Opinion
No. 5-791 / 05-0868
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol S. Egly, District Associate Judge.
The State appeals a juvenile court order finding A.B. incompetent to stand trial on a delinquency charge and providing for the delinquency petition to later be dismissed. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Annette Stanley, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Christine Milligan-Ciha, Assistant Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, guardian ad litem and attorney for minor child.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The State appeals a juvenile court order finding A.B. incompetent to stand trial on a delinquency charge of sexual abuse of N.L. and ordering the delinquency petition to later be dismissed. The State contends the juvenile court erred in concluding A.B. satisfied his burden to establish his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. In the alternative, the State argues that even if A.B. satisfied his burden of proof the court erred by failing to suspend the proceedings for a reasonable amount of time in order to allow A.B. to become competent. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
A delinquency petition was filed November 29, 2004, charging then fourteen-year-old A.B. with sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and 709.3(2) (2003). The charges were based on an incident which occurred in late August 2004 in which A.B. allegedly forced six-year-old N.L. to fondle A.B.'s penis. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing A.B.'s counsel filed a motion requesting the juvenile court to determine whether A.B. was competent to stand trial. The court suspended proceedings on a probable cause finding, made shortly after A.B.'s fifteenth birthday, that A.B. lacked the required competence. The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of A.B. and scheduled a hearing to determine whether A.B. was competent to proceed.
Prior to the hearing two professionals examined A.B. Dr. David Beeman, a psychologist, examined A.B. on January 14, 2005, and Dr. Donner Dewdney, a child psychiatric consultant, examined him on March 2, 2005. Each issued a written report on his findings. These evaluations were submitted to the juvenile court for consideration. Dr. Beeman used a number of tests in preparing his written seven-page evaluation. He administered those tests to A.B. over an approximately four-hour period. Dr. Beeman concluded A.B. was functioning in the borderline range of intelligence. He opined that A.B. did not currently suffer from any mental illness, but concluded that A.B. had an extremely limited understanding of the court proceedings or the potential consequences. Thus, Dr. Beeman opined that A.B. was not competent to stand trial or assist in or participate meaningfully in his own defense. However, he also stated A.B. "could likely be educated in many aspects of the process over time" but "while [A.B.] may become competent over time, it would be unlikely that he could be made competent quickly."
Dr. Dewdney briefly interviewed A.B., and prepared a written one and one-half page evaluation. He did not administer any of the objective tests performed by Dr. Beeman. It is not clear from the record exactly how long the interview with Dr. Dewdney lasted. Although A.B.'s mother testified the interview lasted only approximately ten minutes, it appears to us that Dr. Dewdney would not have been able to obtain all the information set forth in his evaluation in that amount of time. However, it is clear that Dr. Dewdney spent a much shorter time with A.B. than Dr. Beeman did. Dr. Dewdney's evaluation concluded that, "Certainly [A.B.] has the capacity to understand his current alleged offenses and is competent to participate with any formal legal process."
Following the hearing the juvenile court found A.B., who was by then age fifteen, lacked competency to participate in any further delinquency proceedings. The parties had invoked and generally relied on Iowa Code chapter 812 and certain procedures established therein in seeking a determination concerning A.B.'s competency to stand trial. The juvenile court had utilized the procedures established by chapter 812 in finding A.B. lacked competency. However, in making its finding the court concluded Iowa Code chapter 812 is not exclusively the law to be applied when determining the competency of a juvenile to stand trial. It found Dr. Beeman's conclusion that A.B. was not capable of assisting in his own defense more persuasive because "he gives his reasons for that conclusion supported by substantial facts which include some generally accepted objective test results that were not considered by Dr. Dewdney." The court determined that due process required the cessation of delinquency proceedings when the juvenile cannot appreciate the charge, understand the proceeding, or assist effectively in his own defense, regardless of whether the juvenile's inability to do so is the result of a "mental disorder."
The juvenile court ordered Dr. Beeman to work with A.B. to assist him in understanding that he cannot engage in any sexual activity with children under age twelve and to assist him in rehabilitation "so long as it [is] therapeutically indicated or until the next review date scheduled by this judge, whichever is shorter." The juvenile court further ordered that "[w]hen appropriate therapy has occurred, this judge will enter an order dismissing this case." The court also ordered the State to file a Child in Need of Assistance petition on behalf of N.L., pursuant to section 232.83, if an evaluation revealed his need for treatment.
The State appeals, contending the juvenile court erred in concluding A.B. met his burden to establish his incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. In the alternative, the State argues that even if A.B. satisfied his burden of proof the court erred by failing to suspend the proceedings for a reasonable amount of time in order to allow A.B. to become competent.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
We generally review court rulings in juvenile proceedings de novo. State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2005); In re Interest of T.V., 563 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Iowa 1997). We review constitutional issues de novo, under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2002). We give deference to the district court's findings of fact due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. However, we are not bound by those findings. Id. III. MERITS.
It is undisputed that there is a presumption of competency and that A.B. bore the burden here to overcome this presumption and establish incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1996).
The State first claims that if section 812.3 applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings then the court erred in finding A.B. incompetent because there was no evidence he suffered from a "mental disorder" as required by this section. We believe section 812.3 can and should be applied to delinquency proceedings. For example, if it is proved that a juvenile is suffering from a "mental disorder" which prevents him or her from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, as provided in the statute, the court would be correct in finding the juvenile incompetent to stand trial. However, we agree with the juvenile court that as a matter of due process of law the provisions of chapter 812 should not be applied to the exclusion of other relevant and applicable principles in determining competency in a delinquency proceeding.
Limiting incompetency in delinquency proceedings to cases in which the child is incompetent by reason of a "mental disorder" would fail to recognize that a juvenile's inability to appreciate the charge, understand the proceedings, or assist effectively in the defense may be the result of immaturity, lack of intellectual capacity, or both. We conclude that limiting determinations of incompetency in juvenile cases to those cases in which the inability to appreciate, understand, and assist is based on a "mental disorder" would offend rights to due process. The juvenile court correctly recognized this problem and thus interpreted due process in such cases to require the suspension of delinquency proceedings whenever a juvenile cannot appreciate the charge, understand the proceedings, or assist effectively in responding to the allegations. In doing so the court in effect adopted the constitutional standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824, 825. (1960). In Dusky the Court stated that the test of competency of a defendant to stand trial "must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 825. We agree with the juvenile court that this is an appropriate standard by which to determine the competency of a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding.
The State argues, however, that even if the standard used by the juvenile court in assessing A.B.'s competency was correct the court erred in finding A.B. met his burden to prove that he was incompetent to stand trial under that standard. More specifically, the State contends that because the outcome of the competency hearing fell to a battle of the experts and the evidence of competency was essentially in equipoise, incompetency was not proven. The State is correct that when evidence on the issue of competency is essentially equal on both sides, the defendant has failed to meet his or her burden to overcome the presumption of competence and a finding of incompetency cannot be made. See State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 35 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). However we, like the juvenile court, conclude the evidence here was not in equipoise, and thus we are not required to conclude A.B. did not meet his burden of proof.
The juvenile court found the two experts' reports were very different in scope and detail. It further found Dr. Beeman's conclusion that A.B. was not presently capable of assisting in his own defense to be persuasive because the reasons for his conclusion were supported by substantial facts, including some generally accepted objective test results not considered by Dr. Dewdney. Accordingly, the court gave greater weight to Dr Beeman's evaluation in determining legal competency. We agree. Dr. Beeman took much more time with A.B., performed several more objective tests, and his written evaluation was much more detailed and comprehensive than Dr. Dewdney's. Thus, the evidence offered was not in equipoise and we also accord Dr. Beeman's report more weight than Dr. Dewdney's report. We conclude A.B. met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Dusky and applied by the juvenile court in this case, that he did not have at the time of the competency hearing have sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
The State also claims that even if A.B. met his burden of proof, which we have now concluded he did, the juvenile court erred in ordering the delinquency petition to be dismissed after "appropriate therapy has occurred," rather than suspending the proceedings for a reasonable amount of time to determine whether A.B. could become competent and further proceedings occur. The State argues that findings of incompetency in juvenile delinquency proceedings frustrate efforts designed to rehabilitate juveniles and adversely impact the rights of victims. It urges that society therefore has significant interests in preventing juveniles from escaping the consequences of delinquent acts by reasons of incompetency. A.B. argues in response that due process requires the cessation of a delinquency proceeding whenever a juvenile establishes his or her incompetence, and that the juvenile court's order for therapy until no longer needed or until the next review date, "whichever is shorter," followed by dismissal of the delinquency case "best serves the interests of [A.B.] and society."
Due process does not provide a right to dismissal of a delinquency proceeding in the event of incompetency, but rather prevents a juvenile from being tried or required to proceed while incompetent. See generally In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742, 745-47 (Mich.Ct.App. 2000), and cases cited therein. Further, as argued by the State, a delinquency proceeding does involve not only the welfare and interests of the juvenile, but important interests of victims and society as well.
We note that if A.B. had been an adult criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial the court would have been required to suspend the proceeding indefinitely, order the defendant placed in a treatment facility, and thereafter make further findings as required by statute; any treatment program would be one "designed to restore the defendant to competency"; at such time as competency became restored the placement would be terminated and the criminal proceeding reinstated; and the defendant could not remain under placement designed to restore competency beyond, among other time limitations, eighteen months from the date of the original adjudication of incompetence to stand trial or such earlier time as the court found there was no substantial probability the defendant would be restored to competency in a reasonable amount of time. See 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1084, §§ 7, 8, 10, 11 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 812.5, .6, .8, .9 (2005) respectively). We believe that the legislatively-determined policies, procedures, and limitations contained in Iowa Code chapter 812 can and do provide a useful guide in the context of facts such as those present in this case.
This case involves a juvenile charged with a felony-level act of delinquency who was fifteen years of age, and thus more than eighteen months from reaching his eighteenth birthday, at the time the juvenile court found probable cause to believe he lacked the competency necessary to proceed with the delinquency charge. We need not and do not decide whether the provisions of chapter 812 also provide a useful guide in cases involving a non-felony level delinquency charge, a much younger juvenile, or a juvenile within eighteen months of his or her eighteenth birthday. In those types of cases, as well as in the case presently before the court, it may be necessary, in the reasonable exercise of discretion, for a court to substitute other or modified policies, procedures, and time limits. See, e.g., Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 748 n. 3. (stating that in applying Michigan's Mental Health Code to juvenile competency determinations trial courts must recognize that its provisions may sometimes need to be liberally construed or modified).
We conclude that in this case the juvenile court should have ordered counseling and treatment designed to assist A.B. to acquire competency, with periodic reviews scheduled. If A.B. does not acquire competency, the efforts designed to achieve competency should end eighteen months from the date of the original adjudication of incompetence or at such earlier time as the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no substantial probability A.B. will acquire competency in a reasonable amount of time. See Iowa Code § 812.9(1) (2005). If a preponderance of the evidence shows A.B. has acquired competency, the suspended delinquency proceeding should then be reinstated and proceed toward conclusion pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.46 through 232.58 as appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISPOSITION
We agree with the juvenile court that A.B. met his burden to establish incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm on that issue. We respectfully disagree with the court's conclusion that therapy for a period no longer than until the next review date, followed by dismissal of the delinquency proceeding, best serves the interests of A.B. and society and reverse its resulting order to that effect. We conclude that in the context of facts such as those present in this case, upon a balancing of the interests of the juvenile, a victim or victims, and society, an order as outlined in the preceding paragraph of this opinion is called for. We therefore reverse in part the order of the juvenile court and remand for entry of an order and further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.