judicial discretion as a condition precedent to subjecting a child to the T.V. chamber. The concept of judicial discretion generates visions of flexibility with rational and well-reasoned choices formulated from a sense of justice that is individualized and sensitive to the personal needs and circumstances involved. Thoughts of hand-tailored decisions and results that are free from a mass-production mentality ride the wings of true judicial discretion.
The practical operation of the amendment approved today, as described by the amendment proponents during oral argument, is the antithesis of "judicial discretion" which we have historically honored. The proponents proudly proclaim that the discretion embodied in this amendment is exercised only once and then totally without regard to an individualized case. The discretion is exercised on an all or nothing basis because if a particular circuit approves use of an electronic device, all juveniles are condemned to the T.V. chamber, without exception, unless and until some unstated, undefined, non-quantified problem arises while a child is already being subjected to the robotic detention hearing process. In my view, this is not the exercise of judicial discretion at all, but is nothing more than the implementation of a predetermined policy representing a mechanistic approach to problems that need individualized care and attention. See, e.g., Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1987). Where judicial discretion is the stated standard, a mechanical application to produce a singular result should be unacceptable to all. See, e.g., Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Florida Public Defender Association has noted that the process contemplated by this amendment will impair the ability of a child to present pertinent information to the court. The reports submitted have not demonstrated that children will be provided an opportunity to communicate fully and completely in privacy with anyone other than a singular defense counsel. It has been suggested that even some of the perceived benefits of time saving may be a direct result of the inability of a child or defense counsel to identify potential information and present relevant factors to a court. It has been suggested that two of the most important factors to impact a discretionary release decision during the detention hearing process are the interaction of a juvenile with parent or guardian and the personal interaction of the juvenile with the presiding judge. The depersonalization of the proposed amendment gives the entire proceeding a mechanical quality which is not conducive to individual justice and creates a sterile atmosphere in which children do not fully understand what has happened to them in the judicial proceeding, and the decision for one's freedom appears only on a glass screen with a voice resonating through speakers.
Persons involved with child welfare issues have suggested that the children subjected to the T.V. chamber process have a reduced perception of receiving a fair hearing and the children subjected to this appear detached and unemotional even though they are experiencing emotions of concern and fear. Our children must be able to understand what is happening to them and why things are happening, which may be very difficult in the sterile environment of T.V. chamber justice.
I certainly recognize that there are benefits to be found in virtually all well-intended excursions into new methodologies and, to be sure, there are some present with this amendment. However, the dehumanizing quality of requiring our youth to communicate with a T.V. screen during this intensely serious proceeding, one that may alter the balance of a young life, is offensive to me as a lawyer, as a jurist, and as a parent. In my view, a far better approach is that incorporated in Alaska, which affords the juvenile the fundamental right to be physically present in court unless the juvenile consents to make an appearance by way of television, subject to approval by the court. It is this type of provision that allows for flexibility if implementation of the T.V. chamber concept truly benefits the child rather than the system and, at the same time, retains for the child the right to humanized justice. The supporters and proponents of this amendment present the proper "buzz words," but I cannot overlook that written documentation from virtually every circuit having attempted this type of procedure on a trial basis includes an undercurrent of efficiency and economy which, I fear, is the engine moving the procession. We cannot overlook and must specifically recognize the enormous demands placed on juvenile judges as noted by the majority with regard to caseload statistics. It appears that this Court is in unanimous agreement that we must allocate more judicial resources to our juvenile court system. We all agree that if we are to make a difference, we must place our children first. We should do more, not less, to encourage personal contact and personal attention to our youth, which, in my view, is the only path that will lead to a brighter tomorrow for juveniles who are the tomorrow for Florida.
See Alaska Delinquency Rule 3(e) (1998).
ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.