Opinion
C. A. 9:20-cv-3479-DCN-MHC
03-06-2024
Alicia Holland, Plaintiff, v. Beaufort County and James Beckert, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Beaufort County, as well as against Defendant James Beckert, in his individual capacity and his official capacity as the elected Auditor of Beaufort County. ECF No. 28.
Before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) a Motion filed by Defendant Beckert, ECF No. 114; and (2) a Motion filed by Defendant Beaufort County, ECF No. 115. Plaintiff filed Responses in Opposition to the Motions, ECF Nos. 120 & 121, and Defendants each filed a Reply, ECF Nos. 124 & 126. The Motions are ripe for review.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motions be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims and that the state law claims be remanded to state court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendant Beaufort County
Beaufort County operates under a council-administrator form of government. Under this statutory system, council members are elected in the general election, SC Code Ann. § 4-9-610, and the council “employ[s] an administrator who shall be the administrative head of the county government and shall be responsible for the administration of all the departments of the county government which the council has the authority to control,” Id. § 4-9-620. However, “the county administrator shall exercise no authority over any elected officials of the county whose offices were created either by the Constitution or by the general law of the State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-650. The Beaufort County Auditor, the Beaufort County Treasurer, and the County Council members are all popularly elected officials of the County. See ECF No. 115-7 at 40:9-19; ECF No. 115 at 6. Former County Administrator Gary Kubic testified that the Auditor's office and the Treasurer's office are “hand in glove” and “cannot work independently and produce a product that satisfies the needs of the taxpayer.” ECF No. 115-7 at 40:9-19.
The South Carolina Code provides, in relevant part, the following mechanism for the suspension and removal of a county auditor:
When any county auditor shall, during a recess of the Senate, be shown, by evidence satisfactory to the Governor, to be guilty of misconduct in office or crime or for any reason shall become incapable or legally disqualified to perform his duties, in any such case and in no other the Governor may suspend such officer and designate some suitable person to perform, temporarily, the duties of such office until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted upon by the Senate.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-39-30.
B. Plaintiff Alicia Holland
Plaintiff began working for Beaufort County as a financial analyst in 2010. ECF No. 120-11 at 18:13-25. She was promoted to Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in 2013. Id. at 19:8-21:15. As CFO, Plaintiff was responsible for the general ledger; consulting the County's financial documents or data provided by each department to calculate rates and analyze Beaufort County's revenue; calculating the County's millage rates from data provided by the County's Auditor, Treasurer, and Accessor; and developing the County's budget. Id. at 22:14-24; ECF No. 28 at ¶ 12. As CFO, she reported to the County Administrator. ECF No. 120-11 at 51:2-52:12. Plaintiff remained as CFO until her resignation, effective May 1, 2020.
Gary Kubic was the County Administrator at the time Plaintiff became CFO until his retirement in 2017. Josh Gruber then filled the role of interim County Administrator until he left in 2018, at which time Tom Keaveny assumed the role of interim County Administrator for about six months, after which John Weaver became the interim County Administrator until Ashley Jacobs was hired in April 2019 to be the County Administrator. Jacobs was still in that role at the time of Plaintiff's resignation. ECF No. 120-11 at 51:2-52:12.
C. Defendant James Beckert
James Beckert was elected in 2014 to be the Beaufort County Auditor, took office in 2015, and was re-elected to that position in 2018. See ECF No. 120-11 at 21-22. Beckert remained in that position until July 1, 2023.
D. Defendant Beckert's Interactions with Plaintiff
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Beckert did not understand “basic tax and mathematics principles” and made her job “unnecessarily difficult by attempting to audit her work at every turn.” ECF No. 28 at 3 ¶ 15 & n.3. She points to letters written by Beckert on February 22, 2018, to the County's external auditors, in which Beckert asserted that the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports contained material misrepresentations and violated South Carolina law. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Although the letters reference Treasurer Maria Walls, they do not mention Plaintiff, see ECF Nos. 28-2, 28-4; nonetheless, Plaintiff believes these letters were attacks on her because Plaintiff is the person responsible for signing the Reports and maintaining the County's general ledger, see ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 16-17.
She also alleges that in May 2019, “Beckert took it upon himself, without proficiency in tax or mathematics, to calculate the value of a mil and forward his calculations to the County's Public Service Districts,” but “his calculations were incorrect” and contradicted Plaintiff's calculations, which caused “a mass state of confusion” and required Plaintiff to justify and defend her calculations. ECF No. 28 at ¶ 22. On May 6, 2019, Beckert gave a presentation at the Finance Committee Workshop regarding information, including Plaintiff's spreadsheets, related to Fiscal Year 2019 Reassessment Data and Rollback Millage Values. Id. at ¶ 23; ECF No. 28-10. Beckert accused Plaintiff of not taking depreciation into account, but Plaintiff maintains that she used data provided by the Treasurer, Auditor, and Accessor to calculate the millage values, such that any failure to take depreciation into account would have been Beckert's mistake. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of this presentation, she had to defend her work to the Beaufort County Council Members, the Beaufort County School District Board, and County Administrator Ashley Jacobs. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24; see ECF Nos. 28-11, 28-12. In October 2019, Plaintiff had to defend her work again following an email from Beckert to Beaufort County Council in which he questioned Plaintiff's millage calculations. ECF No. 28 at ¶ 29; ECF No. 28-15.
Plaintiff's office was located at the Beaufort Industrial Village, ECF No. 120-11 at 47:10- 11, while Beckert's office was located in the County Administration Building, see ECF No. 120-6 at 10:8-13. Plaintiff testified that her role as CFO required interaction with the Auditor's office to some degree, but she avoided in-person communication with Beckert “because of how hostile he was towards [her].” ECF No. 120-11 at 62:25-63:3, 105:8-14. She explained that 70-75% of her communication with Beckert was via email, and she would have face-to-face meetings with him only when she came to the County Administration Building. Id. at 141:2-9.
She testified that Beckert began his “attacks” on her in 2017. ECF No. 120-11 at 53:21- 22. Plaintiff further testified that the subject matter of Beckert's attacks and criticisms were issues related to County finances and financial documents and that they “all pertain[ed] to our jobs, what his accusations were about.” Id. at 108:7-24 (further testifying that she could not identify a specific instance where Beckert attacked her in another way); see Id. at 107:19-22 (testifying that Beckert “constantly” accused her of “providing incorrect information or telling [her] he had different data than [she] had”); Id. at 140:1-11 (testifying that Beckert's harassment was “nonstop,” “relentless,” and “the same nonsense over and over and over,” that “his accusations were the same garbage . . . that her “work is incorrect, that things are being done wrong, that . . . everything [she does] is wrong [and] poor performance on the job”).
According to Plaintiff, Beckert “constantly e-mailed, asking for meetings for me to explain information to him that was out of my purview to explain to him,” such as tax increment financing. ECF No. 120-11 at 84:11-19. She further testified that he would holler at her across a parking lot to try to talk to her, block her exit from meeting rooms to try to force her to talk to him, and get up at County Council meetings, school district meetings, and finance committee meetings to say that there was fraud and illegal activity and that Plaintiff's work and calculations were incorrect. Id. at 85:21-86:13; 107:2-13.
Plaintiff complained to Councilman Paul Sommerville about Beckert's job performance and harassment. ECF No. 120 - Ex. 8, 17:14 - 17:17; 23:20 - 24:12. In October 2019, County Council member Chris Hervochon sent an email to Plaintiff and others in which he tried to set up a monthly lunch meeting with Plaintiff, Beckert, County Administrator Jacobs, councilmember Hervochon, and councilmember Joseph Passiment to “facilitate[e] teamwork.” ECF Nos. 28-14 at 2; 120-4 at 62:25-63:18; 120-11 at 103:25-105:7. When Plaintiff received the email, she felt that they were trying to force her to interact with Beckert. ECF No. 120-11 at 104:20-24. She never attended the meeting and does not know whether the meeting was an attempt to accommodate her and address the issues she was concerned about. Id. at 104:20-105:7.
On April 20, 2020, she submitted her letter of resignation to County Administrator Jacobs, in which she stated, “The most recent three (3) years have been intolerable and unfortunately have resulted in undue stress and medical issues beyond my control.” ECF No. 28-1 at 2. She later told Councilman Sommerville that “Jim Beckert and all of his nonsense that was entertained by certain council members is the root of what le[d] to the majority of my stress . . . [and] interfered with my ability to do my job.” Id. at 1.
E. Defendant Beckert's Interactions with Other County Employees and Officials
Other Beaufort County employees and officials also perceived Beckert's conduct to be difficult and harassing. County Deputy Attorney Thomas Keaveny (male) testified that Beckert is “difficult, I mean with everybody, and in some instances, I would say yes, difficult to the point of being abusive.” ECF No. 120-7 at 9:13-18. He further testified that the following people complained to him that Beckert was abusive towards them: Plaintiff, Treasurer Maria Walls (female), former County Administrator Gary Kubic (male), Assessor Ebony Sanders (female), former deputy administrator Chris Inglese (male), and former interim County Administrator John Weaver (male). Id. at 22:15-25.
Suzanne Gregory (female) was the Human Resources Director for Beaufort County for fifteen years until her departure in February 2020. ECF No. 120-15 at 6:13-7:14. She testified that men and women complained that Beckert was rude to them. Id. at 33:13-34:4 (recalling conversations Beckert had with two men that were “very confrontational”). She had multiple conversations about Beckert's rudeness with Plaintiff, Melissa Beere, Monica Spells, Maria Walls, Ebony Sanders, and Katherine Mead, but she does not recall any of them complaining of any other behavior beyond rudeness. Id. at 30:5-34:9. She does not recall anyone indicating he was threatening them, but she and others described his behavior as odd, noting specifically that Beckert would stare at her when she said hello in the hallway. Id. at 67:10-68:5. Ms. Gregory testified that his rudeness in emails and his air of superiority were reasons that the two of them had an adversarial relationship. Id. at 68:20-69:10. She does not remember ever having anyone come into her office and file a grievance against Beckert during her tenure as the HR director. Id. at 75:22- 25.
Gary Kubic was the Beaufort County Administrator from January 2004 until his retirement in September 2017. ECF No. 120-6 at 6:15-22. He testified as follows:
“But it is my definite opinion predicated on what I witnessed and what I saw in terms of how Mr. Beckert treated others, not only his employees, but other employees throughout the County, I would interpret those actions towards those employees that he was harassing them. His anger, his - the method, the way he talked to them clearly did not comport with what would be considered reasonable and appropriate conduct in a workplace.”ECF No. 120-6 at 125:17-126:7. Kubic testified that Beckert would stand on the sidewalk and stare at him through Kubic's office window at least once or twice a week, which Kubic reported to the sheriff a few times. Id. at 14:19-15:3, 16:23-17:9 (further testifying that Beckert stared into his window twenty to thirty times). Treasurer Maria Walls told Kubic that she also felt that Beckert was staring at her through her office window, and Kubic advised her to report it to the sheriff. Id. at 15:4-11. Kubic also authorized installation of security cameras to video those occurrences and for the general security of the building itself, id., and he told his staff member Monica Spells not to give Beckert access to the County Administrator's side of the building through the card swipe, Id. at 15:12-21. Planning Director Tony Criscitiello told Kubic that Beckert stared at him, and Monica Spells told Kubic that she felt uncomfortable when Beckert stared at her in the hall. Id. at 20:23-21:15. Deputy Attorney Keaveny also testified that he had noticed Beckert staring at times, which Keaveny described as “unprofessional,” “demeaning,” “inappropriate,” and “intimidating.” ECF No. 120-7 at 92:24 - 93:5.
Plaintiff complained to Kubic about her conflicts with Beckert regarding budgetary management and systems management. ECF No. 120-6 at 24:12-22. According to Kubic, Beckert accused both Plaintiff and Kubic of violating policies and laws, and “Beckert basically had disagreements along those lines with almost everybody outside the auditor's office.” Id. at 25:11- 17, 29:2-10. Kubic testified that Beckert's accusations regarding Plaintiff and Kubic were untrue, and Kubic took offense that Beckert would go behind Kubic and Plaintiff's “backs and directly, either through e-mail or conversations, discuss his viewpoints regarding [Kubic's] performance and [Plaintiff's] performance with [Kubic's] bosses who were county council members.” Id. at 25:18-26:13, 29:7-10. Kubic testified that after a period of time, it became impossible for him to sit and talk with Beckert. Id. at 30:5-12.
David Cadd worked with Beckert as a deputy auditor for Beaufort County from August 2015, until Beckert dismissed him from the position in January 2021. ECF No. 120-12 at 6:13-17, 7:9-25. In that role, Cadd was second in command in the Auditor's office, and he interacted daily with Beckert. Id. at 8:20-22, 9:13-19. After Cadd was dismissed, he filed a hostile work environment grievance against Beckert. Id. at 9:25-11:13.
Cadd testified that Beckert “felt like he should have the last word” and that he was “right in most situations, and everybody else was wrong.” Id. at 50:24-51:1. According to Cadd, Beckert would give County Council the numbers he thought were correct, and “he said his goal was to ensure that the numbers that the county had were going to be wrong.” Id. at 110:17 - 111:5. Cadd testified that Beckert was “very confrontational with everybody outside and in the office,” Id. at 51:11-13; that he had issues with people who were in positions of authority, Id. at 65:23-25; that Beckert had problems with Mr. Kubic, Mr. Eric Greenway, Mr. Keaveny, Mr. Gruber, all of whom served as County Administrator on a permanent or interim basis, Id. at 61:21-64:22; and that the women with whom Beckert seemed to have problems were the women in positions of authority, Id. at 49:21-50:1. He also testified that Beckert felt like the County would support Treasurer Maria Walls more than Beckert in his requests or work, so he would photograph her and “would go outside while she was talking on the phone because he knew it would make her feel uncomfortable[,] . . . and he would come in and laugh.” Id. at 39:18 - 40:13.
Regarding Mr. Greenway, Cadd noted that Beckert and Greenway used to talk every day before Greenway became County Administrator but that they started “butting heads” after Greenway was in that role. Id. at 65:16-22. Greenway likewise testified that before he became County Administrator, Beckert's interactions with him, which occurred once every week or two, were cordial and nice, but after he became Administrator, Beckert's demeanor towards him changed, and he found Beckert difficult, unnecessarily demanding, and rude on occasion. ECF No. 120-5 at 22:4-23:21.
Ebony Sanders has been a Beaufort County employee for over twenty years and has been the County Assessor, a non-elected position, since January 2018. ECF No. 120-9 at 6:2-25. The conflicts between Sanders and Beckert began only after Sanders became the Assessor. Id. at 8:18- 25; see ECF No. 120-4 at 21:7 - 21:21 (former County Administrator Jacobs testifying that the conflict between Beckert and Sanders started only after Sanders became Assessor). Sanders testified that Beckert would intimidate and bully her face-to-face and in written communications by making accusations against her, her staff, and the department that were not true. ECF No. 120-9 at 9:23-10:15. He falsely accused her of being a racist and of not having the ability to do her job, and he bullied her staff, including “one particular gentleman who has autism.” Id. at 11:12-17. Sanders described Beckert's conduct as “demeaning” and “unbearable at times.” Id. at 27:18-19. On July 2, 2020, Sanders filed with the Beaufort County Human Resources Department a “formal complaint (grievance) and a request for an investigation concerning the repeated discrimination, harassment, bullying, and defamation that I have experienced by the County Auditor, Jim Beckert.” ECF No. 115-11. Sanders testified that after she filed the grievance, the County took actions to help her limit her interactions with Beckert. ECF No. 115-10 at 6.
Ashley Jacobs (female) was the Beaufort County Administrator from April 15, 2019, until around October 2020. ECF No. 120-4 at 12:5-11; see ECF No. 120-5 at 7:11-14, 10:8-19. She found Beckert friendly, polite, and nice when she met him in March 2019, but their relationship became strained beginning in June 2019. ECF No. 120-4 at 15:8-16:7. When asked to give examples of times Beckert attempted to intimidate or harass her, Jacobs testified as follows:
So Jim frequently wanted to meet with me, and when we would meet, he was just -- he would talk and talk and talk about whatever he thought was wrong and needed to be changed and differently, and he was just -- he was just -- he was very creepy in the meetings. I don't -- I don't know any other word to describe it. He was just very -- I felt very uncomfortable in his presence.
He is quite a bit taller than I am, and he would - he'd, like, stand over me if we met in the conference room. Sometimes he would have his phone out, and Maria and Alicia have told me that he has secretly recorded them previously, and so I was very concerned about that. And I asked him a couple of sometimes, you know, “Jim, are you recorded me?” And he would say, “No, of course not.” But I was really uncomfortable because he always seemed to have his phone, you know, like, poised. It just seemed odd, and so after a while, I told him I -- he couldn't bring his phone into meetings with me.
But sometimes he would come up to me in the parking lot and kind of -- kind of stand over me and say things. He -- he liked to -- he liked to convey to me that he knew information, that he had insider information, so that he was privy to information that the council members knew.
And he -- there were -- there were several times when we were having meetings and - with council, and he would burst into the room, and he wasn't on the agenda, but council would let him speak, and then he would just kind of go on and on about how -- how everything that we were doing was wrong, and he was right.
And there was one other incident where he -- he sent a letter. I believe he sent it to -- to a set of -- there was a general set of -- or a specific set of taxpayers. He sent a message to them and told them that Maria and I needed to be investigated by the FBI.
But overall his demeanor was just very hostile. He was -- he was not pleasant to be around. I felt very uncomfortable around him.Id. at 26:19 - 28:17.
Jacobs testified that Plaintiff, Maria Walls, Ebony Sanders, Monica Spells, and Tonya Crosby talked to her about Beckert's behavior and how they could work together to “handle Jim” and support each other. Id. at 17:14-25:10, 142:7 - 142:18. According to Jacobs, Hayes Williams (male) in the finance office found Beckert difficult and irrational. Id. at 128:25-18. Jacobs testified that she would define “the Jim Beckert problem” as “his incompetence as the auditor and his disruptive behavior in terms of questioning everyone and changing things without authority and, you know, refusing to do what the council asked him to do and just harassing people, specifically, you know, a group of women who were in positions of authority.” Id. at 189:15-190:5. She says that she told councilmembers that “Jim doesn't make sense[,] . . . that the things he asks us to do or that he complains about and what he wants done, none of this makes sense to us,” that he is “not rational,” does not know what he is doing, and is “very problematic for all of the female employees.” Id. at 126:24 - 127:10.
F. Beaufort County's Actions Related to the Auditor
In 2016, County Attorney Keaveny and County Administrator Kubic contacted the South Carolina Department of Revenue to request guidance regarding issues related to the duties of the elected County Auditor and County Treasurer. ECF No. 115-4. In 2018, Beaufort County Assistant Attorney Christopher Inglese contacted the South Carolina Attorney General on behalf of County Council regarding a possible referendum for the November 2018 general ballot asking voters if they would like to change the form of government to the Council-Management form of government, which would permit County Council to change the Auditor's position to an appointed position. ECF No. 115-4 at 27-28.
At some point in 2020, County Administrator Jacobs, the County Council, and the County Attorney developed a policy “that said that Mr. Beckert was going to be relocated to another building, and if he wanted to come into [the County Administration] building, he would need an escort in order to be in th[e] building.” ECF No. 120-5 at 34:3 - 34:16; see ECF No. 120-4 at 71:9- 19. Greenway continued to carry out the policy after he became County Administrator. ECF No. 120-5 at 34:3 - 34:16.
In September 2020, Beaufort County filed a Complaint in Mandamus against Beckert in his capacity as Beaufort County Auditor, alleging that Beckert “breached his ministerial duty by refusing the clear and certain obligation to invoice property owners in the Town [of Hilton Head Island] for the Law Enforcement Service Charge, which was duly and properly enacted.” ECF No. 115-6 at 3-7. That same month, Deputy County Attorney Keaveny contacted general counsel for the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”) regarding “issues Beaufort County is experiencing with the activities of the Beaufort County Auditor.” ECF No. 115-4 at 6.
Keaveny sent SLED's counsel a follow-up letter in November 2020, stating that “Beaufort County asks that SLED open an investigation into the activities of the auditor and more particularly into his violations of the general laws of the state of South Carolina in the performance of his duties.” Id. at 7. He noted that “Beaufort County Assessor (Ebony Sanders) [and] Beaufort County Treasurer (Maria Walls) are available to review with your investigative staff the materials they compiled,” and he is “sure the former Chief Financial Officer ([Plaintiff]) will voluntarily cooperate in your investigation.” Id. He noted that Plaintiff's resignation in May 2020 “was due, in part, to the auditor's refusal to perform the ministerial functions of his office properly and to his unrelenting harassment of her both personally and professionally.” Id. at 6; see Id. at 8 (list of Plaintiff's issues with Beckert).
On July 9, 2021, Beaufort County filed another lawsuit against Beckert in his capacity as Beaufort County Auditor, alleging that Beckert “has had (and continues to have) a contentious and adversarial relationship with various other officials and employees” of Beaufort County, that this “contentiousness has manifested itself in Defendant Beckert's frequent threats or promises not to do things that state law plainly requires him to do,” and that Beckert “has repeatedly sought to usurp the powers of other officials and officers and to avoid fulfilling his legal obligations when they are at odds with his own personal wishes.” ECF No. 115-6 at 9-10 ¶¶ 4-6.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.” See Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). However, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). When a party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.”).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move, pursuant to Rule 56, for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action in her Amended Complaint: (1) a claim against Beaufort County for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII; (2) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Beaufort County for harassment and discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA) against Beaufort County for negligence; (4) a claim pursuant to the SCTCA against Beaufort County for assumption of duty; (5) a claim against Beckert for outrage; (6) a claim against Beckert for assault; (7) a claim against Beckert for defamation; and (8) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Beckert for harassment and discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 28.
In her Responses in Opposition to Defendants' Motions, Plaintiff withdraws the assault claim against Beckert. ECF Nos. 120 at 32; 121 at 24. However, she argues that the remaining claims should survive summary judgment and proceed to trial.
The undersigned will address the federal claims before moving to the state law claims.
I. Plaintiff's Claims Under Federal Law
Of Plaintiff's seven remaining causes of action, three arise under federal law-her Title VII claim against Beaufort County (First Cause of Action), her § 1983 claim against Beaufort County (Second Cause of Action), and her § 1983 claim against Beckert (Eighth Cause of Action). In each claim, Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to a hostile work environment based on her sex. See ECF No. 28 at ¶ 52 (Title VII claim alleging that “Beaufort County violated federal law by permitting a work environment to exist”); Id. at ¶ 60 (§ 1983 claim alleging that Beaufort County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by “failing to take action when it was notified, repeatedly by multiple women, of Beckert's conduct” and creating a de facto policy or custom of tolerating Beckert's behavior); Id. at ¶¶ 102-03 (§ 1983 claim alleging that Beckert violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he “unlawfully harassed and discriminated against Holland on the basis of her sex, subjecting Holland to a hostile work environment fueled by sexual harassment and discrimination”).
“Public employees enjoy the protection of antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII as well as the protection of the Constitution, which they may enforce against their employers in civil actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Wilcox v. Lyons, 970 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2020); see Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We have held that Title VII is not an exclusive remedy for employment discrimination by a public entity. A state employee may still bring a Fourteenth Amendment challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to discriminatory employment decisions.” (citation omitted)).
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “This constitutional imperative of equal protection does not entirely remove the States' power to classify but ‘keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.'” Wilcox, 970 F.3d at 458 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Distinctions based on sex or gender are subject to heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. Id.
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “the Equal Protection Clause confers on public employees ‘a right to be free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related to important governmental objectives.'” Id. (quoting Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, “[i]ntentional sex discrimination and sexual harassment against public employees by persons acting under color of state law violate the Equal Protection Clause and are actionable under Section 1983.” Id. (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (“Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where . . . the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.”)).
The standards courts apply to evaluate Title VII hostile work environment claims are also used to evaluate hostile work environment claims under § 1983. See Brown v. Bratton, No. 21-1998, 2022 WL 17336572, at *11 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) (noting that county employee's equal protection claims pursuant to § 1983 are governed by the Title VII analysis); Beardsley, 30 F.3d at 529 (“Courts may apply the standards developed in Title VII litigation to similar litigation under § 1983.”).
A. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim Against Beaufort County
Title VII prohibits an “employer [from] discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII is violated “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims' employment and create an abusive work environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To survive summary judgment on her hostile work environment claim pursuant to Title VII, Plaintiff must show that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on her sex; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer. Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Okoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011).
1. Unwelcome Conduct
As to the first element, “[c]onduct is ‘unwelcome' when it continues after the employee sufficiently communicates that it is unwelcome.” Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to this element. See, e.g., ECF No. 115 at 9 (Beaufort County's motion challenging only elements 2, 3 and 4 of the hostile work environment factors).
2. Based on Plaintiff's Sex
To demonstrate the second element, a plaintiff may establish “that such conduct would not have occurred but for her sex.” Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original) (citing Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2011)). “While the conduct need not be ‘motivated by sexual desire' or sexual intent to satisfy this element, it does need to have been conducted ‘in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.'” Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
“The critical question is therefore ‘whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.'” Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). “[H]arassment due to personality conflicts will not suffice.” Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2008). Rather, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that a reasonable jury could see the hostility as a product of gender animus rather than the kind of personality conflict that pervades many a workplace.” Id. at 227.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the alleged harassment was based on Plaintiff's sex. Upon review, the undersigned agrees.
At her deposition, Plaintiff testified generally that she believed Beckert targeted and “singled out females in an attempt to intimidate and harass and bully them,” and she stated that Beckert “did not treat males that way.” ECF No. 120-11 at 134:10-135:1. However, she also testified that she has no knowledge of Beckert mentioning her gender in his criticisms of her. Id. at 135:5-6 (“I don't know that he specifically mentioned my gender.”). Rather, she testified that the subject matter of Beckert's attacks and criticisms were issues related to County finances and financial documents and that they “all pertain[ed] to our jobs, what his accusations were about.” Id. at 108:7-24 (further testifying that she could not identify a specific instance where Beckert attacked her in another way); see Id. at 107:19-22 (testifying that Beckert “constantly” accused her of “providing incorrect information or telling [her] he had different data than [she] had”); Id. at 140:1-11 (testifying that Beckert's harassment was “nonstop,” “relentless,” and “the same nonsense over and over and over,” that “his accusations were the same garbage . . . that her “work is incorrect, that things are being done wrong, that . . . everything [she does] is wrong [and] poor performance on the job”).
In her Responses in Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that there is ample evidence that Beckert's actions were based on sex. Specifically, she points to Plaintiff's testimony that she believes females were Beckert's targets and that he did not attempt to intimidate, harass, and bully men; to former Deputy Auditor David Cadd's testimony that the women with whom Beckert seemed to have issues were the women in positions of authority, ECF No. 120-12 at 49:21-50:1; to former County Administrator Ashley Jacobs's testimony that she would define “the Jim Beckert problem” as “his incompetence as the auditor and his disruptive behavior in terms of questioning everyone and changing things without authority and, you know, refusing to do what the council asked him to do and just harassing people, specifically, you know, a group of women who were in positions of authority,” ECF No. 120-4 at 189:15-190:5; and to Jacobs's testimony that “Jim doesn't make sense[,] . . . [is] not rational[, does not] know[] what he's doing, . . . [and is] very problematic for all of the female employees,” Id. at 126:24-127:10. See ECF Nos. 120 at 11-15; 121 at 10-12.
Plaintiff also cites testimony regarding non-Beckert-related interactions between Jacobs and two councilmen, Stu Rodman and Paul Sommerville. See ECF No. 120 at 12-13. However, Plaintiff testified that her lawsuit pertains to the conduct of only Beckert, not any other individual. ECF No. 120-11 at 112:13-113:2. Accordingly, the undersigned does not find this evidence probative as to the question of whether Beckert's conduct towards Plaintiff was based on Plaintiff's sex.
She also points to testimony about Beckert's treatment of specific women, including that he stared at Treasurer Maria Walls through her office window, which former County Administrator Kubic considered rose to the level of harassment, ECF No. 120-6 at 19:15-20:6, 51:10-51:14; that after Ebony Sanders became the Assessor, Beckert made accusations that were not true about Sanders, both to her face and in written communication, ECF No. 120-9 at 10:5-15 & ECF No. 120-4 at 21:7-21; that he made County Administrator Jacobs feel uncomfortable, would stand over her, conveyed to her that he was privy to insider information, sent a message to certain taxpayers telling them that Walls and Jacobs needed to be investigated by the FBI, and would speak at council meetings saying that he was right and everything people were doing was wrong, ECF No. 120-4 at 26:19-28:17; that he criticized the female chief financial officer for the school district for wasting money, Id. at 24:8-22; and that he would stare at Monica Spells in the hallway, ECF No. 120-6 at 21:12-15. According to Plaintiff, the above evidence is sufficient to create a jury question as to whether Beckert's treatment of Plaintiff was based on her sex. See ECF Nos. 120 at 14-15; 121 at 15-16.
In her Response, Plaintiff cites Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 144 (2000), for the proposition that “a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” ECF No. 120 at 14. Reeves is inapposite, however, as it involved the application of the McDonell-Douglas burden-shifting paradigm to an age-discrimination claim and did not address the standard applicable to hostile work environment claims.
Defendants, however, contend that none of this evidence is sufficient to establish that Beckert's conduct towards Plaintiff would not have occurred but for her sex, as the evidence shows that Beckert's conduct towards males in positions of authority was similar to his conduct towards Plaintiff and other women in positions of authority. ECF No. 115 at 11-14 (arguing that the “discovery undertaken throughout indicates that Mr. Beckert was equally inquisitive of financial issues of the County and raised his political agendas with males and females”); ECF No. 114 at 10-12. They point to former County Administrator Gary Kubic's testimony that Beckert stared at Kubic through his office window on at least twenty to thirty occasions, accused Kubic of violating laws and policies on several occasions, would send accusations and emails about Kubic to County Council, and that it eventually became “impossible” for Kubic to sit down and talk with Beckert because of what he saw as “some type of inferiority complex, and to offset that paranoia, he would become zealous in the way he would treat or discuss other individuals who did not share his viewpoint,” ECF No. 120-6 at 20:23-21:11, 115:20-116:2; to HR Director Suzanne Gregory's testimony that she did not believe Beckert's rudeness was specific to women and that she had conversations with men with whom Beckert was “very confrontational,” ECF No. 120-15 at 33:13-34:4; to Assessor Ebony Sanders's testimony that Beckert “bullied my staff, one particular gentleman who has autism, and I had to defend him,” ECF No. 120-9 at 11:5-17; to Deputy County Attorney Thomas Keaveny's testimony that multiple men and women complained to him about Beckert being difficult and abusive, ECF No. 120-7 at 21:23-22:14; to County Administrator Eric Greenway's testimony that he had cordial relations with Beckert until Greenway became the County Administrator, ECF No. 120-5 at 22:4-23:21; to former Deputy Auditor David Cadd's testimony that he filed a hostile work environment grievance against Beckert after he was fired, and that Beckert told him Beckert had problems with Kubic, Greenway, Keaveny, and Gruber, ECF No. 120-12 at 9:25-11:13, 61:21-64:22.
In Reply, Beckert argues that “[u]nless one selects only those confrontations between women and Mr. Beckert, the record does not leave us with any justifiable inferences that Mr. Beckert directed his conduct at women alone.” ECF No. 126 at 14-15. The undersigned is constrained to agree, particularly as to Plaintiff, given her testimony that all of her interactions with Beckert pertained to their jobs and that she does not know of any time he made any comments related to her gender. See Brown, 2022 WL 17336572, at *11 (affirming district court's determination that “apart from the racially charged remarks made by Peach and Eastland, Appellant failed to show the unwelcome conduct was based on his race”). The evidence shows that Beckert similarly criticized and made accusations regarding male county employees in positions of authority, such as County Administrator Kubic, and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he treated her differently than he did similarly situated males because of her sex.
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of behavior by Beckert “conducted in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to make it clear that [Beckert] is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.” See Webster, 38 F.4th at 410 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor has she pointed to evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that “members of one sex [we]re exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex [we]re not exposed.” Id. On this record, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated “that a reasonable jury could see [Beckert's] hostility as a product of gender animus rather than the kind of personality conflict that pervades many a workplace.” See Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 226. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish this element of her hostile work environment claim, such that summary judgment on the Title VII claim is warranted on this basis. 3. Severe and Pervasive
“The third element of a hostile work environment claim requires that the offending conduct be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'” Strothers v. City of Laurel, Maryland, 895 F.3d 317, 331 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003)). “This element has both a subjective and objective component, i.e., the employee must both personally and reasonably believe that the conduct rises to the level of a hostile environment.” Id.
“Whether the environment is objectively hostile or abusive is ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.'” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81). “That determination is made ‘by looking at all the circumstances,' which ‘may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “It is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A hostile work environment claim is actionable if it establishes one that is ‘hellish,' not one where the occasional vulgar banter or language with sexual innuendo may be heard.” McLaughlin v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 211 F.Supp.3d 770, 787 (D.S.C. 2016).
The Fourth Circuit has “recognized that plaintiffs must clear a high bar in order to satisfy the severe or pervasive test,” because “complaints premised on nothing more than rude treatment by coworkers, callous behavior by one's superiors, or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with one's supervisor are not actionable under Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the “task then on summary judgment is to identify situations that a reasonable jury might find to be so out of the ordinary as to meet the severe or pervasive criterion,” i.e., “instances where the environment was pervaded with discriminatory conduct aimed to humiliate, ridicule, or intimidate, thereby creating an abusive atmosphere.” Id. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Beaufort County argues that Plaintiff has not produced evidence to establish that the environment was objectively severe and pervasive, noting that the evidence before the Court does not show “pervasive sexual statements but rather comments regarding each of their job responsibilities within government.” ECF No. 115 at 15. The County argues that when considering Plaintiff's complaints about Beckert's conduct directed at her, the complained-of “actions focused upon challenging the County's accounting principles related to his political office as the duly elected county Auditor ‘serving Beaufort County citizens.'” Id. Beaufort County further contends that “[b]y their inherent nature, these governmental functions relate specifically to the Plaintiff's role working as the Chief Financial Officer of the county and Beckert's political position related to his being the elected Auditor,” and the County argues that there is no evidence establishing that these types of inquiries by an Auditor upon the County's CFO and chief bookkeeper “were inconsistent with the usual course of business between an elected Auditor and the County's Chief Financial Officer or that Beckert's conduct was unreasonably severe or pervasive given his unique political position.” Id. at 15-16. The County suggests that Plaintiff would need an expert to opine to the reasonableness of inquiries and whether the scope of Beckert's requests were within the realm of an Auditor. Id. at 17.
In her Response, Plaintiff points to evidence that she subjectively felt work stress because of Beckert's conduct. ECF No. 120 at 15 (citing ECF No. 120-8 at 24:25-25:3; ECF No. 120-4 at 92:14-23). She also points to evidence that Beckert's conduct made Ebony Sanders constantly feel uneasy and that her job was in question, Id. at 15-16 (citing ECF No. 120-9 at 27:14-28:1), and that Beaufort County's 30(b)(6) witness described Beckert's conduct as “unprofessional,” “demeaning,” “inappropriate,” and “intimidating,” Id. at 16 (citing ECF No. 120-7 at 92:24 - 93:5). As to expert testimony, Plaintiff argues that “a jury is fully capable of understanding and appreciating local government and if Defendants' conduct constituted a hostile work environment - human decency is universal, without the need for translation,” and she maintains that an “expert testifying to legal elements would complicate the matter and usurp the Court's role in charging the jury.” Id. at 17.
Upon review and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to her reasonable belief that Beckert's offending conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment.” See Strothers, 895 F.3d at 331. The evidence is sufficient to establish that many Beaufort County employees and officials found Beckert's communication style and conduct to be difficult, confrontational, and, at times, abusive, to the point that it altered the working environment. Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to establish the third element of her hostile work environment case.
As explained above, however, because there is no evidence that Beckert's conduct toward Plaintiff was based on her sex, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Beaufort County on the Title VII claim.
4. Imputable to the Employer
The final element of a hostile environment claim requires that the offensive conduct be imputable to Beaufort County, Plaintiff's employer. See Strothers, 895 F.3d at 332. “The status of the harasser . . . is relevant to element four of a hostile work environment claim, which necessitates proof that the harassment is imputable to the employer.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 278. If a supervisor perpetrates the harassment and it culminates in a tangible employment action, then “the employer is strictly liable.” Id. (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013)). However, “[i]f the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” Id. (citing Vance, 133 S.Ct. at 2439, and Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 333-34); see Hoyle, 650 F.3d at 335 (explaining that the employer “may be liable in negligence if it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take effective action to stop it”). Harassment by third parties is subject to the same negligence rule as harassment by co-workers. See Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 422-23 (4th Cir. 2014) (adopting negligence standard wherein “an employer is liable under Title VII for third parties creating a hostile work environment if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, Beckert was an elected official and not an employee of Beaufort County. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (explaining that Title VII's definition of “employee” “shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff”). He was neither Plaintiff's supervisor, nor her co-employee. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, the undersigned will apply the negligence rule for harassment by third parties.
“Knowledge of harassment can be imputed to an employer if a reasonable person, intent on complying with Title VII, would have known about the harassment.” Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Once the employer has notice, it must respond with remedial action reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 118 (citing Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (4th Cir. 1995)). Thus, if the employer knows or should have known about harassment of one of its employees by a third party, Title VII requires the employer to respond with remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. See Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 319; Freeman, 750 F.3d at 423; EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669 (4th Cir. 2011)).
Beaufort County argues that it “attempted to take all corrective measures within its control considering the state statutory limitations,” including filing “complaints to the Governor, SLED, Dept. of Revenue and even litigation being filed within the Court of Common Pleas,” as well as seeking “input as to whether a county referendum changing the form of government may be an option to address these concerns.” ECF No. 115 at 18-19. The County “sought advice from the Attorney General as to whether an exception could be made to allow the Treasurer's office to continue to be an elected position while abolishing the Auditor's office under a potential Council-Manager form of government” and learned that this change requires a referendum of the citizens. Id. at 19. The County asserts that these attempts were reasonably calculated to end the harassment, even if this attempted corrective action failed to eliminate the harassment, such that Beckert's actions cannot be imputed to the County. Id. at 18-19.
In Response, Plaintiff cites law regarding third-party harassment and argues that there “is sufficient evidence in this case to find the conduct to be imputed onto Beaufort County,” such that “summary judgment is inappropriate.” ECF No. 120 at 17-18. She “agree[s] that in an Administrator-Council form of government, the County Administrator, who was [Plaintiff's] supervisor, has no authority to exercise control over an elected official.” Id. at 6 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-650). However, she contends that “the County Administrator is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the county,” including operational control of county facilities and premises, and the County Administrator can “control the obligations and job duties of the county employees so as to limit required contact and/or communication with a harasser.” Id. (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-630(3)). She argues that the policy the County eventually put into place to ban Beckert from going into the County Administration building without an escort shows that the County Administrator could and did exercise sufficient control to limit Beckert's conduct; however, she contends that the County took this action only after she resigned. Id. at 8-9. She points to evidence that the County tried to set up a standing meeting with her, Beckert, County Administrator Jacobs, and one or more councilmembers-which, she testified, she never attended-as evidence that Beaufort County did not try to limit her contact with Beckert. Id. at 8. Finally, she notes that Beckert signed and agreed to comply with the Beaufort County Personnel Handbook, including its anti-hostile workplace requirements, but she contends the County “took no action to [enforce these policies,] exposing [her] to continued abuse and harassment.” Id. at 8-9.
In Reply, Beaufort County contends that it “was statutorily prohibited from enforcing its personnel policies against Beckert under S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-30(7),” and it reiterates that it “took drastic measures to remove Beckert from his elected position,” but was statutorily prohibited from doing so. ECF No. 124 at 4-5; see S.C. Code. Ann. § 4-9-30(7) (providing that county government has the power “to develop personnel system policies and procedures for county employees by which all county employees are regulated except those elected directly by the people”). Regarding Plaintiff's suggestion that the County should have limited contact between Plaintiff and Beckert, Beaufort County argues that “collaboration between the County's elected Auditor and the County's Chief Financial Officer are essential to the functionality of the County government,” and it “would be imprudent for the County to create a vast disconnect between the County's elected Auditor and the County's Chief Financial Officer.” Id. at 124. Beaufort County contends that it “was faced with discretionary issues relative to how to control the actions of the Auditor as an ‘elected official' who was inquiring of the Plaintiff relative to financial information in what she claims to have been in a hostile manner,” and the law is not clear how to do so. Id.
Upon review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to create a jury question as to whether Beckert's conduct towards Plaintiff can be imputable to Beaufort County. South Carolina law prohibits county government from enforcing its personnel policies and procedures against elected officials. See S.C. Code. Ann. § 4-9-30(7); see also Eargle v. Horry County, 545 S.E.2d 276 (S.C. 2001) (discussing the lack of power of county administrator over elected county auditors and their staff). The evidence shows that Plaintiff worked in a separate building from Beckert and only about 25% of her interactions with Beckert were in person. Therefore, it is not clear how Beaufort County implementing a policy requiring Beckert to have an escort when he entered the County Administration building-which was not where Plaintiff's office was located-would have been reasonably calculated at ending his conduct towards Plaintiff. Additionally, although there is evidence that Plaintiff was invited to attend a monthly meeting with Beckert, County Administrator Jacobs, and some councilmembers, Plaintiff testified that she never attended those meetings, and she neither alleges nor shows that she was punished in any way for skipping the meetings. On this record, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Beckert's conduct can be imputed to Beaufort County. At any rate, however, even if she has established a material dispute of fact as to this issue, because she failed to show that Beckert's conduct toward her was based on sex, her Title VII claim against Beaufort County fails.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends granting Beaufort County's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Title VII claim, such that the claim be dismissed.
Beaufort County also argues that because Plaintiff filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEOC) and not with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (SCHAC), the court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Title VII claim, such that it should be dismissed. ECF No. 115 at 23-24 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Davis v. N.C. Dep't of Corrs., 48 F.3d 134, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1995)). Beaufort County does not argue that Plaintiff's EEOC charge was untimely, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff received a Right to Sue notice from the EEOC. Plaintiff contends that her filing with the EEOC was sufficient to exhaust her administrative remedies, arguing that SCHAC is the state's Fair Employment Practice Agency (FEPA) and has a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC. ECF No. 120 at 23; see Clavon v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. CV 3:19-3202-JMC-KDW, 2020 WL 8713672, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2020) (noting that SCHAC is the state FEPA and enforces the South Carolina Human Affairs Law (SCHAL), the state law prohibiting employment discrimination), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-03202-JMC, 2021 WL 717229 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2021). She points to EEOC guidance that provides that an employee can file a charge of discrimination with either agency when that agency has a work-sharing agreement. ECF No. 120 at 23 (citing U.S. EEOC, “Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing”). Upon review, the undersigned is not persuaded by Beaufort County's argument and does not find summary judgment warranted on this basis. First, the Supreme Court has explained that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, and not jurisdictional, such that the failure to comply with this requirement does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over a Title VII claim. Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. --, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019). Moreover, this “District has traditionally assumed the existence of . . . a workshare agreement between South Carolina and the EEOC.” Caldwell v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, No. CA 3:13-1202-CMC-TER, 2015 WL 3903686, at *7 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015). Beaufort County's arguments appear predicated only on Plaintiff's failure to file directly with SCHAC; however, there is no evidence before the Court as to the terms of the workshare agreement or whether the EEOC referred the Charge to SCHAC. See Puryear v. Cnty. of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that employee's filing discrimination charge with only the EEOC was sufficient to “commence” any proceedings under state or local law for purposes of Title VII under the terms of the workshare agreement between the state and EEOC). Notably, Plaintiff has not alleged a claim under the SCHAL; instead, her discrimination claim arises only under Title VII. See Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a charge alleging harassment in violation of the SCHAL must be made in writing to the SCHAC in accordance with the exhaustion requirements in the SCHAL), abrogated on other grounds by Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013). Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds that Beaufort County has failed to establish that summary judgment is warranted on this basis. See Chase v. Greenville Tech. Coll., No. CA 6:12-3376-TMC-KFM, 2012 WL 6808967, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2012) (explaining that a “Title VII plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies by bringing a charge of discrimination with SCHAC or EEOC, before filing a claim in federal court”) (emphasis added), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 6:12-03376-TMC, 2013 WL 85161 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2013); cf. Lyansky v. Coastal Carolina Univ., No. 4:21-CV-1879-SAL-KDW, 2022 WL 4181066, at *6 (D.S.C. May 19, 2022) (“Plaintiff's failure to comply with Title VII's requirements of filing charges with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency (here, SCHAC) requires dismissal of any Title VII causes of action purported to have been brought by Plaintiff”) (emphasis added), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-1879-SAL, 2022 WL 3025737 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2022).
B. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Against Beaufort County for Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
In the Amended Complaint's Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Beaufort County developed a policy or custom allowing Beckert to harass, threaten, intimidate, and bully its employees, which created a hostile work environment “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult, severe enough to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff's] work environment.” ECF No. 28 at ¶ 58. She further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the County's policy or custom, Plaintiff “was subjected to a hostile work environment fueled by sexual harassment and discrimination,” which deprived her of “her right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at ¶¶ 62-63.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Beaufort County argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that Beaufort County has an unconstitutional policy or custom that has infringed on her constitutional rights. ECF No. 115 at 21 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff maintains that she has established an equal protection claim and has demonstrated Monell liability. ECF No. 120 at 19-22. Upon review, the undersigned is constrained to agree with Beaufort County.
To maintain a § 1983 municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must affirmatively establish that the constitutional violation was directly caused by an official practice, policy, or custom of the municipality. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). “Municipal policy may be found in written ordinances and regulations, in certain affirmative decisions of individual policymaking officials, or in certain omissions on the part of policymaking officials that manifest deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens[.]” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Outside of these formal decision-making channels, “a municipal custom may arise if a practice is so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As stated above, courts apply the standards developed in Title VII litigation to equal protection claims under § 1983. Brown, 2022 WL 17336572, at *11; Beardsley, 30 F.3d at 529. Thus, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges a Title VII claim and an equal protection claim both under a theory of harassment, and the court concludes that the Title VII claim is subject to summary judgment, the “equal protection claims likewise fail.” Brown, 2022 WL 17336572, at *11 (finding that “because the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Appellant's hostile work environment claims, Appellant's equal protection claims likewise fail”). For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned found that Plaintiff failed to show that Beckert's conduct towards her was because of sex and, thus, failed to establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim. The undersigned finds that her equal protection claim against Beaufort County fails for the same reasons. See id.
C. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Against Beckert for Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
In the Amended Complaint's Eighth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that “Beckert unlawfully harassed and discriminated against Holland on the basis of her sex, subjecting Holland to a hostile work environment fueled by sexual harassment and discrimination,” which deprived her of “her right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 102-03.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Beckert argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish that his actions were motivated by her gender, such that she cannot establish her § 1983 claim for violation of her equal protection rights. ECF No. 114 at 9-13. He also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Id. Plaintiff disagrees. See ECF No. 121 at 9-20.
As explained above, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Beckert's conduct towards her was based on her sex, such that she cannot establish her harassment claim under either Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Beckert's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. See Brown, 2022 WL 17336572, at *11.
Moreover, having found no constitutional violation by Beckert, the undersigned concludes that Beckert, in his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity. The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996). “To overcome a defendant's claim of qualified immunity, the court must determine: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 186 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted above, Plaintiff has not shown Beckert violated her constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a clear constitutional violation, Beckert, in his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity.
Beaufort County also argues that it is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 115 at 19-21. However, the Fourth Circuit has explained that “[u]nlike public officials, municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity.” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)); see Roncales v. County of Henrico, 451 F.Supp.3d 480, 201 n.15 (E.D. Va. 2020) (explaining that claims against local governments are not subject to a qualified immunity defense). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Beaufort County is not entitled to qualified immunity.
II. Plaintiff's Claims Under South Carolina Law
Plaintiff's remaining causes of action all arise under state law. If the district judge accepts this Report and Recommendation, the original federal jurisdiction claims will be dismissed and the only remaining claims will be Plaintiff's state law claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). In analyzing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts are to consider the following factors: judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 6 n.7 (1988). The undersigned concludes that the balance of these factors weighs in favor of remand. See Id. (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).
Having recommended that Plaintiffs claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction be dismissed, the undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims in this case and remand the state law claims to the state court where Plaintiff originally filed this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Beckert's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 114) be GRANTED as to the federal claim arising under § 1983 and that Beaufort County's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 115) be GRANTED as to the federal claims arising under Title VII and § 1983, such that only state law claims against Defendants remain.
The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims and REMAND this action to the state court where Plaintiff originally filed this action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).