Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-532 (JBS).
August 4, 2004
Frank T. Hennessey, Southern State Correctional Facility, Delmont, NJ, Plaintiff pro se.
Donna M. Taylor, Esquire, James T. Dugan, Esquire, Atlantic County Law Department, Atlantic City, NJ, Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION
Plaintiff Frank T. Hennessey, who was a pretrial detainee confined at Atlantic County Justice Facility ("ACJF"), Mays Landing, New Jersey, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff brings this action against the Atlantic County Board of Freeholders, the Atlantic County Department of Public Safety, and Warden Gary Merline.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment filed February 5, 2004, and Plaintiff's response to that motion filed March 4, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment only in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants on February 6, 2003. Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights while he was confined as a pretrial detainee at ACJF from November 2002 to June 2003. Since his initial complaint was filed, Plaintiff was sentenced to the custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections on June 12, 2003, and sent to Southern State Correctional Facility ("SSCF") on June 27, 2003. He was released from custody completely on or about March 23, 2004. Plaintiff has not informed the Court of his new address.
This Court sent a letter to Plaintiff at SSCF on March 25, 2004, granting his request for an enlargement of time in which to file his opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment The letter was returned to the Court, stating Plaintiff is no longer housed at SSCF. The Court entered an Order on April 12, 2004, indicating that the Court has no other address for Plaintiff and noting the attempted correspondence for the record.
A. Plaintiff's Complaint
In his complaint filed February 24, 2003, Hennessey contends that he was housed in inhumane conditions arising out of the extreme overcrowding of ACJF. Hennessey complains that the housing unit in which he was held was originally designed for sixteen inmates, providing sixteen cells and one common area. (Complaint, Statement of Claims at 1.) Hennessey alleges that during his time at ACJF three inmates were confined to each cell and 12-17 inmates also slept on sheets of plastic on the floor of the common area, resulting in more than sixty inmates occupying the unit. (Id.) Hennessey alleges that inmates were allowed recreation time only 2-3 times per week. (Id. at 5.)
The third inmate in each cell was forced to sleep on a sheet of plastic no more than two feet from a toilet. (Id.) Hennessey further alleges that "human beings [are] sleeping so close to a toilet that if one urinates, another's pillow, blanket, and body are sprayed with small amounts of urine which ricochet from the bowl or water." (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that overcrowding problems were exacerbated by inadequate medical treatment and unsanitary upkeep of the unit. He alleges that pre-entry blood and tuberculosis testing is frequently overlooked, new inmates are placed into population without testing, and inmates are routinely denied medical treatment. (Id. at 2.) At the time of the complaint, Hennessey contends that an epidemic existed in the entire unit, resulting in inmates breaking out with very large and painful bumps. On December 5, 2003, this Court received a statement signed by fourteen inmates at ACJF including Hennessey stating that
[W]e contracted Staph Infection(s) and personally witnessed numerous other detainees who also were infected while being housed at the Atlantic Co. Facility in recent years.
Our personal experiences enable us to assure the court that any and all information forwarded in opposition to allegations of extremely overloaded and unsanitary housing conditions which ultimately lead to the infections being contracted by large numbers of detainees are inaccurate and untrue.
(Pl. letter to Judge Donio on December 5, 2003.) Defendants' brief explicitly denies that Plaintiff complained of boils after being transferred to SSCF. (Def. Br. at 21-22.)
However, Defendant's brief also includes medical reports of Hennessey from SSCF where he arrived on June 27, 2003. The reports dated July 9 and 11, 2003, state "inmate has scabbed over lesion behind left ear and new one forming behind right ear" and "multiple boils behind his gluteal and ears, one non-draining behind his right ear and one non-draining with a scab behind his left ear." (Def. Br. Ex. S-24,28.) Hennessey was prescribed Motrin and Floxin, an antimicrobial agent. (Id. at 25,28.) The reports were signed by Judith L. Trout, RN, and Kantiprasad B. Parikh, MD. (Id. at 25,29.) Hennessey claims that he was diagnosed with staph infections and prescribed a different antibiotic after November 4, 2003, which is when the medical report ends. (Pl. Br. at 4.)
Hennessey contends unsanitary conditions are the cause of his and other inmates health problems at ACJF. He claims dust is plainly visible and caked on the unit lights, water sprinkler piping, and stairs at levels between one and three inches. (Statement of Claims at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that floor drainage units back up and flood daily in the common area and some four of the 16 cells. (Pl. Letter of June 7, 2003, at 1.) Plaintiff claims that the flooding in one of the cells was the result of drainage seeping from the first floor bathroom. (Id. at 2.) The detainee assigned to the floor was forced to store his eating utensil and drinking cup two feet from the toilets or inches from the leaking drainage units. (Id.) Though the Court has not received them, Hennessey claims that he is in possession of copies of five fire code violations from July 1998 to December 2002. (Pl. letter to Judge Donio on December 5, 2003; Def. Br. at 10.)
Hennessy further lists among the conditions of which he complains inadequate toilets and showers, inadequate provisions of toilet articles such as toothpaste and toilet paper, and a diet of insufficient quantity and quality to maintain good health. (Statement of Claims at 4, 6, 8.) Hennessey complains that pretrial detainees are charged a $35 per month fee for supplies that ACJF does not provide. (Id. at 8.)
Hennessey contends that each defendant is aware of the conditions and has made deliberate policy decisions to continue them, including deliberately underfunding the facility. (Statement of Claims at 9.) Plaintiff contends these conditions violate his due process rights and the Eighth Amendment. (Id.) He seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
B. Administrative Remedies
Defendants submit with their brief in favor of summary judgment an inmate handbook that outlines procedures for inmates who wish to file grievances. (Def. Br. Ex. E.) Although he admits signing for a packet upon his admission that purportedly contained one, Plaintiff claims ACJF never gave him a handbook. (Pl. Dep. at 26:20-25, 27:1-12.) Plaintiff admits that while at another facility prior to his time at ACJF he had glanced at the handbook and that he was aware of the procedure for filing a grievance. (Id. at 27:24-25, 28:1-2, 62:1-4, 64:16-21.) Plaintiff claims the procedure is not followed by the administration and that ACJF did not distribute the required grievance forms when inmates requested them. (Id. at 64:20-21, 66:16-18.) Plaintiff admits to filing numerous Inmate Request Forms while at ACJF. (Id. at 57:16-20; Def. Br. Ex. D.) None of the requests dealt with anything related to Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims. (Def. Br. Ex. D.) Plaintiff made two requests for toiletries which were both granted. (Id.)
Plaintiff's deposition is contained in Def. Br. Ex. A.
Plaintiff claims that he made several attempts to contact the facility's administration during his time at ACJF concerning his complaints. (Pl. Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff claims to have mailed correspondence to Dennis Levinson, Atlantic County Executive, Warden Merline, and the Atlantic County Department of Public Safety regarding his complaints of overcrowding and conditions of confinement. (Pl. Resp. Ex. C.; Def. Br. at 5; Def. Br. Ex. F.) Certifications of Levinson's secretary, Helen Pearson, and Corrections Lieutenant Steven Murray, who is in charge of investigations at ACJF, indicate that Levinson, Merline, and the Department of Public Safety never received any letters from Mr. Hennessey. (Def. Br. at 5-6; Def. Br. Ex. G; Def. Br. Ex. H.)
C. Procedural History
On March 17, 2003, this Court granted the Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claims sua sponte as frivolous. On that date, this Court also dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's access-to-courts claim. On April 7, 2003, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief, and on November 12, 2003, this Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief for lack of standing. Because the Plaintiff is no longer held at ACJF, he does not have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief.
On August 18, 2003, Plaintiff's amended complaint was entered, allegedly adding Defendants Dennis Levinson, New Jersey Department of Corrections, Prison Health Services, Corrections Medical Care, Inc., and Aramark, Inc. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment entered February 5, 2004, regarding the rest of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
On August 18, 2003, an amended complaint was filed and a self-titled "class action complaint" was annexed to this amended complaint. Also, Plaintiff's letter to Judge Donio on December 5, 2003, includes a request signed by 13 other inmates to be included in the pending suit. Nevertheless, no formal motion for class certification was made and no class has been certified by this court.
The docket reflects service of process was not effected on any of these additional defendants.
None of the defendants purportedly joined in the August 18, 2003, Amended Complaint are included as movants in this motion for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, "[T]he nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-330 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Country Floors v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061-1063 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing district court's grant of summary judgment in a trademark action). However, where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, as Plaintiff does in the present case, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue for summary judgment because Plaintiff has allegedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his § 1983 claim. Plaintiff argues that the administrative remedies were not available to him.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996). Congress's purpose in enacting the PLRA was "primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act . . . many of which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous." Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996). The PLRA provides that no action may be brought with respect to prison conditions unless the prisoner has exhausted available administrative remedies. 42 U.S. § 1997e(a). Specifically, § 1997e(a) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
"[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involved general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendant. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Third Circuit has held that where a prisoner was denied access to the grievance forms necessary to avail himself of administrative remedies, his claim could not be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 529; See also Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A] remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from `utiliz[ing]' is not an `available' remedy under § 1997e(a) . . .") (alterations in original).
Defendants now raise the affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. (Def. Br. at 30.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff was aware of administrative remedies both from his receipt of the prison handbook and his own admissions. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he and other inmates were denied grievance forms. (Pl. Dep. at 64:20-21, 65:2-6, 66:16-18.) Plaintiff also stated that he filed numerous complaints, though he never filled out a formal grievance form. (Id. at 65:9-10.)
In his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not state that he was denied grievance forms but instead relies on his claim that he sent numerous letters to the prison warden, Merline, the Department of Public Safety, and other prison officials. Defendants rely on certified statements from several prison officials that these letters were never received by the warden, the Department of Public Safety, or the Atlantic County Executive.
Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that he filled out numerous Inmate Request Forms. Almost every one of the forms concerns Plaintiff's actions in this case, and every one of Plaintiff's requests was responded to by prison officials. The two times that Plaintiff requested toiletries, the forms indicate that his request was granted. (Def. Br. Ex. D.)
Nevertheless, Plaintiff and Defendant present two different stories, each of which is supported by conflicting evidence. Plaintiff claims prison officials denied the grievance forms to all inmates and that he sent numerous informal complaint letters to the administration, including Warden Merline. Defendants claim there is no evidence that Plaintiff actually sent complaints to prison officials in the letters he claims to have filed. As one example, Plaintiff has submitted a letter (Pl. Resp. Ex. C.) that he claims to have sent to Warden Merline, but Merline's records show that he never received the alleged correspondence. Defendants also submit letters Plaintiff claims to have sent to Levinson, Merline, and the Department of Public Safety. (Def. Br. Ex. F.)
Plaintiff offers more than bare allegations in his deposition because the Court has copies of numerous letters that he claims to have sent. In this motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party; therefore, Plaintiff's "evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [Plaintiff's] favor." Hunt, 526 U.S. at 552. (citations omitted). Although Defendants have submitted certifications by two different prison officials, including Corrections Lieutenant Steven Murray, Defendants have not adequately discharged their burden of persuasion because a justifiable inference could be made that Plaintiff did submit the letters.
Defendants submit three of these letters. (Def. Br. Ex. F.) Plaintiff has submitted numerous letters which are contained in the record.
If Plaintiff's letters were submitted and his statement that inmates were denied grievance forms is true, it is possible that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has not been afforded an "available" grievance remedy with regard to the complaints he placed in the alleged letters. Therefore, this Court should deny summary judgment in favor of Defendants based on their exhaustion claim.
Nevertheless, as noted below, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his deprivation-or-property claim, even if the grievance forms were not "available." See infra pp. 28-31.
C. Due Process Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
Plaintiff claims that the overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, lack of adequate medical care, and insufficient diet at ACJF violated his constitutional rights. A liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from either of two sources: the Due Process Clause itself or State law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). Pretrial detainees retain liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding inmate awaiting sentencing had the same status under the Constitution as a pretrial detainee, and the Due Process Clause protected him).
Analysis of whether a pretrial detainee has been deprived of liberty without due process is governed by the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding that "double bunking" (sleeping two inmates in rooms originally intended for single occupancy), body-cavity searches, room searches, prohibitions against the receipt of packages, and other restrictions did not deprive pretrial detainees of liberty without due process). In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions of confinement, Bell requires inquiry into "whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee." Id. at 535. Not every disability imposed on pretrial detainees is a "punishment" in the constitutional sense because some devices must be employed to effectuate the detention of a person pending trial. Id. at 537. To determine whether conditions of confinement amount to a punishment:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose . . . If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal — if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.Id. at 538-539 (citations omitted). The Court found that "double bunking" did not violate the detainees rights because there is no "`one man, one cell' principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 542. While the facts of Bell did not approach a due process violation, the Court noted that "confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine deprivations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause." Id.
Furthermore, while pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and convicted prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment, pretrial detainees retain at least those constitutional rights with respect to prison conditions as those enjoyed by convicted prisoners. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, n. 16, 545. The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the states from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-345, 347 (1981) (finding "double celling" in question to not be cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
This proscription against cruel and unusual punishments is violated by the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). There is no static test to determine whether conditions are cruel and unusual; "rather, what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is measured by the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The Young court reversed summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff prisoner was forced to spend four days in a dry cell, allowed to leave to defecate only once, allowed to empty his urinal only twice, failed to provide a plastic urinal for his first 29 hours of confinement, and did not allow him to wash his hands before eating.
It is well settled that "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Helling, 509 U.S. at 31. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege both an objective and a subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (reversing Sixth Circuit finding of no cruel and unusual punishment where it did not consider deliberate indifference for subjective component).
A plaintiff may satisfy the objective component of a conditions-of-confinement claim if he can show that the conditions alleged, either alone or in combination, deprive him of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-348 (finding "double celling" is not cruel and unusual and does not satisfy the objective component); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d at 364. However, while the Eighth Amendment directs that convicted prisoners not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. To the extent that certain conditions are only "restrictive" or "harsh," they are merely part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.Id. at 347.
An inmate may fulfill the subjective element of such a claim by demonstrating that prison officials knew of such substandard conditions and "acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to inmate health or safety." Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F.Supp. 193, 198 (D.N.J. 1997);See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305-306 (reversing Appellate Court finding of no subjective element where Appellate Court applied "behavior marked by persistent malicious cruelty" standard instead of deliberate indifference standard.)
Deliberate indifference with respect to the treatment of a pretrial detainee requires proof that the named prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) Recently, the Third Circuit stated that "to survive a summary judgment motion on this issue, the [Plaintiff] `must point to some evidence beyond [his] raw claim that [officials were] deliberately indifferent,' or put another way, some evidence `that [officials] knew or were aware of the risk.'" Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 266 F.3d 186, 192 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Beginning with the "punishment" requirement of Bell, neither party offers a governmental purpose to justify the conditions alleged by the Plaintiff. Defendants submit that the "Plaintiff's pleadings fail to show that any of the challenged conditions were unrelated to a legitimate government purpose." (Def. Br. at 20.) Nevertheless, Defendants do not submit a government purpose either.
Furthermore, Bell held that "double bunking" and various practices to ensure the safety of the detainees were not unconstitutional. Plaintiff here makes claims of triple bunking, including the third detainee being forced to sleep no more than two feet from a toilet, and flooding of drainage units in the common area and one quarter of the living units. Moreover, the detainees in Bell were released within 60 days whereas Plaintiff here spent over seven months at ACJF. Defendants do not deny the factual underpinnings of either of these two claims; therefore, it seems a genuine issue of material fact that these conditions rise to the level that Bell indicated would raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause.
Additionally, Plaintiff seems to raise adequate evidence to meet both requirements to state his claim under the Eighth Amendment with regard to exposure to staph infection and the triple bunking; however, he has not raised adequate evidence with regard to the supervision of inmates and the insufficient diet. Again, Defendants do not refute Plaintiff's claim that one detainee is sleeping less than two feet from a toilet or that detainees are storing eating utensils aside overflowing sewage pipes. Defendants explicitly state that "plaintiff did not complain about boils, staph infection or MRSA" while at SSCF. (Def. Br. at 22.) However, Defendants themselves submit the medical report from SSCF that clearly states that Plaintiff was treated for boils and proscribed an antimicrobial agent just two weeks after arriving at SSCF.
Through Plaintiff's statements about sleeping conditions, the unsanitary drainage, and his and 13 other inmates medical problems, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact that detainees at ACJF were housed in conditions contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the other inmates' conditions of confinement, but he may assert his own and use the other inmates' conditions a demonstrating a pattern of unconstitutional treatment of which a defendant should be aware. While the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, it seems a reasonable jury could construe the alleged conditions at ACJF as failing to provide the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, namely a sanitary shelter that is safe for its inhabitants. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff can meet the objective component necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim with regard to exposure to staph infection and the sanitation of the sleeping accommodation of the third inmate who sleeps on the floor next to the cell's toilet bowl.
However, the objective component necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim is not satisfied with regard to Plaintiff's claim about the safety of the supervision of inmates and the sufficiency of the meals provided. Plaintiff's assertions that one guard is responsible for more than 120 inmates may raise general doubts about the safety of ACJF. Plaintiff, however, admits that he was never involved in an altercation at ACJF that threatened his physical safety. Although Defendants do not deny that one guard, originally intended to supervise 32 inmates, is now sitting in a glass booth with the responsibility of overseeing more than 120 detainees, Plaintiff does not proffer facts from which a reasonable jury could find that he himself has suffered harm from the understaffing; therefore, this aspect of his claim cannot survive summary judgment.
Plaintiff also claims that the diet at ACJF is insufficient; however, Defendants include sample menus signed by Jane Stadick, M.S., R.D., which outline the meal plan beginning in January 2003. (Def. Br. Ex. L.) Defendants also include a dietician's consultation report by Diane West, R.D., but it is dated 1999, which is four years before Plaintiff's complaint. (Def. Br. Ex. M.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims "portions of food fall far short what could legally be considered a suitable or nutritious meal for an adult. While overloading the facility, the staff has apparently failed to update the budget or notify Aramark of what additions would be needed." (Statement of Claims at 6.) Plaintiff further claims that meals are served cold, never warm or hot (Id. at 9.); yet, several of the meals on the sample menus claim to be hot meals.
Aramark is the food service agency contracted to provide food to ACJF and is one of the Defendants joined to the case in Plaintiff's amended complaint filed August 18, 2003.
Defendants include the certification of Kenneth Kellogg, Assistant Food Service Manager at ACJF, who denies Plaintiff's allegations. The only evidence that Plaintiff provides aside from his own certifications is the top to a 4 oz. juice, which he claims shows that inmates are not really receiving the 8 oz. juices for which the menu provides. (Pl. Letter on March 1, 2004, Ex. D.) Whether an inmate receives a 4 oz. portion of juice or an 8 oz. portion is immaterial; supplying a 4 oz. portion could not conceivably enable a reasonable jury to conclude that adequate meals are not being provided. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received food at ACJF, and he quarrels with the size of portions and the temperature of the food. This does not rise to a level of deprivation of a basic human need for food; therefore, this aspect of his claim cannot survive summary judgment.
For Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim to proceed with regard to the staph infection and the third inmate sleeping next to the toilet, Plaintiff must also satisfy the subjective component necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim, and a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff can meet the subjective component. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has provided no proof that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his rights. (Def. Br. at 22.) Plaintiff relies on his claim that he wrote several letters to Warden Merline and the Department of Public Safety detailing the unsanitary conditions at ACJF. Defendants rely on their argument that no notice was given as to the conditions and submit no applicable evidence that any known risks were attended to.
Defendants do submit one satisfactory sanitation inspection report from December 23, 2002 (Def. Br. Ex. N.); however, Plaintiff complains of conditions during his detainment at ACJF from November 2002 to June 2003. As noted above, for purposes of a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed. Because Plaintiff can point to some evidence that Defendants were aware of the risk and Defendants have offered no proof that they attended to those risks, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's complaints.
Plaintiff has adequately met his burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to staph infection and the sanitation of triple bunking a third inmate on the floor inches from a toilet; however, he has not met this burden with regard to the safety of the supervision of inmates and the sufficiency of the meals provided. Therefore, this Court should grant summary judgment for Defendants on this claim only in part, allowing the conditions-of-confinement claim to proceed with regard to exposure to staph infection and the sanitation of sleeping the third inmate on the floor next to the toilet.
D. Access-to-Courts Claim
Plaintiff claims that the inadequate law library at ACJF violated his First Amendment rights. (Statement of Claims at 6; Amended Complaint filed August 18, 2003.) The constitutional right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances.Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). In addition, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law has a corollary requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-414 (1989).See also Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 n. 18 (3d Cir. 1988) (chronicling various constitutional sources of the right of access to the courts).
In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The right of access to the courts is not, however, unlimited. The tools required "are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, a prisoner alleging a violation of his right of access must show that prison officials caused him past or imminent "actual injury" by hindering his efforts to pursue such a claim or defense. Id. at 348-351, 344-355; Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-178 (3d Cir. 1997). A prisoner might show "that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to file even a complaint." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
In describing the scope of services which must be provided by the state to indigent prisoners, the Supreme Court has stated
It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them . . . This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered, for example, in choosing methods to use to provide meaningful access. But the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824-825, clarified on other grounds, Lewis, 518 U.S. Thus, "there is no First Amendment right to subsidized mail or photocopying. [Instead], the inmates must point to evidence of actual or imminent interference with access to courts." Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 183 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff does not allege that he did not have adequate tools at ACJF to attack the conditions of his confinement nor does he demonstrate that he suffered actual injury. In his response to Defendants motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff indicates that the law library at SSCF was hindering his ability to research his conditions of confinement claim. (Pl. Resp. at 6.) However, Plaintiff does not indicate how the library at ACJF was insufficient. Plaintiff admits that he never once attempted to go to the law library while incarcerated at ACJF. (Pl. Dep. at 81:15-82:11.) Moreover, Defendants submit 19 inmate request forms filed by Plaintiff documenting various legal requests, including requests for books the library did not have, various office supplies, photocopying of materials, and the opportunity to make a phone call to the courts. (Def. Br. Ex. D.) ACJF staff responded to each request and where appropriate supplied the necessary documentation or service. Plaintiff was supplied with the constitutionally mandated tools to challenge his conditions of confinement.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could find actual injury suffered by the alleged inadequacies of the law library at ACJF. In addition, Plaintiff has submitted a conditions-of-confinement claim sufficient to survive summary judgment; thus, he has suffered no actual injury with respect to these claims. Even taking all the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was denied materials or suffered harm as a result of the law library and legal services at ACJF. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's access-to-courts claim.
E. Deprivation-of-Property Claim
Plaintiff claims that he and other detainees are being charged $35 per month, but "these unconvicted detainees are not receiving what the fee is intended to cover." (Statement of Claims at 8.) The Third Circuit has recognized that inmates have a property interest in funds held in prison accounts. Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding a program constitutional where prison charged inmates a small fee when they sought medical care and sufficient postdeprivation grievance remedy was available). Inmates are thus entitled to due process with respect to any deprivation of this money. Id.
As noted in Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim above, "prison conditions may amount to cruel and unusual punishment if they cause `unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs . . . [that] deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Tillman v. Lebanon Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 417-418 (3d Cir. 2000); quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Accordingly, if the government detains a person against his will, "it assumes responsibility for satisfying basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety."Tillman, 221 F.3d at 418; citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
In City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983), the Court held that the Constitution did not mandate allocation of costs between the city and the hospital where the hospital sued for the costs of treating a person shot by a police officer. Id. at 245. The Court noted that "[n]othing we say here affects any right a hospital or governmental entity may have to recover from a detainee the costs of medical services provide to him." Id. at 245 n. 7. "The Court thus hinted that so long as treatment was provided, the cost of services might be recovered from the detainee who received the benefit." Tillman, 221 F.3d at 418. Both the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court have thus "anticipated cases where the state would be responsible for ensuring the provision of care, but might seek reimbursement from the party receiving the benefit of the care." Id.
Nevertheless, a violation of due process presumably occurs where care for which inmates have been charged is not provided or basic human needs are not met. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. The rationale for this violation is:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.Id.; cited by Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 174.
In considering a deprivation of property without due process claim, "we look to the private interest, the governmental interest, and the value of the available procedure in safeguarding against an erroneous deprivation." Id. at 421;Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 179; see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Where it is impractical to provide a grievance remedy before taking funds from a prisoner, "due process will be satisfied by a meaningful postdeprivation remedy." Tillman, 221 F.3d at 421; citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981); see also Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 181 (affirming district court finding that postdeprivation grievance remedy was sufficiently adequate to negate inmates' due process claim).
Before Plaintiff's due process claim can survive a motion for summary judgment, there must be genuine issue that no reasonable postdeprivation remedy was available. As noted in the exhaustion analysis above, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the grievance remedy at ACJF was actually an "available" remedy; however, it is important to note than none of Plaintiff's purported correspondences include specific complaints about the $35 fee. Thus, even reading Plaintiff's correspondence to prison officials in the light most favorable to him as the party opposing summary judgment, there is no mention of his assertion that collecting the county's $35 monthly fee amounts to a deprivation of due process.
Although, there is genuine issue as to whether the grievance system at ACJF was actually "available," there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever attempted to avail himself of an administrative remedy with regard to the fee because none of the letters he alleges to have sent contain complaints about the fee. As such, Plaintiff did not even attempt to exhaust all of his administrative remedies with regard to his deprivation of property claim; therefore, this Court must grant Defendants motion for summary judgment on this claim and will dismiss Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the $35 fee due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
F. Defendants' Immunity Claims
Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment claiming that they cannot be held vicariously liable for any individual person's actions and that they are protected by qualified immunity. (Def. Br. at 14-16, 27-29.) The Court finds that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied on the grounds of vicarious liability and qualified immunity.
1. Vicarious Liability
Regarding vicarious liability, Defendants correctly note that they cannot be held liable for the acts of their employees under of a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding relevant policy or custom existed where Prison Health Service turned a blind eye to inadequate practice of denying diabetic inmate insulin during the first 21 hours of his incarceration, resulting in a violation of his constitutional rights); citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Section 1983 basically requires that in order for Defendants to be liable, Plaintiff "must provide evidence that there was a relevant . . . policy or custom and that the policy caused the constitutional violation they allege." Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-584; citing Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Not all state action can be considered a custom or policy. A policy is made "when a decisionmaker posess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict." Natale, 318 F.3d at 584; citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (plurality opinion)). A custom is an act "that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker," but that is "so widespread as to have the force of law." Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (quoting Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 404).
The Third Circuit recognizes three situations where acts may be deemed to be the result of a policy or custom, rendering defendants liable under § 1983:
The first is where the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that policy. The second occurs where no rule has been announced as policy but federal law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself. Finally, a policy or custom may also exist where the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents of the government is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (citations omitted).
There is little evidence in this case that an affirmative policy or custom is the cause of the conditions of confinement and deprivation of property of which Plaintiff complains. However, as noted above, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's complaints about triple celling, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate medical attention. As Plaintiff presents letters allegedly sent to each of the named Defendants, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants were aware of the complaints and chose to ignore them. There is, at least, a genuine dispute of fact about Defendants' knowledge.
Furthermore, placing three inmates in a cell, consistently placing the third just inches from a toilet, and using the unit's common area to house 12-17 more inmates could be considered affirmative acts so widespread as to have the force of law, thereby rendering them customs. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that a policy or custom was in place at ACJF, this Court will deny Defendants motion for summary judgment based on their vicarious liability claim.
2. Qualified Immunity
Regarding qualified immunity, the Defendants claim that their conduct was "objectively legally reasonable" under Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). A claim of qualified immunity for a constitutional violation requires the assessment of two factors. First, does the Complaint state a claim for constitutional violation? Second, if so, are the circumstances such that a reasonable official would have believed that his or her conduct was lawful?
The relevant question in this case is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable official could have believed the alleged unlawful action to be lawful, in light of clearly established law at the time the action was taken. Id. This objective inquiry is to be decided by the court as a matter of law. Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000).
Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers from being tried for actions taken in the course of their duties in an objectively reasonable manner. If the immunity applies, it entitles the officer to be free of the "burdens of litigation."Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). But the immunity is forfeited if an officer's conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997); then the defendant bears the burden of proving that "a reasonable public official would not know that [the] specific conduct violated clearly established rights,"id.; Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636-637).
A claim of qualified immunity on the part of the defendant must undergo a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). First, the court must consider whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. at 201; S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that "[w]hen an individual defendant in a § 1983 action claims s/he is entitled to qualified immunity, `our first task is to assess whether the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish the violation of a constitutional or statutory right at all'") (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)). If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the officer is entitled to immunity.Bennet v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
If, however, "a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The relevant dispositive inquiry in making this determination is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202. If it would have been clear to a reasonable officer what the law required under the facts alleged, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff has satisfied the first factor in the analysis. As noted above, the Complaint alleges a conditions-of-confinement claim sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment with regard to the practice of sleeping a third inmate on the floor next to a toilet and exposure to staph infection; thus, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for constitutional violation. The question, therefore, is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful.
As noted above in the analysis of Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact that detainees at ACJF were housed in conditions contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, and Plaintiff submits evidence that Defendants were aware of the risk through the numerous letters he allegedly sent to prison officials. Furthermore, Defendants do not deny that they are forcing three inmates to sleep in one cell, a third is forced to sleep inches from a toilet, and 12-17 more inmates are forced to sleep on the floor of the common area. It is clear that a reasonable official would understand that a sustained policy of sleeping a person on the floor inches from a toilet is a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
The question is closer with respect to medical treatment and Plaintiff's exposure to staph infection. Although Defendants submit the certification of Director of Nursing Diane Seabock, which outlines some of the medical procedures at ACJF, Defendants also denied Plaintiff's boil outbreak, which is clearly documented by his medical reports from SSCF. Moreover, the practice of sleeping detainees next to toilets and forcing this detainee to store his eating utensils two feet from a toilet or leaking drainage units are affirmative acts which, if true, could have contributed to Plaintiff's health problems. Under these facts, it would be clear to a reasonable official that his actions were unlawful due to exposing a confined person to an elevated and avoidable risk of illness. Because a reasonable official would not have believed that the triple bunking by the toilet and readily preventable exposure to staph infection were constitutionally permissible under the Eighth Amendment, this Court will deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on their qualified immunity claim. The Court expresses no view whether Plaintiff's remaining claims will ultimately be shown to have merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's access-to-courts and deprivation-of-property claims. The Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim insofar as it relates to the practice of sleeping the third inmate on the floor next to the toilet and exposure to staph infection.
The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon Defendants Atlantic County Board of Freeholders, Atlantic County Department of Public Safety, and Warder Gary Merline's motion for summary judgment; and the Court having reviewed the submissions of the parties; and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date; and for good cause shown;IT IS this 4th day of August, 2004, hereby
ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 40-1] shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim with regard to Plaintiff's exposure to staph infection and the sanitation of the sleeping accommodation of the third inmate who sleeps on the floor next to the toilet bowl is DENIED ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim with regard to the safety of the supervision of inmates and the sufficiency of the meals is GRANTED ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's access-to-courts claim is GRANTED ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's deprivation-of-property claim is GRANTED.