Opinion
A-13709 0357
02-07-2024
LESLIE ROY HUNTER JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael Barber, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court No. 3AN-19-06999 CR Anchorage, Josie Garton, Judge.
Michael Barber, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Josie Garton, Judge.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Following a jury trial, Leslie Roy Hunter Jr. was convicted of second-degree assault for injuring his sister after she tried to stop him from driving while intoxicated. Hunter was also convicted of fourth-degree assault for threatening the responding officer. Hunter raises two issues on appeal.
AS 11.41.210(a)(2).
AS 11.41.230(a)(3).
First, Hunter's sister testified at trial that Hunter had previously driven while intoxicated, even though the court had instructed her not to mention any other bad acts or crimes that Hunter may have committed in the past. After discussing the issue with the court and the prosecutor, Hunter's attorney stated that he did not want a curative instruction because he did not want to draw further attention to the issue.
On appeal, Hunter now argues that the court erred in failing to give a curative instruction. Hunter acknowledges, however, that his claim should be reviewed under the "invited error" doctrine. Under this doctrine, an error requires reversal only in an "exceptional situation" when "necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Given that defense counsel had a legitimate tactical reason for declining the curative instruction, we conclude that reversal is not required to preserve the integrity of the judicial process or prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Johnson v. State, 328 P.3d 77, 86 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Parson v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 189 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Alaska 2008)).
Second, during closing argument, the prosecutor invoked Occam's razor, a philosophical principle positing that "the best explanation of a condition or phenomenon is the one that is the simplest, i.e., the one that uses the fewest assumptions or hypotheses to adequately explain what is observed." The prosecutor argued that the simplest explanation for the injuries sustained by Hunter's sister was that Hunter was guilty. Immediately after invoking Occam's razor, the prosecutor told the jury, "I'm asking that you find that the State showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Leslie Hunter committed those crimes."
State v. Auliye, 57 P.3d 711, 717 (Alaska App. 2002).
Hunter's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's statement regarding Occam's razor. Instead, defense counsel began his closing argument by directly addressing Occam's razor and arguing that reliance on this principle was "fundamentally flawed" because the jury's duty was "to apply the presumption of innocence in light of all the evidence that you've heard."
On appeal, Hunter argues that it was plain error for the judge to fail to order a mistrial sua sponte because the prosecutor's description of Occam's razor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense and amounted to a "gross mischaracterization of the law." We disagree with this contention. Understood in context, the prosecutor was arguing that any alternative version of events consistent with Hunter's innocence - e.g, that his sister was injured by someone else, or caused her own injuries - was implausible and thus did not create a reasonable doubt where none otherwise existed. Because the prosecutor made clear that the burden remained on the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor's argument did not shift the burden of proof.
See Lewis v. State, 862 P.2d 181, 190 (Alaska App. 1993) (noting that a comment by the State did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant when the prosecutor prefaced the comment by reiterating that the State bore the burden of proof).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.