Opinion
No. 30823-1-II
Filed March 22, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County. Docket No: 02-2-00538-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/04/2003. Judge signing: Hon. James J. Stonier.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Keith Hisao Hirokawa, Mark Erikson Attorney at Law, 1111 Main St Ste 402, Vancouver, WA 98660-2958.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Patrick Leonard Brock, Attorney at Law, 2305 Trillium Heights, Longview, WA 98632.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Jerry Franklin King, Attorney at Law, 2003 E Evergreen Blvd, Vancouver, WA 98661-4238.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Grant Clark Broer, Broer Passannante PS, 8904 NE Hazel Dell Ave, Vancouver, WA 98665-8020.
Daniel and Carole Heermann own property neighboring a city park in the City of Woodland (City). The Heermanns sued to prevent the City from transferring some park land to the Woodland Swimming Pool and Recreation District (District). The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Heermanns' claims. The Heermanns appeal on various grounds. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2002, after an advertised public hearing, the City Council approved an agreement (Agreement) between the City and the District. Under the Agreement, the City would convey 1.44 acres of Horseshoe Lake Park to the District. The District would use that property, along with other adjacent property, for construction and operation of a 24,000 square foot indoor swimming pool and community center facility costing more than $2,000,000.
The land comprises about 16 percent of the total park.
A private, nonprofit corporation, Woodland Swimming Pool Committee, exerted efforts to secure construction of the pool facility during the seven years leading up to the Agreement.
The Heermanns own real estate adjacent to Horseshoe Lake Park. They are concerned that many of the recreational and public events they attend in the 1.44 acres will be relocated if the District constructs the swimming pool and community center.
In addition to the 1.44 acres in Horseshoe Lake Park, the Agreement included another acre of land (the parcel). Benno and Klazina Dobbe are the purported owners of the parcel, but the Heermanns claim an interest in the property.
In their amended complaint, the Heermanns alleged that a diking district owned the parcel until the 1980s. They claimed that `[i]n 1984, said Diking District released its interest in portions of the property claimed by Defendants Dobbe, but did not convey any of its interest to any identifiable person, creating a confusion as to the ownership of the Dobbe parcel.' Clerk's Papers at 388.
The Dobbes proposed to transfer the parcel to the District as part of the Agreement. Under the Agreement, the City must acquire the parcel before transferring it to the District. Should the City fail to acquire the parcel, the contract ceases to exist.
Asserting their claimed interest, the Heermanns filed a lawsuit alleging that the City violated statutory and state constitutional provisions when it entered into the Agreement. The Heermanns later amended their complaint to include the Dobbes and sought to quiet title to the disputed parcel.
The Heermanns moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Agreement was ultra vires and violated chapter 39.33 RCW. The City moved for summary judgment on all issues except the quiet title action. The trial court denied the Heermanns' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The quiet title action remains outstanding.
The Heermanns appeal.
ANALYSIS Surplus
The Heermanns first contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. They assert that the park property is not `surplus' and the City's declaring it so is arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.
In reviewing the Heermanns' claims, we must first determine which statutes govern the City's transfer of park land to the District. We review questions of law, including statutory construction, de novo. Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wn.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992). We look to the statute's plain language in order to fulfill our obligation and give effect to legislative intent. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). When faced with an unambiguous statute, we derive the legislature's intent from the plain language alone. Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Util. Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994). Finally, when faced with two controlling statutes, we apply the more specific. Waste Mgmt., 123 Wn.2d at 630.
The Heermanns base their argument on chapter 39.33 RCW, entitled `Intergovernmental Disposition of Property.' RCW 39.33.020 reads:
Before disposing of surplus property with an estimated value of more than fifty thousand dollars, the state or a political subdivision shall hold a public hearing in the county where the property or the greatest portion thereof is located. At least ten days but not more than twenty-five days prior to the hearing, there shall be published a public notice of reasonable size in display advertising form, setting forth the date, time, and place of the hearing at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the area where the property is located. A news release pertaining to the hearing shall be disseminated among printed and electronic media in the area where the property is located. If real property is involved, the public notice and news release shall identify the property using a description which can easily be understood by the public. If the surplus is real property, the public notice and news release shall also describe the proposed use of the lands involved. If there is a failure to substantially comply with the procedures set forth in this section, then the sale, transfer, exchange, lease, or other disposal shall be subject to being declared invalid by a court. Any such suit must be brought within one year from the date of the disposal agreement.
The Heermanns argue that the City violated RCW 39.33.020 because the park land does not qualify as `surplus.' Appellant's Br. at 13. The City counters that RCW 35A.11.010 and .020, and not chapter 39.33 RCW, control its actions in transferring the park land to the District.
Moreover, the City asserts that if it is required to do so, it has complied with chapter 39.33 RCW because it gave notice and held public hearings.
RCW 35A.11.010 reads: `Each city governed under this optional municipal code . . . by and through its legislative body, . . . may contract and be contracted with; may purchase, lease, receive, or otherwise acquire real and personal property of every kind, and use, enjoy, hold, lease, control, convey or otherwise dispose of it for the common benefit.' And RCW 35A.11.020 provides, in relevant part:
The legislative body of each code city shall have all powers possible for a city or town to have under the Constitution of this state, and not specifically denied to code cities by law. By way of illustration and not in limitation, such powers may be exercised in regard to the acquisition, sale, ownership, improvement, maintenance, protection, restoration, regulation, use, leasing, disposition, vacation, abandonment or beautification of public ways, real property of all kinds, waterways, structures, or any other improvement or use of real or personal property, in regard to all aspects of collective bargaining as provided for and subject to the provisions of chapter 41.56 RCW, as now or hereafter amended, and in the rendering of local social, cultural, recreational, educational, governmental, or corporate services, including operating and supplying of utilities and municipal services commonly or conveniently rendered by cities or towns.
The City asserts that these statutory sections allow it to transfer park land to the District as it is being done `for the common benefit' under RCW 35A.11.010. Respondent's Br. at 4.
Here, the trial court properly applied RCW 39.33.020 as the more specific statute as it applies to intergovernmental disposition. It provided the following explanation for its decision: As to the substantive determination that the property was surplus, both the statute and post-1981 amendment decisions are silent as to the standard of review, if any.
If judicial scrutiny of the `surplus' decision lies with this Court, such scrutiny is necessarily quite limited. Certainly judicial scrutiny of the legislative decision would not exceed that Marion [sic] Property v. Port Commissioners wherein the Supreme Court limited appellate review only to whether the determination was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Marino Property v. Port Commissioners at 316. Obviously the Court on review will not engage in a de novo determination as to whether the property was surplus. Some decisions are left to the municipal legislative authority with limited court overview. Marino Property v. Port Commissioners at 315. Having considered the procedural history, the stated reasons for Resolution 463 of the City of Woodland, the affidavits and declarations filed by parties and the files and pleading, I find the case does resemble that of Marino Property v. Port Commissioners, supra. . . . In the instant case while the City of Woodland is giving up more than bare legal title, the transfer is to a Parks and Recreation District, with the requirement that the property be used `perpetually' for park and recreation purposes. Consequently, the land is perpetually dedicated to park and recreation purposes serving the City of Woodland. In addition, Resolution 463 obligates the Park and Recreation District to acquire an additional acre of park and open space. While the park and recreation use as open parkland may be changed to park and recreation use as a swimming pool, the general nature of the purpose of the land has not changed. It will remain as park and recreation use property. The City does not need to own the land to maintain the land's dedication to park and recreation use. As in Marino Property v. Port Commissioners, the declaration of surplus is defensible and is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Accordingly, the City of Woodland has statutory authority to transfer the property to Woodland Park and Recreation District, substantially complied with the procedural requirements of RCW 39.33, and did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law in declaring the property to be surplus. The motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 499-500. The trial court's reasoning properly follows Marino Property Company v. Port Commissioners, 97 Wn.2d 307, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982).
In Marino, the Port of Seattle attempted to convey title deeds to the city. 97 Wn.2d at 309. The Port held a public hearing, following which the Port approved a resolution which declared the property in question `surplus.' Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 309. The Port then sought court approval of this declaration under RCW 39.33.010. Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 309. The trial court determined that the property in question was surplus and entered a decree authorizing the transfer. Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 309. Marino appealed, arguing that it had a right to review of the trial court's declaration of `surplus' and that the property was not surplus. Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 310. Our Court held:
Chapter 39.33 RCW was amended in 1981, and now includes the following language: `If there is a failure to substantially comply with the procedures set forth in this section, then the sale, transfer, exchange, lease or other disposal shall be subject to being declared invalid by a court.'
RCW 39.33.020. Because the Heermanns do not appeal the trial court's ruling that the City substantially complied with the notice and hearing requirements set forth in RCW 39.33.020, the amendment does not affect our review.
Marino's claim of a right to appellate review is controlled by In re Bellingham, [ 52 Wn.2d 497, 326 P.2d 741 (1958)], in which we stated no right of appeal exists under the statute. [Bellingham, 52 Wn.2d at 498-99]. . . . We may, however, exercise our inherent power of review to determine if the trial court's determination is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 316. Applying this standard of review, the Court found that because the Port transferred only the bare legal title to the land in question, but retained most of the "indicia of ownership," and because the Port did not need the bare legal title to accomplish its desired use of the property, the bare legal title was surplus. Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 317. Specifically, the Court found, `The Port declared surplus that which it did not need — the bare legal title.' Marino, 97 Wn.2d at 317.
In Marino, the Court held that the Port could secure the same use for the land, regardless of whether it retained the bare legal title. 97 Wn.2d at 317. Here, the trial court found that the City can assure its same use for the land, for parks and recreation, regardless of whether the park remained an open space for sporting events and festivals or whether it became an indoor swimming pool and recreation center. As the Port did in Marino, the City has transferred that which it did not need, ownership of park and recreation property that, according to contract, must remain park and recreation property.
Because the property must be retained for parks and recreation, regardless of ownership, legal ownership of the property is surplus, as it serves no benefit to the City beyond that which the City already enjoys. And even under the arbitrary and capricious standard articulated in Marino, the Heermanns' argument fails.
Article VIII, Section 7
The Heermanns next contend that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on their claims under Article VIII, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. They assert that the City intends eventually to transfer the property to the private Woodland Community Swimming Pool Committee (Committee). The Heermanns' argument is not persuasive.
On appeal, we review a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21, 896 P.2d 665 (1995); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, that is, that reasonable minds could not differ that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). We consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson, 98 Wn.2d at 437. The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).
Article VIII, Section 7 of Washington State Constitution provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
The trial court ruled that `Article VIII, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution does not apply to intergovernmental transfers.' CP at 792. In ruling, the trial court cited Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, 86 Wn. App. 165, 176, 936 P.2d 1148, review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1021 (1997), and explained:
Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that the City of Woodland's intent is to transfer the property to the Swimming Pool and Recreation District in order that it can be subsequently transferred to the Woodland Community Swimming Pool Committee or any private/nongovernmental entity. Other than averments in pleadings, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there exists evidence raising a genuine issue as to a material fact to support their contention that the intent is to eventually transfer the property to a nongovernmental [entity]. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the City of Woodland on the fifth cause of action.
CP at 792.
Mount Spokane involved an allegation that the County `attempted to give its powers and public authority to a group of people with a private agenda and a private purpose, which is prohibited by article VIII, section 7' when it created a public corporation to operate a ski facility. 86 Wn. App. at 176. The court held that the prohibition, designed to prevent public funds from being used to benefit private interests where the public interest is not primarily served, `applies only to loans to private agencies and has no application to a loan of credit to a state agency.' Mount Spokane, 86 Wn. App. at 176.
At the trial court level and on appeal, the Heermanns set forth no evidence that the District intends to transfer the park to a private entity, other than their speculative, bare assertions in their pleadings. The Heermanns cite their attorney's affidavit indicating an intention `to adduce evidence relating to the relationship between the Defendant Woodland Community Swimming Pool Committee, the Woodland Swimming and Recreation District and the City of Woodland in this transfer of Horseshoe Lake Park.' CP at 668. And the Heermanns refer to the City's Resolution 394, which ordered the City Council to instruct City staff and the City attorney to cooperate with the Committee in its efforts as basis for their assertion.
Resolution 394 states that it is `to explore the feasibility of eventually constructing the Lewis River Swimming and Recreational Facilities, to be owned by the Park and Recreation District, and to build the Facilities at the Horseshoe Lake Park and report back to Council for its consideration of whether or not such a facility should be built at this location.' CP at 379.
Contrary to the Heermanns' argument, Resolution 394 denotes the City's intent that the facility remain in District ownership. The Heermanns argue that the City `essentially conceded' that the park land would be eventually transferred to the Committee during argument below. But our review of the record reveals the opposite.
Finally, the Heermanns cite Resolution 463 and an agreement between the City and the District, which reads: `[The] District warrants that with the assistance of the Woodland Swimming Pool Committee it has or can obtain the resources necessary to complete [the project.].' CP at 297. This does not rise above speculation that the District intends to transfer the property to the Committee. It merely shows that the nonprofit Committee intends to cooperate with the District in the development of the pool. The Heermanns' argument fails.
The Heermanns also note that many of the Committee members are District officials.
Full Value
The Heermanns next contend that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the City because factual issues remain as to whether the City transferred the park land for `full value,' as required by chapter 43.09 RCW. Appellant's Br. at 31. Again, we disagree.
RCW 43.09.210 reads, in relevant part:
All service rendered by, or property transferred from, one department, public improvement, undertaking, institution, or public service industry to another, shall be paid for at its true and full value by the department, public improvement, undertaking, institution, or public service industry receiving the same, and no department, public improvement, undertaking, institution, or public service industry shall benefit in any financial manner whatever by an appropriation or fund made for the support of another.
The Heermanns argue that without a property appraisal, it can never be shown that the transfer complied with the `full value' requirement.
The City cites RCW 39.33.060, which reads, in pertinent part:
Any governmental unit . . . may convey its real or personal property . . . to, or contract for the use of such property by, the county or park and recreation district wherein such property is located for park or recreational purposes, by private negotiation and upon such terms and with such consideration as might be mutually agreed to by such governmental unit and the board of county commissioners or the park and recreation district board of commissioners.
The trial court ruled:
As to the issue of full value, RCW 43.09.210 and RCW 39.33.010(1) must be read together and can only be harmonized if `true and full value' is a flexible standard. RCW 39.33.060 gives to the governmental unit the authority to transfer property to a recreational district for recreational purposes for mutually agreed consideration. The plaintiffs have presented no evidence supporting an issue that the City of Woodland acted irrationally or arbitrarily in deciding to convey Horseshoe Lake Park to the Woodland Swimming Pool and Recreation District. The uncontested evidence establishes mutually agreed consideration. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the City of Woodland.
CP at 791-92.
As noted, we construe statutes de novo on review, giving effect to the legislature's intent. Pasco, 119 Wn.2d at 507; Lacey Nursing Ctr., 128 Wn.2d at 53. The legislature enacted RCW 43.09.210 as part of a chapter entitled `Establishing a Uniform System of Public Accounting' in 1909, and has remained unchanged since. 1997 Letter Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 2. As the Attorney General noted in an opinion, when harmonizing RCW 43.09.210 and RCW 39.33.010, the plain language raises some problems:
Opinions from the Attorney General are not binding on our court. Thurston County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Olympia, 151 Wn.2d 171, 177, 86 P.3d 151 (2004). But they are persuasive authority to which we afford great weight. Thurston County, 151 Wn.2d at 177.
If the `full value' requirement in RCW 43.09.210 is applied in its strictest sense, the consequence is to eliminate much of the discretion the Legislature intended to grant governments in RCW 39.33.010. If the transferring governments have no discretion to negotiate over the price of the item transferred, much of the purpose of chapter 39.33 RCW is frustrated.
1997 Letter Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 3. The Attorney General opinion further explained:
RCW 43.09.210 requires governments to conduct their negotiations against the backdrop of the `full value' requirement. This requires representatives of both governments to think about the `value' of the property in question and to address the issue of value in their negotiations. Thus, a transfer of property for no consideration at all, and with no documentation that the parties addressed the issue of value in their negotiations, would not satisfy RCW 43.09.210.
Thus, we conclude that when a government uses the provisions of RCW 39.33.010 to transfer property to another government, the transferring agency is required to negotiate for the receipt of `full value' for the property transferred. `Full value' has a flexible meaning, depending on the nature of the property transferred and the other circumstances of the transaction, and `value' could take forms other than monetary consideration.
1997 Letter Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
The Heermanns assert that such a value discussion could not proceed without an appraisal. But the 1997 Attorney General Letter Opinion makes clear, and the Heermanns concede, that money need not be exchanged for the property to satisfy the `full value' requirement and that the parties may negotiate the meaning of `full value.' 1997 Letter Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 3-4. The Letter Opinion indicates that the `full value' requirement, in this instance, is really a requirement that consideration be paid for the property.
The City argues that the District gave consideration for the property, as the Agreement provides that the District will maintain and operate `an indoor swimming pool and community center comprising more than 24,000 square feet of building area at a capital cost in excess of $2 million dollars.' CP at 297. And the District must make those facilities available to the City at no cost for at least 15 years.
We agree with the City. Given the terms of the Agreement, the District gave substantial consideration and, thus, gave `full value' within the meaning of RCW 43.09.210. Because the amount of value the District `paid' to the City for the property is not a material fact, the trial court properly granted the City summary judgment on the `full value' issue.
Takings and Due Process
The Heermanns next contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their takings and due process claims and further erred in finding that they did not have a property interest in the property transferred by the Agreement. These arguments lack merit.
In their amended complaint, the Heermanns alleged:
8. The properties subject of this lawsuit also include that certain real estate claimed for ownership by Defendants Dobbe. . . .
9. An interest in a portion of the Dobbe property was acquired in 1920 by the Diking District 11 of Cowlitz County, which merged into Diking District 2 of Cowlitz County.
10. In 1984, said Diking District released its interest in portions of the property claimed by Defendants Dobbe, but did not convey any of its interest to any identifiable person, creating a confusion as to the ownership of the Dobbe parcel.
CP at 387-88. Apparently based on this confusion of ownership, the Heermanns argued:
73. As owners of the property in the City of Woodland adjacent to and within the boundaries of the property affected by the subject Agreement, Plaintiffs have legitimate claims to entitlement and protected property interests in the above-mentioned procedures.
74. Defendants' acceptance of the Agreement subject of this appeal fails to comply with the procedural requirements applicable to municipal government agreements and land exchanges, in violation of the Plaintiffs' right to procedural due process of law.
75. Defendants' acceptance of the Agreement subjects Plaintiffs' property to public use, in violation of the procedures protecting the Plaintiffs' right to due process of law.
CP at 396.
The Heermanns sought to quiet title to the parcel, arguing that the Dobbes' agreement to transfer the parcel to the District `will cloud Plaintiffs' [the Heermanns'] title to the same.' CP at 397 (No. 80). They argued that because they own land that the Agreement requires the Dobbes to transfer to the District, the City's actions constitute inverse condemnation.
In deciding the issues before it on summary judgment, the trial court ruled:
As to inverse condemnation, cloud on title, and quieting title the agreement between the City of Woodland and Woodland Swimming Pool and Recreation District obligates the latter to acquire the Dobbe parcel; however, in so doing the agreement does not thereby create a contractual interest in the property on behalf of the City of Woodland. Instead, it merely obligates the Woodland Swimming Pool and Recreation District to acquire this parcel or breach its contract with the City of Woodland. In addition there has been no showing by affidavit or otherwise of physical invasion of the property, damage to the property, or diminished value of the property. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to the claim of inverse condemnation in favor of the City of Woodland.
CP at 794.
The City notes: `Appellants have included a quiet title action in which they claim to have a property interest in a part of the property which the District has contracted with the City to acquire from `the Dobbes.' The City did not seek summary judgment as to that cause of action and it [is] still pending trial.' Respondent's Br. at 12.
Here, the Heermanns' arguments are premised on a property interest in the parcel. But, as the City correctly notes, the quiet title action was not resolved on summary judgment. Absent success in their quiet title action, the Heermanns have no interest in the property. Thus, they lack standing to assert due process, takings, or inverse condemnation claims. See Orion Corp. v. Dep't of Ecology, 103 Wn.2d 441, 455, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) (holding that landowner had standing to assert inverse condemnation, due process, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claims, inter alia), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
Additionally, the Heermanns claim that the City acquired a reversionary interest in the parcel, thereby taking their property without due process or just compensation:
Resolution 463 and the agreement adopted thereunder vest the City with a property interest in the subject property. . . . [T]he City has acquired a reversionary interest in property in which it never had title, without paying just compensation. Rather, upon operation of the reversionary clause, the City will acquire title to [the Heermanns'] property. Appellant's Br. at 36 (citation omitted). Again, this argument is premised on the fact of ownership. And the quiet title action remains outstanding. Thus, we do not address this issue further.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on these claims. 42 U.S.C. 1983
Finally, the Heermanns contend that the trial court erred in finding that they failed to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 1983-1988. This argument is not persuasive.
The trial court ruled:
Plaintiffs' cause of action claiming depravation of their Constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1988, appears to be predicated on the theory that they own or have an interest in the Dobbe's [sic] parcel, and that the City of Woodland callously failed to inquire into the nature of their interest. On its face, the claim presents no 42 U.S.C 1983 et seq. cause of action. Should plaintiffs be successful in quieting title to said parcel, the Woodland Swimming Pool and Recreation District will be required to negotiate with plaintiffs to acquire this property. Although averring that they have been injured in some fashion, the affidavits fail to describe evidence supporting a claim that plaintiffs' property interests have been adversely affected by the proposed agreement. Therefore plaintiffs have presented no evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the 42 U.S.C. 1983-88 cause of action. To the extent that this claim is based on facts related to the inverse condemnation cause of action, it too must be dismissed. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the City of Woodland.
CP at 795.
The Heermanns base their sec.sec. 1983-1988 claims on their takings and due process claims, already addressed. Because the trial court properly granted the City summary judgment in favor of the City on the Heermanns' takings and due process claims, the trial court also properly granted summary judgment on the Heermanns' sec.sec. 1983-1988 claims.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BRIDGEWATER, J., QUINN-BRINTNALL, C.J., concur.