Opinion
No. FST CV 05 5000134
August 14, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiff, Mary Louise High, filed a revised four-count complaint on August 2, 2005, against the defendants, Stamford Health Systems, Inc. (Stamford Health), Healthcare Realty Services, Inc. and Contour Landscaping Company, Inc. High alleges that on March 5, 2003, she sustained injuries and losses when she slipped and fell on ice that had formed on a common walkway in an apartment complex owned and maintained by her employer, Stamford Health. High also asserts that she was a tenant in the same apartment complex and this living arrangement provided by Stamford Health was a perquisite of her employment. She further alleges that Stamford Health terminated her employment after thirty-five years of satisfactory service after she sustained injuries as a result of her fall in order to dissuade other employee-tenants from filing legal claims for injuries on the same property.
High maintains that she was employed as a clerical worker at Stamford Hospital, a for profit organization operated by Stamford Health. Stamford Health disagrees with High's assertion that she was employed by Stamford Health, but treats this assertion as true for the purposes of its motion to strike count four of the revised complaint.
The revised complaint sets forth the following four counts: count one alleges negligence against Stamford Health, count two alleges negligence against Healthcare Realty Services, Inc., count three alleges negligence against Contour Landscaping Company, Inc. and count four alleges a violation of General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) against Stamford Health.
On February 15, 2006, Stamford Health filed motion #132 to strike count four of the revised complaint. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court construes the facts in the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Id. "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Thus, [the court] assume[s] the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, [the court] read[s] the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). Furthermore, "[i]n ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
Stamford Health moves to strike count four on the grounds that High has failed to allege a claim under CUTPA because the Act does not encompass claims involving the employer-employee relationship, such as retaliatory discharge. It argues that High's CUTPA claim should be stricken as it centers around her allegation that she was wrongfully terminated after she fell on the premises of the apartment complex owned by Stamford Health. Stamford Health also argues that High's allegation that her termination constitutes a violation of public policy under CUTPA is erroneous because she was an at-will employee.
"CUTPA prohibits anyone from engaging in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. General Statutes § 42-110b(a)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Schoenhorn, 89 Conn.App. 666, 674-75, 874 A.2d 798 (2005). "[I]n determining whether a practice violates CUTPA [the Connecticut Supreme Court has] adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory or other concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other business persons] . . . All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, CT Page 14410 155, 881 A.2d 937 (2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1913, 164 L.Ed.2d 664 (2006). "CUTPA, by its own terms, applies to a broad spectrum of commercial activity. The operative provision of the act, § 42-110b(a), states merely that [n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. Trade or commerce, in turn, is broadly defined as the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state . . . The entire act is remedial in character . . . and must be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 492, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995).
Section 42-110b(a) provides in relevant part: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."
In count four, High alleges that Stamford Health violated public policy under CUTPA when it terminated her employment after she fell on an apartment walkway owned and maintained by Stamford Health. She further alleges that Stamford Health committed an unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA when it terminated her employment with the purpose of dissuading other tenant-employees from making claims against it for any injuries sustained on the same property. She asserts that Stamford Health acted as both her employer and landlord and enjoyed an unfair business advantage over other housing providers in the market through its arrangement with employees who were also tenants. High also asserts that Stamford Health received direct rental payments deducted from the employee payroll and enjoyed other financial advantages through its business of renting apartments to employees. In opposition to the motion to strike, she argues that her CUTPA claim mainly arises out of her landlord-tenant relationship with her employer, rather than the employer-employee relationship and is therefore legally sufficient.
In Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn.App. 660, 670, 613 A.2d 838 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Hart v. Carruthers, 77 Conn.App. 610, 823 A.2d 1284 (2003), the Appellate Court noted that the employer-employee relationship does not fall within the definition of trade or commerce for the purposes of an action under CUTPA. The mere existence of such a relationship, however, does not proscribe a CUTPA claim and the court should consider the defendant's activities outside the employer-employee relationship. Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, supra, 232 Conn. 493-94. In Larsen, a plaintiff employer alleged that the defendant, a former employee, accepted a job with a competing real estate broker and then tortuously interfered with its business relationships with existing clients. In deciding that the trial court should not have set aside the jury verdict for the plaintiff with regard to its CUTPA claim, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's allegations "lie outside the narrow confines of the employer-employee relationship and may constitute a violation of CUTPA . . ." Id., 494.
The allegations of the fourth count, even when viewed in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency, lie outside the narrow confines of the employer-employee relationship. High has failed to allege sufficient facts to show Stamford Health's actions violated public policy as established through statutory or common law, were immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, or caused substantial injury to other consumers in accordance with Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, supra, 275 Conn. 155. Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that CUTPA applies to residential landlord-tenant transactions, High has not alleged facts to support her argument that her landlord-tenant relationship with Stamford Health is the center of her claim. See, e.g., Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983). She has not alleged that Stamford Health violated the public policy of the Landlord Tenant Act, codified at General Statutes § 47a-1 et seq., or any facts to support her allegation that Stamford Health's business of renting apartments to employees constituted an unfair trade practice. Rather, it is the employer-employee relationship that is the center of her claim because the ultimate injury she complains of in count four is the termination of her employment. Thus, "even when unfair acts within trade or commerce are alleged, if the ultimate injury for which redress is sought occurs within the zone of the employment relationship, a claim under CUTPA will not lie." Tanner v. Darly Custom Tech., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 00 0340177 (February 8, 2001) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 415).
For the foregoing reasons, Stamford Health's motion to strike count four of the revised complaint is granted because the plaintiff has failed to assert a claim under CUTPA.
So Ordered.