Opinion
7:02-CV-27
April 17, 2003.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment of defendant Union Pacific Railroad Co. (U.P.), Filing No. 30. This is an action for race and disability discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (ADA) and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-11101. Plaintiff Richard Heglin (Heglin) alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of race because his wife and children are Hispanic and by reason of disability because he has a psychiatric condition. He further alleges he was subject to a hostile work environment and was retaliated against for filing a discrimination claim.
In support of its motion, U.P. argues that Heglin cannot show that his wife's national origin was related to his allegations of a hostile work environment, that he cannot show a causal link between his filing of a discrimination claim and any retaliation, and that he cannot establish a claim under the ADA or the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act.
On a motion for summary judgment, the question before the court is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(C); Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995). The burden of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
Summary judgment should seldom be granted in discrimination cases. Heaser v. Toro, 247 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2001). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the court's role to decide the merits. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (on motion of summary judgment, district court should not weigh evidence or attempt to determine truth of matter). The court must simply determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact. Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1107 (8th Cir. 2000).
In a Title VII action, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if the evidence, considered in its entirety, creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons for an adverse employment act are pretextual and creates a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision. Bassett, 211 F.3d at 1105 (8th Cir. 2000). The ultimate question of law remains whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. The question is thus whether Heglin's theory is substantiated by evidence from which a jury could find that Heglin was intentionally discriminated against. See id. at 1109. "That question remains and must be determined by a finder of fact making important credibility determinations." Id. The court has reviewed the parties' submissions and finds that Heglin has demonstrated that a genuine dispute of material fact exists which only a jury should decide.
Heglin has similarly shown that issues of fact exist with respect to his hostile environment claim. Heglin must demonstrate unwelcome harassment based on race which is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Bowen v. Missouri Dep't of Soc. Serv., 311 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2002). Heglin has presented evidence that he was subjected to racial comments and slurs. Because the epithets carried clear racial overtones, they permit an inference that racial animus motivated defendant's conduct toward Heglin. Id. The court finds that the evidence demonstrates an issue of fact with respect to whether the cumulative effect of U.P.'s discriminatory actions were sufficiently severe. See id. at 884. Moreover, the fact that certain allegedly hostile remarks fell outside the limitations period is of no consequence. Only a small portion of conduct creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII needs to occur within limitations period for a claim to be timely. Jensen v. Henderson, 315 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2002).
In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Heglin must show that: (1) he is disabled as defined by the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action due to his disability. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999). There is evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of these elements.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Heglin must show that (1) he filed a charge of discrimination; (2) U.P. took adverse action against him; and (3) the adverse action was linked to the filing of the discrimination charge. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2001). Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Heglin, there are genuine issues of material fact on this claim. There are fact issues with respect to whether Heglin can show a causal connection between filing the charge of discrimination and his subsequent termination. See Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting a temporal link between an EEOC charge and adverse action is sufficient to create an inference of retaliation). Because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Heglin's claims, summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment, Filing No. 30, is denied.