Summary
In Hodges v. Shuler (supra) the court said (at p. 80): "Contracts resting on this basis, are to be held to mean, what the law of the place where the contract was made held them to mean.
Summary of this case from Vander Horst v. KittredgeOpinion
September Term, 1860
John K. Porter, for the appellant.
John B. Gale, for the respondent.
The single question is, whether the defendants can be held as indorsers. It is insisted that they cannot, for the reasons, 1st. That the instrument set out in the complaint, is neither in terms nor legal effect a negotiable promissory note, but a mere agreement; the indorsement in blank of the defendants, operating, if at all, only as a mere transfer, and not as an engagement to fulfill the contract of the railroad company in case of its default; and 2d. That if it be a note, the notice of its dishonor was insufficient to charge the defendants as indorsers.
Whether the blank indorsement of the defendants imports any binding contract, depends on the law of Massachusetts; in which State it is to be assumed, from the facts in the case, that the original instrument and indorsement were made. But the law of Massachusetts does not differ from that of this State or of England in any particular material to the present inquiry. In Massachusetts there has been apparently a relaxation of the common law rule so far as to extend the remedy against indorsers to notes payable absolutely in a medium other than cash; but in all other respects the legal rules applicable to negotiable paper, are the same in that State as in our own.
The instrument on which the action was brought has all the essential qualities of a negotiable promissory note. It is for the unconditional payment of a certain sum of money, at a specified time, to the payee's order. It is not an agreement in the alternative, to pay in money or railroad stock. It was not optional with the makers to pay in money or stock, and thus fulfill their promise in either of two specified ways; in such case, the promise would have been in the alternative. The possibility seems to have been contemplated that the owner of the note might, before its maturity, surrender it in exchange for stock, thus canceling it and its money promise; but that promise was nevertheless absolute and unconditional, and was as lasting as the note itself. In no event could the holder require money and stock. It was only upon a surrender of the note that he was to receive stock; and the money payment did not mature until six months after the holder's right to exchange the note for stock had expired. We are of the opinion that the instrument wants none of the essential requisites of a negotiable promissory note. It was an absolute and unconditional engagement to pay money on a day fixed: and although an election was given to the promisees, upon a surrender of the instrument six months before its maturity, to exchange it for stock, this did not alter its character, or make the promise in the alternative, in the sense in which that word is used respecting promises to pay. The engagement of the railroad company was to pay the sum of $1,000 in four years from date, and its promise could only be fulfilled by the payment of the money, at the day named.
We are next to inquire whether the notice was sufficient. A notice, that in terms, or by necessary implication or reasonable intendment, informs the indorser that the note has become due, and has been presented to the maker, and payment refused, is sufficient. The party to whom the notice is addressed should not be misled by an indefinite or uncertain description of the note and, from the imperfection of the notice itself, be unable to determine to what particular note it refers. A notice which omits an essential feature of the note, or misdescribes it, is an imperfect one, but is not necessarily invalid. It is invalid only when it fails to give that information which it would have given but for its particular imperfection; and even in case the notice in itself be defective, if, from evidence aliunde of the attendant circumstances, it is apparent that the indorser was not deceived or misled as to the identity of the dishonored note, he will be charged. A note is well described when its maker, payee, date, amount, and time and place of payment, are stated; and when a notice sets forth these particulars, with reasonable accuracy, together with the facts of presentment and dishonor, it cannot be rendered invalid by showing aliunde that notes similar as to parties, date, amount, and time, and place of payment were outstanding, and were only distinguishable from each other by their numbering.
This notice, which was dated at Boston, informed the indorsers that a promissory note made by S. Henshaw, treasurer, for $1,000, dated April 1st, 1850, payable in four years, in favor of themselves, and indorsed by them, had been presented on the 4th of April, 1854, at the office of the treasurer, and payment being duly demanded, was refused. The notice contained no allusion to the number of the note, and described it as made by "S. Henshaw, treasurer." The date, amount, payees, indorsees and time, and, inferentially, the place of payment, were accurately described. But it is urged that there was a failure to charge the defendants as indorsers, for the reason that there was a misdescription as to the maker, and the notice contained no reference to the number by which the note was designated and distinguished from four others of a similar description, given and transferred by the defendants simultaneously. I think both of the reasons are without force, and that the notice, construed in the light of its attending and that the notice, construed in the light of its attending and surrounding circumstances, was sufficient. At least, from the contents of the notice itself, and the extrinsic facts admitted in the case, it was a question not of law, but of fact, whether knowledge was actually brought home to the indorsers of the dishonor of the note in suit; and that question of fact has been found against the defendants in the court below. Examine, for a moment, the objections to the notice, separately. It describes the note to have been made by "S. Henshaw, treasurer." This was a misdescription, as it was, in fact, made by the railroad company, Henshaw acting as its agent, and signing the instrument in his capacity as treasurer. But did this misdescription deceive or mislead the defendants as to the identity of the dishonored paper? It is very apparent that it did not. Henshaw never signed, as treasurer or otherwise, any note in which the defendants were named as payees, except the five notes given to the defendants on the 1st April, 1850, for $1,000 each, payable in four years from date, for labor performed as contractors in constructing the road of the company. It is admitted that these five notes were given in satisfaction of their contract with the railroad company. They knew its financial officer, the treasurer, and that the five notes dated April 1st, 1850, became due and payable in Boston on the 4th April, 1854; and they are to be presumed not to have indorsed any like notes of the company, or have had any indorsement outstanding on any note, except the five, which resembled them in any one important feature. Upon the receipt, therefore, by due course of mail, of the notice dated and mailed at Boston on the 4th April, 1854, and describing the note accurately as to date, amount, payees, and time and place of payment, and giving the name of one of its signers, whom the defendants knew was the treasurer of the railroad company, they were fully informed that such notice referred to one of the five notes. At all events, it was a question of fact, whether the information had been actually given to them, and whether they were reasonably apprised of the particular paper upon which they were sought to be charged.
Secondly, as to the objection founded on an omission in the notice to designate the number of the note sued on. It seems that the note was designated in its margin as No. 253, and the notice omitted to describe it by the number. But this did not render the notice per se fatally defective. The number was not a part of the note, and there was a complete description of it without the number. It cannot be, that when a notice actually describes every essential feature of a dishonored note, such notice may be invalidated, by an indorser showing, aliunde, that there were similar notes indorsed by him simultaneously, and distinguishable only by their different numbers. All that the holder of a note is bound to do is, to give the indorser a complete description of it, and if from such description it cannot be identified, it is the fault or misfortune of the indorser in having indorsed several notes alike in every essential feature. Showing, in this case, that there were four other notes given to the defendants by the railroad company, on the 1st April, 1850, and shortly afterwards transferred by them by indorsement, like the one in suit except that they were differently numbered, did not, as matter of law, stamp the notice as a defective and insufficient one. Indeed, these extrinsic facts were quite immaterial, without showing further that the four notes were transferred to persons other than the holder of the note in suit, and that they were outstanding in April, 1854. The latter facts were not to be presumed, with the view of invalidating the notice, or imposing the onus upon the plaintiff to identify, by extraneous evidence, the note in suit to the defendants as the one referred to in the notice as dishonored.
I am of the opinion that the action was well brought against the defendants as indorsers of a negotiable promissory note, and that the notice of its dishonor was sufficient.
The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
All the judges agreed that the instrument in suit was a promissory note; DENIO and WELLES, Js., dissented on the ground that the notice of non-payment was insufficient in omitting the number upon the margin of the note.
Judgment affirmed.