Opinion
Civil File No. 99-1031 (PAM/JGL)
November 26, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case arises from Plaintiff Tzuli Joseph Huang's suit against Defendant Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company ("3M") for employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et seq. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff has stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Counts Five and Six of his Complaint, alleging retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA. Accordingly, the Court will not address those claims.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tzuli Joseph Huang worked for 3M as a researcher from 1983 to 1999. During this period, Huang allegedly received positive performance evaluations, and in 1989 he was promoted from a T-3 level researcher to a T-4 level researcher. Huang spent the last seven years of his career at 3M working full-time in the Traffic Control Materials Division ("TCM"). He was assigned to the Durable Signing Laboratory ("DS Lab") where he tried to develop a dew-resistant coating that could be applied to traffic signs to improve their visibility under foggy and dewy conditions.
3M alleges that by late 1997 Huang had not developed a market-ready dew-resistant coating. In March 1998, 3M assigned Jamie Ojeda, another researcher, to the dew-resistant project ("DRP") on a half-time basis. Huang estimates that in the fall of 1998 he was still at least three months and several million dollars away from developing a market-ready version of the dew-resistant coating. (See Huang Dep. at 197-201.)
In September 1998, TCM implemented a reduction in force ("RIF"). As part of that process, John Stephan, the Director of the DS Lab, recommended to his supervisor, Tom Chaffin, which projects in his rea should be cancelled and which positions should be eliminated. (See Neely Aff. at ¶ 2.) Stephan asked Mark Fiegen, a supervisor in the DS Lab, to identify the lowest priority projects in the Lab. Although the DRP had been considered a high priority project as late as March 1998, Fiegen identified it in September 1998 as one of two projects that was low in priority. (See Janulis Dep. at 259-60.) The DRP was allegedly considered a low priority project because the development of a commercially viable product was deemed years away and because the European market potential for such a product had dropped dramatically. (See id.)
Based on Stephan's recommendation, Chaffin cancelled the DRP and eliminated twenty-five positions, including Huang's. Pursuant to 3M's policy, Huang and all the other impacted employees were placed on an unassigned list and given up to six months to find another position at 3M. Huang claims that he applied for more than 20 jobs within 3M but received only five interviews and no job offers. 3M terminated Huang's employment on March 22, 1999. At the time, Huang was 50 years old.
Huang has now filed this suit alleging race, national origin, and age discrimination in violation of both federal and state law.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is only proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Unigroup, Inc. v. O'Rourke Storage Transfer Co., 980 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials and must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). However, because discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence, courts are more deferential to the non-moving party alleging discrimination. Webb v. Garlick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1996).
B. Huang's Claims
Haung's discrimination claims, whether under Title VII, the ADEA, or the MHRA, are analyzed using the same framework. See Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 109 F.3d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994) (Title VII analysis applies to ADEA claims); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996) (Title VII analysis applies to claims under section 1981)); Henenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying principles of Title VII analysis to MHRA claims because of the substantial similarities between the statutes); Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 368 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. 1986) (analysis for MHRA claims is equivalent to analysis for Title VII claims); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (same).
Because Huang has no direct evidence of discrimination, his claims must be analyzed under the ubiquitous burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Russell v. Men's Wearhouse, Inc., 170 F.3d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 1999). As an initial matter, Haung must establish a prima facie case of discrimination or face dismissal of his claims. In the context of a RIF, he must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he met the applicable job qualifications; (3) he was discharged; and (4) there is some additional evidence that a prohibited criterion such as age, race, or ethnic origin was a factor in his termination. Herrero, 109 F.3d at 483-84; Ahmed v. Am. Red Cross, 218 F.3d 932, 933 (8th Cir. 2000).
If Haung establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the burden shifts to 3M to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Haung's termination. If 3M successfully produces such a reason, the burden shifts back to Haung to establish that 3M's articulated justification is a mere pretext for discrimination and that illegal discrimination was "a motivating reason" for 3M's action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Coffman v. Tracker Marine, 141 F.3d 1241, 1245 (1998). While the inquiry into pretext is similar to the "additional showing"necessary to prove a prima facie case, it is not identical. See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1995). In order to establish pretext, a plaintiff must not only show that the defendant's articulated explanation is false or incorrect but also that the explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Hutson, 63 F.3d at 777 (citations omitted).
In this case, 3M does not seriously dispute that Huang satisfies the first three prongs of his prima facie case. Rather, it contends that Huang has failed to provide any additional showing that age, race, or ethnic origin were factors in his termination. Even if Huang has made out a prima facie case, however, 3M contends that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for placing Huang on the unassigned list, because he was placed on this list as part of a RIF. 3M claims that it implemented the RIF in an effort to improve the TCM's financial performance. (See Def.'s Ex. J, K.) TCM management identified projects which it determined were low-priority projects and cut funding to these projects in order to focus its efforts on the best opportunities available. Accordingly, 3M argues, and the Court agrees, that even if Huang establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts back to him to show that 3M's proffered justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.
Huang fails in his submissions to differentiate between his burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and his more substantial burden of showing that 3M's nondiscriminatory reason for his termination is pretext. The Court will therefore analyze whether the evidence that Huang offers satisfies either burden.
Huang essentially presents three categories of evidence which he claims prove that his age, race, or ethnic origin were factors in 3M's decision to terminate his employment: (1) a racist statement made by a co-worker; (2) statistical evidence regarding age discrimination; and (3) evidence that Gene Janulis, a manager in charge of Mark Fiegen, was hostile to Huang and another Asian employee. These categories of evidence are insufficient both individually and in combination to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if they were sufficient to establish a prima facie case, however, they are inadequate to show that 3M's nondiscriminatory justification is a pretext for discrimination.
1. Racist Statement by Co-Worker
Huang claims that Mark Leverty, a member of Janulis' group, made several comments to Huang about an alleged "Chinese Mafia" within 3M. (See Huang Dep. at 109-10.) At least one time, Janulis was only a few feet away. (See id. at 110.)
Huang argues that biased comments of co-workers, even if considered stray remarks and even when made by non-decision-makers, constitute relevant circumstantial evidence that may give rise to an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Fisher v. Pharmacia Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that stray remarks in combination with other evidence may give rise to an inference of discrimination).
3M contends that Fisher is distinguishable because in that case the comments were made by management-level employees who had input into employment decisions.
It is too big a step from recognizing inferences reasonably drawn in Fisher concerning comments of management level employees that were not causally related to the discharge, to recognition of any [discriminatory] comment, even if made by only a co-worker with no demonstrated relationship to management decisions, as supportive of an inference of discriminatory motivation in the decision at issue.
Richards v. Farner-Bocken Co., 145 F. Supp.2d 978, 997 (N.D.Iowa 2001).
The Court agrees that such comments, in the absence of additional evidence, are legally inadequate to show that a prohibited criterion was a factor in Haung's eventual termination. As is discussed below, Huang does not offer any additional evidence. Accordingly, these comments are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or pretext.
2. Statistical Evidence
Huang notes that 83 percent of 3M employees on unassigned status as of September 17, 1998, were over the age of 40. (See Pl.'s Ex. 5.) Additionally, Huang points out that his only immediate co-worker, Jamie Ojeda, who was under the age of 40, was not put on the unassigned list. Huang argues that these statistics may not be conclusive evidence of "discrimination in itself, but [they are] surely the kind of fact[s] which could cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow, and proceed to assess the employer's explanation for this outcome." Lewis v. Areospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988)).
These statistics are inconsequential, however, because both employees who were placed on the unassigned list and those who were not averaged more than 40 years in age. Furthermore, the fact that Ojeda was not put on the unassigned list is irrelevant because Ojeda and Huang were not similarly situated. See Herrero, 109 F.3d at 485 (noting that comparison to other employees is valid only if the employees are similarly situated to the plaintiff) (citations omitted); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d at 777 (same) (citations omitted). Although Ojeda was transferred to another project instead of being placed on the unassigned list, he was not working on the DRP full-time. See Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997) ("full-time employees are simply not similarly situated to part-time employees"). Accordingly, these statistics are insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish either prima facie evidence that Haung's age was a factor in his eventual termination or that 3M's justification for that termination was a pretext for age discrimination.
3. Janulis' Hostility to Huang and Another Asian Employee
Huang claims that Janulis repeatedly singled him out for unwarranted criticism. For example, in 1994 Huang wrote a memorandum on the effects of dew on 3M products used in traffic signs. Janulis recalled the memorandum, edited it, and then distributed the edited version. Apparently, Janulis stated that the memorandum was faulty and contained many mistakes. Huang contends that this characterization is contrary to the evidence and that Janulis' edited version of the memorandum primarily fixed grammatical errors and deletions. (See Huang Dep. at 47.)
Additionally, Huang claims that Janulis blocked his promotion to a T-5 level researcher in 1996. Janulis said that Huang was not known and recognized within the 3M technical community as an expert in a specific technical area. (See Def.'s Ex. G.) Haung claims again that this is contrary to the evidence, citing Fiegen's assessment of Haung as an "expert within his field in 3M." (See Pl.'s Ex. 6.)
In 1997, Huang claims that Janulis singled him out for criticism, blaming him for the lack of progress in the DRP, despite the fact that the project was collaborative. Huang also contends that he complained to his superiors several times that Janulis was treating him unfairly and sought to transfer out of Janulis' management area. (See Pl.'s Ex. 7.) His complaints went unanswered, however, and he was not transferred.
Finally, Huang notes that Kim Phan, another Asian employee under Janulis' management, received an unsatisfactory job rating and transferred to another division in 1996. (See Huang Dep. at 56-59; Janulis Dep. at 322-23.)
3M responds by first arguing that Janulis was not the person who made the decision to place Huang on the unassigned list. Even if Janulis was the decision-maker, however, 3M contends there is no evidence that Janulis had any discriminatory animus against Huang. Huang does not debate that the memorandum which Janulis recalled had grammatical errors, and this fact alone could have accounted for its recall.
Additionally, 3M claims that the fact that Janulis did not support Huang's promotion proves nothing. The promotion that Huang sought had specific requirements which he did not satisfy. Huang's disagreement with Janulis' decision is not evidence of discriminatory animus. See Herrero, 109 F.3d at 485 (noting that courts are not "super-personnel departments" reviewing the wisdom or fairness of business decisions).
Finally, 3M discounts Huang's claim that Phan was discriminated against by noting that the performance evaluation was not written by Janulis and that Huang has not presented any evidence that Janulis played any role in Phan's decision to accept an offer of a different position at 3M.
The Court finds 3M's arguments persuasive. Huang presents no evidence other than his own speculation suggesting that Janulis was a decision-maker. Even Janulis was a decision-maker or part of the decision-making process, however, the evidence that Huang seeks to introduce is not sufficient to allow a jury to infer that Janulis possessed impermissible discriminatory animus against Huang or people of Asian ancestry in general. Assuming that Huang's allegations are true, they fail to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding 3M's motivation for placing Huang on the unassigned list and eventually terminating him.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court determines that Haung has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if he has established a prima facie case of discrimination, however, he has failed to meet his more substantial burden of showing that 3M's proffered nondiscriminatory justification is a pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's Doc. No. 31) is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.