Opinion
No. 01-03-01252-CV
Opinion delivered January 13, 2005.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Washington County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 00-76.
Adam H. Miller, Stern, Miller Higdon, 4909 Bissonnet St., Suite 100, Bellaire, TX, 77401 for Appellant.
James F. Tyson, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 542257, Houston, TX, 77254-2257 for Appellee.
Evin G. Dugas, Dugas Inselmann, 2303 Ranch Road 620 South, Suite 135 PMB361, Austin, TX, 78734 for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Hupp, appellant, contests the take-nothing judgment rendered after a jury found that it was not Karen Rose's or Millie Peters's negligence that caused the automobile accident that injured Hupp. In two points of error, Hupp argues that (1) the jury's finding that neither Rose nor Peters was negligent is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and (2) under the "alternative liability theory," the burden shifted to Rose and Peters to exculpate themselves. We affirm.
Background
On July 5, 1999, Hupp was a passenger in Rose's car while she was driving eastbound on East Alamo in Brenham, Texas. Rose testified that the traffic light at the intersection of East Alamo and South Market was green when she entered the intersection. At the same time, Peters, who was driving northbound on South Market, entered the intersection. Peters testified that the traffic light on South Market was green when she entered the intersection. The two cars collided at the passenger side of Rose's car. Hupp, who broke a rib in the collision, sued the two drivers.
The evidence introduced at trial established that the traffic light was properly functioning at the time of the collision.
At trial, Hupp testified that he was entitled to recover $2.10 for every breath he took while his broken rib was healing.
With a unanimous verdict, the jury found that neither Rose nor Peters was negligent at the time of the accident. The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment.
Sufficiency
In point of error one, Hupp contends that the jury's answer as to the negligence of Rose and Peters is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly unjust.
In reviewing factual sufficiency, we consider and weigh all of the evidence; we will set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Schwartz v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex.App. 2003, pet. denied). We will not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact. Schwartz, 127 S.W.3d at 121.
At trial, Rose testified as follows:
Q. Okay. You had the green light, right?
A. Yes.
Q. You're certain?
A. Positive.
. . .
Q. That's okay. I guess my question really is: You saw the lights after the accident, did they seem to be in good working order? I mean, they weren't both green at the same time, right? They kept switching back and forth, right? You said in your deposition they were in good working order.
A. Right.
Q. So if you're positive you had the green light, then who caused the accident?
A. I don't know. She said I did and I said she did.
Q. But you're sure you had the green light, right?
A. Yes.
Q. That means [Peters] had to have the red light?
A. I feel she ran through the red light.
. . .
A. Someone had to have a red light.
Q. Somebody had to have the red light. It would be inconceivable that — it's clearly inconceivable that one of you was — it's inconceivable that both of you were not at fault for this accident. One of you had to be at fault for the accident and since you had the green light, it must be Millie, right?
A. Correct.
Q. You're certain of that?
A. I'm positive. And Jim saw a green light, too.
Hupp testified that he did not "know who had the red light."
Peters was not present at trial, but excerpted portions of her deposition were read before the jury. Peters' deposition testimony was as follows:
Q. And you came to the intersection and you saw your light was what color?
A. Green.
. . .
Q. Did you see the green Pontiac Grand Prix coming down Alamo?
A. Yes.
Q. How fast would you say it was going?
A. Well I'm not sure but it was going pretty fast.
. . .
Q. After the accident did you have a chance to look at the lights again?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they appear to be in good working order like the police officer said?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. So there is not an issue in this case in your mind that maybe both — that they were both green at the same time or both red at the same time?
A. I have no reason to believe that.
. . .
Q. You just remember looking up and seeing a green light and moving through?
A. Yes.
Hupp argues that, considering the above testimony, "for a jury to find that NO ONE was negligent when one of the Appellees ran a red light is inconceivable and inequitable."
It is true that testimony was introduced indicating that Rose's light was green when she entered the intersection. However, conflicting evidence of probative force was introduced tending to prove that Peters's light was green thus disproving negligence and causation on Peters's part.
It is the jury's function to decide credibility issues. The court of appeals will uphold the jury's finding where it would not be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust to do so. In the case at bar, the evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict. Hupp simply failed to prove that one of the driver's negligently ran a red light.
Accordingly, we overrule point of error one.
Alternative Liability
In point of error two, Hupp argues that the jury's answer to the negligence question "is against the burden of proof, which shifted to the defendants upon a showing of alternative liability."
"Alternative liability, initially adopted by the California Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), relaxes the plaintiff's burden of identifying the actual tortfeasor and, thus, may allow the plaintiff to prevail when the traditional rules of causation would prevent recovery." Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68-69 (Tex. 1989). Under this theory of liability, which is embodied in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second, when independent acts of negligence are simultaneously committed by two or more tortfeasors and only one act results in injury, the plaintiff is relieved of his burden of proof. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1963). The burden shifts to the defendants to exculpate themselves. Gaulding, 772 S.W.2d at 69.
Assuming without deciding that Texas has adopted the alternative liability theory, Hupp never asserted such a theory in his pleadings or in the jury charge. The failure to raise a complaint at trial to a jury charge waives review of that complaint on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 274.
Hupp waived his complaint, and we overrule point of error two.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.