Opinion
23-CV-2906 (LTS)
06-20-2023
YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENTS & PRECINCTS IN MANHATTAN NY, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as Defendants are “The New York Police Departments & Precincts in Manhattan NY.” Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. New York Police Departments & Precincts in Manhattan NY, No. 23-CV-0531 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023). This case is one of the 60 cases Plaintiff has filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. By order dated March 24, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island when he filed this action. In a notice dated April 10, 2023, Plaintiff confirmed that he was released from custody. (ECF 11.) However, according to records maintained by the New York City Department of Correction, as a result of a May 6, 2023, arrest, Plaintiff is currently detained in the Eric M. Taylor Center on Rikers Island.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff lists “The New York Police Departments & Precincts in Manhattan NY” as the Defendants in the caption of the complaint. In the section of the complaint form in which he is asked to list all defendants, he lists as a single defendant, “The City of New York Police Department, Communications Division, Tape & Records Unit” and “The Commissioner.” (ECF 1, at 2.) He states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred at “multiple places around Manhattan & within precincts in Manhattan.” (Id. at 3.) In response to the question asking when these events happened, Plaintiff states that “the date time & events of the incidents are being witheld & I ask that they are released.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standardized capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff alleges the following:
Within the borough of Brooklyn Ive experienced a lot of police brutality physical & sexual harassment from police officers & life threatening experiences & incidents, & the interception of multiple financial opportunities, such as interviews & business meetings. Ive also experienced several cases of unlawful arrest by police officers, more than ten counts. * The incidents have also led to wrongful hospitalizations due to the police department trying to justify a wrongful arrest.(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered financial damages, back pain, headaches, “various scars,” and hospitalizations that “resulted in false medical diagnosises & medical malpractice.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff requests $10 million in damages, “all footages & information of past arrest,” and “disclosures of all officers that ever arrested” him, and he asks the Court to “verify [his] words with the information in tapes & files.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. He alleges that he is the victim of “police brutality,” “sexual assault,” “unlawful arrests,” and “wrongful hospitalizations,” but he pleads no facts describing any of the specific events giving rise to his claims. For example, he does not allege when or where he was arrested, who arrested him, or any facts suggesting that any such arrest violated his federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff's allegations, even when afforded the solicitude due to pro se submissions, do not provide sufficient factual detail to plausibly suggest that any defendant has violated his federally protected rights. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief many be granted. Because it is unclear whether Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a plausible claim, in light of his pro se status, the Court grants him 60 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
B. The New York City Police Department
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and its precincts because subdivisions of the City of New York, such as the NYPD and its individual precincts, are not entities that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).
Even if the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD and its precincts as being asserted against the City of New York, he still fails to state a claim. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Here, nothing in Plaintiff's complaint suggests that the City of New York has a policy, practice, or procedure that caused a violation of his federal constitutional rights. If Plaintiff has facts suggesting that the City of New York violated his federal constitutional rights, he may replead his claims against the City of New York in his amended complaint.
C. NYPD Commissioner
Plaintiff also appears to name the Commissioner of the NYPD as a defendant. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant's direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official[.]” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that the NYPD Commissioner was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD Commissioner are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). If Plaintiff has facts showing that the Commissioner of the NYPD was personally involved in violating his rights, he may replead his claims against this defendant in his amended complaint.
D. State Law Claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
E. Leave to Replead
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because it is unclear whether Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a plausible claim under Section 1983, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave file an amended complaint detailing his claims.
Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.” The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses this action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to replead his claims under Section 1983 in an amended complaint. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-2906 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order.
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the prescribed time and he cannot show good cause for such failure, the Court will enter judgment dismissing the action for failure to state a claim on which relief many be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.