Summary
reversing and ordering a grant of specific performance of a contract
Summary of this case from Sectek Inc. v. DiamondOpinion
44293 Record No. 791009.
March 12, 1982
Present: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Compton, Thompson and Stephenson, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice.
A Trial Court's denial of specific performance of a contract for the sale of land solely because of the changed "personal situation" of a party is error; specific performance granted.
(1) Contracts — Sale of Land — Specific Performance — Granted Within Discretion of Trial Court — Matter of Course for Courts of Equity.
(2) Contracts — Sale of Land — Specific Performance — When Decreed.
(3) Contracts — Sale of Land — Specific Performance — Denial of Solely Because of Changed "Personal Situation" of Aggrieved Party Is Error.
Winston M. Haythe and his wife entered into a "lot reservation agreement" with May Properties, contemplating the construction of a residence on a tract of land in Fairfax County. The couple separated, and in December, 1976, the wife assigned her interest in the property to her husband. In June, 1977, Mr. Haythe contracted with May for the construction of the dwelling. Nine months later, he attempted to assign the contract to a third party. His attempt failed when May refused to agree to the assignment and later plans to resell failed. Settlement was scheduled for April 20, 1978, but was not made because Haythe justifiably refused to close due to certain construction defects and other problems. Another settlement time was scheduled for the following week but confusion arose as to the proper day and time. When Haythe's attorney appeared at the courthouse for closing, he found that May had conveyed the property to a non-bona fide purchaser. The Trial Court found that by this conveyance May had breached his contract with Haythe and ordered May to pay Haythe his deposit and his incidental expenses. Haythe appeals the Trial Court's refusal to grant specific performance.
1. The granting of specific performance is addressed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court. It is not a matter of absolute right. But where the contract sought to be enforced is proved and is in its nature and circumstances unobjectionable, the decreeing of specific performance is as much a matter of course for courts of equity as is the granting of damages for breach of contract by a court of law.
2. When the contract sought to be enforced has been proven by competent and satisfactory evidence, and there is nothing to indicate that its enforcement would be inequitable to a defendant, but would work injury and damage to the other party if it should be refused, then, in the absence of fraud, misapprehension, or mistake, relief should be granted by specific performance.
3. Here, a valid contract existed between the parties, and it was breached. The terms of the contract were fair and clear. There was no evidence that decreeing specific performance would work any hardship on the breaching party. The Trial Court thus erred in denying specific performance solely because of the changed "personal situation" of the purchaser.
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. Hon. James C. Cacheris, judge presiding.
Reversed and remanded.
Haynie S. Trotter (Boothe, Prichard Dudley, on briefs), for appellant.
J. Strouse Campbell; Howard M. Bushman (Herrell, Campbell Lawson; Whitaker and Bushman, on brief), for appellees.
Winston M. Haythe and his wife entered into a "lot reservation agreement" with May Properties, contemplating the construction of a residence on a tract of land in Fairfax County. The couple separated, and, in December, 1976, the wife assigned her interest in the property to Haythe.
In June, 1977, Haythe alone contracted with May for the construction of the dwelling. Completion was scheduled for April, 1978. The contract did not provide that time was of the essence.
Haythe, in March, 1978, attempted to assign the contract to a third party. When May refused to agree to this assignment, Haythe made plans to resell the dwelling the same day he acquired title from May. These plans were never carried out.
May scheduled settlement for April 20. Haythe refused to close at this time due to certain defects in construction and other problems. The trial court found this refusal to be justified. The next week confusion arose as to the day and time of settlement. When Haythe's attorney appeared at the courthouse for closing, he found the property had been conveyed from May to Vatia Albright. The trial court found that by this conveyance May breached his contract with Haythe. Further, the court found that Albright knew of Haythe's contract and was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
Having made the above findings, however, the trial court refused to order specific performance of the contract. Instead, it ordered that Haythe recover the deposit he had paid May and his incidental expenses. The trial court's refusal to grant specific performance was based on its view that Haythe's "personal situation" had changed, since he had divorced and no longer needed the property for his family. Haythe appeals this ruling.
[1-3] The granting of specific performance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Although it is not a matter of absolute right, "where the contract sought to be enforced is proved and is in its nature and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of course for courts of equity to decree specific performance as it is for a court of law to give damages for a breach of it." Pavlock v. Gallop, 207 Va. 989, 995, 154 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1967). See also Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954); Bond v. Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 69 S.E.2d 470 (1952); Walker v. Henderson, 151 Va. 913, 145 S.E. 311 (1928).
When the contract sought to be enforced, has been proven by competent and satisfactory evidence, and there is nothing to indicate that its enforcement would be inequitable to a defendant, but will work injury and damage to the other party if it should be refused, in the absence of fraud, misapprehension, or mistake, relief will be granted by specific enforcement.
First Nat. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 117, 192 S.E. 764, 771 (1937).
In the present case, the trial court determined a valid contract existed between Haythe and May and that May breached the contract by conveying the property to Albright. Furthermore, the terms of the contract are clear and definite and the evidence fails to suggest the presence of fraud, misapprehension, or mistake. Nothing in the evidence indicates that decreeing specific performance would work any hardship or unfairness on May.
The trial court's sole reason for denying specific performance rested upon its finding that Haythe's marriage had ended and the property would therefore not be a home for his family. We are of opinion this was an insufficient basis for denying specific performance and the trial court failed to exercise the sound discretion required of it.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in denying specific performance. The decree of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded with direction that the appellees be ordered to specifically perform the contract.
Reversed and remanded.