Opinion
Case No. 94 C 7585
October 10, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jimmie Huff has sued UARCO, Inc., for age discrimination. Huff, who was a supervisor in UARCO's finishing department, says that he was demoted to an hourly position due to his age. Judge Milton Shadur previously granted summary judgment in UARCO's favor, but the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision in 1997. Huff v. UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1997). At the same time, the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge David Coar's entry of summary judgment in favor of UARCO in a similar case brought by another finishing department supervisor, William Schoolman. Id. In January 2000, a jury found in favor of UARCO in Schoolman's case. In March 2000, Huff's case was reassigned to my calendar from that of Judge Shadur. Huff has moved to reconsider a ruling that Judge Shadur made on a motion in limine filed by UARCO, and UARCO has moved for summary judgment.
Background
We start with an overview of the case, taken from the Seventh Circuit's decision. UARCO produces business forms at its Watseka, Illinois plant, which is divided into five departments: composing, preparatory, press, finishing, and warehouse. Huff was promoted to a supervisory position in 1977 and as of 1993 was working as a supervisor in the finishing department. In the fall of 1993, plant manager Ron Trillet decided that the finishing department, which had five supervisors, was top heavy compared to the press department, which had only three, and he decided to demote two finishing department supervisors.
To determine whom to demote, Trillet asked the finishing department's general supervisor Richard Rhodes to rank the five supervisors. He ranked them in the following order: 1) Landry, age 48, excellent; 2) Paro, age 56, above average; 3) Schoolman, age 55, average; 4) Huff, age 56, average; 5) Nasers, age 48, below average. Not satisfied with the results of Rhodes' ranking, Trillet sought input from human resources director Robert Williams, who in turn sought the opinions of Fred Focken and James Reutter, two general supervisors who had no direct contact with Huff or Schoolman. Focken "put in a good word" for Nasers and said that he thought Huff had come to work drunk one night (discovery showed that on that night, Huff had suffered a stroke, which caused him to appear drunk). Reutter had no comment on Huff but said that he felt Schoolman was a poor supervisor.
Nasers was subsequently transferred to the press department as a supervisor, and Dean Schipper, a 51 year old press department supervisor, was transferred to the finishing department. Schoolman and Huff were demoted to line positions. Huff and Schoolman claimed that their demotions were the only "competitive" demotions that had occurred at the plant and that all other demotions had been made on the basis of seniority. They contended that they were demoted due to their age.
The Seventh Circuit's decision
Both Judge Shadur and Judge Coar (to whom Schoolman's case was assigned) previously granted summary judgment in favor of UARCO. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that "although plaintiffs may have a weak case, . . . they have enough of a case on their age discrimination claims to take the claims to a jury." Huff 122 F.3d at 388.
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit summarized Huff's evidence, 122 F.3d at 377, and addressed several of the matters upon which Huff relied to show age discrimination. We list below the eight matters that Huff relied upon and how (if at all) the Seventh Circuit dealt with each:
1) Huff claimed that UARCO's Industrial Relations Manual was the source of company policy for demotions and that the Manual used seniority as the sole criterion. The Seventh Circuit found "that the plain language of the Manual creates a triable issue on whether UARCO violated its own policy on reductions in force for supervisors." Id. at 382.
2) Huff contended that ten of the eleven workers terminated in 1993 were over forty. The Seventh Circuit did not specifically address this.
3) Huff said that in 1993, UARCO sought early retirement of four older management employees. The Seventh Circuit did not specifically address this.
4) Huff argued that contrary to UARCO's claim that it was undergoing a reduction in force, the number of plant employees increased. The Seventh Circuit did not specifically address this.
5) Huff argued that Trillet (the decision maker) and another UARCO representative named Wilson had made age-biased comments during union negotiations. The Seventh Circuit concluded that such statements, "when considered in conjunction with other evidence," could support an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 385.
6) Huff claimed that when UARCO began to recall laid-off union workers, it failed to recall older workers with more seniority contrary to its contractual obligations. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "in combination with plaintiffs' other evidence," this evidence required a trial. Id. at 386.
7) Huff said that after the demotions, a younger worker with less seniority was promoted to supervisor. The Seventh Circuit did not specifically address this.
8) Finally, Huff argued that even though supervisors were interchangeable between departments, the company only ranked finishing department supervisors, leaving younger supervisors with less seniority unconsidered for demotion. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Huff had "raised a genuine issue about interchangeability, and consequently, in combination with other evidence, have raised a genuine issue about pretext." Id. at 387.
The present motions
UARCO has moved for summary judgment, arguing that later developments make it clear that six of the eight items discussed by the Seventh Circuit (items 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8) actually are untrue, without support, or have no bearing on the issues in this case; one of the items (item 1) was ruled inadmissible by Judge Shadur in an in limine ruling after remand; and the last (item 5) was a factor that the Seventh Circuit said was significant only in combination with other evidence — evidence that is now lacking.In response, Huff does not challenge UARCO on items 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, or 8, instead training his guns on the other two. He argues that Judge Shadur's in limine ruling is contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision on appeal and seeks reconsideration of that ruling. Huff argues that if I vacate Judge Shadur's in limine ruling, item 5 — the evidence that the Seventh Circuit said was significant only in combination with other evidence — once again becomes significant, and that these two matters together require a trial. I deal first with Huff s motion for reconsideration.
Huff's motion for reconsideration
Following remand from the Seventh Circuit, Schoolman's case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for UARCO. Based on testimony by Huff during Schoolman's trial, UARCO sought an in limine ruling from Judge Shadur that the Industrial Relations Manual — the primary evidence upon which the Seventh Circuit had relied in reversing Judge Shadur's earlier summary judgment ruing — was inadmissible in this case. Judge Shadur agreed with UARCO and excluded the Manual (more later on the grounds for that ruling). Huff v. UARCO, Inc., No. 94 C 7585 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999).
Huff now seeks reconsideration of Judge Shadur's in limine ruling. UARCO argues that this is not cricket; it says that Huff agreed not to use the reassignment of the case to my calendar as an excuse to seek reconsideration. Determination of this issue requires a fuller exposition of the circumstances that led to reassignment of this case from Judge Shadur.
This case was reassigned to me in exchange for a patent infringement case that was transferred from my calendar to Judge Shadur's: Nilssen v. Magnetek, Inc., No. 98 C 2229. Judge Shadur had an earlier-filed case involving the same patents, same attorneys, and same plaintiff (but different defendants), and he and I agreed that having one judge preside over both cases would avoid inconsistent determinations of common issues, including among things interpretation of the patents. The Court's procedures concerning reassignment of a case by agreement permits the receiving judge to cause a case to be reassigned to the sending judge. See N.D. Ill. IOP 13(d). Judge Shadur selected the present case to be reassigned to me in return for Nilssen v. Magnetek. UARCO says that when Judge Shadur advised the parties of the impending reassignment, he stated that the reassignment should not be used as an occasion to revisit his rulings, and that both parties agreed to this. It argues that primarily for this reason, I should deny reconsideration of Judge Shadur's in limine ruling.
I disagree. Judge Shadur's in limine ruling would have been subject to reconsideration by him if the case had not been reassigned; interlocutory rulings are always subject to change prior to entry of judgment. The fortuity of reassignment should not be used to prevent plaintiff from asking me to do what Judge Shadur undeniably could have done.
Just as importantly, what Huff is arguing is that Judge Shadur's ruling is contrary to the Seventh Circuit's prior ruling. If I decline to revisit the matter and Huff turns out to be right, another remand is guaranteed. Under the circumstances, it makes no sense for me to refuse to revisit the issue.
Judge Shadur relied on testimony by Huff at Schoolman's first trial following remand (which ended in a hung jury) to conclude that the Manual was inadmissible. In that testimony, Huff stated that the Manual did not apply to his demotion. See Nov. 18, 1999 slip op. at 10-11. Though Judge Shadur acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit had implicitly concluded the Manual was admissible, see id. at 13-14, he concluded that Huff's testimony constituted an admission that the Manual did not apply, a new development he believed compelled a conclusion that the Manual was irrelevant and inadmissible.
Though there is no question that later developments may warrant revisiting earlier rulings, including those made by higher courts, I disagree with Judge Shadur regarding the effect of Huff's Schoolman testimony. Read in context, what Huff said was that based on the wording of the Manual itself — in particular the fact that it did not refer to "demotions" — it did not apply to UARCO's decision to demote him. See slip op. at 10-11 (quoting testimony). But the Seventh Circuit read the same language and held that there was "enough ambiguity in the express language of the Manual to create a triable issue on whether the terms of the Manual apply to line supervisors such as Schoolman and Huff." Huff, 122 F.3d at 381. There is no indication that Huff is in any better position than the Court of Appeals or anyone else to read the Manual and determine what it means; indeed, prior to Schoolman's second trial, Judge Coar precluded Huff from testifying again about the meaning of the Manual, concluding that he had no foundation upon which to do so. The Seventh Circuit did not require foundational testimony by Huff in concluding that the Manual was admissible; conversely, Huff's conclusion that the Manual does not apply — what one might call "anti-foundational" testimony — does not render it inadmissible.
Under the circumstances, I believe that to uphold Judge Shadur's ruling would be contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision in this case. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that the Manual is admissible based on its own language, and no development since that time undermines that conclusion. For these reasons, I grant Huff's motion for reconsideration and vacate Judge Shadur's in limine order of November 18, 1999.
UARCO's motion for summary judgment
My decision to vacate Judge Shadur's in limine ruling concerning the Manual undermines a major premise of UARCO's summary judgment motion. Because the Manual is admissible at trial, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "the plain language of the Manual creates a triable issue on whether UARCO violated its own policy on reductions in force for supervisors," Huff, 122 F.3d at 382, still holds true. It is undisputed that an employer's violation of its policies is evidence from which a jury can conclude that the employer's proffered legitimate reason for its actions is a pretext. See, e.g., Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992); Nair v. Bank of America Illinois, 991 F. Supp. 940, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1997). And that is not all that Huff has; he can also rely on Trillet and Wilson's allegedly discriminatory remarks made in the context of union negotiations. In its opening brief, UARCO addressed these comments only by stating that "the Seventh Circuit recognized that the comments standing alone are not enough to get Huff to a trial," arguing that since that was all Huff had left, summary judgment was required. See UARCO SJ Mem. at 14. But I have now held that Huff indeed has other evidence: the Manual. For that reason, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that Trillet and Wilson's comments, "when considered in conjunction with other evidence, could support an inference of discriminatory intent . . .," Huff, 122 F.3d at 385, remains applicable. The fact that the jury in Schoolman's case found in UARCO's favor does not change this; in addition to the fact that that decision is not binding on Huff as a matter of res judicata, there is no way of knowing what that jury thought about Trillet's and Wilson's comments.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of Judge Shadur's order barring the industrial relations manual [Docket Item 89-1] is granted. Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment [Item 91-1] is denied. The case remains set for trial on January 8, 2001. The Court directs the parties to file an updated and revised final pretrial order, in conformity with Local Rule 16.1, on or before November 17, 2000. The case is set for final pretrial conference on December 13, 2000 at 4:30 p.m.