Opinion
No. 43232.
April 13, 1953.
The Superintendent of Instruction and the Auditor of the St. Louis Board of Education brought an action against said Board of Education to enjoin the payment of workmen's compensation benefits to school employees. The decree dismissing said petition is affirmed. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law permitting a school district to elect to become an employer under said law are not in violation of constitutional provisions against grants of public money.
1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Workmen's Compensation: School District Authorized to Become Employer. Under Secs. 287.030 and 287.090 RSMo 1949 a school district may elect to become an employer under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Schools and School Districts: Workmen's Compensation: Not Grant of Public Funds. According to the weight of authority the payment of workmen's compensation benefits would not be a grant of public funds in violation of Secs. 23 and 25, Art. VI of the Constitution.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Schools and School Districts: Workmen's Compensation: Statutes: Payment of Benefits to School Employees: Statute Not Unconstitutional. Even if a workmen's compensation benefit should be construed as a grant of public money, Sec. 25, Art. VI of the Constitution permits payments of benefits upon disability or death of public school employees. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law permitting a school district to elect to become an employer are constitutional.
Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. David J. Murphy, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Ethan A.H. Shepley and Shepley, Kroeger, Fisse Shepley for (plaintiffs) appellants.
(1) Legislative power is limited by express terms or necessary implication of the Constitution. State ex rel. Heimberger v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri, 268 Mo. 598, 188 S.W. 128; State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 332 Mo. 1229, 61 S.W.2d 750; State ex rel. and to Use of Hughes v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 352 Mo. 715, 179 S.W.2d 77. (2) Missouri constitutional history and judicial constitutional construction dictate that these expenditures will constitute prohibited grants of public moneys to individuals. The power to tax is expressly limited to taxation for public purposes only. Secs. 1, 3, Art. 10, Constitution of 1945. (3) The Constitution prohibits the grant of public moneys to individuals, with certain express exceptions. Sec. 38, Art. 3, Constitution of 1945; Secs. 23, 25, Art. 6, Constitution of 1945. (4) Constitutional provisions providing for public school funds and their expenditure, and statutes enacted thereunder, do not provide moneys nor except for the challenged statute permit expenditures for Workmen's Compensation benefits to respondent Board's employees. Secs. 3, 5, 7, Art. 9, Constitution of 1945; Secs. 161.180-161.300, RSMo 1949; Secs. 161.030, 165.637, 165.077, 165.063, 165.067, 165.040, 165.110, RSMo 1949. (5) Benefits from expenditures of public funds must be direct and immediate to the public and available to all on equal terms. Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045. (6) The history of the express exceptions to the constitutional prohibitions against grants of public moneys to individuals dictates that further exceptions may not be engrafted by judicial construction. Inclusion of express exceptions of related public aids and exclusion of payments for Workmen's Compensation benefits except to employees of the State Highway Department evidences constitutional intent. Secs. 38, 25, Art. 3, Constitution of 1945; Sec. 30, Art. 4, Constitution of 1945. (7) Constitutional amendments have preceded statutory enactment of authorization to make the permissible grants to individuals, except where otherwise permissible under the police power. State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel, 256 Mo. 611, 165 S.W. 1067; Sec. 208.010 et seq., RSMo 1949; State ex rel. Industrial Home for Girls and Pike County Court, 123 Mo. 424, 24 S.W. 750; Secs. 208.040, 209.030, RSMo 1949; State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Siebert, 123 Mo. 424, 24 S.W. 750; Chap. 202, RSMo 1949; Secs. 46, 47, Art. 4, Constitution of 1875; Secs. 208.010, 86.403, 86.480, 86.640, RSMo 1949; Sec. 47 (a), Art. 4, Constitution of 1875; Chap. 169, RSMo 1949. (8) Only the people by constitutional amendment, not the courts by judicial construction, may engraft this further exception upon the constitutional prohibition against grants of public moneys to individuals. State ex rel. Heaven v. Ziegenheim, 14 Mo. 283, 45 S.W. 1099; State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel, 256 Mo. 611, 165 S.W. 1067; State ex rel. St. Louis Police Relief Assn. v. Igoe, 107 S.W.2d 929; Secs. 48 (a), Art. 4, Constitution of 1875; Secs. 86.010, 86.333, 36.320, RSMo 1949. (9) Other jurisdictions with a similar constitutional history have declared such expenditures unconstitutional. State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel, supra; Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485, 139 S.E. 11; Tyler v. Texas Employers Ins. Assn., 288 S.W. 409; McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co., 116 S.W.2d 679; Sec. 59, Art. 3, Vernon's Ann. State Constitution.
Emmet T. Carter and Gerald K. Presberg for (defendants) respondents.
(1) An expenditure of public money is not necessarily barred as being devoted to a "private use" because individuals, as such, may benefit therefrom. State ex rel. v. Seibert, 123 Mo. 424, 24 S.W. 750; State ex rel. v. Pike County, 144 Mo. 275, 45 S.W. 1096; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125, 73 S.W. 623; State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 275 Mo. 636, 205 S.W. 161; State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 313, 240 S.W. 135; Jasper County Farm Bureau v. Jasper County, 315 Mo. 560, 286 S.W. 381; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 1 S.W.2d 1021; State ex rel. v. Kansas City, 319 Mo. 386, 4 S.W.2d 427; Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045; Jennings v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 173, 58 S.W.2d 979; Woodmansee v. Kansas City, 346 Mo. 919, 144 S.W.2d 137; In re Motley v. Callaway County, 347 Mo. 1018, 149 S.W.2d 875. (2) The expenditure of public money to pay Workmen's Compensation benefits to public employees is an expenditure for a "public purpose" within the meaning of the Constitution of Missouri. The primary purpose of Workmen's Compensation Acts is to serve a public need. Wyoming ex rel. McPherren v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 P. 477; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wn. 156, 117 P. 1101. (3) Comparable expenditures of public funds from which public employees derive incidental private benefit have been sustained as expenditures for a "public purpose." Quinlan v. City of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 124, 68 N.E.2d 11; Giannettino v. McGoldrick, 295 N.Y. 208, 66 N.E.2d 57. (4) Most of the appellate courts of other jurisdictions to which the issue has been presented have held that expenditure of public money to pay Workmen's Compensation benefits to public employees does not violate comparable constitutional prohibitions against expenditure of public funds for a private purpose. Clauss v. Board of Education, 30 A.2d 779; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209; City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26; Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 22 A.L.R. 1438; School District No. 1 v. Industrial Commission, 66 Colo. 580, 185 P. 348; City of Atlanta v. Pickins, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99; Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, 183 So. 86; Wood v. Detroit, 188 Mich. 547, 155 N.W. 592; Lewis Clark County v. Industrial Board, 52 Mont. 6, 155 P. 268; Nevada Industrial Comm. v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, 171 P. 511; Porter v. Hopkins, 91 Ohio St. 74, 109 N.E. 629; Opinion of Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Feb. 7, 1950. (5) An expenditure of public funds authorized by the Legislature should not be held to be unlawful on the ground that it is for a "private purpose" unless the violation of the constitutional prohibition is clear and the reason for judicial interference is strong. Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 573, 262 S.W. 379.
Injunction. Plaintiffs-appellants (herein called plaintiffs) are the Superintendent of Instruction and the Auditor, respectively, of the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis (herein called the Board). Defendants-respondents (herein called defendants) are the Board and its Secretary-Treasurer. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their petition. As construction of the state constitution is involved, the appeal is properly here. Sec. 3, Art. V, Cons., 2 V.A.M.S., p. 31.
The Board administers the public school system of the School District of the City of St. Louis, Sec. 165.563. (All statutory chapter and section references are to both RSMo 1949 and V.A.M.S.) The Board appoints the district's officers, agents and employees and fixes their compensation. Sec. 165.580.
It was stipulated that: In 1951, the Board "determined to bring itself under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Missouri, and authorized its Secretary-Treasurer to procure insurance to cover the liability of said Board which will be assumed by it upon the Board's final compliance with the statutory requirements of election to come within said Workmen's Compensation Act * * * and that the said Secretary-Treasurer * * * is presently engaged in taking the necessary steps to procure said liability insurance, and that the Board and its Secretary-Treasurer will, in the immediate future, contract for the purchase of said insurance and expend public funds therefor unless restrained * * *." Plaintiffs' action was to restrain the proposed expenditure. The trial court found for defendants, refused the requested injunction and dismissed the petition.
No constitutional provision expressly authorizes such an expenditure. However, Secs. 287.030 and 287.090 authorize a school district to elect to become an "employer" under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Chap. 287, Secs. 287.010- 287.800.
Plaintiffs first contend that expenditures of public funds for workmen's compensation [777] for public employees would constitute a violation of Sec. 23, Art. VI, Cons., 2 V.A.M.S., p. 356: "No county, city or other political corporation or subdivision of the state shall * * * grant public money or thing of value to or in aid of any corporation, association or individual, except as provided in this Constitution." Plaintiffs also assert that Secs. 287.030 and 287.090 violate Sec. 25, Art. VI, Cons., 2 V.A.M.S., p. 359: "No county, city or other political corporation or subdivision of the state shall be authorized to * * * grant public money or property to any private individual, association or corporation * * *."
The Workmen's Compensation Law is the exercise by the state of its police power. Kemper v. Gluck, 327 Mo. 733, 39 S.W.2d 330. Sec. 287.800 requires that its provisions "shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare." Such a legislative declaration is "entitled to great weight," and we must presume that the statute's purposes are "public purposes." Laret Inv. Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S.W.2d 65, 68[3, 4]. "The fundamental purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Law was, as a matter of public welfare, to place upon industry the losses sustained by workmen and their dependents by reason of injuries and death arising out of and in the course of employment — the theory being that compensation for such losses should be paid by industry rather than to leave the injured employee or his dependents to bear such loss alone. See 71 C.J., Sec. 15, page 242 et seq." Beatty v. Chandeysson Electric Co., 238 Mo. App. 868, 190 S.W.2d 648, 654[11]. (Our italics.)
"All states have provided some kind of coverage of public employments. * * * Missouri excludes public employees unless they are brought under the act by a law or ordinance of the political subdivision. * * * The compulsory or elective character of an act sometimes varies between public and private employment. Broadly, thirty-seven state statutes are compulsory as to some or all public employees. * * *" 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 56.10, p. 816; see also Secs. 56.20-56.35, pp. 816-823. And also, 2 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation, Chap. 10, p. 276.
The weight of authority is that expenditures of public moneys for workmen's compensation for public employees are for public purposes and are not "grants" of public money. See: 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 121, p. 658; Annos., 53 A.L.R. 1290, 1291-1292, 54 A.L.R. 788, 129 A.L.R. 990, 1009; Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 P. 814, 22 A.L.R. 1438; School Dist. No. 1 in City and County of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 66 Colo. 580, 185 P. 348; City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26; City of Atlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99; Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, (La. App.) 183 So. 86; Clauss v. Board of Education, 181 Md. App. 513, 30 A.2d 779; Wood v. Detroit, 188 Mich. 547, 155 N.W. 592, L.R.A. 1916C, 388; Lewis and Clark County v. Industrial Accident Board, 52 Mont. 6, 155 P. 268, L.R.A. 1916D, 628; Nevada Industrial Commission v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, 171 P. 511; Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N.C. 579, 31 S.E.2d 754; Porter v. Hopkins, 91 Ohio St. 74, 109 N.E. 629; Borgnis v. Falk Company, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(NS) 489; City of Milwaukee v. Roth, 185 Wis. 307, 201 N.W. 251. Contra: Tyler v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, (Tex. App.) 288 S.W. 409; Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485, 139 S.E. 11 (as to certain county employees).
Furthermore, Sec. 23, Art. VI, prohibits grants of public money "except as provided in this Constitution." Sec. 25, Art. VI, empowers the legislature to "authorize payments from any public funds into a fund or funds for paying benefits upon retirement, disability or death to persons employed and paid out of any public fund for educational services, and to their beneficiaries or estates." We shall refer to this exception by its popular name, "teachers' pensions."
The "teachers' pensions" provision is a broad authorization for the legislature to provide for payment, out of public school funds, of "benefits" upon the disability or death of public school employees. Certainly, [778] the provision's language does not exclude "benefits" in the form of workmen's compensation. The legislature has provided for certain disability and death "benefits" for the employees of the instant school district. In the "retirement system" for such employees (see Secs. 169.410- 169.540), disability benefits are payable only for total disability, and death benefits are limited to the amount of the employee's "accumulated contributions." Sec. 169.460. Unlike workmen's compensation (see Secs. 287.020 and 287.120), both total disability and death benefits are payable where the disability or death does not result from personal injuries "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment."
The legislature itself has not made mandatory payment for workmen's compensation for the instant school district's employees. But it has unmistakably recognized workmen's compensation as a "benefit upon disability or death" under the "teachers' pensions" provision, and has recognized its own power to either require or to permit this district to pay for workmen's compensation for its employees. Sec. 169.470 provides that the value of amounts paid or payable by the district under "workmen's compensation or similar law if and when the school district shall elect to place itself under or by law is placed under the provisions of any such law * * * shall be offset against and payable in lieu of any benefits payable out of funds provided by the school district" under the "retirement system." Consideration of the "teachers' pensions" provision of the constitution, Secs. 169.470 and 287.030 (authorizing a school district to elect to accept the provisions of the workmen's compensation law) compels this conclusion as to payment of "benefits upon disability or death" of the district's employees: That "benefits" include compensation for disabilities (partial as well as total) and for death resulting from personal injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of public school employment; and that the legislature has authorized the instant Board to provide for such "benefits" in the form of workmen's compensation and to expend public school funds for that purpose.
It follows that if payment for workmen's compensation for the Board's employees is a "grant of public money," the proposed expenditure of public school money is one authorized both by the constitution itself and by legislative action not prohibited by the constitution. See 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 121, p. 658. "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a State Constitution is not a grant of power as is the Constitution of the United States but, as to legislative power, it is only a limitation; and, therefore, except for the limitations imposed thereby, the power of the State Legislature is unlimited and practically absolute." Kansas City v. Fishman, 362 Mo. 352, 241 S.W.2d 377, 379[1, 2]. Those limitations must be "expressed in the Constitution or clearly implied by its provisions." State v. Shelby, 333 Mo. 1036, 64 S.W.2d 269, 271 [2]. A statute will not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional provision. State ex rel. Hughes v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 352 Mo. 715, 179 S.W.2d 77, 80 [3-5]. The presumption of a law's constitutionality (State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, (Mo.) 247 S.W.2d 969, 972[3, 4]) applies to workmen's compensation laws. 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 8, p. 581.
The judgment is affirmed. Van Osdol and Coil, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by LOZIER, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.